The Roots of Violent Extremism

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List of Abbreviations

A2R  Alliance for Revival and Rebuilding
AAA  Asbat al Ansar
AAD  Ansar al-dine
ABM  Ansar Bayt Maqdis
AMISOM  African Union Mission to Somalia
AQ   al-Qa’ida
AQAP  al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula
AQI   al-Qa’ida in Iraq
AQIM  al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb
AU   African Union
BINUCA  Bureau Intégré de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en Centrafrique
CAR  Central African Republic
CAST  Conflict Assessment System Tool
CFR  Council on Foreign Relations
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CPA  Center for Preventive Action
CPJP  Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix
CPSK  Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country
FFP  Fund for Peace
FPR  Front Populaire pour le Redressement
FSI  Failed States Index
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GNI  Gross National Income
GSPC  Group for Preaching and Combat
HHM  Hierarchical Holographic Models
HRC  Human Rights Council
IC  Intelligence Community
ICU  Union of Islamic Courts
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IIAG  Ibrahim Index of African Governance
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IS  Islamic State
ISIL  Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
ISIS  Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
ISS  Institute for Security Studies
LRA  Lord’s Resistance Army
N/R  Not rated
NSS  National Security Strategy
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PCR  Protracted Conflict Region
PITF  Political Instability Task Force
PPS  Preventive Priorities Survey
PSC  Protracted Social Conflict
RSS  Republic of South Sudan
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAT</td>
<td>Structured Analytical Techniques</td>
</tr>
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<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somali National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFDR</td>
<td>Union des Forces Democratiques pour le Rassemblement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>VE</td>
<td>Violent extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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Dedication

This is dedicated to my loving wife, Kelly; and children, Trai, Bailey, and Kathleen for your enduring support.
Acknowledgments

I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to my Dissertation Committee for their invaluable guidance and time dedicated to this effort. Doctor Diane Maye, my Dissertation Chair, has been an inspiration for me through my time as a Strategic Security student as I pursued my doctoral studies. Professor Gary Bowser’s encouragement and guidance continue to display unwavering support. Professor Frank Nolan has had an equally important role in my dissertation process, especially as he was the first I discussed my ideas with. Significantly, he taught me how I could crack open the puzzle and embark upon this seemingly daunting project.

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Abstract

The recent waves of mass opposition demonstrations and upheavals in countries historically viewed as politically stable are difficult for intelligence analysts to anticipate. An inability to perform predictive analysis derives from preconceived notions of political stability, reliable allies, and viable markets for foreign investments among intertwined growing economies. Predictive modeling provides analysts with an empirically-based tool for anticipating political, military, socioeconomic, environmental, and opposition activities in countries of interest to assess their performance and effectiveness in managing multi-dimensional issues. Moreover, predictive modeling provides a diagnostic instrument for assessing a country’s governmental performance by applying indicators and subindicators to forecast future trends of political stability.

This research provides a visionary conceptual framework focusing on general categories and subcomponent indicators. The indicators focus on effective governance to provide intelligence and academic analysts with an increased capability to anticipate and forecast preconditions producing global state instabilities. Executing predictive analysis with numerically weighted properties and scoring allows analysts to evaluate potential weaknesses and gaps as required for the purpose of identifying rising countries of concern and the triggering effects of their crises upon neighboring stable countries.

*Keywords:* governmental stability, strategy, violent extremism
Chapter One

Introduction

Today’s wars displace more individuals, as geopolitical competition appears to lead to a less controlled, less predictable unstable environment in which violent extremism may be enable to spawn. Insurgencies cause the collapse of governments, typically as a result of civil war, which leads to instability that may require an external state to intervene to quell the disruption. Furthermore, the recent waves of mass demonstrations and upheavals in countries that were previously stable are difficult for analysts to anticipate. Foreign investments intertwine in growing economies and create political stability, alliances, and viable markets. In many of these countries, following the initial success of mass opposition movements in overthrowing their problematic regimes, new governments are viewed as harbingers of long-term improvement. However, new political leaders prove capable of effectively managing their governments and economies, especially among growing tensions from violent extremism (Sinai, 2014).

Initially, a definition corresponding to the term of “political instability” is required to define the scope of the research question. David Sanders (1981) defines “political instability” as:

The extent to which a political system characterized by ‘unstable’ at any given point in time varies in direct proportion to the extent to which the occurrence or non-occurrence of changes in and challenges to the government, regime or community deviate from the previous system-specific ‘normal’ pattern of regime/government/community changes or challenges; a pattern which will itself vary over time (p. 66).
In 2003, speaking at the Brookings Institute, Condoleezza Rice expressed concern with state failure and fragility. She explained the problem that presents a fundamental challenge to global security in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 era.

The phenomenon of weak and failing states is not new, but the danger they now pose is unparalleled. When people, goods, and information traverse the globe as fast as they do today, transnational threats such as disease or terrorism can inflict damage comparable to the standing armies of nation states. Absent responsible state authority, threats contained within a country’s borders can now melt into the world and wreak untold havoc. (Rice, 2003)

Globalization and the associated interdependence of states mean that the dynamics of state instability have repercussions for neighboring countries and the wider global community, in addition to local communities in weak states. The changing context of the international security architecture and the requirement for an appropriate response were recognized prior to 1992, when the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented the Agenda for Peace, a plan for collective global security. He explained:

Respect for a state’s fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; reality never matched its theory. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.

(Boutros-Ghali, 1992)

Acting to address the sources and symptoms of conflict and war in a globalized world, Boutros-Ghali formalized the nascent doctrine of intervention in sovereign states by
members of the global community. His recommendations provided various forms of intervention appropriate to the post-Cold War environment: preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and post-conflict peacebuilding. In the *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali specifies the use of international military action as a means of restoring international peace and security.

During the 1990s, the political landscape shifted. In 1990, the United Nations (UN) Security Council authorized the use of security forces against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. From 1992 to 1995, the UN Operations in Somalia mandated humanitarian military operations in the country, beset as it was by ethnic cleansing, tribal warfare, and state collapse. Meanwhile, the UN intervened militarily to end wars in Nicaragua (1990), Namibia (1990), El Salvador (1991), Mozambique (1992), Guatemala (1994), and East Timor (1999), among others (Yamin, 2011).

With reference to the threat posed by weak, fragile, and failing states, the UN report made the following observation in unequivocal terms:

In an interdependent world, in which security depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities, the existence of fragile states, failing states, states that through weakness or ill-will harbor those dangerous to others, or states that can only maintain internal order by means of gross human rights violations, can constitute a risk to people everywhere (United Nations, 2001)

Within the report, a consensus derives preventive measures involving the consent of, and collaborative engagement with, governments, and coercive reactive measures against states, inclusive of international sanctions, prosecution, as well as military intervention.

Since 9/11, the US National Security Strategy continues to emphasize the desire
to intervene in “failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that become safe havens for terrorists” in collaboration with ally states. The US National Security Strategy (2015) states a commitment to engaging in weak and failing states perceived as breeding grounds of conflict and threats to regional and global security:

Power is shifting below and beyond the nation-state. Governments once able to operate with few checks and balances are increasingly expected to be more accountable to sub-state and non-state actors. They are contending with citizens enabled by technology, youth as a majority in many societies, and a growing middle class with higher expectations for governance and economic opportunity. While mostly positive, these trends can foster violent non-state actors and instability especially in fragile states where governance is weak or has broken down or invite backlash by authoritarian regimes determined to preserve the power of the state (p. 4).

Globally the power of governments is weakening with the rise of the middle class moving beyond basic needs, and craving transparency and accountability. While the middle class places increasing demands on their government, they become more restless (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). If fragile states fail to address issues of accountability, it is unlikely that peace agreements sustain. Competition between powerful states increasingly lends a regional or international color to civil wars, rendering their resolution more complex (Guehenno, 2015). Thus, the world observes a resurgence of nationalism with governments displaying short-term national agendas, shifting toward populist behavior while appealing to legitimacy (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015).
High tensions between businesses and politics are able to portray themselves as regionally aligned economies joined under a common premise. For businesses to thrive, they must demonstrate the flexibility to move talent and capital freely, without impediment across borders. As nationalism increases throughout the world, the two are at odds as multinational businesses become less capable of surviving within localized politics. Furthermore, there is a significant increase in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) globally of medium to high-risk countries throughout the world (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015).

Wars and instability are becoming more geographically concentrated (Guehenno, 2015). In today’s fragile states, political risks increase in a variety of ways because of coups d’état, security crises, cessations of political dynasties, and less predictable environments. Now, a situation exists where historically safe areas are less safe and their economies are less predictable. With the proliferation of technology, organized criminal groups and terrorists display increased capabilities, which are different from the ways non-state actors retain and project power throughout the world (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015).

Previously, crises erupted in every corner of the globe. In the coming year, there will be a series of crises triggered by faulty elections, economic mismanagement and corruption, and succession issues (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). These factors exacerbate regional competition will lead to a less controlled and predictable world. Many analysts doubt whether there are effective early warning mechanisms in the event of military actions.
Meanwhile, violent extremism is growing in regions and numbers, often reinforcing itself, while creating brutal terrorist acts and national security threats. In this situation, it is important to recognize that defense mechanisms are minimal in their ability to defeat the efforts of international terrorist organizations to recruit large numbers from global disenfranchised youth populations. Many of these issues derive from a lack of a government’s ability to provide for the targeted youth population (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015).

The international community continues to accept imperfect peace processes that accompany failed transitions. In turn, many intervening governments arrive too late, offer too little, and exit swiftly, as displayed in many African countries. In a failing global society, weak, corrupt states set the stage for internal wars with external enablers displaying a lack of capacity leaving their political will open to question (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). The resolution of fragile states’ systems takes time. The World Bank Development Report (2011) said it takes 17 years on average to navigate from war to a peace agreement that includes sustainable institutions and order. In 20 of the fastest-moving countries it took an average of 17 years to draw the military out of politics, 20 years to achieve functioning bureaucratic quality, and 27 years to bring corruption under reasonable control (World Bank, 2011).

In 2014, Islamic fundamentalist groups remained a persistent and growing threat. The Islamic State and their peripheries in the Sinai and North Africa, Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabab in Somalia and Kenya, and al-Qaeda franchises are destabilizing governments, killing civilians, and radicalizing local populations (Guehenno, 2015). These groups seek to control territory, blending brutal tactics with astute political or
social outreach. Moreover, some of these groups present alternatives to a corrupt and unjust state, by providing essential goods and services, mainly security and justice, when a government fails to provide for its citizens (Guehenno, 2015).

There are several analytical techniques for predicting potential outcomes relative to political instability. Using these techniques, intelligence organizations evaluate the most dangerous or the most violent course of action (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). Few lenses give insight into potential problems than may give rise to conflicts that are not usual in the determination of a country’s normalcy. Therefore, intelligence analysts should focus on where the greatest sense of deadly violence and impact is by using predictive analysis, under the auspices of the national interest, of violence arising from instability and a state’s fragility. Thus, it is a matter of what a nation needs to do to mitigate risks in these environments, and the cost of doing so?

Most of the conflicts are internal conflicts. Intervening nations are always grappling with the question of how to reconcile sovereignty with the requirement for international intervention when standards of human rights and awareness of the responsibility to protect are rising. Thus, there is not an effective way of resolving this dilemma.

One of the challenges of global governance is the lack of maturity and diplomatic space to handle global crises in the forums of the G-20 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). There is also the problem exists of major powers who veto actions by the UN that would provide legitimacy for resolving these situations, resulting in a gridlock of local conflicts festering and tensions increasing. Intervening states continue to enter conflicts
late and have to contend with resolving a complex situation. Local crises then diminish on the global stage because there is not a will to act.

**Research Question**

The dissertation is designed to study the following research question: which characteristics of a state predict internal instability leading to violent extremism? The present study examines two principal introductory questions leading to defining the research question about violent extremism.

Political instability is a comparative concept, comparing relative degrees of instability of system \(A\) and system \(B\) in the same period. Providing this definition of ‘unstable’ *within a given point of time* enables the ability to assess the degree of instability of a number of political systems month by month. For discerning *changes in and challenges to the government, regime or community*, an initial equation about regime change by Sanders (1981) is depicted in figure 1:

![Figure 1: Regime change formula](image)

**Regime change** \((i_j) = (\text{changes in norms} \times 2) + \text{changes in party system} + \text{changes in military status}**

Figure 1: The regime change formula reflects change in the \(i\)th country in the \(j\)th month, reflecting a change in stability within a country. Adapted from *Patterns of Instability*, by D. Sanders, 1981, The Macmillan Press, p. 70.

The variables reflect the regime change in \(i\)th country in the \(j\)th month, which produces a maximum regime change score of 10 for any given country-month, and a minimum value of zero. Indicators of change are violent challenges such as riots, political attacks, deaths from political violence and unsuccessful irregular transfers, and peaceful challenges such as demonstrations and political strikes (Sanders, 1981). By addressing *deviates from the*
previous system-specific ‘normal’ pattern of regime/government/community changes or challenges, the definition addresses the frequency approach based on a universally applicable normal pattern established when there is not a destabilizing event within a particular system.

The second basic sub-question asks: what are the primary sources of cross-national variations in the incidence of political instability? Some of the suggested dimensions of change and challenge are relative to a regime, government, and community changes whether the challenges are violent or peaceful. Within these dimensions, it makes sense to consider concepts of legitimacy and the relative necessity of coercion as explanatory factors in the genesis of internal war. Gurr (1968) views all violent behaviors as the consequences of relative deprivation, which exists whenever there is a void between value expectations and perceived value capabilities. Societal frustrations expressed as grievances are the source of all destabilizing and violent political behavior. Meanwhile, Huntington (1968) argues that the effects of mobility opportunities, political participation, and institutionalization mediate the effects of social frustration. The presupposition is that if deprivation and frustration are the fundamental cause of violent political behavior, then the participants in violent political events are relatively deprived and more frustrated than non-participants.

This study refers to the following causative factors in determining the capability of states to effectively overcome various internal and external pressure points threatening them:

1. Protracted region conflict—regional conflicts encroaching upon the state, leading to instability
2. Protracted social conflict—political participation through competitive elections, consensual constitution and rule of law, civil and human rights, and civil society institutions, environmental health, food, energy and medical supplies, transportation system, and emergency response capability to disasters

3. Government capacity—political leadership, organizational/bureaucratic, internal security, legitimacy, and judiciary

4. Dwindling economic conditions—economic development and growth, income parity, quality education and high literacy, and low level of human brain flight

5. Opposition conditions—ethnic, religious and sectarian integration, low levels of dissatisfaction and dissent, absence of insurgent activities, and peaceful relations with neighboring states

**Purpose Statement**

The primary reason for government failure is their inability to resolve socioeconomic, political, and other pressures in their societies by establishing consensual frameworks to address issues of concern to disaffected citizenry. These measures include addressing internal stability through consensual law and order, increased opportunities for employment and economic prosperity, transparent legal systems, valid political participation and political competition, religious tolerance, and freedom of speech and media, all of which constitute crucial preconditions for transforming societies into viable, stable, and prosperous modern states.

This research discusses a conceptual framework that focuses on general categories and their subcomponent indicators and constitutes effective governance to provide intelligence analysts with an opportunity to anticipate the preconditions that produce
global state instabilities. Performing predictive analysis with weighted properties and scored to evaluate potential weaknesses and gaps requires identifying new countries of concern and what the triggering effects of their crises may be upon neighboring stable countries.

**Research Methodologies**

Simply stated, qualitative analysis is a means of exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem (Creswell, 2009). While the methodologies to assess state instability, fragility, and failure are well established, this methodology focuses on the indices of state stability and effectiveness as indicators of the injection of violent extremism. The altered focus supports a precipitous decomposition in significant ratios of stable states, particularly those that affect our globalized and interconnected economic system, triggering a cascade of catastrophic systemic disruptions throughout the world. Using predictive models of state indices of fragility, researchers begin to narrow the focus on where violent extremism spawns to create a regional conflict.

Four instrumental cases are studied with this research methodology. An instrumental case study applies concerns associated with political stability to increase understanding of successful measures of performance relating to the components of global security (Creswell, 2013). Through the use of indices, Somalia, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic are identified as failing states in Africa. To narrow the focus of the research, the continent of Africa was selected because violent extremism spreads from the Middle East and other regions of the world to countries in Africa that may support the training of extremist organizations for projected global or regional attacks.
Out of these three states, only Somalia shows the injection of violent extremism and that is through al-Shabaab. Based on a comparison of the characteristics of the three states, a conclusion may point to where the exploitation of the seam of causative factors supports the injection of extremism.

Additionally, a state considered non-fragile is Nigeria. Nigeria attempts to counter the threats of Boko Haram while maintaining some resemblance of governance and legitimacy. The goal of reviewing various mediums and interpretations of data supports the researcher in obtaining consistent patterns existing to create a recommendation of measures of performance supporting national interests and global security. Predictive modeling provides analysts with an empirically-based tool for examining the political, military, socioeconomic, environmental, and opposition activity that constitute the geopolitical makeup of countries of interest to assess their performance and effectiveness in managing multi-dimensional issues and pressures.

Five chapters provide the structure of the dissertation. The first three chapters present the context of the research and identify a plan for a methodological, predictive inquiry. Specifically, Chapter 1: *Introduction* identifies the research question and outlines the structure of the dissertation. Chapter 2: *Literature Review* identifies the essential characteristics of the conceptual evolution of the modern Western normative model of the state, in tracing its relationship to the contemporary paradigm of the failed state. Then, the chapter presents a review of the literature that includes various strands of contemporary Western discourse on weak, failing, and fragile states. The study draws upon relevant US foreign policy and multilateral policy documents, together with scholarly qualitative and quantitative literature on the subject, and assesses the
predominant methodological approaches that investigate the problem. Intertwined in the review are ideas of violent extremism relating to destabilizing global stability. Moreover, the review examines classical theories of political instability while examining the paradigmatic shifts in Western thinking on the problem of state failure in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 landscape and its impact on policy formulation. Thus, Chapter 2 contributes to the salient literature on failed states by demonstrating the need for an alternative diagnostic framework with implications for theory, research, practice, policy, and teaching.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology, describes the aims of the research, defines the problem and presents the hypothesis statement. It articulates the framework of the research design and tests the hypothesis with predictive formulas to support quantitative analysis in Chapter 4. Finally, it sheds light on the strengths and limitations of the research methodology. Supporting predictive analysis and mathematical modeling model individual behavior, yet provide standards act of organizations, governmental institutions, or other actors (Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002). Through the use of mathematical modeling, researchers identify a precise means of discussing a problem and determining what factors are to be considered. In addition, this form of modeling allows the researcher to derive new relations in a medium that is an elegant and practical mode of communicating certain ideas (Myers, & Oliver, 2002). The strength of the research lies in methodological triangulation to confirm the validity of theoretical propositions and findings. The research design relies on several methods to analyze its results, including a literature review, discourse analysis, mathematical modeling, and grounded theory. A greater diversity of perspectives from both regions is more meaningful in informing
theory, and particularly in assessing global multilateral interventions in weak, failing, and fragile states.

Chapter 4: *Data Analysis and Discussion* provides qualitative and quantitative analysis that identifies predictive indicators of political instability. Through the use of predictive models and structured analytical techniques, the chapter provides intelligence analysts with a medium for predicting future instabilities to counter the new dawn.

Reflecting on the information provided in Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4: *Data Analysis and Discussion* explores theoretical constructs to build a comprehensive conflict analysis framework to analyze three conditions: state fragility, failure, and collapse.

Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by associating key findings of the research with implications for theory, research, practice, policy and teaching. This section provides policy recommendations for multilateral conflict resolution processes in response to state weakness, fragility, failure, and collapse, and integrates the findings of the research discussed in Chapters 2 through 4.
Chapter Two

Literature Review

Defining different mediums with which to explore global violent extremism in volatile countries requires exhaustive research that supports the analytical question. The research question is: which characteristics of a state predict internal instability leading to violent extremism? The following subcategories derive an understanding of causative factors which assists the development of timely theories and scientific research methodologies in response to the research question supporting an analyst’s predictive modeling. This chapter provides a review of the academic literature on state fragility and violent extremism. The chapter is subdivided in the following six comprehensive sections to support the review: violent extremism, contemporary ideologies, government capacity, dwindling economic conditions, and research methodologies.

The first section reviewed is violent extremism, which provides the constant in predictive modeling relevant to causative factors of state fragility. Violent extremism continues to erupt globally to usurp traditional governance and military power projection. Many authors focus on internal or regional factors leading to regime change that correlate information associated with Al-Qa’ida or the Islamic State, whereas supportive factors of violent extremism erupting within a defined country have yet to be addressed. By understanding various emotional philosophies provided by Osama bin Laden and other writers in Islamic extremist periodicals, the analyst can understand the reasoning that drives individuals to attempt to counter the projected narrative.

Next, the survey of contemporary theologies supports an understanding of what previous writers propose during their research analysis of domestic and civil strife, and
elements of ethnic instability. Classical literature describes the state’s responsibility to provide their constituents that counters or denies the ability of violent extremism or an opposition to exploit derived weaknesses. Meanwhile, some models focus on a non-psychologically oriented causal analysis of political violence and its role in supporting instability.

In the government capacity section, functions of a state and the search for ideal attributes are subjects of epistemological inquiry. The theoretical concern with ideal statehood is evident in Classical philosophers such as Socrates recollected by Plato in *Crito* (trans. 2015) and *Republic* (trans. 2015), and Aristotle in *Politics* (trans. 2015). Throughout the sub-section various authors describe their ideals of the state’s responsibilities from the Socratic principles down to contemporary thought. Finally, to test competing governmental capacity hypotheses, Hibbs provides a number of indicators of a regime’s coercive capacity. The focus of this section is to determine what literature defines characteristics of the state, which, if provided, forestall the injection of violent extremism into a given society.

Because one of the associated assumptions is about potential grievances between the “haves” and the “have nots,” a conscious decision was made to discern the nexus supporting the injection of violent extremism if a state cannot provide financial stability for its citizens. In the subsection, various authors propose causative economic factors supporting instability. Rapid economic change frequently produces severe social instability, conflict, and the potential for revolution.

The final section is a review of various qualitative and quantitative metrics supporting variables injected into the proposed framework to allow analysts an
opportunity for predictive modeling from a foundations approach. By understanding other models, the analysts apply the information in their analysis to drivers associated with the injection of violent extremism in a weak or fragile society. The indices supporting an exhaustive study are nested in national security interests supporting power projection of US assets defined in the National Security Strategy.

**Violent Extremism**

The purpose of this subsection is to identify what extremists’ beliefs and goals are in conducting their attacks as a way of usurping government systems. A cursory review of the literature shows the ideas and principles of violent extremists and some of their leaders. Through reviewing information that they publicize, Western cognitive and organizational biases dissipate to provide a clearer understanding of the authors’ perspective to define the “why” associated with the increase in violent extremist attacks that have countered diplomacy over the past decade.

Adam Yahiye Gadahn (2014) comments in *Resurgence* that it is time for Islamic fundamentalists to “fight fire with fire” by striking at the heart and lifeblood of the Western economy. From a violent extremist perspective, Western powers have invaded their countries, stolen their resources, and violated their independence. This focus on attacking Western interests creates the requirement to define a medium for predictive analysis to counter extremists’ desires to dismantle governments.

Violent extremism is not a new phenomenon, yet it gains strength whenever high stress affects Arab or other Muslim societies (Hashim, 2001). The passionate desire to affect changes within a society provides mounting pressure to create change compatible with the belief system proclaimed by extremists as a counter narrative to traditional,
Western diplomacy.

Many violent extremists follow a Salafist way of life, which serves as guiding principles of reform when a fragile country adopts Western diplomacy. Salafism is a reformist movement aiming to return Muslims to a pure form of Islam that includes government by Shari’a law. Brachman (2009) delineates several sects of Salafists with varying degrees of Islamic ideology. Interestingly, none of these factions agrees on the specifics of implementing Islamic governance, therefore there is often criticism and strife among them.

Through his research, Brachman proposes five pillars that Salafi-extremists use to delineate actions and behaviors of individuals in their groups, which differ from the Five Pillars of Islam. The extremist five pillars create an environment conducive to extremist actions and set the conditions for exploiting gaps in a states’ ability to provide for its constituents. They are al-wala wal-barah (Loyalty and Disavowal); tawhid (Unity of God); aqidah (Creed); takfir (Excommunication), and jihad (Struggling) (Brachman, 2009). The most important principle for Salafi fundamentalists is the pillar of al-wala wal-barah, or “loving and hating for the sake of Allah” as the “central doctrine” for followers of fundamentalist ideology (Brachman, 2009; bin Laden, 2012).

Western minds find it difficult to grasp the importance of the violent extremist’s reliance on the ummah (Muslim people) to expand the extremist culture to counter Western interests supporting diplomacy. This concept of an Islam united against the West relates to the strength of radical Islam (Ryan, 2013). Despite the continued threat to the West, the al-Qa’ida core has grown weaker as an organization since the 9/11 attacks. Pressure from the West and their allies disrupt communications and make operations
more difficult, yet not impossible (Crenshaw, 2010). Despite these weaknesses, al-Qa’ida’s operational strength is flexibility. The independent nature of al-Qa’ida allows the organization to maintain the momentum by providing philosophical direction for its affiliates to achieve lethal attacks on civilian targets (Crenshaw, 2010).

Al-Qa’ida established the initial framework supporting violent extremism. Mary Habeck (2009) explains al-Qa’ida’s grand strategy as commencing with a period of ideological recruitment and warfare preparation. After these initial conditions are established, attacks begin on Western forces and “apostate rulers” in Muslim countries. Eventually, Shari’a law is introduced, forcing central governments to engage in a “protracted guerilla war” with extremists, as is currently seen in places like Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen. After some time, al-Qa’ida establishes institutions across broad swaths of land, replacing existing governments and unifying its member groups. The establishment of the Caliphate leads to an “all-out war against the unbelievers until the end of time” (Gambhir, 2014). Over the past decade, extremist organizations like al-Qa’ida have expanded their dominance by targeting weak diplomatic states that support Western diplomacy.

Over the past two decades, Islamists have sought to explain the causes of the political, socioeconomic, and identity-related crises of their societies and the Islamic world in order to provide solutions to them. Consequently, bin Laden drew many of his ideas from such Islamists, in particular, the Egyptian Muhammad Abdel Salam Al-Farag who was not an original thinker himself, and more famous scholars offer a deeper understanding of the philosophical wellsprings of violent extremism (Hashim, 2001). Al-Farag is important because he wrote a manifesto of action for violent extremism.
Two key epistles define the philosophical underpinnings of bin Laden’s opposition to America. One is the “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” issued on 23 August 1996 (Declaration of War). The focus of bin Laden’s anger here was the continued American “occupation” of the land of the holy places. The period represents a presence that the al-Sauds permitted at a time when their country suffered from economic distress and demoralization.

Everyone [has] agreed that the situation cannot be rectified... unless the root of the problem is tackled. Hence, it is essential to hit the main enemy who divided the Umma into small and little countries and pushed it, for the last few decades, into a state of confusion. The Zionist-Crusader alliance moves quickly to contain and abort any “corrective movement” appearing in the Islamic countries. (Declaration of War, 1996, p. 22)

Moreover, on 22 February 1998, an edict over bin Laden’s signature was published in the Arabic-language paper al-Quds al-Arabi entitled the “Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders.” The document articulated why bin Laden views the United States as an enemy and how he proposed to deal with that enemy (Ranstorp, 1998). In the 1998 epistle, bin Laden offered three major reasons that America is considered an enemy of the Islamic people. The three reasons are the United States occupying Islamic lands, the United States attempting to slaughter innocent Iraqis to humiliate their Muslim neighbors, and the United States proclaiming alternative economic motives for their actions that draw attention away from killing Muslims.
Repeated instances of a failed state’s ability to harbor terrorists who have converted to violent extremism provide a perspective for understanding the foundational causes plaguing weak societies. Hannah Arendt attempts to describe the potential rationalization and justification of violence in her book *On Violence* (1969). Arendt (1969) describes the use of power through the use of weapons in outbreaks of violence. Furthermore, Arendt’s generation recalls the concentration and extermination camps, mass genocides, and torture of the Second World War which have affected people psychologically (Arendt, 1969). Power continues to remain the ability to influence others to flex to the will of the wielder of power. Dominance supported by established extremist strongholds throughout fragile regions to launch sophisticated attacks on Western interests.

As the quest for power increases, war is a means of binding together the individual, the society, and the state. Although man is inherently greedy, he exists under a government designed to secure the people and their property, which equates to wielding power (Waltz, 1959). In a link with Rousseau, Waltz quotes Montesquieu by noting: “As soon as man enters into a state of society he loses the sense of his weakness; equality ceases, and then commences into a state of war” (Waltz, 1959, p. 166).

The subsection on violent extremism attempts to define various attributes supporting the injection of violent extremism through the desire to create a counter narrative reflecting historical attributes supportive of extremist ideology. Much of extremists’ bias derives from historical interpretations of other societies dominating their societies. Islamic ideologists’ desire to affect change results in redefining power in fragile regions.
Contemporary Ideologies

The subsection on contemporary theologies reviews literature on the attributes of political instability. Some of the discussions allude to domestic issues, whereas others address global concerns associated with conflict behaviors creating regime change. Relative to the topic of attributes supporting the injection of violent extremism into a fragile systems analysis, none of the authors supports answering the theoretical concern.

Seymour Lipset’s (1963) seminal work, *Political Man*, represents the first attempt to navigate the components of political instability (Sanders, 1981). In his research, Lipset focuses on the origins of democratic stability and the mechanisms that political institutions preserve. Conversely, Lipset’s design is not concerned with analyzing the fundamental sources of security throughout various global political systems. Consequently, stability and instability are regarded as two ends of a continuum of indeterminate length supporting a more or less stable environment (Sanders, 1981).

The primary focus of Lipset’s analysis is to use critical thinking to assess a political system’s ability to serve as a more democratic structure indicative of political development. Moreover, the causative factors in his analysis are wealth, industrialization, education, and urbanization during the period 1914–1959 (Lipset, 1963). His initial factors support a foundational approach for a comparative analysis deriving the attributes that may support violent extremism.

The following year Eckstein carries the torch one step further by focusing on internal war characteristics. Eckstein’s (1964) anthology, *Internal War*, reflects a shift in the focus of political inquiry in seeking to identify and analyze the problems associated with political systems (Sanders, 1981). The fundamental importance of Eckstein’s
analysis is that it provides guidelines for much of the quantitative research on domestic conflict behavior which occurred between the 1960s and the 1970s. Eckstein’s two research questions are: what are the major types or dimensions of internal war or domestic conflict behavior; and what are its major determinants?

Furthermore, the analysis of Rummel and Tanter (1966) found evidence of three major factors or dimensions augmenting Eckstein’s analysis of conflict behavior. These were labeled: internal war (organized and widespread mass political violence involving guerilla warfare, assassinations, and death from political violence); turmoil (unorganized mass political behavior not necessarily involving violence, yet including strikes, demonstrations, and riots); and conspiracy (organized elite behavior including coups, attempted coups and acts of governmental repression) (Rummel & Tanter, 1966). Rummel and Tanter provide the reasoning behind the desire for regime change caused by the grievances of the population without shifting the focus from potential intervention elements or extremist ideology.

Identifying additional characteristics supporting regime change, Feirabend (1972) derived nine factors (mass participation/ turmoil, palace revolution/ revolt, power struggle/ revolt, riot, elections, demonstrations, imprisonment, civil war, and guerilla warfare). Moreover, Hibbs (1973) found evidence of two factors: internal war and collective protests. On the other hand, Morrison and Stevenson (1971) found evidence of four major dimensions of internal conflict: elite instability, mass instability, turmoil and communal or ethnic violence. In all these many references, there appeared to not be a sole justification supporting the potential injection of violent extremism. Although the injection of extremism is a warning among other attributes of a weak state, the attributes
proposed by these three authors support the initial discussion of the characteristics that sway the population to support a change in the narrative.

The most influential analysis of causative factors derives from Gurr and Feierabend. Gurr (1968) views all violent political acts as the consequence of relative deprivation when there is a gap between value expectations and perceived value capabilities. Feierabend (1972) contends that societal frustration is the fundamental source of destabilizing and violent political behavior. Thus, societal failure is the most important and immediate source of violence or instability, since the ratio of want formation to want satisfaction defines the level of societal frustration through derived grievances. Meanwhile, Gurr (1968) contends that the gap between value expectations and perceived capabilities determines the level of deprivation.

Continuing to define grievance attributes that may support the injection of violence extremism, Snyder and Tilly (1972) refute the deprivation-frustration-aggression thesis by correlating a series of models of political violence among economic deprivation. The thesis supports what is potentially the most viable justification for a population to shift to the counter-narrative to usurp diplomacy based on economic grievances thereby fostering the climactic change to violent extremism as the desired goal. Moreover, the two researchers draw a conclusion that the two most significant correlates of political violence are governmental repression and nonviolent struggle for power.

The most definitive analysis of instability factors for quantitative analysis supporting the injection of extremism into a fragile society is Hibbs’ (1973) 108-nation study of mass political violence and coups d’état. His theoretical propositions provide a series of single equation hypotheses supporting predictive analysis. The hypotheses
create relationships furnishing significant parameter estimates organized into a single multi-equation block recursive model.

Shaping contemporary conflict resolution as the world became more globalized is Edward Azar’s work. Azar’s research parallels that of Hibbs, and of Snyder and Tilly by studying how humanitarian concerns affect the stability of a state. As a state drowns in societal conflicts, the opportunity for others to join extremist organizations significantly increases. Edward Azar (1990) was the first to describe violent events in the developing world as Protracted Social Conflicts. Edward Azar (1990) defines Protracted Social Conflicts as:

In brief, protracted social conflicts occur when depriving communities of their basic needs on the basis of the communal identity. However, the deprivation is the result of a complex causal chain involving the role of the state and the pattern of international linkages. Furthermore, initial conditions (colonial legacy, domestic historical setting, and the multi-communal nature of the society) play important roles in shaping the genesis of protracted social conflict (p. 12).

This understanding of conflict provides a contrast to observing conflict as an inevitable power struggle between actors trying to establish a comparative advantage (Azar, 1990).

Protracted social conflicts ($P_{SC}$) have three key phases: genesis, process dynamics and outcomes analysis. Genesis refers to a “set of conditions that are responsible for the transformation of non-conflictual situations into conflictual ones” (Azar, 1990, p. 7).

Within the factor of the communal, Azar suggests that the most significant of all factors leading to the formation of $P_{SC}$ is in societies characterized as having a “multi-communal” composition. Multi-communal societies are “...characterized by
disarticulation between the state and society as a whole. With the state usually dominated by a single communal group or a coalition of a few cooperative groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other groups in the society” (Azar, 1990, p. 7). Efforts to reconcile this factor by enforcing integration into, or cooperation with, the nation-building process strain the social fabric and eventually breed fragmentation and protracted social conflict (Azar, 1990).

In his model, Azar categorizes two forms that international linkages formulate: economic dependency and client relationships. States economically dependent on the broader international economic system see their autonomy weakened as outside influences dictate economic development policies. Client relationships refer to arrangements guaranteeing a state’s security in return for loyalty and are equally significant when governments potentially distracted from their key responsibilities.

The second component of PSC is process dynamics, variables responsible for the activation of overt conflict. Azar recognizes three key determining factors. The first factor of communal actions and strategies refers to the potential of various ‘triggers’ that activate otherwise latent conflict, which escalates into broader and possibly more violent conflict. Azar (1990) summarizes this process as follows:

Initially, a trigger may, but not need be, a trivial event (e.g., an insult to an individual with strong communal ties). But the minor event tends to become collectively recognized as a turning point relating to personal victimization. Collective recognition of personal grievances (or incompatible goals) naturally leads to collective protest. A collective protest is usually met by some degree of repression or suppression. As tension increases, communal groups draw the
attention of their constituents to a broad range of issues involving municipal security, access and security needs. The spillover of the event into multiple points increases the momentum for organizing and mobilizing resources. As the level of communal organization and mobilization becomes greater, cooperative groups attempt to formulate diverse strategies and tactics, which may involve civil disobedience, guerrilla warfare or secessionist movements (pp. 13–14).

Communal groups organizing and developing strong leadership gather support outside national boundaries, which results in the creation of a regional issue. Through Azar’s comments, we begin to see the justification for the shift of a population with grievances to support a counternarrative of violent extremism in the hope for change. The destabilizing effect creates an atmosphere of the haves versus the have nots based on perceived differences, which ignites a revolution in expectations.

Lake and Rothchild (1996) argue that ethnic conflict, as a social divide in fragile countries, is neither a result of ancient hatreds nor caused by the sudden uncorking of Soviet repression, but that:

…Ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future. As groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult to resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contains within them the potential for tremendous violence. As information failures, problems of credible commitment, and the security dilemma take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state weakens, and conflict becomes more likely. Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs, operating within groups, build upon these fears and polarize society. Political memories and emotions also magnify these anxieties, driving groups further apart. Together these between-
group and within-group strategic interactions produce a toxic brew that can explode into murderous violence (p. 41). Ethnic conflicts drive discontented men from communities and toward collective extremist action. Once implanted into the new communities, the men do not possess a collective identity or the means necessary to collaborate as a cohesive force. Thus, it takes considerable time and effort for the individual migrant to assimilate into an urbanized society, join the political strivings of his fellows, and foster new forms of organization for collective action to promote in the cities (Hibbs, 1973). The consequence of this encounter of culturally differentiated groups is the concentration of group antagonisms, communal clashes, and the potential for separatist movements. The share of the mobilized and differentiated persons in the population is the first indicator of the probable incidence and strength of national conflict.

Supporting the significance of ethnic and societal relationships, Thaler (2015) comments “sociology, anthropology, and related fields offer insights into instigators and perpetuators of environments vulnerable to insurgencies and terrorism” (xiv). When applying these fields to see how the injection of violent extremism is applicable to the sociological makeup of the operating environment, he refers to the “interplay between individuals’ personal inclinations, beliefs, or position in a society and the political, economic, and organizational structures in which they are situated” (Thaler, et al., 2013, xiv).

Another set of considerations protracting conflict regions is the significance of stable and cooperating neighbors. Regional stabilization is pertinent to the evolving context of globalization associated with regional economic integration. Diamond (2005)
articulates his concern with the implications for a state’s stability when trade relations and dependency on a neighbor are constrained by looming weaknesses. He argues:

Most societies depend to some extent on friendly neighbors, either for imports of essential trade goods, or else for cultural ties that lend cohesion to the society. Hence the risk arises that, if your trade partner becomes weakened for any reason and can no longer supply the essential import or the cultural tie, your society may become impaired as a result (p.14).

Diamond (2005) concerns himself with the potentially adverse impact of trade dependence on weak neighboring states in a region, and with the conflict and instability that spill into the area and affects other states in various forms including disease, human displacement, trafficking of arms and narcotics, and organized criminal activity. Thus, a stable neighbor is fundamentally a positive indicator for the long-term stability of a weak state.

Security must support the agenda of the state as grievances spawn. Monty Marshall (1999) views security as a regional issue when a state cannot contain violence. Exploring the process of diffusion of insecurity in cultures of violence, he presents the concept of the Protracted Conflict Region (PCR) suggesting the spillover of the culture of violence is a function of spatial proximity and “affects all social relations in proximity to the violence” (Marshall, 1999, pp.138–139). While the culture of violence directly affects confrontational states situated at the core of the PCR, it spreads to populations within peripheral countries (those surrounding core states) and marginal states (located beyond the peripheral states) within the region.

of spillover (functional spillover, external intervention, and multiplier-effect-systemic contagion), supporting the notion that conflicts spread within an area, beyond the area and its boundaries, and extend away from its origin.

The subsection on contemporary theologies describes literature reviewed by authors attempting to identify factors supporting regime changes or internal conflict. Through the review, certain initial factors begin the conversation about supporting a weak society consumed by violent extremism. As described, many of the factors are grievances based on humanitarian concerns or a state’s inability to provide for its constituents. When the situation escalates to a point where the state cannot contain it, the issue may result in a regional conflict requiring the intervention of neighboring or global forces to deny the injection of extremism. Again, these factors involve providing the basic necessities to a population and giving them what they perceive they require to establish normalcy in a state. When the state begins to counter the social contract, opportunities are presented which support the injection of violent extremism’s counter narrative of change.

**Government Capacity**

The subsection on government capacity alludes to the capabilities and capacity of a state to provide basic necessities identified within social contracts. Functions of a state and the search for ideal attributes are subjects of epistemological inquiry. There are many forms of governance which may result in a weak or failed state. To understand the state’s requirements to provide, it is necessary to review philosophical references associated with what a state discerns if a state is maintaining governance. The theoretical concern with ideal statehood is evident in classical philosophers such as Socrates recollected by
Plato in *Crito* (trans. 2015) and *Republic* (trans. 2015) and Aristotle in *Politics* (trans. 2015). For example, in Plato’s *Republic* there are five forms of governance which may fall subject to extremism:

a) Aristocracy (described as the ideal type)

b) Timocracy (governed by the love of power rather than dispensing justice)

c) Oligarchy (perceived as the self-indulgent pursuit of greater wealth)

d) Democracy (premised on equality but in reality anarchy by an unruly mob)

e) Tyranny (dictatorship by one).

Niccolò Machiavelli used the word *lo stato* (the state) to describe the social hierarchy that governs and rules a country. In his seminal treatise on political theory, *The Prince* (trans. 2014), Machiavelli proffered advice to rulers on administering a state. Machiavelli’s dicta legitimized the use of superior force and fear to perpetuate the authority of the state and to acquire and project power.

Moreover, Jean Bodin’s and Thomas Hobbes’ ideas decisively contributed to the perspectives of state sovereignty in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Both philosophers viewed sovereign authority as absolute. The seminal work by the French thinker, Jean Bodin, *Six Books of the Commonwealth* or *Six Livres de la Republique* (1955), provides the foundation for developing political theory, centered on his doctrine of unlimited and indivisible sovereignty. Bodin underscored the importance of a system that “should embody somewhere a clear and unquestionable source of authority” (Dunning, 1896, p. 86). Hobbes’ doctrine on the foundations of states and legitimate
governments, articulated in *Leviathan* (trans. 2002), is considered one of the earliest and most influential representations of the social contract. Hobbes argued that people—ungoverned and unregulated—remain in a “state of nature,” and are driven to competition and conflict in pursuit of gain, security, and glory (Wolff, 2006). Wolff (2006) believes that the Hobbesian paradigm portrays individual rationality as one that preys upon others. This is reflected in the Hobbesian reasoning that a person “cannot assure the power and means to live well…without the acquisition of more” (Hobbes, trans. 2002, p. 161). He further explains his conceptualization of the absolute authority of the state as essential for maintaining social order. He maintained that state sovereignty exists as a social contract between the state and its subjects, whereby the latter agree to submit to the absolute sovereign authority of the former in exchange for the provision of security. Meanwhile, the absence of authority on the part of the state to control individuals in “the state of nature” is described as disastrous. Moreover, Hobbes’ concept of the “state of nature” upheld the elitist notion that individuals relinquish the ability to organize in associations constituting a civil society.

In contrast to Hobbes, Locke (trans. 2002) cautions against the inherent tyranny of the state and stipulates that the balance of power in the state should not favor the rulers by placing their constituents at a disadvantage. He perceives all political power as supporting public welfare for the preservation of the natural rights of its citizens as well as their consent. Locke’s position on the absolute sovereignty of the state as the basis of tyranny presents the liberal counterpoise to the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

Locke advocates limited government and authority with minimal encroachment in the management of their constituents, which provides flexibility for the population to
decide their requirements, and thereby decreases potential grievances that would feed a counter narrative. He claims people have the right to resist and prevent tyranny or the violation of their rights by the government. Moreover, he argues that rebelling rebalances the state when it has been exercising power beyond people’s rights (Locke, trans. 2002).

Rousseau’s philosophy provides another dimension to the Western notion of the state’s ability to provide for its constituents. Rousseau’s (trans. 1782) ideas provide the most prominent contributions to classic democratic theory. Rousseau’s position in the Social Contract (trans 1782) follows the line of theorists who argued state authority is not a divine right, but one that involves the volonté générale (will of the people), based upon mutual interest and the idea of cooperation for their welfare.

In the absence of the volonté générale, Rousseau viewed the state as repressive. His notion of the volonté générale presumed that the common good of society resided in liberty and equality. Frank Marini (1967) reflects upon Rousseau’s theory, as it is “created largely out of opposition to arbitrary government, it urged a higher level of civic attachment, devotion to the public welfare and the rule of law, but it did not urge issue decision by the people, not even through responsive mandated representatives” (pp. 467–468). Rousseau’s theory continues to offer a delicate balance between individual autonomy and the institutional function of the state in maintaining democratic order, which fosters a “shared understanding of the common good” (Cohen, 1986).

Because the structure that a state provides its population is vitally important, how the weak state manages stability is another competing interest. If a state cannot contain growing animosity, there is an opportunity for the conflict to grow into a regional concern or an opportunity for the injection of violent extremism. In introducing the
notion of the state’s monopoly, Max Weber advanced the Machiavellian model of the use of force to contain the masses as a fundamental function of a state. He defined it as a “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,” in his seminal lecture titled *Politics as a Vocation* (1919). Weber’s theoretical frame underscores the following core components for a successful state:

- The bureaucratic administrative apparatus of the state
- The state’s monopoly on the use of force
- The legitimacy of the state
- The state’s control over territory

In Weber’s refinement of governance, the absence of the monopoly on the use of force establishes the conditions for anarchy, or the justification for present day violent extremism. He justifies his proposition by arguing that non-state actors weaken state authorities by challenging the state as the “sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence” (p. 1). Additionally, Weber (1919) redefines the role of state institutions, such as the armed and police forces, bureaucracy, and legal structures as the “administrative means” for organizing the state as a political unit. His views establish the development of state and society as a complex process, requiring professional structures of administration. Weber’s description of the pre-eminence of the state serves as a major influence on the dominant tradition of modern European state forms, many of them modeled on some variation of a Weberian blueprint: possessing a rational-legal authority defined as the right to communicate orders and have them respectfully obeyed (Raphael 1991) through bureaucratic structures (Antonio, 1992); and enforcement capacity through the state’s monopoly on the medium of violence (Barkey & Parikh, 1991; Pureza et al., 2006).
Over the past decades, the primacy of the Lockean theory and the role of civil society in balancing state powers has been challenged by Huntington. Huntington (1981) observes the lack of unity in society relative to its multiculturalism in creating diversity within government. Huntington (1981) advocates for a shift in the balance of power tilting heavily in favor of the government: “In terms of American beliefs, government is supposed to be egalitarian, participatory, open, non-coercive, and responsive to the demands of individuals and groups. No government can be all these things and remain a state” (p. 41).

Compounding the ability of a state to manage internal grievances is the ability of a state to mass the population or extremists by using the means of communication. Winn and Zakem (2009) describe Internet 2.0 in James Forest’s book Influence Warfare by setting the tone in their proposed thesis statement, which is: “The emergence of new means of communication and new styles of virtual social interaction have transformed the context for mass persuasion and have expanded opportunities for extremists to disseminate their message” (Winn & Zakem, 2009, p. 27). They expound on such influential power of mass movements within a society. The establishment of Internet communities throughout social media significantly diminishes the requirement for a single leader to become the focal point.

Conversely, Arendt states that within a free society “men are manipulated through physical coercion, torture, or starvation, but not through hidden persuaders, television, advertising, or any other psychological means” (Arendt, 1969, p. 28). On the other hand, the ability to have near real-time social updates and the requirements of technology, the power of peer persuasion, mass movements, and the impact of video/pictures spread
throughout the globe have tremendous effects.

Violence is the defining feature of most fragile countries, and modeling indicates past conflicts are the largest contributor to future conflicts. Within weak countries, the principal dimension affecting the trajectory of these countries is inevitably the quality of leadership and commitment of the governing elite to inclusive growth and development policies. Additionally, the development of state capacity in fragile states is disappointing because aid provides unintended adverse effects on local conditions by exacerbating conflict dynamics (Cilliers & Sisk, 2013). The legitimacy of the regime produces the ingredients for progress in state capacity hinging upon “long-term development in the state’s ability to promote the rule of law, improve public administration, deliver essential services, and make improvements in the accountability of institutions of the state and processes of social accountability” (Cilliers & Sisk, 2013, p. 8). The deciphering force is the perception of the legitimacy of the host government or opposing force in establishing a reliance on the legitimacy of the host-nation government; this forces intervening states to cede control of the outcome of a fragile state to the host country government.

To chart a path to navigate, researchers identify those state and non-state armed groups who oppose and seek to counter peace processes. New political elites, economic elites, and entrepreneurs in violence (such as militias and warlords) establish and occupy different spheres of power and legitimacy. The concern is differing mediums for defining legitimacy between a foreign counterinsurgent, host-nation government, and segments of the population, concurrently in the same state (Lynch, 2014). As spheres shift and change, they overlap and collide within a defined space to claim a monopoly over power. One commonality to all elites is they request different incentives to support the
establishment of a new status quo or attempts to alter it (Watkins, 2014). When warlords and non-state armed groups attack the heart of the state, their source of power still remains at the periphery because of the tyranny of distance. As spheres of power and legitimacy shift, ad hoc systems of local governance begin to form outside the state framework.

A crisis of legitimacy is a crisis of change. Therefore, its roots are intertwined with the character of change in modern society. Crises of legitimacy occur during a transition to a new social structure if the status of major conservative institutions threatens the period of structural change, and all the major groups in the society do not have access to the political system in the transitional period (Lipset, 1963). After an amended social structure is established, if the new system is unable to sustain the expectations of major groups for a long enough period to develop legitimacy on the new basis, a new crisis develops. When new groups become politically active, easy access to the legitimate political institutions wins the loyalty of the revised groups to the system.

A necessary foundation of governance is to define the government’s capacity to contain grievances that can increase to a gap which can be exploited by violent extremism as an alternative to the normal diplomacy. Many theologies say what a state should or should not provide based on the current border boundaries. Although faced with strife and an inability to provide basic necessities in a globalized society, governments must display the ability to contain domestic issues to prevent regional conflicts. In addition, governments must remain legitimate and free of corruption to have the support of the population. When support for the government falters, an opportunity to create a counter narrative supporting extremism is established.
Dwindling Economic Conditions

As the literature reviewed defined the strategic goals of violent extremists to fill the void between governance and social contracts, the subsection on dwindling economic conditions seeks to establish if there is credibility in the argument between the “haves” and “have nots” in a weak, fragile society. In addition, the review seeks to understand the significance of a state’s ability to provide necessities, like education and other services, which increase the human educational capital and support new economic initiatives. The sub-section’s findings support quantitative inputs into the analysis chapter that relate to how a weak state provides financial support to the state and constituents.

When there are indications that a dwindling economy is supporting an environment favorable to violent extremism, an understanding of the socioeconomic development in the state’s capacity is developed. Capacity correlates with the ability of the society to create and sustain the consumption of material goods (Sanders, 1981). Hibbs (1973) provides a starting point for the review supporting a quantitative approach to economic inputs that are factors in the increase of instability. Some of these factors provide opportunity for extremist organizations to insert themselves with a measure of goodwill, which counters governmental development.

Rapid economic change with any of the above factors frequently produces severe social instability and conflict while supporting opportunities for violent extremism to exploit. Part of the concern is that economic change often increases the number of economic losers, since domestic production may increase; yet the society experiences a net loss of economic wellbeing (Hibbs, 1973).

Gurr (1967) alludes to relative change deprivation based on these factors as the
basic determinant of violent extremism. As the discrepancy between societies relative to the perception of what they deserve increases, the more the feeling of discontent engulfs a society. Associating Gurr’s comments with the indicators of education relative to literacy, an assumption indicates educational levels support the level of aspiration and expectations in society, while economic development taps the ability of community to satisfy such expectations. Thus, Gurr anticipates that communities with high levels of education and low levels of economic development contain high deprivation-induced discontent with relatively severe civil strife, whereas those with low educational levels in relation to the level of economic development display moderate discontent and commensurately less violence (Hibbs, 1973).

In many countries, inequality is driven by large financial flows from commodity exports when expressed as a ratio of exports to GDP (Cilliers & Sisk, 2013). In fragile states, the number of people living in extreme poverty increases the humanitarian requirement, as opposed to significant decreases in more resilient states. Economic concentration is more harmful than political centralization.

Specifically, the existence of three distinct economies, namely war, shadow, and coping economies, combine to weaken the hand of the state as the host state seeks to provide a semi-legitimate alternative as a counter narrative to extremism. Economists tout gains in efficiency if countries specialize in the sectors where they hold a comparative advantage, yet specialization makes a state more vulnerable in the face of random events (Taleb & Treverton, 2015). When analysts predict potential adverse outcomes, organizations collaborate with host-nation groups in peace building to counter the intervention of violent extremism. This response supports shifting the focus because the
alternative of perpetuated violence causes destabilizing changes in local power and legitimacy from a central government to a more diffuse range of sub-state entities (Watkins, 2014).

For stability within a state, the loss of a single source of income should not dramatically damage its overall economic condition. Places that depend on tourism are particularly susceptible to perceived instability. Another common source of fragility is an economy built around a single commodity or industry that accounts for the preponderance of exports (Taleb & Treverton, 2015). Even more significant is when large state-sponsored enterprises dominate the economy by compounding the risks of declines in demand for a particular commodity by responding slowly to market signals (Taleb & Treverton, 2015). Consequently, debt is perhaps the single most critical source of fragility, particularly during accelerated shortfalls in revenue.

The scarcity of resources drives many conflicts, which require the US to conduct humanitarian or stability operations. Some factors that stimulate a lack of resources are population growth, the relationship between resources and geography, and the impact of technology on resources and geography. On the other hand, superpowers or emerging powers have the capacity to project their dominance. For example, most dominant countries have intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, tools to support cyberwarfare, naval bases or dominance of the waterways, and air power.

While economic explanations for the resource curse are well established, the political factors explaining why governments fail to take corrective action remain poorly understood. High inflation and slow economic growth undermine living standards, producing dissatisfaction with incumbent governments and resulting in demonstrations,
strikes, food riots, and other forms of instability (Gasiorowski, 1998). Karl Marx (1978) argued one facet of economic discourse by asserting that economic exploitation rooted in the structural contradictions of capitalism creates class conflict and revolutionary activity. On the other hand, some scholars emphasize how aspects of the prevailing environment affect the emergence and persistence of opposition movements and instability. Such environmental factors include the degree of social mobility in society, the degree of institutionalization, the resources available to opposition movements, the state’s repressive capabilities, other aspects of state strength, foreign intervention, and international war. Many of these scholars discount the significance of inequality and other conditions affecting discontent as determinants of instability (Gasiorowski, 1998).

A measure to counter internal economic instability which leads to the injection of extremism is through a regional or globalization approach. The good neighbor effect increases many times over when a state relies on a continuous supply of goods, yet even more when the trading friend, by virtue of the economic stakes, supports conflict resolution processes across the border in the event of instability. Thus, the question of increased economic cooperation formulates itself as an intertwined indicator of success because of the vital importance of regional cooperation for the sustainable economic development of developing regions. An integrated regional economy boosts the economic development of a country through the advantages of geographic proximity (such as lower transportation costs and time constraints), and economies of scale in production and infrastructure.

Meanwhile, it is important to consider the socioeconomic repercussions of arms transfers serving criminal organizations who may come under the umbrella of extremist
organizations. In 2002, arms supplies to Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa constituted 66.7 percent of the value of all arms supplies worldwide. Ironically, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, a peacemaking entity, accounted for 90 percent of that supply (Yamin 2010). Marshall (1999), Ayoob (1995), and Buzan (1991) discuss the destabilizing effects of arms transfers in the Third World.

Weapon availability derives an independent variable causing conflict, a dependent variable following a conflict, or an intervening variable acting as a catalyst in conflicts caused by deeper factors.

Supporting increasing economic growth in a weak country is the increase in literacy rates and the prevention of talent flight. At the very least, a “high” level of education suggests itself as a sufficient requirement for democracy (Lipset, 1963). With literacy rates improving in a given society, urbanization supports the complex of skills and resources characterizing the modern industrial economy. Through the use of communication, literacy formulates shows itself in ability to develop media. Thus, the capacity to read equips the population to perform varied tasks required to modernize a society. Accompanying the growth of modern communication and transportation is an increasing likelihood that societies in poverty lack exposure to regional improvements, particularly in urban areas of the Western world.

Dwindling economic conditions spark instability in a state’s willingness and capability to provide for their constituents. Through defining how a state uses its GDP, creates health-care services within budget, expands industrialization and urbanization, and retains human talent, analysts can determine metrics of a deteriorating circumstance, which can be augmented by the intervention of violent extremism to provide the
necessities not supported by the host government. In the event the state continues to not have the capacity to serve its constituents, a regional or globalization approach exists to support common interests to deter extremist intervention.

**Research Methodologies**

Although the above subsections provide a starting point for eliciting factors that support the injection of violent extremism, various niche organizations enable a holistically exhaustive image to initiate predictive analysis to identify where the injection of violent extremism may occur. These organizations provide the statistical data to implement in further analysis paradigms which support qualitative and quantitative inquiries to refine predictions of the opportunities for the injection. For analysts who do not know where to commence their research, many of the methodologies proposed in this section serve as the initial point to commence analysis, augmented by the factors mentioned previously.

Political instability is an unbounded reality, utilizing aggressive, horrific, and deadly tactics. To meet this emerging threat, more advanced targeting, or hardening, is imperative to mitigate the intelligence community’s (IC) vulnerability to succumb to strategic surprise by extremist organizations (Labaj, 2011). Because formal or informal instability threat-assessment techniques frame judgments about risk in conjunction with vulnerabilities, the lenses that analysts employ in developing actionable intelligence make them the key to identification and prevention of strategic surprises. Assessing the risk posed by non-armed groups or warlords is a challenge for national security intelligence analysts. The most noticeable obstacles are the limited availability of reliable information about violent extremist groups and the absence of objective and rigorous
assessment methods (Lemieux, & Regens, 2012).

Post-Cold War, the genesis of US policy concerned with state failure begins with crisis events in countries such as Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The interest signaled the establishment of the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) in 1994, formerly known as the State Failure Taskforce and sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The task force examines occurrences of conflict such as ethnic and revolutionary warfare, regime overthrow, and genocide leading to state failure. While the concern with state failure in the 1990s ignited the policy community’s interest in understanding better the factors likely to lead to the failure of governments, the post-9/11 policy derives from the perception of direct threats from terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and rogue elements in perceived failed states. The PITF provides a trend analysis over the defined years comparing a country’s performance to others globally. A comparative analysis refines the analysts’ research into priority interest countries to focus their collection efforts, creating a more efficient and effective research implementation tool.

A similar tool is the Failed States Index (FSI) produced by the Fund for Peace and sponsored by Foreign Policy Magazine and Brookings Institution’s Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (2008). In terms of methodology, both indices examine the state as the unit of analysis, focusing primarily on state institutions and internal dynamics of weakness by measuring a range of social, political, economic, and security-related indicators. Both instruments use large-N quantitative samples providing annual snapshots of state performance rather than time series analysis used in other statistical indices such as the State Fragility Index and Matrix (2007–2014) and the Peace
and Conflict Instability Ledger (2008, 2010, 2012, 2014), which is used more reliably for generating predictions. Although state performance in the FSI and the Brookings’ index is classified with different terminology (failure vis-à-vis weakness) the indicators used for operationalizing the problem are more or less similar, pointing to conceptual ambiguities characterizing the discourses.

Supporting a comparative fragile state analysis, the Fund for Peace (FFP) provides the Fragile State Index. Founded in 1957, the FFP is an educational and research organization whose mission is to “prevent war and alleviate the conditions that cause violent conflict” (Funds for Peace, 2014). The FFP strives to illuminate challenges in fragile governments while promoting policy approaches to deter violent extremism (Funds for Peace, 2014). The FSI is a tool that the FFP provides to support policy approaches. The FSI identifies what pressures illuminate challenges within a country which begin to shift the nation toward a failing state. Through identifying the attributes of failing states, the FSI provides risk assessments to support strategic policy approaches (Funds for Peace, 2014). It distils millions of pieces of information into a relevant, easily digestible, and informative form. To support the FSI, the FFP utilizes proprietary software called the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST). The CAST collects data from three sources to support multiple analytical perspectives to review to obtain final scores for the FSI (Funds for Peace, 2014).

The FFP’s software performs content analysis on collected indicators to support collaborative research. Guided by twelve primary social, economic and political indicators (split into an average of 14 subindicators), the CAST software analyzes collected information using search terms of relevant items. This analysis converts into a
score representing the significance of each of the different pressures for a given country. Each fragile state indicator is “rated on a 1 to 10 scale with 1 (low) being the most stable and 10 (high) as the most at risk of collapse and violence” (Funds for Peace, 2014). The content analysis incorporates with two other key aspects of the overall assessment process: quantitative analysis and qualitative inputs based upon significant events in the countries examined.

Moreover, the FFP develops a set of comparative indicators to provide a representation of the capacity of states to support their population with governance and security. Further, capacity indicators are assessed on a 0–5 scale, as well as an A to E grading system to project aspects of professionalism, legitimacy, and representativeness (Funds for Peace, 2014).

When reviewing causative factors of extremist intervention in African countries, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) supports 95 indicators of fragile states’ weakening (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2014). The IIAG provides annual assessments of African governance (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2014). Furthermore, the IIAG determines and debates government performance with a decision-making instrument by assessing progress in four main categories: Safety & Rule of Law, Participation & Human Rights, Sustainable Economic Opportunity and Human Development (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2014).

Freedom House is another useful resource in attempting to identify potential grievances about a lack of accountability or enabling constituent voice on matters requiring a governmental response. Freedom House publishes the Freedom of the World reports. Freedom in the World 2015 analyzes freedom in 195 countries and 15 territories
during 2014 (Freedom House, 2015). Each country is assigned numerical ratings from 1 to 7 for political rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing the freest and 7 the least free (Freedom House, 2015). The ratings base scores assigned to 25 indicators to determine whether a country is Free, Partly Free or Not Free (Freedom House, 2015). The report supports predictive analysis to compare potential biases present in governance through qualitative and quantitative analysis. If the country does not provide an outlet to hear the population’s requests, violent extremists may find an opportunity to exploit as an enabler of the usurpation of weak governments.

Once analysts focus their collection efforts and prioritize the target countries, factors discussed in other sections and the analysis chapter draw quantitative information from the Human Development Report. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has published the Human Development Report since 1990 as independent, empirically grounded analyses of major development issues, trends, and policies occurring throughout the globe. Much of the existing research on vulnerability considers people’s exposure to risks with a holistic approach. The holistic approach considers the factors contributing to risks to human development and discusses strengthening resistance among a broad group of evolving risks (UNDP, 2014). While globalization has brought benefits to many, it has also given rise to new concerns, manifesting at times as local reactions to the spillover effects of events creating a gap for violent extremism to exploit. Preparing citizens for a less vulnerable future means strengthening the intrinsic resilience of communities and countries by means supported by the statistics in the report (UNDP, 2014).

In line with the human development paradigm, the Human Development Report
assumes a people-centered approach, as it pays particular attention to disparities between and within countries. The disparities identify structurally vulnerable groups of people who are more vulnerable than others by virtue of their history or of their unequal treatment compared to the rest of their society. Potential vulnerabilities associated with gender, ethnicity, or geographic location evolve and persist over time. Many of the most vulnerable people and groups face numerous and overlapping constraints on their ability to cope with setbacks (UNDP, 2014).

Once the countries and their factors are defined, the next research question posed is the likelihood of Western intervention to prevent violent extremism’s expansion into the fragile state. The US national security documents addressing the nexus between Western security and state failure are the National Security Strategy, which provides strategic insight into potential intervention opportunities (NSS 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2015). President George W. Bush made a case for preemptive military intervention in weak, failing, and rogue states in his National Security Strategy (NSS 2002) and it was reaffirmed in the following NSS 2006 to protect the security interests of the US and its allies. The NSS 2002 served as the vehicle for preemptive war against Iraq waged by a global coalition of forces led by the US. NSS 2002 noted weak and failing states pose as great a threat as do conquering states, and external military intervention liberated Afghanistan, with the overthrow of the Taliban regime (NSS, 2002). The document is emphatic about threats from failed states with assertions such as: “America is threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones” (NSS, 2002).

Similar to the national security strategies crafted during the Bush era, President Obama reiterated that weak and failing states pose a threat to the US and its allies in the
latest NSS (2015). While the Obama administration omitted the reference to preemptive war in NSS 2010, the escalation of the Predator Drone campaign in Pakistan is considered an extension of the Bush doctrine of preventive intervention in weak, failing, and failed states.

When combining the factors from the subsection and the research methodologies reviewed, the analysts can turn to the Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action to support reinforcing their research position based on the likelihood of Western intervention. An aspect of the Council of Foreign Relations support to strategic intelligence gathering is the Center for Preventive Action (CPA). The (CPA) seeks to aid in the prevention, diffusion, or resolution of deadly conflicts around the world by increasing understanding of conflict prevention. The center focuses on conflicts in countries where U.S. interests are affected, where prevention appears plausible in the realm of the CPA setting the conditions that would make a difference (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014).

To support open source intelligence requirements, analysts utilize the CPA’s Global Conflict tracker. The Global Conflict Tracker is an interactive guide to U.S. conflict prevention priorities for 2014. Conflict prevention priorities draw on the recent Preventive Priorities Survey (PPS), which request foreign policy experts to assess potential conflicts likely to occur in the given year (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014). When using the interactive map, analysts click the icons on the graphic for regularly updated information about each potential or ongoing conflict. In this example, there is the potential for political instability in Libya, the Republic of Iraq and Syria because the Islamic State (ISIS) supports destabilizing these countries in light of their lack of
governance. Next, the analyst uses the filter functions to sort various conflicts by priority level (I–III) to assess the likelihood of the event occurring in the given year, as well as the potential impact on U.S. interests. The conflicts sort into three priority tiers relating to the effects on U.S. interests: High—directly threatens the U.S. homeland and likely to trigger U.S. military involvement, Moderate—affects countries of strategic importance yet may not require military involvement, and Low—potential for severe/widespread humanitarian consequences (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014).

The research methodologies subsection supports inputs into a holistically exhaustive comparative analysis to refine an analyst’s aperture to support efficiency and effectiveness in identifying what state provides an opportunity for the injection of violent extremism, and what is the likelihood of Western intervention to stop it usurping the fragile state. By utilizing the multiple methodologies, the analysts can refine their starting point. Then, the analysts can reflect on ideas proposed in the National Security Strategy to ensure alignment with national foreign policy.

**Summary**

Political instability projections are analyzed similarly to scientific approaches. Within a science experiment, researchers derive results based on valid predictions and observations. The information driving the analysis incorporates the laws of nature, observation reports, laboratory measurements, and facts. Typically, analysts revert to their highest form of education related to science when a discussion arises about the applicability of a scientific approach to intelligence studies. Many analysts likely recall scientists making observations and hypothesizing about the reasoning behind the observations. Next, the scientists test the research hypothesis indirectly by observing
observational studies or experiments testing their predictions. Predictions deemed logical outcomes of hypotheses must be true if the hypothesis is correct (Singer, 2007). At times, distinctions between hypotheses, predictions, and assumptions are muddled. When the difference between the theory and the prediction is very subtle, the prediction may loosely articulate the methods used during the observation.

If the environment is weak, fragile, or failing, extremists provide a counternarrative to the current situation to detach the local population from the current regime. The West interprets and informs in foreign policy the threat posed by failed states (Rotberg, 2002). Rotberg (2002) writes:

Failed states have come to be feared as ‘breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder’ as well as reservoirs and exporters of terror. The existence of these kinds of countries, and the instability that they harbor, not only threatens the lives and livelihoods of their peoples, but also endangers World peace (para. 4).

The literature presented in the five subsections above reflects a review of various theorists and scholars articulating differing viewpoints relative to their time periods and sphere of influence. Although some scholars articulate domestic concerns and others describe global considerations, the literature does not provide a single source of the characteristics of the injection of violent extremism as a state becomes fragile. Through the analysis of the synthesized review, components of each of the literature presented form the foundation for the creation of potential formulas supporting scenarios of violent extremism.
As discussed, the current literature alludes to various components of conflict behavior associated with domestic or regional issues. None of the references provides a holistic query relevant to the injection of violent extremism’s into the counternarrative of a weak or fragile country. With attitudes throughout Africa changing and militants returning from wars in Iraq, Iran, and Syria, Africa presents an opportunity for extremists to exploit. Throughout Africa, the most fragile countries exist, with weak governance and large numbers of ethnic sects, which waiting for the potential absorption into extremist employment apparatus through their placement and access. When local grievances exist along with a lack of legitimacy and governance, which is intertwined with a lack of economic abilities to support the host population, opportunities exist for extremists to exploit by projecting their power and countering Western interests. In cases where the host nation can provide, there is an active voice of accountability and basic economic support, and extremists cannot penetrate for the purposes of exploitation and interjection. With this in mind, when there is a change in a government’s (ΔG) ability to provide along with a lack of economics (ΔE) among a protracted social (P_{Sc}) or regional conflict (P_{RC}), an opportunity exists for the injection of extremism (VE)—particularly if a historical (H) reference is present that matches a pattern analysis.
Chapter Three

Methodology

The purpose of this research is to contribute to theory development for guiding conflict resolution strategies to transform an environment of state fragility and failure into one of predictability that resists the injection of violent extremism. The study undertakes four research aims:

1. It traces various metrics ranking state failure to explore the perceived nexus between failed states and Western security, and its implications for intervention by global actors.

2. It aims to integrate expert perspectives relating to causative factors for a more comprehensive understanding of the root causes of the stability.

3. The study provides structured analytical techniques supporting mathematical modeling to predict the tipping points of fragile states for future intelligence assessments.

4. The dissertation provides a range of recommendations focusing on comprehensive peacebuilding and conflict resolution interventions to assist failing states from becoming *breeding grounds* for future terrorists.

This chapter defines the concerns associated with intervention forces planting themselves into weak or fragile countries. As these concerns plague the global community, the research addresses the dissertation’s concern with the injection of violent extremism into countries identified as fragile, thereby potentially creating regional instability. Analysts have an opportunity to provide an objective baseline for tracking
events through the presented quantifiable indicators to instill rigor into analytical processes that enhance the credibility of analytic judgments. Through grounded theory, a mathematical model is presented to support a scientific approach to intelligence problem solving. Supporting quantifiable logic in grounded theory, four cases studies are presented in the following chapter in an attempt to fill the void in numerical values, thereby presenting an exhaustive research inquiry.

**The Problem**

The international development community increasingly focuses on intervening in fragile conflicts, yet there lacks firm consensus on what exactly constitutes a *fragile state* or situation. The term fragile means by *failed, failing, crisis, weak, rogue, collapsed, poorly performing, ineffective, or shadow*. A fragile situation may be a country at risk of instability, under stress, or a difficult partner (World Bank, 2008). A fragile state is a low-income country characterized by weak state capacity and/or weak state legitimacy leaving citizens vulnerable to a range of shocks. Fragile states are commonly described as incapable of assuring basic security, maintaining rule of law and justice, or providing basic services and economic opportunities for their citizens (Funds for Peace, 2014).

As suggested by the World Bank, the problems stemming from the instability of weak, failing, failed, and fragile states are important to the global community (World Bank, 2008). International organizations voice concern in global governance, US foreign policy, academic, think tank, and development circles. This dissertation lays out various strands of discourse relating to state failure by contributing to policy formulation processes pertaining to global security, national defense strategies, peacebuilding, and development (Carment et al, 2008 Call, 2008; Boege et al., 2009). The predominant
discourses reflect the concern that weak, fragile and failing states are prone to high-intensity conflict, instability, and violence. Another critical concern is states that pose a grave threat to regional and global stability (NSS, 2002; NSS, 2006; NSS, 2010; NSS, 2013, NSS, 2015).

The discourses support a range of global multilateral interventions in fragile states including conflict prevention, management, and resolution, as well as punitive and coercive responses. There is a lack of clarity in the comprehension of the problem with implications for policy. In this regard, the study notes trends in categorizing states as failed, failing, weak, and rogue.

The study builds on a prevailing claim acknowledged by Carment (2008) that the events of 9/11 reinforce the security-failure nexus and disengagement from the world’s poorest and most poorly governed nations. Rebuilding weak security institutions is the subject of key multilateral policy discourses that are timely and appropriate. However, with an increasing perception of threat from weak, fragile, and failing states, the factors of instability are predictable through mathematical modeling supporting a proactive approach to nation-building. In the relationship between discourse and policy, (i.e. the security-failure nexus) military intervention in response to a perceived threat is often a rational choice for state actors. Moreover, deterrence and containment of violence by military means must precede peacebuilding and state stabilization processes where the state poses a direct threat to global security or its communities. The rationale for military intervention begs the question of whether it deters the threat and transforms the conflict environment. Meanwhile, interventions question what constructive, collaborative, and preventive alternatives are available for mitigating the nature of the threat. Finally, the
study claims that when multilateral military interventions in weak and fragile states begin to be perceived by local communities as endangering their lives and property, they contribute to the diffusion of insecurity (Marshall, 1999). The perception generates deep levels of resentment and hostile behavior, triggering active responses across a social and political “web of group relations,” thereby increasing the level of instability in the region. Marshall (1999) defines the process of diffusion of insecurity as:

> Systematic violence (i.e. protracted social conflict) creates or reinforces a social psychology of insecurity, which tends to diffuse through the network of social ties and alter the perceptions and policy priorities of the political actors most closely affected by the threat of violence (i.e. all actors in effective proximity; herein, the protracted conflict region). The growing sense of insecurity leads to increasing exclusivity, enmity, and violence in political relations among all groups in proximity to the source of political violence (p. 27).

Hence, it is argued that reactive adversary-centric responses by external actors in weak, fragile, and failed states contribute to conflict enlargement in an environment afflicted with protracted social conflict. Conflict expansion occurs when more parties are drawn into the conflict scenario, creating a complex operating environment (Mitchell, 2006). The intervention complicates the conditions when other actors within the regional proximity are affected, diffusing conditions of insecurity such that political and social relations are impacted, generating a conflict process of escalation and exacerbation.

**Research Question**

The dissertation is designed to study the following research question: which characteristics of a state predict internal instability leading to violent extremism? Political
violence is defined as, “an episodic interaction between social identity groups engaged in an ongoing, iterative relationship in which instrumental force is used and results in death and/or injury to humans” (Marshall, 1999, p. 19).

To begin to formulate a response to the question, a multi-method approach was used. Initially, a summary and review of the compiled state fragility indices literature was summarized in Appendix A relating to the most fragile states in Africa over the past ten years. By compiling the six references, a commonality was identified that resulted in six potential topics to focus the research question.

Next, the Central Intelligence Agency’s structured analytical technique for identifying indicators or signposts for change reflected a periodical review of observable events or trends to monitor and warn of otherwise unanticipated change (CIA, 2009). Although the structured analytical technique served as the baseline stability categories and indicators, additional indicators were added to serve as an exhaustive research method. Two of the worst countries from Appendix A were researched for Appendix B in addition to a country identified as a contender for a fragile state over the past decade in which the Department of State is initiating interest—the Central African Republic—because of religious violence there. Somalia serves as a failed state with the injection of violent extremism, whereas South Sudan and Sudan display ethnic violence and government corruption. The inclusion of Nigeria serves as a viable test of the research question because the country is an economically successful state, yet is experiencing an injection of violent extremism from Boko Haram. Therefore, the four case studies reference the following distinct characteristics:

Somalia—unstable country with the injection of violent extremism
South Sudan—unstable country with protracted social and regional conflicts

Central African Republic—unstable country with protracted social conflict

Nigeria—stable country with the injection of violent extremism, and protracted social and regional conflicts

The metrics for validating potential Western intervention were the National Security Strategy questions posed for each country, which supported narrowing the list of potential fragile countries of interest to four case studies. These four variables beg the question as to why does Somalia possess the injection of violent extremism, whereas the remaining countries do not? Meanwhile, if Nigeria possesses many of the attributes conducive to violent extremism, why has the country not succumbed along a similar path as Somalia? Unfortunately, many of the states listed in Appendix B possess systems that remain largely ignorant of their role and largely impotent in their responsibilities as players are left to respond as they see fit, and the specifics of their involvement correlate to myopic rational choice terms.

**Instability Indications**

The study supports the following defined causative factors in determining the capability of synthetic states to effectively overcome various internal and external pressure points threatening them. The list of factors draws on the literature review of contemporary theologies, CIA structured analytical technique, or research question of interest. Synthetic states are countries whose borders are defined by colonial powers, and display a cosmetic design of ethnic, tribal, and religious differences that can inherently create an unstable environment:

1. Protracted regional conflict—regional conflicts encroaching upon the state
which then experiences instability (protracted region conflict principles are drawn from the literature review of Marshall and represented as $P_{RC}$)

2. Protracted social conflict—political participation through competitive elections, consensual constitution and rule of law, civil and human rights, and civil society institutions, environmental health, food, energy and medical supplies, transportation system, and emergency response capability to disasters (protracted social conflict attributes are derived from Azar’s review and depicted as $P_{SC}$)

3. Government capacity—political leadership, organizational/bureaucratic, internal security, legitimacy, and judiciary (monitoring a government’s attributes over time describes ($\Delta G$))

4. Dwindling economic conditions—economic development and growth, income parity, quality education and high literacy, and low level of human talent flight (monitoring a change in the economic status of a country describes ($\Delta E$))

5. Opposition conditions—ethnic, religious and sectarian integration, low levels of dissatisfaction and dissent, absence of insurgent activities, and peaceful relations with neighboring states (the opposite conditions are depicted as VE for violent extremism and, when reviewed over time in the specified country, defines H)

The countries of Somalia, South Sudan, Nigeria, and Central African Republic are analyzed based on the following methodology of instability indicators:

Figure 2: Instability country formula

$$\text{Instability}_{x(Country)} = ((\Delta G + \Delta E + P_{SC} + P_{RC}) / (VE \text{ (internal or external affiliates)} + H)) \times 2$$

$G =$ Change in governance indicators from Appendix B (government capacity and legitimacy)
E = Change in economic situation from Appendix B

$P_{SC} = \text{Protracted social conflict change from Appendix B}$

$P_{RC} = \text{Protracted regional conflict}$

$VE = \text{Injection of violent extremism}$

$H = \text{History of violent extremism}$

Figure 2: Identifying the independent variables in the unstable country formula supports varying indications relative to predictive modeling supporting conditions conducive to the injection of violent extremism.

The formula depicted in figure 2 defines attributes articulated in politically unstable environments of a country ($\text{Instability}_X$). When a country changes the government ($\Delta G$), and experiences economic ($\Delta E$), regional ($P_{RC}$), and social conflicts ($P_{SC}$), an opportunity arises for the injection of VE into the now fragile country. When there is a history ($H$) of VE in the country over time, there is an increased likelihood of the continual injection of extremism as the social and political landscape alters. The creation of the predictive formula supports multiple factors articulated in the three Appendices with the qualitative analysis that provides a multi-faceted approach to conflict resolution. There is not one primary factor among the multiple facets which supports a sole justification for countering the formula’s applicability. By incorporating all five values, a holistic approach to identifying core issues within a fragile state is addressed. Meanwhile, the outcome of the formula supports a metric for concern.

When continuing to monitor the various indicators within each phase of the cycle of state failure, differences in metric value support predictive modeling relative to the injection of VE leading to state failure and the potential for foreign intervention. Initially, South Sudan, Nigeria, and Central African Republic are below the 50 percent criteria
supporting indications of potential foreign intervention based on Appendix B’s estimate of national interest requirements. If depicting this indication on a heat chart, the color shifts from yellow to amber. As the percentage broaches 33 percent, countries should fall into the continual monitoring category shifting from a yellow green color to a yellow color. These are the heat signatures of change.

The formula was designed based on outcomes of Appendix C, which draws on Appendices A and B. In a simplistic approach to supporting the formula, these variables are tallied in Appendix C as an example of continuing to monitor for predictive analysis. Each independent variable scored a rating from 0 (meaning non-applicable) through 5 (indicating citing harsh conditions of instability) inhibiting a collection metric or drastic changes in the total number between the four countries. If a country received a not rated (N/R) scoring from Appendix B, the country obtained a score of five. Moreover, in some models South Sudan was not recognized because the state had recently become independent. In these cases, South Sudan was reportedly included in the metrics for Sudan, therefore leading to some inconsistencies. In attempting to discern whether the Central African Republic or South Sudan were more unstable, a potential shift in the total quantifiable measurements is noted. Finally, the quantity of indicators per variable can continue to lengthen based on refinements relative to the intelligence analysts’ requirements and the focal point of their supporting organization.

**Research Methodology**

The most relevant research tradition supporting the dissertation is grounded theory. Grounded theory provides a unified theoretical explanation of a process, action, or interaction shaped by the views of the participants (Creswell, 2013). This tradition
incorporates five major characteristics. First, the researcher focuses on a process with particular phases occurring over time. The dissertation deals with ideas presented in the literature review that support a current conflict associated with countries considered weak and failing, along with one successful country attempting to counter VE. Next, the researcher attempts to develop a theory of the said process to support eventual coding. In this case, the developed theory resonates with the presented instability country formula supported in the Appendices. Third, the primary form of data collection unique to this tradition is incorporating instrumental case studies, and returning to the evolving theory as a means to fill in gaps in the proposed research. To augment the quantifiable structured analytical technique, qualitative information from the literature is bundled into individual case studies to provide a holistic approach that supports the scientific method of analysis. Finally, the data analysis is structured by following a pattern evolving into categories that intersect to focus the approach (Creswell, 2013).

This type of research tradition supports terrorism and counter-terrorism research as a future analysis of the category of political instability fostering an environment of ideological terrorism. Through research, the researcher identifies steps or indicators alluding to this action occurring. Potentially, the theory revolves around the potential for emerging extremist factions and provides a social outreach within the failing state as a means to fill the void in the community.

Simply stated, qualitative analysis is a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem (Creswell, 2009). While the methodologies for assessing state instability, fragility and failure are well established, this methodology focuses on the indices of state stability and effectiveness.
The altered focus supports a precipitous decomposition in significant ratios of stable states, particularly those affecting our globalized and interconnected economic system, which triggers a cascading of catastrophic systemic disruptions throughout the world.

Four cases are studied with this research methodology. An instrumental case study attempts to understand specific concerns relating to stability to increase an understanding to the components of global security (Creswell, 2013). The goal of reviewing various media and interpretations of data support the researcher in obtaining consistent existing patterns to recommend measures of performance to support national interests and global security. This model’s objective is to provide analysts with a quantifiable tool for examining the political, military socioeconomic, environmental, and opposition activity constituting the geopolitical makeup of countries of interest to assess their performance and effectiveness in managing multi-dimensional issues and pressures.

Published data and decisions strongly indicate the need for intelligence-driven strategies to require consolidating physical, informational, and behavioral sciences into logical, cohesive overlays or patterns applied to human terrain data. Meanwhile, generating actionable, valid, and reliable risk assessments to counter adversarial behaviors is a challenging endeavor. Extremists are not homogeneous. They differ widely in terms of capabilities; motivations; decision-making information, skills, and processes; as well as in organizational or personal psychology. At the same time, intelligence organizations formulate assumptions and assessments based upon an Iraq or Afghanistan mentality, which supports “cookie-cutter” or checklist mentalities as opposed critical thinking supported by scientific methodologies. Table 3 highlights many of these methods in with their limitations.
Supporting predictive analysis, mathematical modeling models individual behavior, yet standards act of organizations, governmental institutions, or other actors (Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002). Through the use of predictive modeling, researchers identify a precise means of discussing a problem and determining what factors are considered. In addition, this form of modeling allows researchers to derive new relations in an elegant and practical mode of communicating certain ideas (Myers, & Oliver, 2002).

Mathematical modeling is used to quantitatively express a researcher’s degree of belief in the hypothesis where the total belief held by the researcher associates deterministic potential possibilities related to a scientific methodology substantiating the research. Many times research appears very subjective, based on the references sourced or biases imposed by identifying references sharing the same argument. At the same time, misrepresenting numbers creates statistical fallacies. Meanwhile, through the use of scientific, predictive modeling, the ability to create an accurate depiction of what is correct within the equation appears more justifiable and credible. Through the expression of mathematical equations, a researcher mitigates imprecision by ensuring precise rules while forcing considerations of an exhaustive set of alternatives. Utilizing the equations enables the researcher to provide analysis on a rational basis while providing an accurate prediction for a fragile country of interest (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2011).

If analysts employ predictive modeling via mathematical modeling, they need to resort to software packages to produce the types of solution efficiently and support their commander’s decision-making process. Richard Clarke (2013) commented that analysts use tools like spreadsheets to support advanced analytical efforts by saying: “Spreadsheet
software has made it easy to create equation-based models. The rich set of mathematical
functions incorporated into a spreadsheet provides flexibility and make the spreadsheet a
widely used type for intelligence” (p. 62).

The strength of the research lies in methodological triangulation to confirm the
validity of theoretical propositions and findings. The research design relies on several
methods to analyze its results, including a literature review, discourse analysis,
mathematical modeling, and grounded theory. A greater diversity of perspectives from
both regions is more meaningful in informing theory, and particularly in assessing global
multilateral interventions in weak, failing, and fragile states.
Chapter Four

Data Analysis and Discussion

In view of the theoretical and methodological criticisms of the literature discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, this chapter offers an alternative lens for diagnosing problems of state weakness, fragility, failure, and collapse. The gaps identified in the literature pertain to regional and global contexts of state performance while contending with VE. This chapter describes the importance of a multi-tiered level of analysis. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of protracted social conflicts; the problem-solving response of local civil society actors, the regional contagion of protracted instability, hostile neighbors, and the impact of external multilateral interventions. Through each of these variables, there are consistent criteria alluding to a politically unstable environment. First, the behavior or event possesses an anti-system character reflecting a condition at odds with the existing political authority. Second, any selective criterion possesses direct and relatively immediate political significance. Finally, the event must involve collective or mass activity.

Proposed Theoretical Framework

A proposed theoretical framework guides practitioners and policy makers in comprehensively analyzing various conditions leading to state failure and collapse, and intervention by the international community to manage those conditions. A host of regional and global sources of state instability are explored for the purposes of theory development to assess state performance and guide policy. The local sources of conflict include: hostile and/or hegemonic neighbors; power asymmetries; chronic refugee flows; trafficking of narcotics, arms, and humans; cross-border spillover of violence and sources
of terrorism. Likewise, vast global inputs such as: arms sales, military interventions, restrictive trade covenants, ideological pressures, high power competition for minerals and resources in Third World states, donor-driven development agendas, and political clienteles are among many international factors required for examination as possible impediments to successful state performance.

When studying the problem of state instability, it is important to remain aware that globalization has created a vastly interconnected world. With this in mind, instability in any one state is not entirely a consequence of its domestic context, as much as of what is occurring in the global context. Consider an indirect manifestation of international spillover of violence explored derived throughout the arc of instability, associated with the multiplier-effect-systemic contagion. The spillover of violence entails global diffusion of conflict through the demonstration and bandwagon effects, whereby conflict dynamics (e.g., ethnic insurgency) in one country triggers regional conflict. These and other dynamics of the global security environment call for a wider examination of the international environment and its implications for global instability.

In an apparent contradiction, while many of the quantitative indices identified in Chapter 2 address the threat of spillover from weak and fragile states, most do not situate them in a regional and international security context. The illustration in figure 3 depicts the interconnection between the state’s domestic environment and the local and global environments. When examining the performance of a state, it is critical to assess local and global influences threatening its stability or causing instability, in addition to the threats the fragile state poses to regional and global security. However, the threat weak and failing states pose to the global community remains central to the debate, with little
consideration of how the global context imperils the weak, failing, and fragile state. This research study argues the trajectory of state fragility and failure is rooted in exogenous factors as well as endogenous factors.

Figure 3: Interconnection between the state’s domestic environment, the regional and global environments

Figure 3: When combined, the domestic, regional, and global factors support pillars of instability. Adapted from Revisiting the Discourse on State Failure: Towards a Conflict Resolution Trajectory, by S. Yamin, 2011, George Mason University, p. 38.

The theoretical framework developed explores the endogenous (structural and societal) and exogenous (regional and global) conditions, which lead to state instability and fragility, thereby establishing the conditions of failure when afflicting the state over prolonged periods. The study defines state failure where the state suffers from an overwhelming loss of legitimacy across its geographic area; where it is unable or unwilling to provide public goods and services, justice and security, opportunities for self-actualization and socioeconomic development; where its relationship with civil society is highly asymmetrical; and where society itself is highly fragmented, challenging the cohesiveness of the state through the manifestation of protracted conflict. Figure 4 illustrates the critical components of the theoretical framework postulated for the
diagnosis of state failure. The categories provided in figure 6 supported the analysis based on Appendix C.

Figure 4: Cycle of state failure supporting violent extremism

Figure 4: The cycle alludes to five causative factors leading to the injection of violent extremism. Any one of the factors may support the injection, yet when combined they predict the onset of political instability.

**Dwindling Economy**

The general income level of a nation affects its receptivity to democratic norms. If there is enough wealth in the country so that it does not make much difference whether some redistribution occurs, it is more palatable to accept the idea of indifference to which side of governance obtains power. On the other hand, if the loss of office leads to the increased loss for major power groups, then the group losing control seeks to retain or secure office by any means available. There was the potential for this in Nigeria’s 2015 election (Lipset, 1963). One hardly expects economic growth in light of political turmoil, riots, and unpredictable changes in a regime. Thus, it is those societies at low to middle levels of economic development, where violence increases across nations, are precisely those with higher rates of population growth and relatively low rates of economic growth.
as described in figure 5.

Figure 5: Effects of population growth relative to the economy

As shown in Appendix C, the dwindling economy attribute articulates seven indicators supporting a quantifiable analysis. Comparing four countries (Somalia, South Sudan, Nigeria, and Central African Republic), a ranking is established of 1 to 5. Typically, a ranking of 1 to 4 may be established to identify which country is performing better in a given indicator. In some cases, one country performed extremely well comparatively, hence the alteration in numbers to reflect the superior performance. In most cases a metric of 1 to 4 is established as opposed to 1 to 5. The first indicator compares a country’s ability to provide a high level of economic development and not see educated individuals leaving in pursuit of better lives. This indicator supports a return of individuals supporting their government, which provides employment and relatively low inflation. Other indicators compared poverty, GDP growth, out of pocket health-care expenses, military expenditures for domestic security, and the ability to manage taxes by controlling some corruption. The results of this phase of the cycle of state failure support
Nigeria’s overwhelming economic stature based on the country’s domestic oil production. On the other hand, Somalia was deemed the worst state whereas South Sudan and the Central African Republic were in third and second place respectively.

**Protracted Region Conflict (P\textsubscript{RC})**

One of the critical considerations in societal collapse is a hostile neighbor intervening in domestic issues. When contemplating the medium to transcribe local issues relative to regional associations, it is important to broaden this perspective and consider the role of hostile powers that threaten the stability of weak and fragile states. For the purposes of this research, the relations of weak and fragile states with neighboring states are examined as well, associating contentious relationships with distant conquering states. Patterns of sporadic or chronic hostilities with neighboring states concern the impact on state fragility. Likewise, P\textsubscript{RC} supports the examination of the impact of Western-led humanitarian and strategic military interventions in perceived failed and fragile states.

In the cycle of state failure, protracted regional conflict identifies six variables in Appendix C. The six variables are the spillover of violence from neighboring countries, military intervention, foreign aid intervention, international arms transfers, trade dependence, and peaceful relations with neighboring states. Nigeria and Somalia represented the best and worst states with South Sudan and the Central African Republic were in third and second place respectively again.

**Protracted Social Conflict (P\textsubscript{SC})**

The protracted social conflict phase of the cycle of state failure had the most indicators at eleven. This phase represents the ability of a state to support its constituents, and, where sufficient, prevents the injection of extremists who may support regime
change. The indicators are healthy environment, education, literacy rates, natural resource depletion, child mortality, life expectancy, life satisfaction, freedom, voice and accountability, internal security, and the percentage of the population affected by natural disasters. As in the previous two categories, the following results were articulated from 1 to 4: Nigeria, Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Somalia.

The indicators selected for this phase support unique characteristics associated with domestic concerns. As mentioned, the higher the literacy and education rates, the less likely a country is to support the injection of a counternarrative from VE against the government. Moreover, when a state provides a disease-free environment for the population, the life expectancy increases. Meanwhile, decreases in child mortality rates ensure that individuals have the potential to increase the population by creating economic worth to the state and a better way of life.

Nevertheless, high states of tension require immediate alleviation through the venting of hostility against a scapegoat and the search for a short-term solution with the support of extremist groups. Research indicates the unemployed are less tolerant toward the minorities than the employed. Lipset (1963) cites:

The psychologist Hadley Cantril considered suggestibility to be a major psychological explanation for participation in extremists’ movements. The two conditions for suggestibility are both typical of low-status persons: either the lack of an adequate frame of reference or general perspective or a fixed, rigid one. A poorly developed frame of reference reflects a limited education, a paucity of the productive association on a general level, which provides a basis for evaluating experience. A fixed or rigid one…reflects the tendency to elevate whatever
general principles are learned to absolutes that even experience may fail to qualify and correct (p. 108).

Low-status persons without rich and flexible perspectives are likely to lack a developed sense of the past and the future. Their education is unlikely to have left them with any historical overview or with any idea of a continuing tradition. Vast amounts of the population with disconnected information possess little historical knowledge of various ideological processes. With little intellectual or cultural knowledge and with little training in testing opposing views against reason and existing judgments, decisions are made according to promptings of the received ideas of the group, which come to mind first. Similarly, because there is little real sense of the future; the temptation of an alternative utopia arises.

This emphasis on immediate concerns derives from a short-term perspective and the inability to perceive complex possibilities and the consequences of actions in support of extremist political and religious movements. Even within extremist movements these differences in perception and perspective of working class versus middle class affect their experiences, readiness to join the cause, and reasons for defecting.

Unique indicators included were the ability of a population to feel they are free within the fragile state with an active voice for change. An active voice by constituents in their society reduces the likelihood for the injection of VE to provide another counter-narrative, thereby collapsing the state.

**Declining Governance**

There are eight indicators in the declining governance cycle of state failure. They are political participation, stability, ability to manage a modern state, human
development, Internet users, criminal justice system, adherence to civil rights, and the type of electoral system. Continuing with a consistent theme, the rankings resulted in Nigeria and Somalia occupying the extremes of first and fourth place whereas South Sudan and the Central African Republic tied for second place.

The declining governance phase’s unique indicators are the rule of law, competitive electoral systems, and Internet users. Nigeria clearly shows an ability to provide security in the southern portion of the state even with the injection of Boko Haram in the northeast. Meanwhile, all the states except Somalia continue to display an ability to provide a competitive electoral system supporting the constituents’ desire for changes in the administration. Finally, because Nigerians can use the Internet, the state provides an outlet for advancement in knowledge and understanding with a readily available medium.

**Opposition**

The final observed phase in the cycle of state failure was opposition, which displays seven indicators. The indicators range from ethnic/sectarian violence, riots, refugees, coups, conflict intensity, human rights abuses, and terrorist group activities. All of these indicators support the spread of VE throughout the state when supported by any of the previously mentioned phases in the cycle of state failure. Interestingly enough, Nigeria was the worst state, stricken by a history of violence that provided the injection opportunities for VE. In this instance, South Sudan was the best country potentially because it was the newest nation in a globalized society. Some of South Sudan’s data intertwines with Sudan’s for a clear image of the state’s potential history or potential injection of extremism. Meanwhile, the Central African Republic was in second place
because of the overwhelming number of human rights abuses and refugees.

Antagonistic group histories, exclusionist myths, demonizing propaganda and dehumanizing ideologies serve to justify discriminatory policies and legitimize atrocities. In these circumstances, actions are mutually interpreted in the most threatening light, “the worst motivations tend to be attributed to the other side,” the space for compromise and accommodation shrinks and “proposals for political solutions become rare, and tend to be perceived on all sides as mechanisms for gaining relative power and control” (Azar, 1990, p. 15). All of these attributes intensify as political crisis spiral into war, where new vested interests emerge dependent on the political economy of the war itself, the most violent and unruly elements in society appear in leadership roles and criminality becomes a political norm. At the limit, disintegration follows. With sustained attrition, political structures buckle and collapse. It is a social implosion which creates a power vacuum.

A frequent observation by analysis of comparative violence derives insurrections and rebellions hinge in part to the presence of primordial cleavages. Hibb (1973) cites:

The possibility of an insurrectionary movement arising and then employing organized violence depends upon the existence of sharp divisions within society created by regional, ethnic, linguistic, class, religious, and other communal differences that may provide the necessary social and demographic basis for supporting the movement (p. 66).

Within destabilizing societies, it is neither the most highly industrialized nor the most traditional societies that typically experience rebellions or insurrections, rather those where the process of social and psychological disruption accompanying the downfall of traditional societies fosters the mechanism that supports sharp divisions in societies.
Injection of VE

With the growing use of the tactic of terrorism to support extremist groups in achieving their aims of creating political instability, the status of extremist religion is a product of the same social forces that sustain authoritarian political attitudes. In the affected regions, the revolts of the poor, tinged with religion, carry millennial ideas that spawn and spread to small sects that support extremism. These projections are a “defense mechanism of the disinherited; despairing of obtaining substantial blessings through social processes, they turn on the world which withholds benefits and seeks its destruction in a cosmic cataclysm which exalts them and cast down the rich and powerful” (Lipset, 1963, p. 98). When the five attributes described above come together as a psychological appeal to imagination and simplicity of feeling with a non-reflective habit of mind, a primitive energy, and an urgent sense of need forms.

To summarize, the lower class individual is likely to have been exposed to punishment, lack of love, and a general atmosphere of tension and aggression from early childhood and tends to feel deep-rooted hostilities expressed in ethnic prejudice, political authoritarianism, and chiliastic religion. The extremist’s educational attainment is less than others with a higher socioeconomic status, and their association as a child with others of similar background fails to stimulate intellectual interests, yet creates an atmosphere preventing educational experiences from increasing their general social sophistication and understanding of differing groups and ideas. Leaving school puts the individuals in an environment where they are surrounded on the job by others with a similarly restricted cultural, educational, and family background. Little external influence
impinges on their limited environment. From early childhood, these individuals seek immediate gratification, rather than engaging in pastimes with long-term rewards.

All of these characteristics produce a tendency to view politics and personal relationships in black and white terms, with a desire for immediate action, and impatience with talk and discussion, a lack of interest in organizations that have a long-range perspective, and a readiness to follow leaders who offer a demonological interpretation of the evil forces that are conspiring against the masses. The proposition that the lack of a rich, complex frame of reference is the vital variable connecting low status and a predisposition toward extremism does not suggest that the lower strata are authoritarian; it implies they choose the least sophisticated alternative. In situations where extremism represents the more complex rather than the less sophisticated form of politics, low status is associated with opposition to movements and parties.

Utilizing these formulas provided to predict instability throughout Africa, analysts predict future concerns to support preventive policymaking. Focusing on these countries, Appendix A identifies six states for continued analysis relative to predicting instability. Three of the countries are explored in a qualitative research analysis which augments the quantifiable Appendices (Somalia, South Sudan, and Central African Republic). Establishing initial assessment from various organizations, these indices derive a historical perspective developing a foundational concern within the arc of instability.

The six countries are compiled in Appendix B for baseline analysis to support a cursory understanding of the countries of interest prior to injecting them into the previously mentioned formulas associated with the five causative factors to monitor the progress of each state. Appendix B provides a periodical review of observable events or
trends, which allow the analyst to observe events, targets, emerging trends and warn of unanticipated change. This model’s objective provides analysts and policymakers with an empirically-based tool for examining the political, military, socioeconomic, environmental, and opposition activity threads that are the geopolitical makeup of the countries of interest to assess their performance and effectiveness in managing multi-dimensional issues and pressures. Comparing cumulative scores over time reveals a targeted country’s relative performance during periods of concern, with indicators alluding to strengths or problem areas to develop actionable early warning policy response measures to preempt a state’s inability to govern (Sinai, 2014).

Case Study Analysis

The following countries include components of state fragility. The selection of three countries, after using the metrics from Appendix A, serves as a starting point for the discussion of fragility. One of the countries, Somalia, has the incursion of VE in the form of al-Shabaab, which maintains Somalia’s failed country status with VE. The second country is South Sudan. As the newest country in the world, South Sudan is a fragile country displaying many of the components, yet does not display the injection of violence to exploit regional conflicts. Violence in South Sudan supports the potential for regime change, similar to the Central African Republic. The Central African Republic is a fragile state with a religious fervor in a violent extremist-dominated society. These three cases correlate with Nigeria, which has a violent extremist organization, Boko Haram, yet is not considered a failed state.

From a review of the case studies and quantifiable data in the Appendices, the question is asked why does Nigeria have the highest total in the opposition conditions
phase, yet is not considered a failed state—even with the injection of Boko Haram’s VE? Meanwhile, South Sudan and Central African Republic have an abundance of refugees and ethnic/sectarian conflicts intertwined in a regional conflict, yet the states do not have the injection of VE as seen in Somalia. To answer the question, the instability-country formula augments the data provided in Appendix C. Since the initial data spanned ten years, the constant for history (H) is 10.

\[
\text{Instability}_{x(Country)} = \frac{(\Delta G + \Delta E + P_{SC} + P_{RC})}{(\text{VE (internal or external affiliates)} + H)} \times 2
\]

\[
\text{Instability}_{\text{Somalia}} = \frac{(30 + 31 + 48 + 27)}{(17 + 10)} \times 2
\]

\[
\text{Instability}_{\text{Somalia}} = 74\% \text{ likelihood of continual VE conflict supported by al-Shabaab}
\]

\[
\text{Instability}_{\text{South Sudan}} = \frac{(17 + 20 + 33 + 18)}{(12 + 10)} \times 2
\]

\[
\text{Instability}_{\text{South Sudan}} = 30\% \text{ likelihood of continual social and regional conflict}
\]

\[
\text{Instability}_{\text{CAR}} = \frac{(17 + 15 + 24 + 16)}{(16 + 10)} \times 2
\]

\[
\text{Instability}_{\text{CAR}} = 38\% \text{ likelihood of continual social conflict}
\]

\[
\text{Instability}_{\text{Nigeria}} = \frac{(12 + 11 + 21 + 10)}{(19 + 10)} \times 2
\]

\[
\text{Instability}_{\text{Nigeria}} = 34\% \text{ likelihood of continual protracted regional/social conflict supported by Boko Haram}
\]

Whereas Chapter 2 discussed the literature on the Stability Categories in Appendix B, the beginning sections of Chapter 4 highlighted relevant literature associated with the five variables in the cycle of state fragility articulated in figure 6. Based on the qualitative literature and figures provided while incorporating the quantitative analysis from the Appendices, tables, and figures, the two most significant independent variables are a country’s economic and social structures. In the search for economic indicators, some of the more alarming metrics associate poverty lines in a
country, military expenditures supporting a state’s security, GDP, and medical expenses. Compared to the PSC variable, a state’s ability to support connectivity through communication systems, active voice and accountability, literacy rates and education quality, mixed with life expectancies and satisfaction, define stability. These two independent variables are the underpinnings of maintaining stability in fragile countries.

When a state begins to support higher unemployment rates, lower military expenditures, decreased ability to support health care, increasing inflation and decreasing GDP, the scenario supporting potential regime change and coups is exponential. These variables in a dwindling economy are tinder awaiting the fire that is the conditions that upset the social contract between a state and its population. The consumption of resources at a higher rate results in diminished educational opportunities, natural disasters affecting the majority of the population, and mortality rates increasing while life expectancy decreases. These establish the conditions that support a decrease in life satisfaction and a requirement for change and instability.

These variables and indicators are prevalent in Somalia, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic. Somalia continues to endure widespread lawlessness, ineffective government, terrorism, insurgency, crime, and abysmal development, while the country does appear to be on a slow trajectory of improvement leading some cause for hope. In South Sudan, the country’s independence, while initially cause for celebration, is now giving cause for concern as its politics and leadership grow increasingly fractious, and mass killings—especially targeting specific ethnic groups—gain momentum. Finally, the Central African Republic continues to dwindle to a state
ready for collapse into civil war, widespread atrocities, and the deployment of a French peacekeeping force.

Although Nigeria has Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, their geographic location is far from the significant oil refineries that support a growing economy. With a large GDP ranking, Nigeria continues to support the educational and other opportunities that are a requirement for increased human capital resulting in minimal need for individuals to flee unemployment to join terrorist-affiliated organizations. Through Nigeria’s ability to provide a strong economic backbone to its constituents, the country displays opportunities for advancement within the country. With a strong educational and literacy rate, the population displays an active voice for democracy and government accountability, which provides opportunities for constituents to support change instead of coups and terrorist affiliates.

When continuing to monitor the various indicators within each phase of the cycle of state failure, differences in metric value support predictive modeling relative to the injection of VE that leads to state failure and the potential foreign intervention. Initially, South Sudan, Nigeria, and Central African Republic were below the 50 percent criterion which is the indicator of potential foreign intervention based on Appendix B’s estimate of national interest requirements. In a depiction of this change on a heat chart, the color changes from yellow to amber. As the figure broaches 33 percent, countries should fall into the continual monitoring category shifting from a yellow green color to a yellow color in the heat signatures of change.

Many of the attributes articulated within the analysis and case studies support differences in cycles of fragility. Through the cycle of time, space, and will countries
continue to evolve with the aid of intervention forces. As time progresses, the situation returns to normalcy or deteriorates supporting the inflection of violence through the will of the opposition. When the will of the opposition expands, the space or regional emphasis surpasses a local conflict into a regional concern.

**Case One—Somalia.** Somalia obtained independence from colonial rule in 1960, along with a voluntary unification of two separate colonial territories known as British Somaliland and Italian Somalia. For the past three decades, the country has been without a central government, mirroring a textbook case of state fragility. Somalia’s descent into chaos is attributed to a combination of factors including the fall of Siad Barre’s repressive regime in 1991, hastened by waning superpower support at the culmination of the Cold War, and a clan-based insurgency. The United Somali Congress (USC), a prominent political and paramilitary organization representing the Hawiye clan in south-central Somalia played a key role in Barre’s ouster, who had himself assumed power through a military coup in 1969. A protracted civil war consumed Somalia during the overthrow of Barre.

In the first year of civil war 300,000 people lost their lives, five million faced starvation and disease, and one million were displaced (UNOSOM, 2014). Between 1991 and 1993, Somalia was afflicted by a severe famine that killed up to 280,000 people and displaced over two million people (Gundel, 2002). Most accounts consider the famine the precursor of the conflict (UNESCO, 2001).

The outbreak of the Somali civil war in 1988, the toppling of Siad Barre’s dictatorial regime in 1991, and the subsequent disbanding of the Somali National Army (SNA) created a ten-year power vacuum in Somalia. In the wake of this collapse, many
of the disparate anti-Barre opposition groups seized on the opportunity to compete for influence. In this vacuum of effective governance, the condition of lawlessness produced a sundry series of actors (variously termed as warlords, insurgents, and militants) who prospered on war, chaos, and criminality. A organizational response to disorder was the formation of the Union of Islamic Courts, which created a religious dimension and provided an opportunity for extremist religious organizers to insert themselves into local governance. One of the more dominant radical organizations spawning from the Islamic Courts is al-Shabaab, which eventually evolved to formally become part of the al-Qai’da enterprise (Yamin, 2014).

From the early nineties, Somalis continued their commerce and local or regional governance while resisting or dismissing attempts by the international community to impose the reestablishment of Mogadishu-based constitutional government. The Somali national government traces its origins to the post-9/11 political era. In 2004, Kenya held a conference sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Yamin, 2014). IGAD succeeded in creating a Transitional Federal Charter and a Transitional Federal Parliament with a five-year mandate. Embracing the concept of federalism, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) included existing state governments and regional administrations, such as Somaliland and Puntland, yet remained a weak, donor-driven institution with little public support in Somalia (Yamin, 2014). Though formed as a Somali unity government, it soon split into two camps: a pro-Ethiopian, pro-federalist and anti-Islamist wing concentrated in areas outside Mogadishu, and an anti-Ethiopian, centralist inclusive of Islamist groups with a power base in Mogadishu.
In 2006, armed clashes sparked between a U.S.-backed alliance of militia leaders and a coalition of Islamist militias culminated in a decisive Islamist victory, which organized themselves as the Union of Islamic Courts (ICU) referred to above. Consolidating control of Mogadishu in June 2006, the ICU expanded its control over south-central Somalia. To broaden the TFG’s appeal among Somalis, the ICU created an equitable power-sharing agreement, resulting in the IGAD deploying a peacekeeping force providing security for the TFG. As the agreement dwindled, a subsequent incursion developed into the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Eventually 2,000 Ugandan and Burundian forces deployed to the AMISOM mission, far short of the 8,000 initially sought (Yamin, 2014). Ethiopian troops remained deployed in Somalia as a result, and their presence provoked Somali armed resistance. The TFG became the Somali Federal Government in 2012, and obtained international recognition (Yamin, 2014). A key part of the success was AMISOM, which protects, supports, and provides development space for the reconstitution of the Somali government in Mogadishu and beyond.

When the ICU collapsed in 2006, al-Shabaab emerged as the greatest threat to international and Somali government forces by virtue of its ties to al-Qai’da and ability to generate a conventional and asymmetric threat. By 2009, it held administrative and social control over more than 40,000 square kilometers of territory and a population of five million. It possessed the capability to recruit fighters from Somalia and beyond and could provide basic social services to a portion of the population that tolerated the regime while it quickly terrorized non-supporters into submission (Yamin, 2014).

As AMISOM found success in offensive operations, al-Shabaab sought to change
the character of the conflict. With AMISOM’s capability increasing, al-Shabaab changed tactics from fighting pitched battles against increasingly better trained and equipped AMISOM forces in major cities, to insurgency tactics severing AMISOM supply lines, challenging AMISOM’s control of the countryside, and using lulls between AMISOM offensives to regain strength. Al-Shabaab continues to avoid direct confrontations with AMISOM, while directing their attention to generating small scale humanitarian crises by destroying pumps, agricultural equipment, and blocking commerce. Moreover, al-Shabaab continues to become more involved in criminal activity such as trafficking, production of illicit drugs, and poaching and trafficking wildlife.

Meanwhile, AMISOM and the Somali Federal Government display an inability to assert nominal governance over liberated areas. The net effect in Somalia is that al-Shabaab relinquishes much of their ability to govern broad swaths of Somalia including Mogadishu, regional capitals, and major ports. Somalia’s evolving atmosphere enables al-Shabaab to effect changes in strategy and tactics.

To date, security efforts in Somalia are largely externally driven. AMISOM’s success comes from strong and enduring international support to a group of regional Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) dedicated to neutralizing a regional threat and stabilizing the security environment in the Horn of Africa. Mogadishu and its environs is the field of conflict where African Union forces operate and create space for Somali Federal Government institutions to take root (Carter & Guard, 2015).

The Somali government lacks the capacities to extend governance beyond Mogadishu. Its effort to extend basic services into the interior is nascent and dependent on donor support. Negotiations between regions and the central government on the
division of responsibility and authority under a national consensus of federalism have yet to begin.

Around the world, the links between security sector reform and politics are long established. However, in Somalia this challenge is made even more complex by the lack of basic infrastructure and governing institutions to effect reform. Somalia is struggling to establish legitimate governance after twenty years of violence and chaos. The average Somali lacks a memory of what it is like to live within the constructs of a national state (Carter & Guard, 2015). In short, there is no tradition of national representative governance in Somalia. This is a rather unique circumstance compared to other countries recovering from conflict. Without a historical reference of what is right, state building and security sector reform in Somalia must follow a pragmatic path advancing a federal model of governance while balancing national, provincial, clan, and regional interests (Carter & Guard, 2015).

Three reasons support the inclusion of Somalia in this research. First, it provides a classic example of a failed state for purposes of analysis; and second, it provides insights into the motivations for external military intervention by preeminent global actors (the UN and the US) in the pre-9/11 landscape. Finally, the impact of external military intervention in Somalia is examined and compared with other international initiatives.

Western discourses generally emphasize the humanitarian dimension of the US-led UN missions in Somalia in the early 1990s. However, Bradbury and Healy (2010) argue US intervention was a response to the threat that the collapsed Somalian state posed to the “New World Order” proclaimed by President Bush at the end of the Cold War. Additionally, Kurth suggests intervention was partly driven by strategic interest
(2005, p. 93). One argues the drivers of the US policy of military intervention in response to failed states did not change radically in the aftermath of 9/11. Moreover, the intervention in Somalia was triggered by a humanitarian crisis. Post-9/11, US-led foreign military interventions in perceived failed states experience a policy shift grounded in the perception of direct threats to the West.

US policy in the international political climate is not responsive to a humanitarian concern for vulnerable populations. Ironically, the humanitarian perception has been used post-9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq among other factors including the elimination of terrorist safe havens and WMD (Kurth, 2005). It appears that the lines between humanitarian response, collaborating with rogue governments, and fighting terrorism blur foreign policy discourses. The extensive collateral damage and human displacement caused by interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that the humanitarian objectives of external actors are secondary. The perception of threat associated with these states has played strongly in a West-centric intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq where external actors differ in perception from conflict actors and occupiers to mediators of domestic and regional peace (Yamin, 2014). Unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, in Somalia the military intervention was short-lived and not a factor in the state’s collapse, but it served to complicate the conflict environment.

The attributes of Somalia that show it to be a failed state are lack of structure and a central government for an extended period of time. Moreover, Somali society is highly fragmented with several regions operating as autonomous units. Somaliland has been a self-declared independent republic since 1991, but has been denied international recognition as a sovereign state (Shashank, 2009). Jubaland, situated in southwestern
Somalia, declared itself independent in 1998, but its autonomous status remains unresolved (Emathe, 2006). Likewise Puntland, in north-east Somalia, declared itself an autonomous state in August 1998, but seeks inclusion within a federal Somalia (BBC, 2014). According to a UN report, Puntland declared a temporary secession pending the restoration of stability in Somalia (Ref World, 2009). Thus, the absence of an effective central government led to a crisis of fragmented sovereignty and a deeply divided society. Ethnic infighting and clan cleansing following the 1991 overthrow of Siad Barre’s regime were so horrific that relationships between various tribes are still fractured. The narratives of the Somali diaspora and the transgenerational transmission of trauma reflect reflective of deep societal cleavages and PSC (Volkan, 2006).

In addition to PSC and the absence of an effective sovereignty for an extended time, Somalia is situated in a region where there is protracted conflict with hostile neighbors. Regional rivalries in the Horn of Africa led to proxy wars between Eritrea and Somalia (Lyons, 2007; Jan 2001). Tensions persist along Somalia’s border with Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Somalia’s territorial claims on Somali-inhabited areas in northeast Kenya, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and Djibouti are a source of turbulence (BBC, 2014). In tracing the recent history of Somalia’s relations with other states in the region, it is important to note that it has engaged in direct and proxy warfare on several fronts. Between 1960 and 1964, Somali backed guerillas fought security forces along the border with Ethiopia and Kenya to further Somalia’s demand for a Pan-Somali state (Nazli, 2004). Additionally, in 1977 and 1978 Somalia had invaded Ethiopia and lost the Ogaden War in vain attempt achieve its irredentist aim of a greater Somalia (Nazli, 2004).

Subsequently, in 1982, Ethiopia invaded Somalia, capturing two Somali border towns,
Balumbale and Galdogob. However, Ethiopia’s threat to divide the country led to the Western flow of military aid to Somalia, and was instrumental in repelling the Ethiopian military (Global Security.Org., 2014).

Because the state’s law and order apparatus is ineffective, Somalia provides fertile grounds for militias and terrorists. Note that the TFG has only about 2,000 troops compared with the 5,000 and 15,000 under the command of Puntland and Somaliland authorities (IISS, 2009) Moreover, each clan has its own security force (IISS, 2009). The Darod, Hawiye, Isaaq, Rahanwein, Dir, and Digil Mirifil clans are the main players in the political arena (Global Security.Org., 2014).

Consequently, public perception of the justice system in Somalia is poor. A 2005 report prepared by the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue underscores “a severely undermined public trust in the formal judicial system” (Le Sage, 2005, p. 28). The public views courts as too problematic, uncertain, and prone to corruption. (Le Sage, 2005). Militancy and terrorism pose an existential threat to Somali society and have led to the exodus of the educated sections of society. Unemployment in Somalia is high at 30 percent, as is inflation (Global Peace Index, 2009). The CIA World Factbook reports that businesses in Somalia print their own money, which results in inconsistency of the data relating to the increase in inflation rates (CIA Worldfactbook, 2014). Additionally, Somalia has a very high infant mortality rate at 109.19 deaths per 1,000, ranking 6th in a global comparison of 224 countries (Global Peace Index, 2009). Likewise, life expectancy is low at 49.63 years (Global Peace Index, 2009). Low primary school enrolment (19 percent) and higher education enrolment rate (0.1 percent) speak to its bleak development potential in the short to medium term (Global Peace Index, 2009).
Unemployment, inflation, lack of law and order, poor health and literacy levels, and a culture of militancy contribute to Somali transnational terrorism, particularly piracy, thereby stirring a perception of threat in the West.

A number of Somali-led peace processes have occurred at various levels in Somalia over the course of the past two decades. Panelists at a seminar at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars (2010) stated there have been 90 local peace initiatives ending the violence in some parts of Somalia, notably Puntland and Somaliland. Somali-led peace processes are more successful than international initiatives as they aim to end violence and restore public security. They also noted external actors often do not possess adequate knowledge of the local context. The Puntland and Somaliland experiments with traditional peacebuilding are successful models for the creation of working local governance structures. Shari’a law is a component of effective traditional conflict resolution in Somalia.

Local peace processes focus on the restoration of security, allowing communities to live together through distributive justice, rather than retribution. The cessation of violence reinforces cease-fire agreements and confidence building measures. The initiatives foster truth and reconciliation, consensus-based decision making, distributive justice through compensation payments (diya), and local conflict resolution and monitoring mechanisms for conflict prevention. These models provide a number of lessons for replication in other regions in Somalia (Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, 2010). First, reconciliation precedes state building. Second, the process should be inclusive. Stakeholders and spoilers must integrate in planning and conducting political deliberations with proportional representation of clan
representatives, and a diverse and broad representation of civil society members ensured (Yamin, 2014). Anticipating the possibility of failures and setbacks is an important part of the process of local peace initiatives.

The evidence presented in this case study suggests the state of Somalia collapsed as a result of the complexities faced during the past decades. The absence of an effective national government and a crisis of fragmented sovereignty; PSC and associated economic and agricultural collapse; and regional security complexes are key factors spelling the country’s descent into chaos. External intervention in Somalia is destabilizing the country and compounding the crisis. Although the UN missions in Somalia incorporate an economic development strategy with a military response prescribed by Regan (1996), it interferes with the local economy and made communities entirely dependent on external actors. Seybolt’s (2007) claim that the success of an external intervention is measured by the number of lives saved confirms that the intervention was highly ineffective. It was neither able to restore security nor mediate peace. It was unable to divert Somalia on an economic development trajectory that would address severe food insecurity.

Although the appetite for intervention in Somalia dampened post-1993, the international community could intervene to achieve the following: resolve the broader regional conflicts, prevent the perpetuation of proxy wars, provide funding to the regional government, provide assistance in literacy and agricultural initiatives, and rebuild infrastructure. The importance of reconciliation as a precursor for institution building, and respect for local customs and traditions by the international communities are critical for the success of state stabilizing initiatives in Somalia.
Case Two—South Sudan. The new state of South Sudan faces daunting challenges. The world’s newest nation is one of the poorest—the result of negligible investment in its people and infrastructure over many decades by the erstwhile governing authority in Khartoum. War ravaged the country nearly continuously from 1955, costing over two million lives (Knopf, 2013). South Sudan’s state-building effort started from a rudimentary institutional base that inherited few functional governance systems. Former garrison towns such as Juba, the capital, confine government structures in a territory roughly equivalent to Afghanistan with a population of 11.4 million people (Knopf, 2013). Adding to the difficulty is the very real risk of renewed conflict with Sudan and the chicanery on the part of its government that has created conflicts with its southern neighbor. In short, South Sudan was bound to face struggles.

Despite the steep road that South Sudan must climb, the performance of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) since independence in July 2011 has made it steeper still, disappointing citizens and international partners alike. President Salva Kiir himself has decried the diversion of public monies—perhaps as much as $4 billion—by leading government and military officials (Knopf, 2013). Perceptions are widespread of senior government malfeasance, self-interest, and disregard for citizen priorities. Meanwhile, state authority remains heavily centralized in the executive branch, where opaque decisions lack consultation or oversight. A lack of vetted decisions is matched by regular reports of repression by the army and the police, conveying an impression that government officials see their role as one of self-enrichment and maintaining power rather than provision of services to citizens.

Ethnic divisions, long exploited by Khartoum during the war, are deepened by the
perception that the Dinka dominate the RSS. The dubious state of national elections in 2010 favoring candidates from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement reinforces these fears (Knopf, 2013). In some cases, this translates into open insurgency followed by brutal reprisals by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. The reprisals result in the killing of hundreds of innocent civilians, particularly in Jonglei state, but also in pockets of rising insecurity around the country.

The new country is not without assets. South Sudan assumed control of developed oil fields that are estimated to yield 350,000 barrels per day and annual net oil export revenues of roughly nine billion dollars for the government (Knopf, 2013). The population of South Sudan is nothing if not resilient, enduring years of hardship, isolation, and war. Much of the expansive territory is highly fertile for agricultural production, although only four percent is currently under cultivation (Knopf, 2013). Moreover, South Sudan enjoys international good will, with key partners in East Africa, Europe, and the United States providing extensive humanitarian assistance to South Sudan throughout the war and overwhelmingly endorsing the new state’s quest for independence and membership at the UN.

Efforts to meet the young state’s challenges will fail without greater trust and social cohesion between the new government and citizens. State-society relations provide the foundation for any state. If this foundation is strong, built on the principles of trust and legitimacy, then even poor countries stabilize and withstand intense external threats. Conversely, if the foundation is weak, then instability persists irrespective of government revenue flows, the strength of the security sector, or the maneuvers of external adversaries. Strengthening state-society relations is an imperative for the state-building
and stabilization agenda of South Sudan.

In some cases, the government is directly undermining this confidence by inhibiting the emergence of accountability processes. For instance, the RSS constrains access to independent information by the media and civil society (Knopf, 2013). Intimidation and outright attacks on journalists and human rights advocates are antithetical to building an inclusive, accountable state. Even more troubling, government actions to vilify ethnic communities home to rebel militia groups—such as the Murle population in Jonglei state—and failure to hold security services accountable for attacks on civilians destroy social cohesion across communities and prevent trust in the state.

To improve state-society relations in the near term, the government must cease actions alienating society from the state and focus on three critical tasks: building inclusive coalitions to support key institutional reforms, protecting space for independent voices to foster a national dialogue about the priorities for the new state, and achieving tangible development progress to demonstrate the government’s responsiveness to citizen expectations. While South Sudan suffered serious setbacks in its quest for state legitimacy during its first years of independence, upcoming foundational state-building processes afford opportunities for the government to reverse deterioration: the national constitution review process, the national reconciliation process, the 2015 elections, and investment in public infrastructure that will link disparate regions of the new nation (Knopf, 2013). Central to each is a massive civic education campaign to inform and invite participation from all branches of South Sudanese society in a national dialogue on citizen expectations of the state and what it means to be South Sudanese.

The foundation of the state cannot be an afterthought. Generating renewed
confidence in state-society relations through these opportunities provides the social
capital required to strengthen institutions central to ending violence: citizen security
(ensuring citizens’ freedom from physical violence and from fear of violence), justice
(providing recourse to nonviolent dispute resolution), and employment (enabling
livelihoods without recourse to violence). South Sudan’s leadership can set a new course
toward legitimacy, stability, and sustained development if it prioritizes building trust and
social cohesion within the South Sudanese population.

South Sudan is a prime example of how governance arrangements achieve and
maintain peace, or become the trigger for civil war. South Sudan’s experience shows the
applicability of constitutional provisions to a local context, and the validity of good
governance, devolution and separation of powers, appropriate government and electoral
systems, and strong institutions (Knopf, 2013). In nations as ethnically diverse as South
Sudan, decentralization is necessary for effective public participation, and contributes to
bringing a government closer to the people and empowering local governments to be
more responsive to their constituencies’ needs. Ineffectual decentralization leads to
marginalization of some groups, and causes allegiances to form along ethnic rather than
national lines. Should fighting break out in such a context, the conflict frequently takes
on an ethnic nature, as it has in South Sudan.

In mid-December 2013, when civil war broke out in South Sudan between
President Salva Kiir’s government forces and opposition rebels, led by former Vice
President Riek Machar, repeated attempts to reach a negotiated peace settlement failed.
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) facilitated peace talks (Knopf,
2013). While at present peace remains elusive and fighting continues, the urgent
humanitarian situation in South Sudan is deteriorating rapidly. The failure to end the ongoing conflict can be attributed to numerous and complex causes of violence, as well as to an apparent lack of political will from either side to end the fighting.

On 15 December 2013, President Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, accused his Vice President Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer, of attempting to overthrow him in a coup. It remains unclear whether the coup attempt actually took place; nevertheless, violence quickly broke out in Juba, the nation’s capital. Although it is often touted as an ethnic war, the role of ethnicity in triggering the conflict is uncertain. Of the eleven politicians arrested by the government in connection with the alleged coup, six were Dinkas, two were Nuers, and three were from other ethnic group, which seems to negate the suspicion of ethnic motivation (Campbell, 2014). Regardless of the initial role of ethnicity in the conflict, as the fighting continued and spread beyond Juba, the violence became increasingly ethnic, largely pitting Dinkas against Nuers.

The rapid unfolding of violence highlights the link between the central government and the political market place in Juba, and relationships of power and violence between groups across South Sudan. It raises questions about the relationship between the national, politico–military leaders and the local implementers of violence, but also about the traditional functions of violent conflict for local actors and groups (Pendle, 2014).

Despite ethnic divisions, no insurmountable hostility seems to exist between South Sudan’s ethnic groups; rather, these divisions are the result of patronage systems developing along ethnic lines. Ethnic patronage is understandable, given the natural comfort, ease, and familiarity in working with those with whom one shares common
bonds and language. Still, patronage and the access to resources that patronage provides are undoubtedly significant underlying causes of the violence. Accordingly, one could say “[t]he fault lies not in the DNA of the South Sudanese tribes. It lies with the political leaders who use ethnic patronage to build their power bases; or who incite their ethnic kin to carve out a geographic or political niche” (Campbell, 2014). The inclination to work only with one’s own ethnic and linguistic group must be consciously overcome, particularly in diverse populations.

A number of other factors contributed to the outbreak of violence, which ended the two years of relative peace South Sudan had enjoyed since its establishment in 2011 (Fund for Peace, 2013). These factors include tensions between different factions of the army, some of which have a stronger sense of loyalty to various tribal leaders and militia groups than to the new country or its national leadership (Cope, 2014). The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), between Kiir and Machar, created divisions and instability within the ruling party and the national government (Cope, 2014).

Connected to these factors are several underlying governance features setting the stage for conflict to erupt, including the following: the concentration of power in the presidency under the 2011 Transitional Constitution, which countered decentralization efforts; the presidential system of government, which all too often lends itself to constitutional collapse; and the fragility of the new country’s institutions, which were too weak to constrain individual South Sudanese leaders.

However, the various contributing factors outlined above must be examined within the broader context of the country’s excessively heavy dependence on oil revenues and the political, economic, and social implications of revenue sharing in the country.
Indeed, South Sudan is the most oil-dependent country in the world, with oil accounting for some 98 percent of fiscal revenues and for the totality of the country’s exports (World Bank, 2014). Additionally, over 80 percent of South Sudan’s GDP relies directly or indirectly on contributions made by oil (World Bank, 2014). The high dependency leaves the South Sudanese economy acutely vulnerable to the volatility of international oil markets, as well as to factors affecting oil production in the country.

Heavily influencing the governance issues outlined above is the absence of a professional civil service and the concurrent existence of a pervasive military culture. At independence, commentators described South Sudan as “a militarized, corrupt, neo-patrimonial system of governance,” where corruption is not merely an anomaly of the system (International Commission of Jurists, 2013). Such a system develops when formal institutions are weak and unable to “place significant restrictions on politicians’ actions [or] make them accountable to citizens.” (Acemoglu, 2004). Moreover, it undermines constitutional arrangements for establishing good governance in the country.

Civil war, especially one as protracted as the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, which lasted for much of the period between 1956 and 2005, has an unintended and generally overlooked consequence: The people of South Sudan, in devoting all their energies to the conflict, fail to obtain the skills required in a functioning society (Zapata, 2011). This has harmful, long-term implications. Societies become progressively more dysfunctional as the conflict continues. During the achievement of peace, the country’s leaders frequently lack the skills and experience required to govern a broken nation in a peaceful and non-militaristic manner.

Closely connected to this are people who participate in civil war, particularly
those on the victorious side of independence struggles, expect some recognition for their efforts. After all, their contribution to the country’s achievement of victory and independence necessitated substantial personal sacrifices. Natural human yearning is readily dismissed and not adequately addressed. There is a need to assimilate war veterans into productive roles in a post-conflict society, so as to provide income and to substitute for the sense of purpose and belonging that they felt during the years of war. Failing to sufficiently recognize the contributions of war veterans or to incorporate them into society raises the risk of their return to a life of combat, which in instances of prolonged civil war is often the only life known (Radon & Logan, 2014).

In South Sudan, little effort was made to reintegrate former soldiers into civilian life; rather, different militias were subsumed into the fractious national army. The various militias remained as relatively separate factions loyal to different tribal leaders, and “commanders assembled military units on tribal lines with the aim of maximizing personal loyalty” (De Waal, 2014, p. 361). This “is an inherently risky way of managing an army: it generates grievances at every level and, because most units are composed along ethnic lines, any military operation risks becoming an ethnic conflict” (De Waal, 2014, p. 361). Within this system, South Sudanese leaders secure and maintain power through the use of loyal militias, rather than deriving their authority from the people (Bubna, 2014).

In South Sudan, there are other reforms aimed at increasing the strength of the state. Campaigns to disarm civilians are one such example, as the state attempts to establish a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Disarmament campaigns in South Sudan gained attention in the popular media, including in Jonglei state. These campaigns
correlate to increased violence. Further studies could consider disarmament as the state’s imposition of a technological imbalance between groups and as an expression of the government’s preference for certain groups. This offers an explanation for the frequent concurrence of disarmament with violent conflict.

Both in the short and longer terms, the root causes of South Sudan’s civil war must be addressed. Governance arrangements stipulated by the national constitution should be modified to reduce the government’s susceptibility to authoritarian collapse. While failures in decentralization and other governance arrangements may have provoked civil war in South Sudan, addressing such weaknesses through constitutional amendments and capacity building may put the country back on track toward achieving and maintaining peace and stability. Other key reforms include economic diversification, improved natural resource management, and tighter budgetary control. Despite the significant challenges ahead, there is hope yet for the world’s youngest nation (Radon & Logan, 2014).

The issue of underdevelopment and lack of access to basic services requires an urgent focus since this is a legitimate cause of instability and conflict in the country (Yasin, 2008). There is an immediate need to address the country’s prevailing humanitarian emergency. There are currently 1.5 million displaced people in South Sudan, forced to flee their homes by the fighting, with some 90,000 people taking refuge in squalid camps within UN compounds (Jones, 2014; Graham, 2014). At least five million South Sudanese are in dire need of humanitarian assistance, as a famine looms after fighting had prevented people from cultivating their crops (Jones, 2014; Graham, 2014).
Explanations of violent conflict and its relationship to the state produce a rich literature serving as the foundation of international policy. Hobbesian ideas have been revived to explain continuing violence in Africa. Kaplan (2001) claims that warfare demonstrates an anarchical nature and a disposition to violence that can be controlled only by a strong state. Wherever a strong state is absent or when a state fails, violence occurs. Much literature describes the state in Africa as weak because of its colonial and post-independence history. The perception of an endless conflict is the result (Driscoll, 2009).

**Case Three—Central African Republic.** The Central African Republic (CAR) is a landlocked country in central Africa, with a population of 4.5 million (Janos, 2014). The CAR is often called a forgotten country. It has had a long and substantial international presence and sizable foreign investment. As the country rapidly descends into greater violence, the difficult truth is that international and regional involvement is its only hope.

The former French colony of Ubangi-Shari became the CAR upon independence in 1960 (History World, 2014). When the long-running civil war in the CAR ended in 2007, observers hoped peace would usher in a new era of economic recovery and development (Janos, 2014). Instead the country faces a devastating humanitarian crisis threatening to plunge the population even deeper into misery. Despite these mineral resources, including gold and diamonds, CAR remains one of Africa’s poorest states. Political instability plagues the country’s history. It has seen five coups and several rebellions since independence from France in 1960 (Janos, 2014). Sadly there is nothing new about the atrocities inflicted against civilians in the CAR. What is new is the scale of
violence and widespread and arbitrary targeting of people solely because of their religion.

What many describe as a failed state is awash in illegal weapons and is a place where weak government authority, pervasive impunity, ethnic tensions, and rebel activity drive instability and displacement (Berman, 2005; Bordas, 2013). In 2013, a major security and humanitarian crisis ravaged the country. One of the world’s “forgotten” crises had forced its way back into the headlines as rebels swept across CAR, overthrowing the government, forcing the president into exile, and causing alarm throughout the international community. Some 8,000 years ago, probable ancestors of today’s Pygmy peoples, settled in the borders of what is now the CAR. They now live in the western and southern forested regions of the country (Janos, 2014). The slave state of Dar al-Kuti occupied the northern reaches until the various regions were brought under French colonial rule late in the 19th century (Besenyo, & Hetenyi, 2011). Colonial administrators favored some ethnic groups over others, resulting in political rivalries persisting after independence in 1960 (Janos, 2014). Following periods of civil strife and dictatorial government, the country embarked on a course of threatened democracy by protracted regional conflicts in neighboring countries as well as attempted coups d’état.

Under pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reverse the growth of government spending, liberalize prices, encourage a more open investment code, and provide incentives to agriculture and forestry, the CAR submitted to a structural adjustment program in 1986 (Janos, 2014). In the 1990s, the IMF asked for further adjustments, such as devaluing the franc and privatizing various businesses, commercial banks and a petroleum distribution company (Janos, 2014). As France reduced its financial commitments to its former colonies in Africa, the CAR’s financial
standing deteriorated.

In the 1990s, a decline in international prices for cash crops, the inflated cost of imports caused by the poor quality of transportation into the country, the continued smuggling of diamonds across the border, and domestic political unrest further strained the economy (Janos, 2014). Most significant were corruption and financial mismanagement, which left the government unable to pay the salaries of the military and public sector. The resulting disloyalty of the police, armed forces and public servants caused political unrest to continue into the 21st century.

Seleka rebels have for several years controlled some of the diamond-producing areas in the north of CAR, allowing them to have ample financial resources for better weaponry. Even more worrisome, armed fighters from neighboring Sudan known as the Janjaweed, who were accused of committing atrocities against civilians and responsible for ethnic cleansing in Darfur, aid the Seleka.

Observers fear many of CAR’s illicit diamonds are being funneled into Sudan (Janos, 2014). The country’s mineral wealth provides several examples of the attraction to rebel groups. In September 2011, for example, the Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP) clashed with the Union des Forces Democratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR) in Bria, over control of the area’s diamond mines. In June 2012, between 70 and 100 armed men, alleged to be LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) rebels or Baba Lade fighters, attacked AREVA’s Bakouma mining project. Baba Lade, rebel leader of the Chadian Front Populaire pour le Redressement (FPR), which operates in the north-central CAR, allegedly earns income from the sale of gold in Bangui. Nevertheless, cattle breeding has always been a much more important source of revenue for Baba Lade
An important security issue is the presence of bandits throughout the country. These gangs profit from state security services’ lack of control outside the capital and randomly attack traffic on the country’s dilapidated road network (Larson, 2014). Banditry is a major problem in mining zones and on mineral trading routes, where bandits demand diamonds and taxes from diggers and diamond traders. From 2006 the threat of bandits has diminished in the relatively stable southwest. In the east, however, the situation remains precarious (Bordas, 2013). Next to armed violence, natural resources give rise to friction between other, non-armed groups of society. Conflicts might arise between migrant workers and local communities over access to mining lands, or the migrants’ alleged lack of respect of local social norms and customs.

In late 2012, a coalition of old rebel groups under the new name of Seleka renewed fighting (Janos, 2014). Two other, previously unknown groups, the Alliance for Revival and Rebuilding (A2R) and the Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK) joined the coalition, as well as the Chadian group FPR (Ambenatna Infos, 2012). The group accused Bozize of not implementing aspects of a previous peace agreement. It demanded his ouster from the presidency and called for him to stand trial at the International Criminal Court. Seleka quickly advanced south stopping short of Bangui in December and entering into negotiations with the government. In January 2013, Seleka and Bozize’s administration agreed to a cease-fire and a power-sharing deal addressing several rebel demands, such as the release of prisoners and the withdrawal of foreign troops in the country (Janos, 2014). In addition, it provided for the inclusion of some Seleka members in a new unity government allowing Bozize to finish his term, with new
elections in 2016. Seleka quickly became disenchanted with the implementation of the deal, claiming that Bozize failed to honor important aspects of the agreement. In mid-March 2013, the group issued an ultimatum to Bozize and resumed hostilities a few days later (Janos, 2014). Seleka advanced toward Bangui, seizing the capital on March 24, and Bozize fled the country.

The interim government struggled to restore order and perform the normal functions of state. However, it was unable to fulfill the requirements of an efficient state (Bordas, 2012). Meanwhile, Seleka rebels were pillaging parts of the country and engaging in horrific acts of violence, rape, and kidnapping. The primarily Christian civilian population began to form militias, known as “anti-balaka” (Sango: anti-machete), to protect themselves against the mainly Muslim rebels, which in turn degenerated into a cycle of violent attacks between Christians and Muslims leaving hundreds dead and thousands displaced. Analysts warned of the potential for the situation to further degenerate into genocide should nothing be done to stop the violence (Mudge, 2014).

Since the outbreak of this most recent crisis, the situation remains extremely volatile, with a normalization of violence, widespread human rights violations and lack of state efficiency and a collapse of state structures (Bordas, 2012). The humanitarian situation is dire as the current crisis occurs in the context of chronic underdevelopment persisting throughout the country. The impact on the population is severe (including the lack of access to basic services, in particular to health care, and lack of livelihood, and a looming food crisis). State security forces and members of non-state armed entities, including Chadian soldiers and bandits, continue to attack cattle herders, who are
primarily members of the Mbororo ethnic group. Many observers believed Mbororo were targeted primarily because of their perceived foreign origins, relative wealth, and vulnerability to cattle theft. French troops attempt to disarm rival groups of vigilantes before a Rwanda style genocide occurs. The CAR is the size of France, but there are fewer than 2,000 of these troops currently deployed, along with some 2,500 African peacekeepers (Janos, 2014). The French intervention reduces the violence in Bangui, but the long-term danger is sectarian brutality perpetuating communal hatred.

While the situation in Bangui slightly improved, the security situation outside the capital continues to deteriorate, with serious human rights violations reportedly perpetrated by different armed groups. There are 4,000 MISCA troops, and 1,600 French forces, and the EU announced an additional 500 soldiers (Janos, 2014). The crisis in CAR requires highly mobile and numerous troops since it its territory is almost the size of Texas with very poor infrastructure (roads, railway and airports). The UN Secretariat estimated that 10,000 soldiers could be required (BBC, 2013). In January 2014, there were a number of significant CAR-related developments in Bangui, Brussels and Geneva. The National Transitional Council elected Catherine Samba-Panza, the mayor of Bangui, as the new interim President of CAR. The Secretary General and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in CAR (BINUCA) welcomed her election. In Brussels, EU foreign ministers approved a peacekeeping force of approximately 1,000 troops, while at a conference organized by OCHA and the European Commission, donors pledged nearly $500 million in international assistance. In Geneva, the Human Rights Council (HRC) held a special session on the human rights situation in CAR (What’s in Blue, 2014).

Despite its wealth in mineral and natural resources, CAR ranks 180 out of 187
countries in the 2012 United Nations Development Programme Human Development Index. Socio-political instability is the primary factor hampering development, which is the consequence of rebellions, coups, and inter-ethnic fighting during the last three decades. The increase in violence resulted in a deterioration of basic social and economic infrastructure resulting in many school-age children being out of school. The national net school enrolment of primary schoolchildren is 63 percent (Janos, 2014).

As of mid-January 2014, some 900,000 residents were internally displaced, while another 86,000 fled to neighboring countries as refugees (USAID, 2014). UN agencies estimate that 2.6 million people, or half the population, require humanitarian aid, and that 60 percent of households have no available food stocks (UN World Food Program, 2014). Prior humanitarian conditions were already poor because of past conflicts and a lack of basic social services. Still, violence deteriorated dramatically over the past year, constraining humanitarian access and provoking deep communal tensions.

The CAR has had five coups and numerous rebellions since independence from France in 1960 as different groups fought for control of state resources. These social conflicts and the spillover from regional conflicts, in neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and Chad, have destroyed the rule of law, leaving a phantom state with an ill-disciplined army, corrupt administration and a lawless interior. The CAR, located as it is in an unstable triangle bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Southern Sudan, and Chad, requires a regional approach to the problem. Combined, these factors breed a cycle of instability, which has left Central Africans among the poorest in the world.

The disasters that the CAR endures are not natural or caused by external political
forces, but are man-made and indigenous. Numerous rebel groups compete with the
government and each other not on the basis of ideological differences, but motivated by
the personal ambitions of leaders and competition over natural resources (diamond mines
in particular). With the exception of sporadic LRA activity in the sparsely populated far
east, conflict in the CAR has caused extensive problems and outward refugee flows
toward Chad in the north and Sudan in the northeast.

In the longer term, the CAR confronts significant governance and security
challenges, and the internal political and military arrangements allowing for greater
future stability proving elusive. Neighboring states, France, the EU, and UN agencies
repeatedly attempt military interventions, peace processes, state building, and security
sector reform efforts in CAR with mixed results, at best (Arieff, 2014).

**Case Four—Nigeria.** Nigeria has the largest African community with a growing
insurgency security interest in the midst atmospherics relative to the 2015 election.
Nigeria has deployed military forces to the northeast states where Boko Haram creates
the largest security concern and gives rise to the need to foster a counterinsurgency
strategy that will ensure Nigeria’s future success. Absent a counterinsurgency strategy,
Boko Haram continues to kill thousands as they strive to create an Islamic state. February
2014 brought the death toll of over 300 casualties, predominately males, in Nigeria with
the group continuing to succeed against the military forces. Boko Haram, al-Qa’ida in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Bayt Maqdis (ABM), and al-Shabaab are transnational
terrorist organizations that train, recruit (via social media), and implement ground
operations throughout Africa. By conducting a case study of Boko Haram’s history, a
consensus on a practical counterinsurgency policy hopes to draw out what success looks like in the state as a means of identifying a strategy to resolve future concerns.

After initially advising his fighters to protect the oil wealth in Islamic countries, Osama bin Laden decided in 2003 that al-Qa’ida should target the global energy industry on which the United States and its allies depend. As such, he listed Nigeria as the only African country “ready for liberation” along with the traditional al-Qa’ida adversary states—Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco. Shortly afterwards, two leaders of the Nigerian Taliban traveled to Pakistan to obtain funding and instructions from members of the Tablighi Jammat, a group that was believed to be affiliated with al-Qai’da recruitment and radicalization, on targeting Americans and their interests in Nigeria (Zenn, 2012).

The Nigerian Taliban utilized funding to send several dozen members to train at camps operated by AQIM located in Mauritania, Niger, and Mali. Interestingly enough, the Nigerian Taliban did not forge a deep ideological or strategic partnership with AQIM because the Nigerian Taliban were less committed to AQIM’s transnational agenda—including cross-border criminal activities, smuggling, and kidnapping. On the other hand, the Nigerian Taliban focused on their primary goal, imposing Shari’a law in Nigeria. At the same time, the Nigerian Taliban were prevented from supporting AQIM’s agenda by an effective security campaign by the Nigerian military which forced the group to go into hiding in 2003. As an underground movement under the leadership of Muhammad Yusuf, the Nigerian Taliban grew in the states of Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, and others in northern Nigeria while attracting members from Niger, Chad, and Cameroon (Zenn, 2012).
Nigerian security forces were successful on July 2009 in an attack in which they killed more than 700 members, including Yusuf, in a four-day series of raids throughout northern Nigeria (Zenn, 2012). Following the raids, hundreds of Nigerian Taliban members withdrew into Nigeria’s border regions with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, while others went into hiding in other states in Nigeria. In September 2010, more than a dozen members resurfaced and carried out a prison break operation in Bauchi, freeing more than 100 members who had been seized in the July 2009 attacks (Zenn, 2012). The raid sparked an initiative to conduct more lethal insurgency tactics against the government, which continues today (Zenn, 2012).

After the success of the security forces in 2009, the Nigerian Taliban became known as Boko Haram. Loosely translated, as “Western education is sinful,” the name reflects a general story where university graduates shredded their degrees to join Yusuf’s followers in the early 2000s. Meanwhile, Boko Haram rejects the name and calls itself Jama’atu Ahlis Suna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (The Organization Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad). Prior to 2009, the group was known as Yusufiyya, referring to followers of Yusuf; Ahlusunna wal Jamaa wal Hijra, a name that blended the name Ahli Sunna wal Jamaa that translated into “Followers of Sunni Islam and Community” with the idea of hijra, meaning migration; and the Nigerian Taliban or Yobe Taliban identifying with their source of inspiration, the Taliban, as well as the primary state for their operations (Zenn, 2012).

As a result of many of the atrocities committed by Boko Haram as it increased in capability, Nigeria assembled a Joint Task Force (JTF) of military and police units to battle the group during the state of emergency in May 2013. This move forced the
militants out of the cities in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, but their atrocities continued. The JTF, augmented by vigilantes associated with the civilian JTF organizations, were implicated in extrajudicial killings of militants and civilians thereby galvanizing support for the insurgents (Sergie, 2014).

After the execution of Yusuf in 2009, Abubakr Shekau emerged as the leader of Boko Haram. Shekau and his spokesman displayed anti-American ambitions similar to those of al-Qa’ida. However, even though Boko Haram expanded their operations throughout northern Nigeria, they have not carried out operations abroad or coordinated with the Nigerian diaspora in the West to attack Western interests. Nevertheless, hundreds of Nigerians traveled from Nigeria to join the Islamist insurgents in the separatist state of Azawad in northern Mali. As the wars in Syria and the insurgencies throughout Africa continue, among groups like AQIM, al-Shabaab, ABM, and countless others, a movement to return to Nigeria with a more internationalist vision of militancy and new militant capabilities is a threat to Western economic interests (Zenn, 2012).

Insurgencies, like Boko Haram, resulting in the collapse of governance, typically as a result of civil war, lead to instability requiring the state to intervene to quell the disruption. Because Nigeria shapes up to become the possible next battlefield, counterinsurgency operations may take place there in the near future. As insurgencies have occurred for over 150 years, many strategists have not embraced the history that enables successful foreign policy measures beyond trying to win “hearts and minds.” Through analyzing Africa counterinsurgencies and defining several models of what has been occurring, strategists and policy makers obtain a much greater understanding of the situation to avoid the likelihood of an Iraq 2.0. As such, the need for a counterinsurgency
strategy in Africa is to prevent future terrorism spreading after the Syrian civil war dissipates, and terrorist organizations venture to new frontiers. By studying histories of insurgencies in Africa and creating a pattern analysis, planners assist in preventing the spread of terrorism enabled by a lack of governance and poor state security. As Mohammad Aly Sergie (2014) cites “…the group itself is an effect and not a cause; it is a symptom of decades of failed government and elite delinquency finally ripening into social chaos” (para. 12).

Part of defining a path for future policies related to counterinsurgencies is to understand generalized trends that intervening states attempt to obtain success in the strife-torn country. Justin Lynch (2014) found his definitions for foreign policy and strategic objectives to create a foundation for the idea of intertwining the two objectives. As such, he notes large counterinsurgencies have diminished the military’s ability to deter threats and prevent new armed conflicts. In so doing, victories inconsistently translate into strategic success and hinder the accomplishment of American foreign policy objectives (Sergie, 2014). He further mentions an unintended consequence of large counterinsurgency campaigns focuses on the reduction of the American military’s ability to deter foreign threats (Sergie, 2014). By having a credible force to deter threats, successful counterinsurgencies have the look of an unbeatable force that convinces the opposition that it will not hesitate to efficiently use the power it possesses. In Nigeria’s case, the failure of the military to protect civilians has fueled anger in the northeast. Despite President Goodluck Jonathon’s message that the military was defeating the insurgency, Boko Haram is inspired to inflict massive atrocities on the civilian population to display the lack of security and governance in the region.
The second key factor is “people need to believe that the campaign will provide a worthwhile victory at a reasonable cost” (Sergie, 2014). To counter President Goodluck Jonathon’s claim about Boko Haram, in February 2014, the insurgent group killed 59 boys at the Federal Government boarding school in Buni Yadi (Sergie, 2014). In addition to killing the boys in the school, the group burned 24 of the school’s buildings and staff quarters (Hemba, 2014). If the cost is high in lives or in the diminution of the people’s self image, policy makers in democratic society tend to either make the perceived reward significant enough to justify the cost or abandon the campaign.

The third key characteristic is the “most valuable thing the military can do in winning the support of the populace is to provide essential services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief [in addition to] establish, safeguard, or restore basic civil services” (Lynch, 2014, para. 6). This statement begs the question as to: what does success in a counterinsurgency look like when the insurgents are providing civil services in Nigeria? Once the lack of a clear victory is apparent, or the cost of the counterinsurgency grows, the Nigerian people withdraw popular support. Accordingly, the government is less reluctant to use military force in a manner that reduces their credibility and eventually results in a foreign policy loss. In the light of this lack of reluctance, the intervening state relinquishes control to the host state for resolution of the insurgency.

The shortcomings of former President Goodluck Jonathon’s counterinsurgency strategy meant that his administration had yet to win the “heart and minds” campaign that counterinsurgency theorists advocate. Efforts to address the dissatisfaction of Muslims in northern states, such as the reintroduction of Shari’a criminal courts, were not successful
because people did not believe in the fairness of the institution in imposing law. Moreover, the Human Rights Watch report in 2011 noted that the corruption in Nigeria is so pervasive that it has turned public service into a criminal enterprise. In addition, police brutality and impunity have added to the tensions and, as Amnesty International has reported, Nigerian police were responsible for hundreds of extrajudicial killings and disappearances, which are largely uninvestigated and unpunished. Along these same lines, the report continued to note nearly one thousand people, mostly Islamist militants, died in military custody during the first half of 2013 (Sergie, 2014).

As the most populous African country, with more than 174 million people and approximately 350 ethnic groups speaking 250 languages, Nigeria requires security adequate for meeting its protection management concerns (Sergie, 2014). Cyril Obi (2006) identifies and analyzes the issues and challenges flowing from the integration of West Africa into globalized security arrangements that will assist in solving the security problem in Nigeria. Furthermore, it critically examines the possibility of a terrorist threat in the region and analyzes the global stakes involved in integrating West Africa into the global war on terror. On this basis, it concludes that “zero-sum, militarist, globally driven solutions may fail to address the historical, political, and socioeconomic roots of a possible terrorist threat in West Africa” (Obi, 2006, p. 87). Nigeria has long grappled with how to govern such a diverse nation in which the struggle between Christian and Muslims over political power remains critical to the ongoing need of stability among one of the world’s poorest populations. Caught up in this struggle, more than 25,000 people have been killed since 1999 (Sergie, 2014, para. 15).

The author notes that many broad considerations impel the US to focus on this
area: Nigeria’s openness and perceived lack of effective governance or secure borders; a need to integrate the area into a US-controlled global security structure; the area at present provides 15 percent of US oil imports and this is expected to increase to 25 percent within a decade; the possibility of recruiting locals in the ‘Muslim Belt’ to terrorist cells; and opportunities to launder or move vast amounts of money using the cross-border trade in ‘blood diamonds,’ timber and arms, and to raise funds within the state of chaos of conflict or emerging post-conflict zones (Obi, 2006).

Nigeria is emerging as a concern to the U.S. because societies in conflict or emerging from civil wars are vulnerable to infiltration or harboring transnational criminal networks strengthened by illegal trade and funding from al-Qa’ida linked terrorist networks (Obi, 2006). Many of the current partnerships hinge upon the “prognosis that weak or distressed states and conflict societies are vulnerable to terrorist infiltration and that states and governance should be strengthened to contain the threat often neglect the socioeconomic and historical inequities that lie at the roots of most violent conflicts or wars” (Obi, 2006, p. 93). Some security officials in Nigeria and around the world worry that Boko Haram will splinter into two factions: one focusing on local grievances and another seeking regional expansion. At the same time, exclusively focusing on terrorism prevention may distract from potential policy options required to address the underlying concerns driving the insurgency.

In Africa, domestic terrorism increased because of the after effects of decolonization, as well as the failure to effect sustained development while attempting to consolidate accountable and effective governance. An interesting statistic the author mentions is from Robert Pape’s study of suicide attacks from 1980 to 2004 where 95
percent of attacks worldwide support national political goals related to control over
territory rather than by something intrinsic in radical Islam (Obi, 2006). He further notes
“radical Islam does not come out of traditional Muslim societies, but rather is a
manifestation of modern identity politics, a byproduct of the modernization process
itself” (Obi, 2006, pp. 62–63) when commenting on the effects of Islam transnationally in
Africa. He further notes the importance of the absence of governance in Africa, which
provides the opportunity for an armed group to fester and develop into a battleground for
the war on terror. His ideology for this notion is that African countries have a limited
ability to affect law and order and a target-rich environment tends to provide many
opportunities to attack high-value Western targets (Obi, 2006). In concluding, he remarks
modern threats intertwine in the sense that armed conflicts cannot be addressed in
isolation from extreme poverty or environmental degradation.

Boko Haram has three ideological goals. One aims at imposing Shari’a law over
the entire country. A second aim strives to identify with al-Qa’ida’s transnational militant
purposes, whereas the third enables criminal activities like kidnappings on behalf of
political elites or international criminal organizations. To carry out these objectives,
poverty, illiteracy, porous borders and the wide availability of small arms and light
weapons throughout northern Nigeria enable Boko Haram to carry out their insurgency.
At the same time, Boko Haram strives to return power to northern Muslim political and
religious elites as a way of Islamizing Nigeria by force while disrupting social justice,
income equality, and educational opportunities. In Nigeria’s democracy, political power
through voting favors Christian presidential candidates, like Goodluck Jonathon, whose
religious constituency has a higher level of civic education and voter turnout than
Muslims (Zenn, 2012).

After combing some of the atrocities of the Second Boer War, Fremeaux begins to group the violence into eight thematic categories: large acts of violence as a result of battle; collateral damage affecting the civilian population; retaliatory abuses seen as a response to native violence; actions by the French searching for a response to the use of terrorism; some acts of violence resulting from trying to force the people to submit to the French’s will; in spite of the violence, the French attempted to show themselves as operating humanistic principles; torture; and take action as soon as possible with as little of a force that was necessary (Sergie, 2014).

Commonalities can be derived from qualitative case studies of various insurgencies throughout Africa to determine what critical factors enable a successful counterinsurgency strategy. The use of various qualitative case studies is important and required for several reasons. First, a possible gap in basic information may emerge from assumptions based on counterinsurgency strategies applicable to Iraq and Afghanistan. By utilizing the same strategies from these two recent wars, a strategist may template the same model upon Africa, which may lead to misinterpreting the foundational principles for dissolving the insurgency in a given a country. With insurgencies occurring for well over 150 years, some of the only data collected on counterinsurgencies are historic pieces of information based on previous research by journalists, academics, or researchers in the field. Through these case studies, various individuals from across the globe provide their analysis of isolated events and allow researchers to merge information so that future strategists can collaborate to solve insurgencies. Additionally, this study provides a refined vantage point to allow strategists to better understand the countries and enhance
the strategist’s creation of a counterinsurgency strategy to rid Africa of a growing insurgent problem.

Official U.S. rhetoric is focused increasingly on security issues related to Nigeria as opposed to the development of conventional goals throughout the Sahel region of Africa. When designating on November 13, 2013 Boko Haram and its splinter group Ansaru as a foreign terrorist organization, the U.S. Department of State stated that it would “assist U.S. and other law enforcement partners in efforts to investigate and prosecute terrorist suspects” (Campbell, 2013). The State Department continues to urge Nigeria to counter Boko Haram through a combination of law enforcement, political, and development efforts, as well as military engagement. Additionally, analysts proclaim the Nigerian government must do more to win “hearts and minds” by providing better education and health-care services in the north, and by including prominent, locally respected northern Muslims in the cabinet of the federal administration (Sergie, 2014, para. 22).

The consequences of the U.S.’s strategic message are limited, mostly involving visa restrictions and inspections of financial support of American origin. Furthermore, the vagueness of the Department of State’s announcement could pose administrative difficulties for Nigerians outside the insurgent movement. Following the designation, the Nigerian ambassador to the U.S., Adebowale Ibidapo Adefuye, released a statement opposing the designation for fear that it will raise obstacles for Nigerians’ travel and financial interactions with the U.S. Meanwhile, the small U.S. presence in northern Nigeria has primarily been in the form of development assistance. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) continues to work to improve the
quality of education, strengthen the government’s capacity, and provide quality health-care conditions for poverty-stricken communities. In light of the recent increased attacks, all international assistance programs, including USAID, have been reduced because of the security issues caused by Boko Haram and a lack of the Nigerian government’s ability to establish governance (Campbell, 2013).

In light of this concern with the lack of a counterinsurgency strategy on part of the Nigerian government, strategists must understand that no al-Qa’ida threat remains domestic for long. Organizations like Boko Haram recruit internationally, maintain links, are financially supported, alternate with a near and far adversary, target Western interests and Christians/churches, utilize social media to the fullest extent, and overwhelm local security forces. To perform these acts, Boko Haram utilizes central leadership under Abubaker Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi, and Mamman Nur of a part-time insurgent force that has underground access throughout northern Nigeria. Shekau is a divisive leader, but has legitimacy as he served as Yusuf’s deputy and remained close to the grassroots organizations followers in Borno. He likely retains a core group of loyalists since many of the militants opposing him have already defected or were killed by Boko Haram—leaving only the more ruthless and indoctrinated militants with Shekau. Barnawi is regionally connected, but unless he cooperates with Boko Haram, he lacks the grassroots support that Shekau fosters because he operated for years in the Sahel and has few religious credentials. If Shekau were killed, a scenario would emerge in which Barnawi assumes power over Boko Haram operationally and Nur assumes the role of ideological figurehead. Nur is connected to al-Qa’ida affiliates in Africa and serves as an operational
and ideological leader. He likely cooperates with Barnawi, yet opposes Shekau’s leadership style in Borno (Zenn, 2014).

To counter this threat, the Nigerian military must understand that Boko Haram has created an isolated insurgency. They can disguise themselves within the population by changing their attire—even dressing as women to evade prosecution. Additionally, 90 percent of their attacks are confined to the state of Borno, which is where the preponderance of their safe havens lie (Sergie, 2014). Kidnappings will continue. This terrorist method continues to serve as a source of finance for Boko Haram for their campaigns that are instigated by a growing population of youth population. The youth population has been raised on radical ideologies that focus on targeted killings on Western schools and religious affiliates. Indicators of a successful campaign on the part of the Nigerian security forces may be: whether Boko Haram is developing a higher stage of warfare or is navigating back to a lower one; the strength that Boko Haram can bring to bear on a single operation; a chart that would display the amount of weapons that Boko Haram possesses; the number of ambushes directed at the security forces; the rate of desertions both from Boko Haram and the populations; and the strength required to install an isolated Nigerian force to maintain security in the crisis arena. Non-military indicators may include: the number of volunteers for the counterinsurgent forces, the amount of information spontaneously offered, and the Nigerian people’s readiness to go against Boko Haram’s orders (Crane & Hosmer, 1962).

Among these indicators, the most dramatic driver toward success will be the spontaneous response of the populace in offering information, and the Nigerian people’s active participation in the capture or disabling of Boko Haram insurgents who come into
their villages. Regardless, President Muhammadu Buhari’s (former President Goodluck Jonathon’s successor) leadership and a sound counterinsurgency strategy combined with effective military action are the keys to success in Nigeria. The need is to apply at every level the trinity concept, from the top of the government to the individual Nigerian soldier whose threefold job is to kill enemy soldiers, obtain information, and win the support of the local inhabitants in northern Nigeria. As such, the necessary political stability will not be attained until the Nigerian people have a strong government of their own that they are willing to support.

Nigeria continues to remain a major focus of extremist attention. The country is especially susceptible to radical agitation since the state lacks widespread influence of Sufis, which support the polarization of Muslims and Christians. In these conditions, Nigeria must be considered at serious risk of becoming a major new front for Islamist terrorism (Swartz, 2005).

**Summary**

In general, the total amount of violence in a society diminishes as societal development progresses. The initiation of violence is inherently illegitimate and unjust as it presents a radical transformation of normal political interactive behavior. Violence is never considered a legitimate method of conflict resolution because it simultaneously transforms a nonviolent relationship to violence, escalates and broadens the nature of conflict grievances, and serves to divide targets from their source as an essential aspect of its radicalization (Marshall, 1999). The escalation of violence tends to consume the power of association and disintegrates the basis of political relationships from a unitary us to a binary them and us. In this sense, violence as a solution exists only as a direct
response, or as a dissuasive function of violence, which can be used legitimately only in the smallest measure necessary to neutralize the perceived rational utility of force.

The implication of Von Clausewitz’s dictum that “war is the continuation of diplomacy by other means” is the seed of the idea of transformational politics relayed through Hannah Arendt’s distinction between power and violence.

Power and violence are opposites; where one rules the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its course it ends in power’s disappearance…Violence can destroy power, it is utterly incapable of creating it (Arendt, 1969, p. 155).

Arendt posits the idea that the decision to utilize violence in response to a conflict is symptomatic of an inherent loss of control over the dynamics of the interactive process and the devaluation of the exchange from a positive-sum to a negative-sum game. This conceptualization departs dramatically from conventional perspectives on the deployment of military force, which allows for signaling and accentuating the perception of a chaotic situation spiraling out of control and, through the addition of violence, the population is in severe danger of losing physical control as not being able to initiate decisive ways of establishing social control (Marshall, 1999).

The initial condition in a social conflict derives from cognition, the perception and objectification of a goal-directed interaction with the external environment. Such actions are initiated continuously by individuals with many of these actions triggering a response from other individuals in the external environment modifying the original attainment of the goal. At this point the first transformation occurs: the recognition of a
state of conflict. Such recognition, or prediction, motivates the individual to reassess the situation and alter their behavior.

The second transformation occurs when the person, after deciding to either maintain the aspiration or continue the pursuit of their interests, identifies a frustrating object. Then, the target of action shifts from the goal to the intervening obstacle. To overcome the obstacle, the individual seeks information, support, and resources from the external environment.

These transformations led to conflict escalation dynamics dampened by collective problems. Of significant importance are the abnormal aspects of conflict processes, which are those experiences within the third transformation of violence. Violence involves the realization of physical or psychological harm that weakens the integrity of a society. Marshall (1999) highlights six points:

1. Violence is an extreme behavior that is very dramatic, powerfully emotive, and highly visible; it tends to distort general perceptions by flooding the senses and sensibilities of observers.

2. The decision to use violence directly involves a subset of the mobilized population, even in extreme situations; only a minority of any population engages in violent actions.

3. Violent action is extremely consumptive and requires a relatively large support group; the majority of the indirectly mobilized population supports the violence through acceptance and support activities.

4. The most insidious aspect of protracted violence is the increasing scope and range of violent effect; experiences imprint victims of violence and others
who are directly affected by violence, which stimulates a will to revenge the violence and supports lifelong physical and psychological impairments.

5. The retention of nonviolent infrastructure by the mobilized group throughout the conflict process is directly supported by the majority of the population, and remains the preferred alternative to violence.

6. A group that has repeated experiences with violence tends to institutionalize and glorify its capacity to engage in violence; in such situations, the conflict process becomes overgrown with stylized ornamentation and ritual, which becomes increasingly less transparent (Marshall, 1999, p. 33).

Insecurity of one’s physical integrity serves as the primary agent of societal disintegration. The violation of one’s integrity stimulates violence within reasoned proximity. The “condition of insecurity increases the individual’s disposition to justify the use of coercion and violence in political interactions and broadens the acceptable range of discretionary applications of coercion and violence” (Marshall, 1999, p. 138). A condition of crisis derives from unexpected events posing an imminent threat to vital interests or integrity (Marshall, 1999). In terms of conflict management, the condition of insecurity increases the propensity for political violence, while the condition of crisis increases the probability of political violence throughout Africa.
Chapter Five

Conclusions and Recommendations

The United States is facing a strategic inflection point characterized by an uncertain strategic security environment paradoxically framed by diminishing defense resources and an increasing number and variety of potential threats. Social, political, informational and economic trends in international competition are converging between state and non-state actors and others for relative superiority in physical, cognitive, and moral security, as well as adequate governance of populations.

Moreover, the operational environment is characterized by disorder, scarcity of resources, ecological challenges, extremist ideologies, game-changing technologies, emerging resistance movements and opportunistic competitors employing various warfare capabilities. As the foreseeable future’s new normal, this setting challenges the effectiveness of traditional forms of power while enabling non-traditional forms. Despite the apparent need to actually collaborate in this environment, our willingness to commit resources beyond our borders appears to be on the wane.

The requirements to protect and advance US interests demand new ways of thinking, with unique approaches broadening strategic options for our national leaders. Essential to any new plan is a comprehensive definition of what strategic success looks like in an increasingly disordered world punctuated by competitors capitalizing on various warfare capabilities.

Key Findings

The key findings using the instability formula identify three primary areas of the impact of governance, the incursion of state fragility, and the injection of VE.
1. The impact of governance. In an attempt to deconstruct the failed states paradigm, the dissertation explored key theoretical and discursive influences shaping the fragility debate. In today’s operating environment, and within the arc of instability, turmoil increases. On a global level, increasing geopolitical competition leads to a less controlled and predictable world. Meanwhile, as power is more diffuse, antagonism between regional powers matters more. Competition between powerful states increasingly lends a local or international color to civil wars, rendering their resolution more complex.

Wars and instability are becoming more geographically concentrated, compounded by a concerning tendency toward violence in countries attempting to transition to democracy. Some of the world’s most troubling countries are those attempting to transition away from authoritarian rules, such as Libya and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Transitioning governments pose dilemmas for domestic and foreign powers. On one hand, the behavior of many authoritarian rulers creates problems later as they hollow out institutions, repress their opponents, neglect many of their constituents, and often leave succession mechanisms vague. Conversely, regime change creates significant complications because no system is in place to manage change. Throughout 2015, VE remains a persistent and growing threat by destabilizing governments, killing civilians, and radicalizing local populations.

Attempting to identify violent extremists within the arc of instability is an important first step in the process of peacemaking and peacebuilding to resolve the perpetuation of violence in conflict areas. However, what makes such identification difficult is the reality that dramatic changes often take place within local power structures
during times of conflict. New political elites, economic elites, and entrepreneurs in violence establish themselves and occupy different spheres of authority and legitimacy. These areas shift and change, often overlapping and colliding. Some areas gain from violence through access to new economic activities or political spaces brought about by violent turmoil. For example, the militias operating in CAR profit from access to diamond mining operations and other resources while militias in Sudan’s Darfur region use a force of arms to occupy political spaces opened by conflict. Often, these groups take advantage of their superior force of arms in a defined area to claim a monopoly of power. One thing common to all elites is they have different incentives to either support the establishment of a new status quo or attempt to change it, which has significant consequences for the peacebuilding process.

Non-state armed groups often fill the void where states are unable or unwilling to assert their dominance. Weber defines the state as an entity that has a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence in a territory (Weber, 1919). However, conflict areas are characterized by states losing the support of their constituents. Thus, what is legitimate becomes unmoored from its Weberian foundation. In this context, alternative forms of power, control, and coercion develop to fill the void. Nowhere is this void more visible than at the margins of the state where warlords and non-state armed groups principally operate (Weber, 1919). They derive power from their position at the frontiers where states have difficulty extending power. Frontier examples include rebel groups such as the LRA, militias throughout the CAR, and the smattering of rebel groups in South Sudan. Although they may attack the heart of the state, their source of power remains at the periphery.
As spheres of power and legitimacy shift, ad-hoc systems of local governance often take shape. Legitimate needs for management components like courts to adjudicate disputes and security to conduct trade and protect property are developed outside the state framework and legitimize as they are supported by the population. Sometimes, this process is controlled by newly empowered political and economic elites. Other times, it is the need to survive that forces citizens to operate outside state control. Specifically, the existence of three distinct economies, namely war, shadow, and coping economies, combine to weaken the hand of the state as they provide a semi-legitimate alternative to it. In these new spheres of power, it is the non-state armed groups, warlords, and other potential injectors who are often ascendant absent the state presence. This point is central to understanding the possibility of engaging injectors in peace building since the violence they perpetuate destabilizes local power and legitimacy from a central government to a more diffuse range of sub-state entities.

The evolution of democracy in the West was the outcome of a historical, cultural, economic, political and intellectual experience, a process that must be allowed to take its course in less developed states. Allowing local systemic change dynamics to evolve unhindered ensures the viability and durability of their outcomes. Meanwhile, Western interventions to promote democracy rarely foster democratic cultural values in a weak nation unless supported by a call for change from within. Therefore, it is best for the international community to exercise more patience with poor and developing nations, and allow their societies to claim their human rights, freedoms, and liberation from dictators. The potential pitfall of international involvement in state-building processes in weak states rests in the eagerness of external actors to steer change from the outside, with
minimal collaboration with domestic state and civil society actors. Even when there is evidence of collaboration through financial aid and development programs, local voices are frequently unacknowledged in planning and policy formulation. Such interventions often do more harm than good. Interventions may also be very destabilizing in circumstances where coercive strategies such as economic sanctions are pursued to manipulate the behavior of ruling elites, especially when it adversely affects local communities. Likewise, the use of force by preeminent global actors serves as the driver of policy intervention. This concern stems from the observation that, more often than not, military intervention in troubled states results in the cost of greater instability.

2. The incursion of state fragility. From a theoretical perspective, the literature review suggests that Western literature generally approaches the problem of state weakness using the state as the unit of analysis, without taking into adequate consideration regional and global factors undermining its development and stability. Moreover, Western theoretical frameworks examining state failure do not explore the state’s relationship with society and the capacity of civil society to effect systemic change dynamics that are critical for determining a state’s resilience to cope with instability. The disadvantage of an exclusive focus on the dynamics of state instability provides a skewed analysis of the issue, sometimes magnifying the level of threat to domestic, regional and global stability, and potentially rationalizing reactive external responses.

In addition to a broader analysis of the local context of the state, the present dissertation creates the case for analyzing the problem from a multi-tiered perspective, examining the historical, regional and global context, aspects generally neglected in Western literature on state failure. Related to this approach, the study makes the claim
that state fragility and failure are highly context-dependent processes not assessed
through annual snapshots of events in a particular country that are proffered by many
quantitative models such as the Freedom House report, the Failed States Index (FSI), and
the Brookings’ Index of State Weakness. Such models support policy responses lacking a
holistic comprehension of the dynamics of instability in a particular state. In examining
the historical, domestic, regional and global context of a range of weak, fragile, failed,
and collapsed states, the dissertation employed a pronged theoretical framework
developed from the literature, to assess the conditions of instability and conversely the
potential for stability.

The framework encompasses mainstream Western focus on the domestic sources
of instability, including prolonged conflict and crisis conditions, and the role of state
institutions. Second, it provides a more elaborate exploration of the regional context of
state fragility, acknowledging the significance of protracted regional instability and
hostile neighborhoods. Third, it brings into focus the global context, in which the role of
the injection of VE in weak states highlights a highly destabilizing and conflict-
exacerbating factor.

Additionally, the ideas of enduring rivalries and protracted social conflicts
intertwined with regional conflicts address ways of viewing wars and acts of warfare in
their context. Protracted social conflicts are debilitating to the social groups consumed by
them. These hostile interactions involve sporadic episodes of war displaying no apparent
beginning or end. When they periodically erupt into war, it is fought without rules or
standards of conduct (Marshall, 1999). On the other hand, rivalries rarely involve actual
warfare, as the stakes are too high.
In light of these concerns addressed throughout the dissertation, the twenty-first-century security environment is characterized by the following dimensions:

- A proliferation in the number of weak and failing states as well as of powerful armed groups able, through violent and nonviolent means, to affect stability and security at the local, regional, and, in some instances, even global levels.

- The proliferation of actors creates new interactions and interrelationships between and among local, regional, and global players.

- These first two developments, in turn, foster the emergence of coalitions of states, armed groups, and other non-state actors. These formal and informal groupings achieve their aims by employing irregular warfare tools and techniques.

- Faced with security challenges of these hostile coalitions of actors, democratic states foster coalitions of state and non-state allies to oppose them (Shultz et al., 2011, p. 76).

Nevertheless, the primary problem requires resolution if instability defines the range of behaviors regarded as constituting destabilizing political action. Some of the behaviors included are coups d’état, attempted coups d’état, acts of guerilla warfare, insurrections, riots, demonstrations, political strikes, deaths from political violence, assassinations, changes in the chief executive, and cabinet changes, together with changes in the type of normative structure, changes in party system and change in civilian-military status. Figure 6 depicts these changes.
Even when the constituent behaviors of instability are identified and schematized, a second subsidiary problem persists. This problem, broadly of cultural relativity, concerns the question as to whether equivalent or identical frequency of predictable outcomes on any given instability dimension constitutes comparable levels of instability. In other words, are ten demonstrations in country A within the arc of instability during a given period relative to the same quantity of instability as ten demonstrations in country B within the same period, even though country A has a long history of frequent and intense demonstrations while country B has yet to experience such violent political outbursts over the previous ten years or more? The concluding response is ‘no.’ Thus, the
conclusion supports the destabilizing impact of any given political event is considered within the context of the system and period in which it occurs; thereby considered in terms of the extent to which it constitutes a deviation from the previous system pattern. With this in mind, it is argued that:

The extent to which a political system may be characterized as unstable at any given point in time varies in direct proportion to the extent to which the occurrence or non-occurrence of changes in and challenges to the government, ...(or)...regime...deviate from the previous system-specific ‘normal’ pattern of regime/government changes or challenges; a pattern which will itself vary over time (Sanders, 1981, p. 199).

By using the predictable formulas presented, any rational system determined reasonably objectively as stable via statistically defined assessments of normality that are achieved through references of regularities in the occurrences of that event observed over time. Using the instability formula presented, a stable country is classified with a number below 33 percent.

Since the pattern of stability varies from system to system, the definition of political instability relates to system-specific conditions proposed in the five variables. The definition does not accord identical instability intensities to similar political events regardless of system context, yet measures the destabilizing impact of a given political development in terms of the extent to which it deviates from the particular standard pattern of the system in which it occurs. This is the medium for countering the new normal environment via predictive modeling utilizing the instability formula presented.
3. The injection of violent extremism. The initiation of violence by the state against its citizens contradicts its primary function, as it then becomes the transgressor or violator of societal norms and conversations rather than the adjudicator. In such case, the state abnegates its legitimate authority, which is its primary instrument of conflict management through justice. Without the cloak of legitimacy, the state acts as another social identity group competing for preeminence or predominance in the social milieu (Marshall, 1999). To examine the problem of violence meaningfully, the entire system must be considered because the full process of social conflict and the possibility of violent dysfunction are complex and inextricably intertwined with the normal social process. Once it becomes noticeable as violence and as a problem, it is already high enough to defy rational control.

All forms of political violence and warfare are social processes and symptomatic of advanced systemic breakdown and societal disintegration based on the injection of a multitude of factors which have the capability to alter the status quo. In this sense, ethnic violence is the most insidious form of intra-state political violence in that it presupposes a breakdown in authority structures that are required to impose measures of control against violence, retains minimal organization and coordination to invoke high levels of mechanized warfare, and characterizes the nature of the conflict in evocative, symbolic terms that are intrinsically non-negotiable (Marshall, 1999). Ethnic conflict is especially volatile when ethnic identities coincide with religious identities.

Violent extremists, operating separately or at times through or aligned with armed groups, have the capacity to affect the security environment by causing conflict and instability. Their power flows from personal wealth, financial or other material resources
and technologies, access to weapons, or their ability to influence directly or serve as a conduit for influence.

Stateless groups present a greater threat than nation states because extremists wield weapons and mount assaults that many nations would not dare to attempt. Meanwhile, trends in technology shape the rise of stateless power. Computers, the Internet, cellular and satellite telephones, and satellite television provide extremists unprecedented access to one another. This connectedness enables extremists throughout the globe to organize themselves more efficiently than ever before. Extremist groups assemble command and control structures that previously would have been organized only by wealthy nation states.

Moreover, we are only beginning to look beyond groups like al-Qa’ida to the groups succeeding this extremist group, such as Islamic State. Looking beyond the current extremist disposition, it is alarming when one considers that twenty years ago, neither al-Qa’ida nor any other extremist organization was a credible foe to the United States’ security interests. Twenty years from now, new extremist groups and causes will exist. Thus, it is crucial that we realize the fundamental problem surpasses a particular organization or ideology.

**Counter-narratives to Violent Extremism**

Even if the extremist worldview appear farfetched to an outsider, its internal logic is active and individual components are robustly interrelated. Moreover, it frequently incorporates elements of conspiratorial thinking, permitting it to reject contradictory views or information as “just another part of the conspiracy.” Occasionally, the narrative loses its grasp. One measure indicates a group of once dedicated extremists is becoming
disillusioned and eventually separating from the group as they lose faith in the extremist narrative. Some separate because central claims stop making sense, such as the division of the world into us and them, or the notion that violence is transformative and liberating. Others lose faith in absolutist claims of the militant narrative and realize that there are more points of view. In some departures, the loss of faith appears as a gradual process (Dalgaard-Nielson, 2013). To others, it occurs due to one eye-opening and dramatic experience.

One particularly potent trigger is a confrontation with the consequences of violence. A fascination with violence is characteristic of extremist narratives and propaganda across different forms of extremism. Their violence and resulting human suffering is displayed and emphasized in the communication, frequently with heartbreaking footage of dead, wounded, or suffering civilians. Our violence is glorified and celebrated as the only possible response to the injustices occurring. The consequences of extremists’ violence are glossed over, or the victims portrayed as faceless and anonymous non-humans. Truly, things are not like that, and when confronted with the human costs of violence, some begin to doubt.

Another trigger of ideological doubt is the entrance of a significant other into the world of the extremist—a person who in a credible and convincing way represents a different perspective from the extremists. The significant other may be a romantic partner, yet one who serves as a fellow human being displaying concern, interest, and willingness to collaborate. In some cases, the person belongs to the extremist’s out-group, yet acts kindly, selflessly, and justly. When this occurs, a central notion in extremist narratives across different forms of extremism disintegrates under pressure: The division
of the world into us and them where we are good and just and they are evil, devious, and murderous is weakened.

Anja Dalgaard-Nielson (2013) reviews case studies containing examples of how extremists for different reasons find themselves in the company of the presumed adversary, forced to admit exceptions to their stereotypes. Her studies (2013) give examples of how some people who leave become able to perceive the extremist narrative from the outside. Increased contact with the outside world, travel, time to reflect and isolation from the extremist group causes some of the initially perceived granted truths of the extremist narrative to seem less plausible. Once a leaver steps outside the story and realizes how self-referential and self-sustaining it is, he or she might feel disillusioned, even cheated. Since most parts of the extremist narrative are closely interrelated, once an extremist begins to question one element, the whole worldview eventually collapses. A number of extremist and former leftwing extremists exited once they gained a perspective on the extremist narrative, realizing the reality was a more complex than what the extremist narrative postulated.

We know from research into radicalization that a number of individuals are drawn to extremist groups because of the community and sense of belonging they offer. Additionally, it is seen in extremist propaganda how we contrast with them and how that is idealized and glorified. We portray a courageous, honorable, selfless, authentic, mutually supportive group. The leaders in such groups are naturally expected to embody these values and to serve as models and examples to emulate.

It appears in the different forms of extremism that the strongly dualistic worldview with its sharp division of the world into us and them, right and wrong, black
and white turns into a liability to the extremist group in the sense that it precludes a flexible coping with internal conflicts. Conflict resolution is reduced to two options: either the dissenter is forced entirely to conform, or the dissenter is excluded. Since the ideology is presumed to represent the world, as it is the truth, dissent is ascribed to character weakness, personal flaws, or deviousness.

If external partners collectively engage with fragile countries throughout the arc of instability, they facilitate the development of individual long-term national development plans. Meanwhile, organizations such as the United Nations Peace Building Commission and others should consider investing in methodologies for undertaking regular independent political-economic and forward-looking assessments based on predictive analysis to support the fragile states over at least an initial ten-year period.

In the absence of UN Security Council reform to promote greater institutional accountability and responsiveness, much more can be done to bolster the relationship between the UN Security Council and the African Union’s Peace and Security Council. This includes greater integration between the African Union and United Nation’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, including assessed contributions for African Union peacekeeping missions; consultations prior to decisions about division of labor and sharing of responsibilities; the practical use of the comparative advantages of the African Union and its regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution; the full operationalization of the African Standby Force; and greater financial support by African member states to African peace efforts (Cilliers & Sisk, 2013).

Efforts should be made to build informal local-level institutions for resilience and conflict prevention, which bridge formal state institutions and authority with traditional
and informal institutions. The focus of conflict prevention is shifting to critical areas of land and other natural resource disputes in rural areas, and urban conflict along identity lines in informal settlements and underserved and marginalized areas, which is often experienced as the result of unmanaged urbanization.

The future promises ever more complexity. Governments must learn how to operate and thrive in this complexity while dealing confidently with strategic shocks as they occur. The first step is to acknowledge the inherent complexity of the operating environment. Then they should consider the imperative of a whole-of-government approach among potential strategic risks. These conditions will not eliminate shocks, yet analysts can predict shifts in the political environment to counter VE by reducing their frequency and impact. In turn, this will assist governments and nations in growing more resilient as their leaders govern for the future.

In summary, the totality of the security challenges facing the nations and the evolving character of various threats demand earlier action to prevent these challenges from scaling beyond our level of strategic depth and capacity to respond. Stabilizing a disordered world requires a proactive stance to successfully compete with state, non-state actors, and others for relative superiority over the physical, cognitive, and moral security of critical populations to prevent political instability throughout the arc of instability. Just as the sunrise is predictable, so is predicting elements to counter VE in a new normal environment by anticipating and responding to the new dawn.
## Appendix A

### African Weak and Failing Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Central African Republic</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
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### Preventive Priorities Survey (PPS)

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- Somalia = 26
- Sudan = 22
- Congo (D.R.) = 18
- Chad = 15
- Central African Republic = 9
- Zimbabwe = 9
### Appendix B

**Indicators or Signposts of Fragile Country Change**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stability Categories</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Central African Republic</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Government Capacity</strong></td>
<td>Political leadership's capabilities as Public Administrators and Technocrats to effectively manage modern state</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>66.51</td>
<td>16.27</td>
<td>0.96</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Political stability(^1)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>3.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military expenditures (% of GDP)(^2)</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational/Bureaucratic capabilities to manage the collection of taxes and delivery of goods and services (control of corruption)(^3)</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>14.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freedom(^4)</td>
<td>Worst of the Worst</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>Worst of the Worse</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voice and Accountability(^5)</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>27.49</td>
<td>6.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal security capabilities and monopoly over weapons(^6)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy of Regime</strong></td>
<td>High level of political participation through fully competitive electoral system and universal suffrage(^2)</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>46.40</td>
<td>43.65</td>
<td>61.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effectiveness of civil/criminal justice systems based on consensus constitution and international rule of law(^5)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>12.32</td>
<td>0.47</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type of electoral system</td>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government adherence to human/civil rights and freedom of the press/media(^9)</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>110</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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1. Political stability reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. Retrieved from [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)

2. Military expenditures data are derived from the NATO definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military spase activities. Retrieved from [http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS)

3. Control of corruption reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Retrieved from [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)

4. Freedom categories are based on Freedom House methodologies, which reflect two broad categories: political rights and citizens who have a decisive vote on public policies. Civil liberties include the freedom to develop opinions, institutions, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. Retrieved from [https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VXxIcmDFS0s](https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VXxIcmDFS0s)

5. "Voice and accountability" reflects perceptions of the extent to which citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Retrieved from [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)

6. The security apparatus should have a monopoly on use of legitimate force. The social contract is weakened when affected by competing groups. Retrieved from [http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf](http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf)

7. The database figures compile the Voting Age Population (VAP), as well as the number of Registered Voters (REG) as indicators of political participation. The VAP figure includes an estimated number of all citizens over the legal voting age, while the registration rate comprises the actual number of people on the voters' roll. Retrieved from [http://www.idea.int/vt/methodology.cfm](http://www.idea.int/vt/methodology.cfm)

8. Rule of law reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Retrieved from [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)

9. The index assesses the degree of print, broadcast, and Internet freedom in every country in the world, analysing the events of each calendar year. Retrieved from [https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press#.VXxNOmDFS0s](https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press#.VXxNOmDFS0s)
### Socioeconomic Conditions

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<th>2013 Value</th>
<th>2012 Value</th>
<th>2011 Value</th>
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<tr>
<td>Education quality (% satisfied)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
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<tr>
<td>High level of economic development and growth/ high employment/ strong</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>25.36</td>
<td>12.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>manufacturing sector/ low inflation/ low public debt/ high credit rating/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>high foreign capital investment/ low capital flight out of country</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Multi-dimensional poverty intensity of deprivation</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>55.6</td>
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<td>High quality educational system and high literacy rates in secular subjects</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>56.6</td>
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<td>Inflation</td>
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<td>Child Mortality</td>
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<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>N/R</td>
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<td>21</td>
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### Environmental Conditions

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<tr>
<td>Strong environmental health in terms of physical, chemical, and biological</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>119</td>
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<tr>
<td>factors (disease-limited, pollution-free and healthy environment)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource depletion (% of GNI)</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out of pocket health expenses</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human development</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td>0.341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

10 The figure reflects the percentage of respondents who answered, *satisfied* to the Gallup World Poll question, “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the education system?” Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/195037/satisfaction-education-system-climbs.aspx

11 The state’s regulatory quality reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home


13 Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG

14 Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to age-specific mortality rates of the specified year. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT

15 Life expectancy at birth compares the average number of years to be lived by a group of people born in the same year, if mortality at each age remains constant in the future. Life expectancy at birth is also a measure of overall quality of life in a country and summarizes the mortality at all ages. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html

16 GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orsr/2015/01/index.htm

17 The rankings of the countries reflect the Environmental Performance Index (EPI). The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) is constructed through the calculation and aggregation of 20 indicators reflecting national-level environmental data. These indicators are combined into nine issue categories, each of which fit under one of two overarching objectives—Environmental Health and Ecosystem Vitality. Retrieved from http://epi.yale.edu/epi/country-rankings


19 The figure reflects household direct payments to public and private providers of health care services and nonprofit institutions and non-reimbursable cost sharing, such as deductibles, copayments and fee for services, expressed as a percentage of total health expenditure. Retrieved from http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2014HDR/HDR-2014-English.pdf

### Appendix C


22 The figure reflects the Average response to the Gallup World Poll question: “Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you, and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you feel about your life, and the lower the step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you feel?” Retrieved from [http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2014HDR/HDR-2014-English.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2014HDR/HDR-2014-English.pdf)


24 The figure reflects the number of people who have fled their country of origin because of a well founded fear of persecution due to their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group and who cannot or do not want to return to their country of origin. Retrieved from [http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2014HDR/HDR-2014-English.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2014HDR/HDR-2014-English.pdf)
### Cycle of State Failure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle of State Failure</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Central African Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dwindling Economy</strong></td>
<td>High level of economic development and growth/ high employment/ strong manufacturing sector/ low inflation/ low public debt/ high credit rating/ high foreign capital investment/ low capital flight out of country</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-dimensional poverty intensity of deprivation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Out of pocket health expenses</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military expenditures (% of GDP)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational/Bureaucratic capabilities to manage the collection of taxes and delivery of goods and services (control of corruption)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protracted Regional Conflict</strong></td>
<td>Spill-over affects from neighboring conflicts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current foreign military intervention</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign aid intervention</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International arms transfers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade dependence on neighboring states</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peaceful relations with neighboring states</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Protracted Social Conflict</strong></td>
<td>Strong environmental health in terms of physical, chemical, and biological factors (disease-limited, pollution-free and healthy environment)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education quality (% satisfied)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High quality educational system and high literacy rates in secular subjects</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natural resource depletion (% of GNI)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Child Mortality</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall life satisfaction</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal security capabilities and monopoly over weapons</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population affected by natural disasters per million people</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
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### The Roots of Violent Extremism

#### Declining Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>3</th>
<th>1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High level of political participation through fully competitive electoral system and universal suffrage</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political stability</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political leadership's capabilities as Public Administrators and Technocrats to effectively manage modern state</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human development</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users (% of population)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of civil/criminal justice systems based on consensual constitution and international rule of law</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government adherence to human/civil rights/and freedom of the press/media</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of electoral system</th>
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<th>Republic</th>
<th>Republic</th>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
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#### Opposition Conditions

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<tr>
<td>Ethnic/religious/sectarian integration and cohesion</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low levels of dissatisfaction or dissidence resulting in riots or socioeconomic protests</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees (by thousands)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Incidence of Coups</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity/ Territory Affected by Conflict</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross Human Rights Abuses</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of insurgent/separatists/ terrorist group activities</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Total** | 17 | 12 | 19 | 16 |

#### Instability Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>153</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>88</th>
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References


THE ROOTS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM


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Institute.


Weine, S. (2015). Understanding Communities’ Attitudes towards CVE. *Study of*
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