The Russian/Afghan War and the U.S. /War on Terrorism: How the Asymmetrical battlefield and the 7th War Fighting Function is critical to continued operations.

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Abstract

This paper examines the Human Terrain System as it applies to generation warfare and the shortfalls of the process. The model outlines a brief history involving insurgencies and the U.S. efforts to counter operations by applying cultural knowledge of the region and analysis of the success and shortfalls of the program. There have been two culturally based counter insurgency systems that have been executed, during Vietnam and during the War on Terrorism, which require additional refining to achieve maximum results. The Human Terrain System utilized during the War on Terrorism ties together the existing political, informational, economic, cultural and military pacification programs to enable success at the tribal level. Previous systems such as the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support System (CORDS) used during Vietnam had success during small scale operations; however, the program was shelved in the aftermath of the war. The successes versus the failure of experiences with both models have made it difficult to evaluate and analyze the shortfalls of each program. The lack of research available and their associated execution within each mission area results in an inability to effectively evaluate the effectiveness of the HTS teams. The need to establish a model for counter insurgency operations, specific to regional conflict, requires more than a military undertaking and could be developed with the Department of Defense as the lead agency.
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List of Terms, Abbreviations, or Symbols

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support System (CORDS)
Counter-Insurgency (COIN)
Department of Defense (DOD)
Human Terrain System (HTS)
Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Special Operations Forces (SOF)
United States (U.S.)
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
United States Ship (USS)
Chapter 1
Introduction

War is inevitable, it has been carried out though the passage of time and history. How battles are fought, won or lost is not a game of chance but a strategic plan which requires more than a soldier and a weapon system. Human Terrain Systems (HTS) were a tool used in the war on terror. How effectively they were used is a matter of debate. However, the sheer number of off shoots of the original Army program is a testament to the fact the U.S. need social scientist in order to mitigate threats and assist military personnel with understanding the cultural intelligence aspect of the battlefield.

The majority of previous battles were viewed as two opposing forces readily identifiable by the wear of uniform, equipment or flags engaging another force. The engagement was force on force action which involved troop movements to engage enemies. Today’s battlefield is viewed by a mired of technological advances in real time. Engagements are not about conquering and restoring a given area, but about establishing governments and ensuring the welfare of civilians in the affected area.

A soldier is trained in weaponry, formations and urban warfare but not in how to establish the human connection or understand why a particular engagement may turn a peaceful community against them. Understandable given the purpose of the soldier but previous wars were missing a key concept that could have prevented some of the military actions though understanding. The HTS brings a unique aspect but also success and failures. The key is to learn from the events and adjust as needed to add another force multiplier to the battlefield toolbox. There are limitless applications for HTS both in the military, civilian and private sector to be successful in a multitude of disciplines.
Chapter 2
Literature Review

History
Russian Afghan and U.S. War on Terror parallels

Successful war fighting is more than bullets and bombs; it is about winning the hearts and minds of the people affected. Previous wars were fought using military tactical applications of the time; without understanding or applying socio-political, economical concepts to the cultural environment. The U.S. War on Terror paralleled the Russian Afghan War in several ways from occupation to the reintegration aspects. Another parallel was the evolving battlefield, where tactics, techniques, and procedures were not the military concepts of operations used in previous conflicts (Bard, 2003). Operations had to adapt due to the changing styles of fighting and the urban environments they encountered. The 7th War Fighting Function using mental aspects of warfare wasn’t implemented with Special Operations or sustainment forces effectively (Magnuson, 2013). This lack of foresight created unintended rifts within the local population and a continuum of setbacks which have led to an extended conflict.

During the Russian Afghan War, the Russian and Afghanistan military fought against the Mujahedeen rebels (Delong, 2004). These insurgents were Muslim fighters who believed in a radical form of Islam. The Russians were a superpower that was well financed, organized, and equipped. They gained the advantage in the early stages of the war since they were fighting against a group of radicals. The Russians conducted their campaigns’ using traditional military organization for both ground and air support. The Mujahedeen did not have the training, organization, or money initially to be able to sustain operations against the larger, more skilled adversary.
The Mujahedeen broke into small groups helping conceal their identities and waged war using sabotage as the main means of fighting (Delong, 2004). Abandoning typical rules of war defined by nations, they had no uniforms and used no particular rules of engagement (Cox, 2011). They targeted both military and civilian objectives without regard to collateral damages. They used any means necessary to meet their combat objectives. Their tactics included poisoning, kidnapping, bombings, and other covert actions which the Russian Army was not prepared to fight (Hudson, 1999).

The Mujahedeen received financial backing and firearms from the U.S. and its allies as the war progressed (Delong, 2004). Those transactions allowed the Mujahedeen to continue fighting however; the increased supplies did not alter the techniques the Mujahedeen used to achieve their objectives (Delong, 2004). Despite the financial backing they received, there were no limitations or threats of discontinued support for any civilian targeting that occurred resulting in loss of life (Delong, 2004).

Over the years, the Russians continued to attempt to gain ground through the domination of key terrain and the Mujahedeen continued to take out targets of interest using whatever means necessary. The Mujahedeen targets included aircraft, power stations, as well as military facilities (Bard, 2003). The Russian Army embarrassed by the lack of progress also began to breach established rules of engagement by targeting civilians. They went so far as to drop bomb laden toys on the countryside that maimed children in an effort to demoralize the civilian population (Noorzay, 2013).

The Russians realized there was no way to defeat the Mujahedeen without suffering severe financial and personal loses (Bard, 2003). A Russian exit strategy was devised and control was slowly transferred to the Afghan Army. The rift that was created by the
Mujahedeen and the Afghan government through the war left the country in a state of destabilization which contributed to its unrest (Bard, 2003). The Mujahedeen were at a tactical disadvantage with the Russian Army and created the environment that was conducive to their operations and eventually their success.

The asymmetrical battlefield is not a new concept. It has been around since wars have been fought with the perceived weaker force gaining the advantage through unconventional means. The operational planning that occurs prior to a conflict is critical. It includes assessing enemy’s strengths and abilities, as well as adjusting strategic and tactical movements to exploit any weaknesses. The Mujahedeen were outnumbered and lacked the equipment the Russian’s had, but they were able to apply tactics and gain advantage through unconventional warfare, which the Russian Army was not trained or prepared to confront.

The asymmetrical battlefield used by the Mujahedeen, using logistical support of the U.S., allowed the Mujahedeen to sustain and ultimately defeat the Russian Army. The Russians failed to use any cultural understanding when applying war fighting strategies and integration with the Afghan Army.

The Russians placed members of the Afghan Army primarily in infantry roles. The Afghan army was a conscript military and the Russians failed to view the lack of motivation and morale within the Afghan rank and did not attempt to integrate them effectively. The Afghan Army members were not fighting for a cause, but were primarily motivated by the paychecks they were receiving.

The lack of foresight led to a change in strategy, where the Russians used Afghan secret police to infiltrate the Mujahedeen to secure intelligence and begin to gain loyalties. The program’s limited success was hampered because some secret police members were also
mujahedeen, able to procure arms and equipment, and gather intelligence about future Russian militarily operations. The Russians withdrew a few years later under the guise of a changed foreign policy, change rather than admit defeat to the Mujahedeen. The U.S. involvement was limited to supplying the Mujahedeen though a covert CIA operation called Operation Cyclone. The U.S. funneled more than three million dollars in money and weapons to the Mujahedeen.

Since there was no U.S. and Mujahedeen direct contact, the U.S. failed to develop of a relationship and eventually a strategic advantage with a future enemy (McFate, 2005). The U.S. support for the Mujahedeen eventually led to the creation of Al-Qaeda which brought the U.S. into Afghanistan eleven years after the Russian Afghan war ended.

The actions of the Russian Afghan war put Afghanistan in a state of civil war were those who had the means to fight and defend gained the advantage (Tillman, 1982). The Mujahedeen joined forces with the Taliban, while others joined Al Qaeda (Tillman, 1982). Terrorist groups flocked to Afghanistan to attend training camps and operate openly due to the civil war, which had no international intervention (Hudson, 1999). These groups operated in both the desert and mountain climates; creating more versatile fighters. Pakistan continued supporting the jihad’s movements through the Taliban and Al Qaeda, which ultimately led to the planning and execution of the 1993 World Trade Center, USS Cole, Kenya and Yemen bombings and eventually the September 11th attacks in the U.S. (Young, 2003). In October 2001, after the September 11th attacks, the U.S. declared a War on Terror and began an air and ground attack in Afghanistan (Lansford, 2009). The Taliban controlled of approximately 90% of Afghanistan at the onset of the war (Delong, 2004).

The U.S. led attacks included 46 other NATO countries that provided support on some level to eradicating the insurgency in the region (Young, 2003). Operation Anaconda pushed the
insurgents towards the mountains bordering Pakistan, while the U.S. and its allies set up operating bases in Kabul (Clarke, 2004). The insurgents utilized hit and run tactics during the Russian Afghan war and continued those tactics during the U.S. occupation (Clark, 2003). The U.S. and NATO forces sustained casualties and were not initially as proficient at fighting an enemy with operating variables that changed depending on the circumstance (Clark, 2003).

The U.S. rules of engagement were not aligned with the guerrilla warfare tactics where civilian casualties and collateral damages could be enormous due to the operating area (Rashid, 2000). The ability of the insurgents to create the most damage using the least amount of resources and limiting the exposure to them created a shift in the battlefield dynamics (Cox, 2011). That shift required U.S and NATO forces to change their tactics to defeat the insurgents measures (Kaye, 2008). That change in tactics and understanding in asymmetrical warfare, allowed the U.S. to gain ground, where the Russians, decades earlier, had been defeated (Sacolick, 2012).

As Operation Anaconda continued, and the insurgents fell back to secondary positions to regroup and recruit more forces (Delong, 2004). The U.S. and NATO forces began to establish reconstruction teams to help transition the country back to local control after the occupation ended (Imre, 2008).

The insurgency resurfaced and between 2003 and 2005. There was an increase in NATO force deaths mainly due to bombings using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) (Hudson, 1999). As U.S. forces used technology designed to help defeat IED’s and different IED’s took their place on the battlefield. The continuum of the asymmetrical battlefield forces changed the rules of engagement and forced creative employment of techniques on the U.S. front (Delong, 2004).
The ability to survive and operate became a game of chance, rather than success of proven military concepts. This type of warfare made it difficult to assign a particular battlefield doctrine, since the enemy had no rules and there were no predictions about the types of attacks, only educated guesses developed after a series of attacks created a pattern (Hudson, 1999). The U.S. was not prepared to defeat the terrorist on foreign soil as they had in the Gulf War (Delong, 2004).

**Asymmetrical Battlefield**

Understanding the asymmetrical battle field and how the U.S. was ill prepared in Afghanistan, requires grasping the evolving changes of warfare based, not on friendly forces capability, but on the enemy and their capabilities (Delong, 2004). Most modern warfare is defined by an asymmetrical battlefield where rules, technology and military concepts are not standard on either side. Troop strengths is a factor but not a pre-determining element of success or failure (Sacolick, 2012).

The inability of the U.S. to understand culture considerations during the Afghan War was a setback that had a ripple effect throughout the country and created several setbacks (Bard, 2003). The war fighting capabilities didn’t consider the cultural aspects as part of the war fighting functions (Sacolick, 2012).

The Afghan people have experienced war and civil unrest for most of its history (Bard, 2003). They also view outsiders as a threat, because of the impact of past occupation forces and the destruction they’ve seen in previous wars. Many Afghans who witnessed the Russian Afghan war are still alive. They were forced to endure the hardships of the civil war for years prior to the U.S. occupation (Bard, 2003). To many of them the threat of violence or limitations of freedom were not factors that worked (Hudson, 1999). The Afghans who reside in the
countryside have the lowest literacy rate in the world, which contributes to them being a safe haven for terrorist training camps (Hudson, 1999). The inability of the U.S. to consider such cultural aspects during the planning of the war may have been a critical element creating more casualties and setbacks. The war fighting functions were executed, but the joint mission didn’t account for Army doctrine to utilize the cultural concerns to achieve regional stabilization (The Human Terrain, n.d.).

The U.S. failure to become involved in the Russian Afghan war could have given some insight into the insurgency and their activities. It would have also helped establish counter insurgency operations, giving the US the ability to interact and train alongside a future enemy. This would have given the U.S. an advantage during the War on Terror, allowing them to understand local doctrine, as well as not being perceived as an occupation with those who had witnessed the Russian Afghan war.

The missed opportunity led to the creation of many insurgents throughout the occupation. COIN operations were not utilized during the War on Terror, at first, even though they already had been proven to be effective on some scale during the War in Vietnam. The name Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS for short, was designed by Robert Komer, a member of the National Security Council under President Johnson in 1966 (Andrade, 2006). Komer thought that the war in Vietnam could only be won if three things were accomplished.

The first task being security, meaning the local population had to be protected from the fighting so they felt safe. If the villagers felt safe and saw that the U.S. was providing the security, they had met the objective of pacification thus preventing the villagers from turning against them.
The second task was to organize both local and military personnel into a command structure that enforced the objectives and limited corruption in local villages by insurgency, by using partnerships with the occupying force. They established partnerships this by making CORDS an operational agency, rather than a labeling them “political advisors”. This provided informational flow to the command, as well as operational abilities integrating the military and civilian planning pieces into a functioning department. In that department no one aspect was more important than the other (Andrade, 2006).

The third task was creating a huge impact. Things had to be done on a large scale to make a significant change to the outcome of the conflict. Establishing CORDS on a small scale wouldn’t matter when the conflict was a regional problem, but it wasn’t (Andrade, 2006).

CORDS had many spin-off programs and were considered a success since the implementation led to a decline in insurgency recruiting in rural areas (Andrade, 2006). This allowed the local population to view the occupying force as a force against the Viet Cong, and not the local villagers, was key to the decline in support to the Viet Cong.

A controversial aspect of CORDS was the Phoenix Program, which used information gathered during the program to neutralize support for the Viet Cong (Andrade, 2006). Even though there was success, the program’s late implementation meant it did not gain enough traction to be considered a successful tactical application to the counter insurgency. The doctrine, though limited in its data collection, did provide a framework for countering insurgency through the application of military and anthropological tasks.

The CORDS program was shelved by the Department of Defense after Vietnam and was not considered during the subsequent conflicts as a viable option for COIN operations until six years after the War on Terror had begun.
Generations of Warfare

There are four generations of warfare encompassing the different types and styles of warfare that have been used over time to explain how the war is to be fought by the U.S. military. The four generations terminology was created by a U.S. team of analysts describing how wars were previously fought and how warfare in the future will evolve based upon previous history.

First generation warfare uses personnel in uniforms and rudimentary formations, such as line and column tactics (Lind, 1989).

An example would be the Civil War, where there were large causalities due to the face to face encounters on the battlefield and little to no cover and concealment methods utilize during major battles. The line and column formations, along with the organized command structure, allowed for better communication towards the end of this generation.

The second generation is marked by a change in technology, where the rifle and tactics such as indirect fire allowed for significant changes on the battlefield (Lind, 1989). The smaller units resulted in fewer mass casualties and the use of cover and concealment introduced the element of surprise.

World War I and II are examples of second generation, where trench warfare and intelligence gathering became part of the defined battle space. Many of the concepts of this generation are still carried out on today’s battlefield, with adjustments made for technology; this generation is not as defined as the first since many concepts are still in use (Lind, 1989).

Third generation warfare is based upon the ability to overcome technological disadvantages though strategy, mostly speed and surprise (Lind, 1989). This generation also has more decision making abilities at lower levels in order to ensure speed and surprise are available
to counter situations on the battlefield. An example would be in Vietnam, where small units, geographically separated from their command, were able to take out targets and make tactical decisions as situations developed.

The fourth generation is characterized by the blurred lines between military and civilians, in war and politics. This warfare is characterized by terrorist tactics, media manipulation, and use of insurgency (Lind, 1989). An example is the U.S. War on Terror, Afghan war where insurgency and terrorist tactics are common and media manipulation, by both sides, allowed a global view of the conflict in order to influence warfare on a national scale.
Chapter 3
Methodology

Methodology used in formulating this thesis was researching previous peer reviewed publications on the subject, publications by subject matter experts in the fields of anthropology, psychology and social engineers, military publications related to the topic and interview with a previous member who had deployed as a member of a Human Terrain System team.

War Fighting Functions

There are six standard war fighting functions recognized among the branches of the U.S. military (The Human Terrain, n.d.). They are tasks and people that are organized to perform certain functions, whose goal in any of the functions is sustainment of their operations.

This is achieved when the objectives are met and the ability to sustain operations, without daily shifts in the environment occurs (The Human Terrain, n.d.). The 7th War Fighting Function is only utilized extensively by the U.S. Army (Sacolick, 2012). It incorporates the information needed to assist in reintegration, of forces in battlefield environments. The lack of training of this aspect may have led to numerous unintentional setbacks during the War on Terror (Sacolick, 2012).

The 1st War fighting Function is movement and maneuver (Army, 2012). This function identifies how forces will be employed to deter conflict and prevail in war. It describes how acquisitions and technology advances effect and the evolving battle space, and may delay war fighting options, because of evolving technology. The doctrine covers joint operations and how the constraints and dominance can be exploited during occupations. This function shows how we are going to get there, what equipment and personnel are needed, and how we are going to set them up once we are in place.
The 2nd War Fighting Function is command and control or Mission Command (Army, 2012). This function develops how the mission will be controlled. Mission Command gives the combatant commander the necessary steps to engage in joint, multination and interagency operations. The primary goal of this function is to apply the operational process of planning, preparing, executing and assessing operations on the battlefield. These aspects allow the commander to process information and intelligence, and then adjust future operations to gain the advantage.

The 3rd War Fighting Function is sustainment (Army, 2012). This takes a three pronged approach to operations, and incorporating logistics, personnel and health services into the function. Personnel are not just the solider fighting the war, but the religious, legal and morale aspects of personal life. The third aspect is health services, defined by those things needed to ensure the solider stays healthy and ready to fight, both physically and mentally.

The 4th War Fighting Function is protection (Army, 2012). This function allows the combatant commander to maximize the combat capabilities of resources and personnel at their disposal. Protection means all aspects, resources, personnel and information, are protected against enemy forces so other aspects of the functions can operate as effectively as possible.

The 5th War Fighting Function is intelligence and utilizes the area of responsibility for the intelligence, as well as the continuous process of collection, processing, evaluation and analysis of information with regard to the enemy and potential hostile forces, and tactics, as well as capabilities, key terrain and civil considerations (Army, 2012).

The 6th War Fighting Function is fires. This incorporates surface to air and ground fires, as well as indirect fires (Army, 2012). This coordination is key during joint operations, where
there is the potential for cross-fire. This aspect is discussed in depth during the planning phase of operations.

**7th War Fighting Function**

The 7th War Fighting Function, which has been used by the U.S. Army for decades, was not implemented by other services during the war (Sacolick, 2012). The function requires Special Operations Forces (SOF) to use a methodology more mentally based, than physical. The ability to utilize the socio-cultural aspects to create village stability and apply psychological operations was not applied evenly during the War on Terror (The Human Terrain, n.d.). This tactic uses a comprehensive approach to regional stability though partnerships, rather than by using brute force (The Human Terrain, n.d.). Coalition forces didn’t decide to create a joint operational doctrine, even though it had been utilized by the Army effectively for several decades, leading to ineffective management of stabilization efforts region wide (Sacolick, 2012).

The 7th War Fighting Function is a program more widely known as the Human Terrain System (HTS) and is a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) program. It employs embedded social scientists to provide combat commanders with an understanding of the region where they are operating.

The HTS was proposed in an academic paper in 2005, discussing the gaps in DOD regarding cultural knowledge, and proposing a change to the way forces were employed during the War on Terror. In 2007, TRADOC deployed five teams as a test of the HTS. The program was successful and became a permanent program in 2010.

The program has had many setbacks, including an anthropologist stating it is unethical for them to inform military commanders about cultural idiosyncrasies that may be used against particular group to gain military advantage. The ethical standards of protecting cultures and the
interests of those groups, has met with several complaints from the Board of Anthropology concerning application of the program.

The program has also been criticized for using social scientists on the battlefield. Complaints, ranging from sexual harassment to investigations into pay anomalies, have plagued the program and created a need for restructuring the system and reporting processes.

There have been some successes. Some anthropologists view the program as progress in military culture, as well. COIN operations are pushing efforts towards the “winning of hearts and minds”, rather than the use of military force, will have direct implications for the military and the areas of occupation, which may save lives and minimize counter insurgency operations during future military conflicts (McFate, 2005).

Civilians are often on the battlefield during the War on Terror. The need to hold the Human Terrain Teams accountable to the same standard as military members seems to be a key component lost during battlefield operations. The HTS is based at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has different teams, operating and providing analysis, support and coordination for the deployment teams located in the forward operating locations.

The teams forward deployed must be trained in the same basic standards as the military they function alongside. They should meet both the physical and mental criteria required for such operations. They should also be familiar with rules of engagement, formations, battle drills, and threat detection.

Incidents will continue to evolve, as wars continue with the teams on the ground, making accountability and standards key components to ensuring success. Training about regional awareness and the employee/employer relationships with TRADOC fail to include operational abilities and limitation of the program (Lamb, 2013). The study finds that commanders thought
that teams were effective and supported the teams continued efforts in deployed roles (Lamb, 2013). The failure of TRADOC not to identify a solid process for implementation and evaluation teams in the field, and adjusting doctrine where necessary, created program setbacks, which could have been avoided with proper training and implementation (McFate & Fondacaro).

In 2008 HTS member Paula Loyd was surveying a village when she was doused with gas and set on fire by a local Afghan villager and she died two months later (Caryl, 2009). The local was caught and detained by military forces and Don Ayala another HTS member. He became so distraught over Loyd’s injuries; he shot the handcuffed Afghan in the head. Ayala was sent back to the U.S. and was tried in federal court on a charge of 2nd degree murder (Caryl, 2009). He was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, sentenced to 5 years’ probation and a fine. The actions of Ayala and the aftermath of the trial, not only put the soldiers involved in the incident in increased danger, but the publicly didn’t win “hearts and minds” (Caryl, 2009).
Applications and Way Ahead

The need to establish and understand the legal and ethical limitations of employing a HTS needs to be addressed and applied globally, not just in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Muslim countries. This would allow the firm execution of the doctrine without bringing additional Congressional oversight after the fact. It could also allow combatant commanders to focus on strategy, rather than worry if a procedure may or may not be legally acceptable. Members of HTS and the military units they are deployed with should have contact and training outside of the battlefield to ensure the successful integration of personnel and establish everyone’s role in the mission.

Former HTS member Dr. Scott Catino during an interview stated “The concept of taking social scientist and anthropologist who were generally speaking unfamiliar and inexperienced with military operations and placing them in a combat environment which was rapidly evolving created a steep learning curve for everyone involved.” Scientists focused on issues relevant to their research and occasionally overlooked the operational needs of the embedded military units which created operation rifts (Catino, 2014). The shades of loyalty regarding insurgencies were more difficult to unveil and work around in Afghanistan due to the many different cultural barriers within their society (Catino, 2014).

TRADOC was in need of social scientists and there was not as much emphasis placed on the recruitment and vetting of individuals for the program since the billets had to be filled quickly in order to meet the timelines for execution for the HTS teams. The initial recruitment of
social scientist and anthropologist had many individuals who were motivated by the money being offered, the opportunity to research in an evolving environment. They came from academic background where they were inexperienced with military and combat environments and had no stake in the military objects. Those aspects combined with the steep learning curve and the inability to provide operationally relevant data occasionally created rifts in the military necessity and the scientific research (McFate & Jackson, 2005).

TRADOC initially created a twelve week training program based out of Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas where area-specific orientation, field research methods and military planning and procedures were taught. An exercise was the culminating event that tested the students’ knowledge and application of the material. The measured outcomes were not as easily assessed due to elements such as unity and effectiveness which prevented the program from adjusting in real time to avoid some of the pitfalls the HTS and Army faced during deployed situations.

Operational unity within the combatant command was difficult to achieve since HTS teams did not collect intelligence the same as their military counter parts (Fattahi, 2007). HTS teams focused intelligence efforts on local populations rather than enemy forces (Fattahi, 2007). This shift in focus for what was applicable to the battlefield created some gaps in intelligence reporting.

Operational effective varied for HTS teams and were more team based rather than program based. The variables made it difficult to gauge where the success and failures were program based or personality driven. The standards were varied across the board which made streamlining the programs operational effectiveness impossible to achieve though a series of attainable goals.
In 2012, the HTS initiated a system where Phase Zero is the earliest and occurs prior to a conflict. This positive tool should not be limited to conflicts, but expand to other regions such as Africa (Chill, 2011). There is can support to begin supporting COIN operations aimed at intelligence gathering of terrorist camps and deterrence of terrorist recruiting and control of tribal warlords. The need to reestablish stability on a large scale is a key component to limiting the capabilities of terrorist cells in a region. Human terrain models could also work with border patrols and narcotic interdictions in South America. Military interdiction is not warranted however; in some areas where locals are engaged in the same activities as gangs and under the same influence that create insurgences in warzones.
Chapter 5
Conclusion

The problem is significant to the field of strategic security, since it reiterates historical compliances experienced in Afghanistan and it also captures the ability of the SOF teams to work within a joint doctrine, and complete the circle created by the conflict experienced within the affected Muslim communities.

The historical data from the Russian Afghan war reveals insurgents, using guerrilla type warfare, led to the Russians losing the war. This is not based upon technology or numbers, but through the ingenuity of the insurgents to attack and use opportunities, even when outnumbered (Magnuson, 2013). The U.S. War on Terror fell upon similar battlefield considerations, where the U.S. significantly outnumbered the insurgents, however sustained large causality numbers through the use of the asymmetrical battlefield. (Delong, 2004). The U.S. was able to develop some technology for counter measures in its response to attacks which already occurred. The technology development was not revolutionary in countering the insurgent’s war fighting techniques creating a larger higher casualty rates.

The 7th War Fighting Function was not developed and trained prior to the on-set of the War on Terror, preventing initial special forces and reconstruction teams from fully understanding the proper reintroduction of the human factor into the society regarding cultures and psychological aspects of that situation (Magnuson, 2013).

The result was a series of setbacks, including civil unrest and withdrawals where the mission to restore order failed due to the lack of the proper foundation.

The research proves doctrine regarding warfare needs to be adjusted to accommodate those areas of the world which have cultural concerns that need to be addressed in a sensitive
matter, no matter what. The asymmetrical battlefields, and previous engagements in the area, are strong indicators of what should be expected during the conflict. Special Operations teams need to be trained for the mental side of those operations, which are just as important as the physical aspects, in order to reach combat objectives quicker and to prevent further loss of life.

The HTS has the potential to be an effective tool for counter insurgency, however, training, continual performance based assessments, and fluid doctrine needs to be implemented in order to merge military and civilian personnel as an effective counter to evolving threat.
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