Defining Workplace Violence in the US Army
And Generating a Threat Response Plan
by
Joshua S. Pierson
Henley-Putnam University
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Dr. Barbara Burke, Committee Chair
Dr. Frank Nolan, Subject Matter Expert
Dr. Harry Nimon, Committee Member
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Abstract

Workplace aggression is commonly studied and analyzed in the civilian sector and within other government agencies. However, there are no comprehensive studies with regard to workplace aggression amongst the Department of the Army population. The lack of specific research on the root causes and effects of workplace aggression endangers the entire US Army workforce, both Soldiers and Department of the Army Civilians (DAC). The US Army does not adequately prevent or respond to acts of workplace violence, as demonstrated by the case studies and the lack of policy. The case studies demonstrate when people who reach the point where they conduct a violent act in the workplace exhibit a series of identifiable indicators. Applying civilian and other government agency methodology to preventing acts of workplace aggression will afford the US Army the ability to also mitigate these violent acts. However, the US Army needs a culture of violence to ensure success on the battlefield. Therefore, the US Army must make a strident effort to ensure violence committed by its Soldiers is justifiable and does not target individuals in the workplace.

Keywords: workplace violence, US Army workplace violence, workplace violence prevention, mitigating workplace aggression, workplace violence federal employee, case studies workplace violence.
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my wife, KatieBeth and my mom, Karen. Both of these individuals are instrumental in removing the word “can’t” from my vocabulary.

If you want to do great things, you must first master the small ones. – KatieBeth Pierson
Acknowledgements

First, I’d like to thank Joe DiNoto, a DSS Candidate at Henley – Putnam University. I remember a conversation with him where I stated I wanted to look at pursuing a Master’s Degree in the field of Intelligence. Joe reminded me that we go to school to broaden our horizons and should consider a degree in a field well outside of my comfort zone.

Next, I’d like to thank Dr. Barbara Burke. Your patience, guidance and perspective are the reasons why this thesis is successful. I couldn’t have had a better committee chair and advisor. I’d also like to acknowledge Dr. Harry Nimon and Dr. Frank Nolan. Your valued insight further crafted my research to focus on what was truly important and to maneuver through the periphery to identify what is important to the topic of workplace violence in the US Army.

I’d like to thank my mom, Karen. Your unwavering support and continual words of encouragement help in a way that I cannot explain. You’ve been by my side for every significant event in my life. Thank you for standing by me even to the detriment of your personal goals. I’d also like to acknowledge my dad, Scott. Dad, you stressed the importance of the words determination and ambition. Thank you for teaching me that doing the job right is more important than getting the job done.

I’d like to acknowledge, Jadyn and Christina, my daughters for providing me with the time and energy to pursue my studies. I love you both dearly and wish you success in your endeavors. Finally, and most importantly I’d like to thank KatieBeth Pierson, my wife. I required her to have a baccalaureate level of organizational management, personnel security, and workplace violence so I could ensure I was not veering off topic. You spent countless hours studying the topics on your own so I could have a person to provide a different perspective. Thank you for your time, support and creativity, and your red pen.
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List of Terms, Abbreviations, or Symbols

ACAP
Army Career Alumni Program

BCT
Basic Combat Training

BG
Brigadier General

CIRG
Critical Incident Response Group

COP
Combat Outpost

DAC
Department of the Army Civilian

DA
Department of the Army

DHS
Department of Homeland Security

DOD
Department of Defense

EO
Equal Opportunity

FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation

IMCOM
Installation Management Command

ITP
Individual Transition Plan

OER
Officer Evaluation Report

OPORD
Operations Order
PFC
Private First Class

SME
Subject Matter Expert

TAO
Transition Assistance Office

TMT
Threat Management Team

USACI
US Army Counterintelligence

USACIDC
US Army Criminal Investigations Division (Command)

USA–WAPRP
US Army Workplace Violence Prevention and Response Program

USUHS
Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

William Kreutzer Jr. opened fire on his formation during physical training in October 1995 (US v Kreutzer, 2004). The event shocked the US Army and the United States (US v Kreutzer, 2004). The official Army statement regarding Kreutzer’s violent action is that there was no way to know that Kreutzer was going to take violent action (US v Kreutzer, 2004). Contrary the official statement and popular belief, people who take violent action in the workplace provide plenty of warning signs (McElhaney, 2004). Kreutzer displayed certain behavioral norms that demonstrate his intent to take violent action. The court case transcripts revealed that Kreutzer was the recipient of many negative jokes made at his expense within his platoon (US v Kreutzer, 2004). The constant emotional grief and other issues created the environment where he actually believed violent action was the only mechanism to create change (DA, 2010).

Introduction to the Problem

Workplace aggression is commonly studied and analyzed in the civilian sector. McElhaney (2004) offers a comprehensive definition of workplace violence and aggression as any kind of conduct that is intimidating, hostile, offensive, or threatening. Workplace violence and aggression are identical and must be considered the same during the development of a workplace aggression prevention and intervention program (McElhaney, 2004).

There are no comprehensive studies with regard to workplace aggression amongst the Department of the Army population.

In September 2012, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Predicting Violent Behavior concluded that there is no effective formula to predict violent behavior with any accuracy. (Martz, 2014, npn)
The Soldier’s workplace is unique. The workplace varies from a cubicle-style office in garrison to an autonomous mission where Soldiers are in civilian clothing working in pairs to conducting a mission on a remote COP. The standard access Soldiers have to weapons imparts peculiarity to the idea of workplace violence in the US Army. Soldiers commit violent acts; they must commit violent acts if they are to win wars. Commanders justify these violent acts through the Rules of Engagement (Cole, Drew, McLaughlin, & Mandsager, 2009). However, the Army does not address unjustified acts of violence as potential acts of workplace violence.

The lack of specific research on the root causes and effects of workplace aggression endangers the entire US Army workforce, both Soldiers and DACS. Statistical research indicates that a government employee is more likely to become a victim of workplace violence than a civilian employee (Harrell, 2013). In 2011, approximately 1 in 5 victims of workplace aggression were government employees (Harrell, 2013). Finally, and the most telling statistic is that 56% of all government employee workplace violence incidents were attributed to those working in law enforcement and security-related occupations (Harrell, 2013). The US Army does not have any statistics concerning violent behavior in the workplace with the exception of the report by the US Merit Systems Protection Board titled Employee Perceptions of Workplace Violence. However, the statistics of workplace violence in the government sector provide insight into the possibility of the seriousness workplace violence poses in the US Army. There is a definite need to fill the void present and design a comprehensive US Army workplace aggression prevention program that incorporates the various necessities for the DAC workforce and the Soldier.

Statement of the Problem

The problem addressed in the research was that the US Army does not adequately deter, prevent, mitigate, and neutralize both the act of and potential acts of workplace aggression. The
case studies provided insight into two elements. Firstly, the US Army seems to view violent acts in the workplace as isolated incidents. Policymakers do not link violent acts together. Secondly, the case studies outlined in chapter four support the following statement: the US Army seems not to confront issues of workplace aggression until the aggressive behavior becomes violent action.

**Purpose Statement**

The purpose of this case study is to understand, define, and classify different acts of violence in the US Army using the lens of workplace violence from a civilian perspective. The intent is to document the US Army’s experiences with workplace violence and provide a civilian perspective on the phenomenon to explore the possibility of how the Army might improve for more positive outcomes.

**Research Questions**

**RQ1**: What are the definitions, and classifications of different acts of violence in the US Army when using the lens of workplace violence from a civilian perspective?

**RQ2**: What current programs does the US Army have that can support a workplace violence prevention and response program?

**RQ3**: What case studies are available to demonstrate that workplace violence does occur within the US Army?

**RQ4**: What procedures that are used in the civilian sector can the Army adopt to prevent and respond to acts of workplace violence?

**Significance of the Study**

This study on violence in the US Army workplace is significant for a variety of reasons. First, the study is useful in understanding the issue of workplace violence in the US Army. It defines and classifies workplace violence and also identifies common indicators in the case
studies. Secondly, this study includes recommendations to policy makers and practitioners to ensure that the US Army can identify, prevent, and respond to acts of violence in the workplace. Thirdly, Soldiers benefit from the study because they are the sensors for acts of violence. The US Army cannot prevent acts of unjustifiable aggression if individuals cannot identify these acts. This study argues for a comprehensive workplace violence program to ensure safety amongst Soldiers. Finally, this study sets the framework for future focused studies on acts of violence pertaining to the US Army workplace.

Assumptions

There are three assumptions identified that pertains to this study. First, violence is a normal action within the US Army. The US Army trains to fight wars (US Code Title 10). Second, The US Army struggles to provide adequate psychological care to Soldiers. There are many studies on the topic that demonstrate the lack of adequate psychological care to Soldiers (Department of the Army and the National Institute of Mental Health, 2015). The lack of care further amplifies the issue of workplace violence because Soldiers, like civilians without a positive outlet, might be provoked to violent action (Naifeh, 2013). Third, the US Army does not understand indicators of workplace violence. Not understanding the indicators of workplace violence means Soldiers will not recognize the signs and symptoms of someone that is on the path to violent action.

Limitations

Three main points limit the study. First, the US Army does not correlate acts of violent aggression; therefore, the study does not have any statistical data regarding aggressive behavior in the US Army workplace. Gathering data approved by the Army is not possible since the Army has not conducted any quantitative studies on workplace aggression. Second, there is no agreed
upon definition of workplace aggression within the US Army. Third, the study is limited in providing indicators of workplace violence to two entities, case studies and scholarly articles because the Army views these acts of violent behavior in the workplace as isolated.

**Delimitations**

The researcher limited the study to Soldiers that commit acts of workplace violence. The study was then further limited to Soldiers that commit an atrocity in a combat zone and to Soldiers that commit violent acts as a result of the Global Jihadi Ideology. All case studies utilized are Soldiers that presented indicators and fellow Soldiers either didn’t report or superiors ignored their report. Finally, the study was delimited to incidents that indicate a disenfranchisement with leadership.

**Organization of the Remainder of the Study**

Chapter one provided the problem statement and an introduction to the problem. Chapter one further includes a synopsis as to why this study is significant. Finally, chapter one discusses assumptions, limitations, and delimitations.

Chapter two will provide a review of the literature. Chapter two articulates all research that is available and synthesizes it to identify a common theme. Chapter two also provides the basis of the types of data utilized in crafting this study.

Chapter three articulates how the researcher gathered the data and applied it to the study. Chapter three discusses research design and states that the researcher utilized the qualitative method.

Chapter four analyzes the research question and provides the findings. Chapter four offers a definition of violence in the US Army workplace based on the research and classifies acts of violence pertaining to the US Army workplace. Finally, Chapter four discusses current
policies, regulations, and jurisdictional boundaries that pertain to acts of workplace violence in the US Army.

Chapter five covers the conclusions and implications of the findings within Chapter four. It also crafts the US Army Workplace Violence Prevention and Response Program (USA – WAPRP) as a recommendation to policymakers. It offers the basis of new policy and discusses the 10 – step program (McElhaney, 2004). Finally, Chapter five provides new jurisdictional boundaries that ensure reports of workplace violence are handled when reported.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This chapter provides a review of the current literature on the subject of workplace violence. Three themes drive the literature review. The first theme is research based in academia and government publications for the purpose of defining workplace violence. The second theme is exploring US Army and DOD regulatory guidance to identify policies and regulations that are integral to preventing and responding to acts of aggression in the workplace. Case studies are the basis of the third theme. The case studies will justify the need to develop a workplace violence and prevention response program.

Literature Review Methodology

Academic search engines provided access to data that defined workplace violence in both the private and government sectors. DeepDyve provided background on the proper usage of the terms “workplace violence” and “workplace aggression.” Dr. McElhaney believes the terms are interchangeable since an entity must prevent workplace aggression in order to prevent workplace violence (McElhaney, 2004). Although Paludi, Nydegger, & Paludi (2006) state that the terms are not interchangeable since both denote different connotations and actions.

The literature presented here is derived from word queries to find government publications. Government publications are collated on their websites; however, navigating their websites without the use of a search engine is impractical. The US Army Publication website armypubs.army.mil and apd.army.mil collate sources in a manner that is easy to navigate. Armypubs.army.mil and apd.army.mil further collate their resources into two groups; those sources that are accessible by the public and those that are limited distribution. Limited distribution sources are accessible by common access card. All sources utilized are accessible by
the public. Key words utilized were: workplace violence, US Army workplace violence, violence workplace, workplace violence prevention, mitigating workplace aggression, and workplace violence federal employee.

**Defining and Classifying Workplace Aggression**

Researchers in the field of violence studies have different perspectives regarding the interchangeability of workplace violence and workplace aggression. According to McElhaney, in his book, *Aggression in the Workplace* the statement “workplace violence” conjures an image of an individual shooting everyone in the workplace with an assault rifle. However, violence and aggression have the same meaning because prevention should encompass both aggressive behavior and violent action (McElhaney, 2004). McElhaney further discusses how workplace violence and workplace aggression are one in the same when developing a prevention and intervention program. McElhaney (2004) defines workplace violence and aggression as any kind of conduct that is intimidating, hostile, offensive, or threatening. According to Barling, Dupree, and Kalloway (2009), workplace violence and workplace aggression have separate meanings. The difference is in the action. Workplace violence is more physical in nature than workplace aggression (Barling, Dupree, & Kalloway, 2009).

The US Merit Systems Protection Board, in their report titled *Employee Perceptions of Workplace Violence* states that prior to the mid-1980s, the reports on workplace violence were scarce (Grundman, 2012). The earliest report of value on workplace violence occurred in 1988 (Hales, Seligman, S.C, & C.L., 1988) Four individuals authored a report that focused on employees in the state of Ohio that were the victims of Occupational Violent Crime (Hales, Seligman, S.C, & C.L., 1988)
The earliest attempt to define workplace violence occurred in 1998. Warchol, a statistician for the Bureau of Justice Statistics authored a study titled *Workplace Violence, 1992 – 1996*. This study provides the earliest definition of workplace violence. Warchol defined workplace violence as:

Violent acts against a person at work or on duty, including physical assaults (rape and sexual assault and aggravated and simple assault) and robbery. (Warchol, 1998, p. 1)

The Center for Disease Control and Prevention commissioned a report to be authored in 2004. This report is the first instance where a report classified workplace violence. The CDC report classified workplace violence into four categories. The four categories of workplace violence are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type 1</td>
<td>Criminal Intent</td>
<td>Perpetrator has no legitimate relationship to the business or its employee, and is usually committing a crime in conjunction with the violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2</td>
<td>Customer/Client Violence</td>
<td>Perpetrator has a legitimate relationship with the business and becomes violent while being served by the business.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 3</td>
<td>Worker-on-Worker Violence</td>
<td>Perpetrator is an employee or past employee of the business who attacks or threatens another employee(s) or past employee(s) in the workplace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 4</td>
<td>Personal Relationship Violence</td>
<td>Perpetrator usually does not have a relationship with the business but has a personal relationship with the intended victim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 – Types of Workplace Violence – Center for Disease Control
These four categories are now the standard for all government reports. The FBI article *Workplace Violence Prevention Readiness and Response* authored in 2011 by Stephen Romano, Micòl E. Levi-Minzi, Eugene A. Rugala and Vincent B. Van Hasselt affirms their usage by the FBI. DHS utilized these four categories in their report authored in 2013 and titled *Violence in the Federal Workplace: A Guide for Prevention and Response*.

**Indicators of Workplace Aggression**

Workplace violence does not occur in a vacuum (McElhaney, 2004). People who reach the point where they conduct a violent act in the workplace do not decide to commit a violent act on a whim, they exhibit a series of identifiable indicators. These indicators end in a triggering event. A triggering event is either a minor or significant act that pushes the person to the breaking point where they believe they must take violent action to correct the perceived issue (McElhaney, 2004). An individual committing an act of workplace aggression or violence will present several indicators. The indicators of workplace aggression in most instances are linked directly to interactional injustices as a result of poor management (Barling, Dupre, & Kalloway, 2009). Further research indicates that workplace aggression is linked to job and role ambiguity as well as unmanageable stress and work constraints (Barling, Dupre, & Kalloway, 2009; McElhaney, 2004). Both Julian Barling and Dr. McElhaney, in their individual works, agree that there is no set profile; however, the indicators are ambiguous yet identifiable. The most tangible indicator between both McElhaney and Barling is that the perpetrator has a propensity to violence and aggression.
Current Army Programs

There is only one DOD policy letter stating common procedure to identify and mitigate workplace violence (Department of Defense, 2014). This policy is seven pages and defines workplace violence as:

Any act of violent behavior, threats of physical violence, harassment, intimidation, bullying, verbal or non-verbal threat, or other threatening, disruptive behavior that occurs at or outside the work site. (p. 7)

This policy does not mention the US Government standard four types of workplace violence. It does not distinguish between work – related violence and workplace violence. The literature review did not reveal any Department of the Army policy on workplace violence. McElhaney finds that organizations that have a written workplace violence policy, and implement the policy are more likely to prevent acts of workplace violence than entities that do not have a written policy (2004). The Department of Defense Inspector General report titled DOD needs a Comprehensive Approach to Address Workplace Violence states that the DOD does not have a comprehensive DOD-wide program to address workplace violence threats and incidents (2005, p. 3).

Grundman’s (2012) study provides any insight into US Army viewpoints on workplace violence. The study asked three questions:

1. My agency takes sufficient steps to ensure my safety from violence occurring at my workplace.

2. During the past two years, have you observed any incident of workplace violence?

3. Please identify the type and consequence of the event and mark whether it resulted in physical injury or damage to/loss of property (2012, p. 4).
Grundman (2012) articulated that the US Army had 789 observances of workplace violence in the past two years, of which over 60% were Type III. The US Army’s Insider Threat Program is the only program that attempts to identify, respond to, or prevent the insider threat (McHugh, 2013). This program does not pertain to workplace violence, as seen in the 2014 report by LTG Martz on SPC Ivan Lopez’s violent act (Martz, 2014). Martz (2014) stated that the US Army has three programs that detect and deter the insider threat. However, since Lopez would not have been classified as an insider threat the US Army could not have predicted and prevented Lopez’s violent act. Martz wrote in his report of the 2 April 2014 Fort Hood shooting, applying the definition from the Presidential Memorandum, we conclude SPC Ivan Lopez was not an insider threat. While it is true that SPC Lopez-Lopez killed and wounded Soldiers, thereby causing “degradation of departmental resources or capabilities,” this fact alone does not support a finding that he was an insider threat. He did not commit or attempt espionage or a terrorist act, nor did he disclose national security information without authorization. His actions were not designed to do harm to the security of the United States. To interpret this shooting as the work of an insider threat, simply because Soldiers were killed and wounded, would undermine the apparent intent of the Presidential Memorandum, resulting in the diversion of focus and resources away from addressing true threats to our national security. Instead, we find SPC Lopez-Lopez’s actions on 2 April 2014 are more appropriately characterized as acts of violent behavior, as defined in DoD Instruction 1438.06. (2014, p. 41, 42)
Synthesizing the Literature

The literature review revealed integral elements of each theme. The Government and academia view workplace violence differently. The US Government classifies workplace violence into four types (Grundman, Wagner, & Robbins, 2012):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type 1</td>
<td>Violent acts by individuals who have no legitimate business connection to the workplace but enter the workplace to commit a robbery or other criminal act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2</td>
<td>Violent acts by current or former clients, customers, patients, students, inmates, or other individuals to whom an organization provides services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 3</td>
<td>Violent acts by individuals who have some employment-related involvement with the workplace - namely, present or former employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 4</td>
<td>Violent acts by individuals who are not employed by the organization but who have a personal relationship with an employee - for example, an employee's abusive intimate partner.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 – Types of Workplace Violence – Government Sector

Academia tends to base their definition on a general emphasis on action and behavior (McElhaney, 2004). The US Army does not have a definition.

The literature reviewed DOD and DA policies and determined that these policies are lacking severely. There are few regulations on workplace violence prevention and response (Grundman, 2012). Other government entities can only offer recommendations. The FBI and DHS both offered recommendations (Critical Incident Response Group, 2012; Interagency Security Committee, 2013) but cannot enforce adherence. The DOD has a seven-page policy letter stating that the subordinate departments must implement a workplace violence prevention program (DOD, 2014). The US Army has an insider threat program but this program is not
responsible for preventing and responding to acts of workplace violence (McHugh, 2013). The Insider Threat Program applies to individuals that pose a national security threat (McHugh, 2013).

Finally, studies show that violence is inherently part of US Army culture (Grossman, 1996). They further demonstrate that the US Army is flawed in their approach to unjustifiable violence (US v. Kreutzer, 2005). Due to the importance of violence in US Army culture, the US Army as an enterprise tends to ignore the indicators of potential aggressors in the workplace until these indicators reach critical mass (Leibermann & Collins, 2011). The Kreutzer case (US vs. Kreutzer, 2005 (Critical Incident Response Group, 2012) (Critical Incident Response Group, 2012)) and Nidal Hasan (DA, 2010) are examples of the type of response the US Army has to workplace aggression and support the finding that the TARP Case Studies (DA, 2010) demonstrate that the US Army is reactionary in their attempt to prevent violent action as a result of a person’s ideology (DA, 2010).

DOD does not have a comprehensive workplace violence prevention and response policy (Inspector General, 2015). Furthermore, the DOD Inspector General (DODIG) found that the US Army published interim guidance until the DOD published an overall policy (2015). DODIG further identified that the basis of US Army workplace violence prevention and response policy was US Army IMCOM OPORD 14-091 (2015). The IMCOM OPORD tasked the tenant commands to develop workplace violence prevention and response to each separate installation (2015).

This literature review demonstrates that the US Army approaches preventing workplace violence from a fractured viewpoint. This decentralized approach to developing comprehensive policy exacerbates understanding and mitigation of violent acts. The US Army should consider
understanding, defining, and classifying acts of violence using the lens of workplace violence from a civilian perspective. An OPORD is not the proper venue to mitigate these violent acts and this literature review reflects that the Army must utilize capability from the civilian perspective to prevent and respond to these acts.
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

This chapter justifies what research was gathered, how it was gathered and analyzed, and why the research chosen was important to the topic. It outlines why a positivist approach is not the best when attempting to understand the nature behind the event. This chapter then justifies why the collected data is narrowed to specific criteria. Finally, the researcher discusses how the data was analyzed to design the definition, provide common behavioral indicators, and recommend a workplace violence prevention program.

Research Process

The research process is broken down into three parts. The first part covers why the researcher chose the specific topic and the objective of the study. The second part discusses the purpose behind the chosen literature in the study. The third part covers how data was collected, collated, and analyzed. The objective of the research process is to demonstrate how the researcher reached their conclusion.

Selecting the Research Area

Workplace violence is a frequent topic of study in the civilian sector. However, there are not any studies of significance on the topic within the US Army workplace. The researcher has first-hand experience with attempting to prevent acts of workplace violence as a Counterintelligence Investigator. The researcher noticed a gap in studies regarding workplace violence in the US Army and decided to attempt to fill that gap.

Formulating the Research Aim

The researcher identified four research questions to be answered in this study.

RQ1: What are the definitions, and classifications of different acts of violence in the US Army when using the lens of workplace violence from a civilian perspective?
**RQ2**: What current programs does the US Army have that can support a workplace violence prevention and response program?

**RQ3**: What case studies are available to demonstrate that workplace violence does occur within the US Army?

**RQ4**: What procedures that are used in the civilian sector can the Army adopt to prevent and respond to acts of workplace violence?

**Research Philosophy**

The researcher chose a research philosophy that is subjective, inductive, and based on Phenomenology. The researcher’s bias also plays a significant role as to the purpose behind the study and to the subjective nature of the study. Understanding workplace violence means there is a need to understand actions and behavior. The best philosophy to utilize is one that factors in the environment, the social and conscious construct of the individual that commits the violent act (Dudovskiy, 2015).

**Phenomenology vs. Positivism**

The aspects of workplace violence are influenced by a person’s environment and are subjective. Objectively categorizing workplace violence and generating a program based off of a positivist perspective means the research will never be conclusive. Positivism is objective and the researcher must remain independent of the research (Dudovskiy, 2015). Also, positivism focuses on facts and reduces the human condition to very simple elements (Dudovskiy, 2015). Identifying facts in a workplace violence case can prove impossible. The only common fact across all workplace violence case studies is that a person committed a violent act. Reducing the purpose behind the act to its simplest element means that understanding the indicator and
anticipating the potential act is lost since society will only be concerned with how to respond and not prevent.

The researcher has many years of experience in the US Army handling Workplace Violence issues and chose not to remain independent of the study. Phenomenology allows for the researcher to provide a bias based on their experience. Workplace violence case studies have a meaning behind the event and phenomenology allows the researcher to explore and analyze that meaning (Dudovskiy, 2015). Case studies prove one of the best ways to understand how workplace violence occurs because the researcher can explore the totality of each individual case (Dudovskiy, 2015).

The researcher chose five case studies that are significant to this study and workplace violence in the US Army as a whole. Using a phenomenological approach, the researcher breaks down these five case studies. These case studies afford the researcher the ability to provide a basis for types of workplace violence, a definition of workplace violence as it pertains to the US Army, and offer a program to prevent and respond to acts of violence in the workplace.

Statement of Personal Bias

This study is the result of the author’s fifteen years of experience as an investigator in the US Army. The author has conducted inquiries on several cases of workplace aggression that could have resulted in workplace violence. The author is a US Army Chief Warrant Officer Two, Counterintelligence Technician and is considered to be a technical expert in his Military Occupational Specialty. The author’s bias will influence his perspective that the US Army does not understand the necessity to correlate acts of workplace aggression to determine common indicators.
Research Approach and Design

The researcher chose the inductive process to answer the four research questions. The researcher utilized case studies and secondary sources as the basis for developing the pattern and generating the theory (Dudovskiy, 2015). See figure 1 below depicting the utilization of the inductive process.

![Figure 1: Inductive Process]

Population and Setting

The population base covers US Army Active Duty Soldiers and Department of the Army Civilians. DACs are bound by the same regulations and reporting requirements that Active Duty Soldiers must follow. The researcher limited the case studies to US Soldiers only because even though DACs are bound to the same regulations and reporting requirements, they are not bound to the UCMJ. The setting is the US Army workplace. The US Army workplace varies from a desk at a US Army Command, such as the Army Materiel Command, to the Soldier standing guard at a COP in a conflict area. The US Army workplace is dynamic and is in every corner of the globe.

Sampling Procedures

The researcher is the primary instrument for reviewing case studies on workplace violence, surveys, government policies, and government publications relating to workplace violence. The research focused on identifying data to develop a definition of workplace violence for the US Army and identify indicators derived from case studies that help develop a prevention
program. The target population is US Soldiers. The sampling group is individuals that committed a violent act in the US Army workplace and have a case study. This study utilizes five US Soldiers who committed a violent act.

The definition of workplace violence provided by the researcher in chapter four is the result of synthesizing definitions provided by government publications and SME in academia. The indicators provided in table seven were derived from government publications and identified in case studies. Finally, the recommended program utilizes both academic studies on successful workplace prevention programs and a government publication that provides a recommendation for a government workplace violence prevention program.

Case Studies and scenarios establish the necessity of the US Army to design and implement a workplace violence prevention and response program. The case studies are the result of document review of previous instances of violence in the US Army workplace that is unjustified and fits the definition provided.

**Data Collection**

The researcher noticed that even though data with regard to workplace violence in the US Army is scarce, there are many different resources on workplace violence in the civilian sector and by different entities within the US Government. The researcher narrowed the topic to identifying the data from the civilian sector that offers the baseline for a definition and developing a program. The researcher focused the case studies on the specific reason why a person commits an act of workplace violence and extrapolated common indicators.

The qualitative theory provided the process of collecting, compiling, and coding data in a coherent methodology (Dudovskiy, 2015). The researcher applied qualitative theory to the case studies to identify behavior patterns regarding indicators amongst the subjects of the case studies.
Furthermore, the researcher utilized phenomenology to understand the reason why the subjects committed these violent acts and attempt to identify an underlying common root cause.

The data was collated into four groups. The first group pertains to defining workplace violence in the US Army workplace. The two subgroups that fomented the basis of the definition provided are academia and government publications. The second data group involved case studies of workplace violence occurring in the US Army. Data in this category was further collated into three subgroups: violence against Soldiers, violence against noncombatants in a combat zone, violence against Soldiers as a result of global jihadi ideology. The third category was policies and regulations within the US Army, US Government, and the DOD that craft the US Army perspective on workplace violence. The fourth and final category addresses the development of USA – WAPRP. Two subgroups comprise this category, academia and government publications.

**Data Analysis**

The researcher analyzed the data to identify three elements. First, the researcher needed to derive a definition for violence that occurs in the US Army workplace. The researcher utilized several government and academic sources to craft the definition for US Army workplace violence. Second, case studies provided the indicators and types of workplace violence that occur within the US Army. These case studies provided a pattern of behavior that allowed the researcher to develop a prevention program focused on specific actions as opposed to a general policy. The case studies also provided insight into the meaning of the events that occurred. The researcher wanted to discover why these individuals decided to take violent action and offer a recommendation based on that conclusion. Third, these data points and works on workplace
violence prevention programs set the basis for designing the US Army Workplace Violence Prevention and Response Program offered in chapter five.

**Conclusion**

This chapter justified the chosen research process and philosophy then discussed how data was collected. The collected data was reduced to identify why individuals committed these acts. Finally, this chapter outlined how the data was analyzed to develop the recommendations provided in chapter five. Chapter four will discuss the results of the analysis.
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the analysis determined over the course of the study. The analysis covers three topics. First, it provides a definition of workplace violence for the US Army. Second, it discusses necessity for the Army to have a culture of violence. Third, it uses case studies to determine the types of workplace violence that occur within the US Army.

Introduction

The US Army does not adequately prevent or respond to acts of workplace violence, as demonstrated by the case studies and the lack of policy. The case studies all have common indicators and provide a starting point to understanding of the depth of the problem of workplace aggression in the US Army. These common indicators can establish a baseline of indicators for a workplace violence program. Figure two articulates the current issue with the US Army workplace violence prevention policy.

Figure 2 – Depiction of current US Army Workplace Violence Standard

The US Army does not have a definition of workplace violence for its purpose. There are no resources that focus specifically on workplace aggression amongst Soldiers. The US Army does not have a workplace violence prevention program. Therefore, this study utilized civilian definitions and established policy and found that many aspects of workplace violence in the civilian sector can transfer to a US Army program. Finally, the policies and regulations that are currently utilized, do not mention workplace violence in any form. They are not adequate to preventing and responding to workplace aggression.
This chapter provides a definition of workplace violence in the US Army since one does not exist. This chapter then further categorizes acts of violence into three types and articulates issues of violence in the US Army workplace in the form of case studies. Publications by the US Government and Subject Matter Experts in the field of organizational management, as well as case studies of Soldiers that committed these unjustifiable acts provide the best opportunity to understand the need to define and prevent workplace violence in the US Army. The terms violence and aggression are only interchangeable in context. This study focuses on preventing violent acts by noticing aggressive behavior. Therefore, the term violence is the primary term utilized throughout chapters four and five.

The US Army and the Culture of Violence

The Operational Army must have individuals willing to commit justifiable violent acts. The US Army establishes the ability to commit these acts in BCT (Department of the Army, 2011). BCT emphasizes the importance of the Chain of Command and the group over the individual (Department of the Army, 2011). BCT also dehumanizes the enemy and creates the environment that emotion can lead to weakness on the battlefield (Grossman, 1996). Dave Grossman, in his book On Killing, discusses the importance of the Chain of Command. Soldiers that are highly trained, professional, and have a commander dedicated to success on the battlefield have the propensity to destroy an army of amateurs (Grossman, 1995).

Roman Legions defeated Greek citizen-soldiers due to their treatment of the Army as a profession (Grossman, 1995). Rome trained their Soldiers to dehumanize their enemy and kill in a group, believing that group influences create the need for the individual to conform (Grossman, 1995). The US Army adopts the same philosophy and it is for this reason that the US Army has the most professional and highly trained force on the planet (Grossman, 1995). However, the
antithesis of this philosophy is unique and present in the US Army. The Army has a justifiable culture of violence. This culture of violence breeds aggressive behavior that when left unchecked, meaning nobody intervenes, will end in an atrocity.

The US Army needs a culture of violence to ensure success on the battlefield. However, the culture of violence means that the US Army is more prone to have acts of workplace aggression on a greater scale than in the private sector. If a Soldier or group of Soldiers commit a violent act that a commander ordered then the violent act is not workplace violence, the act is mission fulfillment. If the Soldier decided to act violently as a result of their disenfranchisement with the US Army and their command climate, then the act committed is an act of workplace violence.

Through the course of his research, Grossman discovered that Soldiers believe that they will return fire in self–defense. However, a survey of veterans revealed that the number one reason Soldiers return fire is due to the orders of their commander (1995). Military commanders have the most influence on getting the group to commit acts of violence than any other entity on the planet (Grossman, 1995). The influence commanders exude is the reason there are atrocities conducted at the behest of a commander (Grossman, 1995). Due to the influence of the commander, distinguishing between an act of workplace violence in the US Army and an act of mission fulfillment is important.

The group, a squad – sized, or platoon – sized element is the most important entity in the US Army formation. The group is what fights the war and crafts a way of thinking. The individual does not have a predisposition to violence; however, the group will conduct acts of atrocity to garner respect from the group (Grossman, 1995). Statistics demonstrate that when Soldiers operate alone, they are less susceptible to kill or fire a weapon. Only 21% of individuals
fired their rifle during WWII. However, 100% of machine gunners fired their weapon (Grossman, 1995). Machine gunners operated in two–man teams in WWII; this statistic justifies partially why snipers operate in two–man teams as well (Grossman, 1995). According to Grossman, snipers and machine gunners continued to fire due to pressure of not performing in front of their peers (1995).

**Workplace Aggression and the US Army**

Violent acts in the workplace do not constitute workplace violence. Violent acts in the Operational Army begin with the commander (Grossman, 1995). The movie A Few Good Men (Sorkin, 1992) provides an excellent and accurate depiction of the depth and breadth of the commander’s influence. Jack Nicholson’s character, Colonel Nathan R. Jessup utilized his command influence to train PFC William Santiago (Sorkin, 1992). Two Soldiers, acting on the orders of their Commanding Officer performed a violent act on PFC Santiago, causing the death of the PFC (Sorkin, 1992). This unjustifiable act of violence is not an act of workplace violence because the two Marines that performed the violent act on a fellow Marine did so under the orders of their commander despite the legality of the order. The basis of workplace violence in the US Army is disenfranchisement with the command.

An act of workplace violence in the US Army can occur in any setting. The Marines in the movie willingly committed the violent act on the orders of their commander. The Marines did not have a history of disenfranchisement with their leadership. Workplace violence in the US Army is different from a violent act that occurs in the US Army workplace because the Soldier who commits an act of workplace violence reached the point of disenfranchised with the US Army.
Defining workplace violence is not an easy task. Those attempting to identify workplace violence must consider the context of the act, events leading to the aggressive act, and the intent of the individual that committed the act. Soldiers in combat face frequent life–changing decisions where even the best of several bad choices can have a profound negative impact on both the Soldier and the US Army (Grossman, 1995). Therefore, the US Army must understand workplace violence and workplace aggression and apply mitigation techniques accordingly.

**Defining Workplace Violence**

Defining the action of workplace violence or aggression is not easy. Workplace violence is not merely violence in the workplace, and encompasses many complex facets which, when standing alone, lead to a debate on the topic. According to the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) report titled *Workplace Violence Intervention and Prevention*,

A working definition should encompass all conduct implicating physical violence that an organization will be called on to intervene in and that it is legally required to intervene in (ASIS, 2011, npn).

ASIS constructed their definition of workplace violence based off of the following facets:

- Threats of physical violence towards a person, whether direct or indirect;
- Behavior that generates concern for safety from violence due to its nature and severity;
- The exhibited behavior must have a nexus associated with the workplace;
- Finally, the exhibited behavior is not limited to a specific population in the workplace.

According to the ASIS report previously mentioned, the definition of workplace violence is the following:
A spectrum of behaviors, including overt acts of violence, threats, and other conduct that generates a reasonable concern for safety from violence, where a nexus exists between the behavior and the physical safety of employees and others (such as customers, clients, and business associates), on-site, or off-site when related to the organization. (ASIS, 2011, npn)

Michele Antoinette Paludi, Rudy V. Nydegger, Carmen A. Paludi, in their combined work, *Understanding Workplace Violence: A Guide for Managers and Employees* define workplace violence as:

Workplace violence includes but is not limited to, verbal threats, nonverbal threats, pushing, shoving, hitting, assault, stalking, murder, and related actions. These behaviors constitute workplace violence whether people who are in a supervisory position or by co-workers, vendors, clients, or visitors commit them. These behaviors also constitute workplace violence if they occur between employees of the same or opposite sex. (Paludi, Nydegger, & Paludi, 2006, p. 104)

McElhaney (2004) stipulates that workplace aggression and workplace violence are one in the same. Workplace violence has the perception of an individual coming to the work location and committing a mass casualty situation (McElhaney, 2004). Workplace violence, in this capacity, is accurate; however, mass shootings as a result of workplace aggression are not the only form of workplace violence (McElhaney, 2004). McElhaney defines workplace aggression and violence as any conduct that is intimidating, hostile, offensive, or threatening. McElhaney also assesses that act of sexual assault and aggression in the workplace is also acts of workplace violence (McElhaney, 2004). Using McElhaney’s assessment of workplace violence, the US
Army must apply incidents where individuals enter into a fist – fight with each other and determine the reason behind the fight.

The US Army has a justifiable culture of violence, yet has many recent examples of violence occurring in what both the FBI and academia consider as the workplace. These examples range from supervisors creating a hostile work environment to Soldiers conducting acts of violence against fellow Soldiers or civilians. The definitions the FBI and academia provided are sufficient enough to articulate a working definition for the US Army. The US Army has two distinct types of violence, justifiable and unjustifiable violence. A definition of workplace aggression for the US Army must address unwarranted aggression and separation from the elements essential to the US Army livelihood, loyalty, duty, honor, and integrity. Three distinct facets construct the definition of US Army workplace violence:

- Disenfranchisement with the Command element
- A basis of moral depravity directed against fellow Soldiers or DOA Civilians in peacetime or wartime
- Violence against noncombatants when in a wartime scenario not associated with an order from a commander

**Proposed Definition of Workplace Violence for the US Army**

Figure 2 depicts how three definitions utilized in the civilian sector were synthesized to construct the proposed US Army definition of workplace violence.
Figure 3 – Developing the Proposed Army Definition of Workplace Violence

Table three depicts how the researcher reduced each definition to identify commonalities. These commonalities were then applied to the US Army workplace violence definition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Considerations</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| American Society for International Security (ASIS) | • Threats of physical violence towards a person, whether direct or indirect.  
• Behavior that generates concern for safety from violence due to its nature and severity.  
• The exhibited behavior must have a nexus associated with the workplace.  
• The exhibited behavior is not limited to a specific population in the workplace. | “A spectrum of behaviors, including overt acts of violence, threats, and other conduct that generates a reasonable concern for safety from violence, where a nexus exists between the behavior and the physical safety of employees and others (such as customers, clients, and business associates), on-site, or off-site when related to the organization” |
Michele Antoinette Paludi, Rudy V. Nydegger, Carmen A. Paludi

“Workplace violence includes but is not limited to, verbal threats, nonverbal threats, pushing, shoving, hitting, assault, stalking, murder, and related actions. These behaviors constitute workplace violence.

McElhaney

- Workplace aggression and workplace violence are one in the same.
- Workplace violence has the perception of an individual coming to the work location and committing a mass casualty situation.
- The act of sexual assault in the workplace is an act of workplace violence.

“Any conduct that is intimidating, hostile, offensive, or threatening.”

Table 3 – Comparison of Definitions

The following definition is a compilation of the analysis of US Government publications and case studies, and publications of SMEs in organizational management:

Workplace violence in the US Army is an act of aggression as a result of disenfranchisement with the command element that is directed against fellow Soldiers or Department of the Army Civilians in either peacetime or wartime or noncombatants when in a wartime environment.
Figure 3 articulates the three main parts of the provided definition. The basis of workplace violence in the US Army is disenfranchisement with the command. The target is rarely the command, but the Soldiers assigned to the unit, or noncombatants on the battlefield.

Figure 4 – Main Points of Defining Workplace Violence

A US Army workplace violence definition should adopt the method that the CIRG, FBI utilized in their report *Workplace Violence, Issues in Response*. Initially, the report states that academia and professional management reached a consensus that workplace violence encompasses a range of actions and behavior. The range of actions and behavior include domestic violence, stalking, threats, harassment, bullying, emotional abuse, intimidation, and
other forms of conduct that create anxiety, fear, and a climate of distrust in the workplace (Critical Incident Response Group, 2012). The reports then categorized workplace violence into four types, which were discussed in Chapter 2. The US Army needs only three types to meet the intent of the aforementioned definition. They are provided below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type 1</td>
<td>Violent acts by individuals, who have no other connection with the workplace, but enter to commit a violent act.</td>
<td>Mohammod Youssuf Abdulazeez, 16 July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2</td>
<td>Violence against coworkers, supervisors, or commanders by a present or former Soldier.</td>
<td>SGT William Kreutzer, 27 October 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 3</td>
<td>Violence directed against noncombatants in a conflict zone.</td>
<td>SSG Robert Bales, 10 March 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maywan Kill Team, Summer 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Table 4 – Types of Workplace Violence in the US Army |

Below are examples of violent acts associated with the types dictated in Table 4 – Types of Workplace Violence in the US Army. Should the US Army adopt this plan, these three types are the basis of an overarching workplace violence prevention policy.

TYPE 1: Violent acts by individuals, who have no other connection with the workplace, but enter to commit a violent act.

implications. However, the dual classification does not diminish the gravity of the violent act. The dual classification further enhances the case against Abdulazeez. First, according to the TYPE 1 category of workplace violence, his is an act of workplace violence. Second, his was an act of terrorism and an act of war because he sought out a military target and attacked military personnel due to his global jihadi ideology. The act is dually defined as both workplace violence and global jihadi terrorism.

TYPE 2: Violence against coworkers, supervisors, or commanders by a present or former Soldier.

SGT William Kreutzer has the dubious honor of committing the first recorded act of TYPE 2 Workplace Violence where a Soldier used a fatal method to correct a temporary problem. TYPE 2 will encompass incidents as marginal as fist – fights that are not a part of a training scenario to a Soldier attempting to use their rifle against several individuals. TYPE 2 will also encompass workplace violence committed as a result of dual loyalties when a Soldier or employee commits the act. Sexual Harassment and Assault is also part of TYPE 2 workplace violence. TYPE 2 is the most common form of workplace violence in the US Army.

TYPE 3: Violence directed against noncombatants in a conflict zone.

Robert Bales and the Maywan Kill Team each committed an act of TYPE 3 workplace violence. TYPE 3 covers atrocity committed as a result of disenfranchisement with the leadership. A pilot who accidentally drops a bomb on a hospital has not committed an act of workplace violence because the intent was not to harm or kill noncombatants intentionally.

These are the three main categories of workplace violence as they pertain to the US Army environment. These definitions will establish the baseline for defining workplace aggression in the US Army. The US Army’s definition must encompass two separate elements. The first is
workplace aggression against fellow Soldiers and Department of the Army civilians that encompasses acts of depravity and violence. The second pertains to unnecessary aggression against noncombatants.

**Abu Grahib – An Example of Violence in the Workplace that is not Workplace Violence**

The Abu Grahib atrocity is an example of violence in the workplace not associated with workplace violence. This atrocity demonstrates what can occur when the command climate allows for sadistic behavior. Between October and December of 2003, the 800th Military Police Brigade engaged in numerous sadistic and illegal acts of detainee abuse (Gonzales & Tabuga, 2004). Statements from many witnesses corroborated the evidence resulting in the relief BG Janis Karpinski and 11 other individuals under her command (Gonzales & Tabuga, 2004).

The possibility arises to classify these heinous acts as workplace violence given the nature of the sadistic behavior, and the violence US Soldiers wrought on the Iraqi detainees. However, as previously stated, the US Army should base an act of workplace aggression pertaining on an individual’s disenfranchisement with the US Army Establishment.

The Soldiers that carried out these acts did so wittingly with the authority of their commander, who was a Brigadier General. Lynndie England, the Private sentenced to three years in prison, stated that she felt no remorse for her actions when she returned home (England, 2009). This issue is not workplace violence because the command sanctioned the behavior and the Soldiers acted upon the authority of the command. They were not disenfranchised even though their actions were reprehensible. The distinction between an atrocious act that violates the Law of Armed Conflict and an act of workplace violence in the US Army is derived from the command climate and the reaction of the Soldiers to the command climate.
Indicators of Workplace Aggression in the US Army

The US Army is arguably the most diverse workforce in the US; thus identifying the boundary of standard indicators is difficult. Infantry units will have a different interpretation of indicators than military intelligence units. The US Army should borrow the policy on EO to develop practical workplace aggression indicators. The table below depicts the methodology that resulted in the development of US Army workplace violence indicators:

![Diagram of Indicator Development]

**Figure 5 – Developing US Army Workplace Violence Indicators**

Ms. Caitlin Durkovich, Chair for the Interagency Security Committee oversaw the report titled *Violence in the Federal Workplace: A Guide for Prevention and Response*, 2013, provided the following indicators of workplace aggression:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Workplace Aggression in the Government Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct or veiled threats of harm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimidating, belligerent, harassing, bullying, or other inappropriate and aggressive behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numerous conflicts with supervisors and other employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringing a weapon to the workplace, brandishing a weapon in the workplace, making inappropriate references to guns, or fascination with weapons.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Statements showing fascination with incidents of workplace violence, statements indicating approvals of the use of violence to resolve a problem, or statements indicating identification with perpetrators of workplace homicides.

Statements indicating desperation (over family, financial, and other personal problems) to the point of contemplating suicide.

Pending or recent layoffs.

Drug/alcohol abuse.

Extreme changes in behavior/Paranoia

**Table 5 – Indicators of Workplace Violence in the Federal Workplace**

Some of these indicators are typical discussion topics among Soldiers in a US Army environment and there are no publications stating what US Soldiers should consider acts of workplace aggression. Academia also offers a different set of indicators, depicted in the table six below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History of Aggressive Behavior</td>
<td>Used violence and will use again if deemed necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Isolation</td>
<td>Alienates coworkers and superiors. Occurs through aggressive actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent Productivity</td>
<td>Perceived as lazy or disinterested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signs of Emotional Distress</td>
<td>Abnormal mood swings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abnormal Obsessions</td>
<td>Withdraw into their specific belief or obsession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable Work History</td>
<td>Consistently late or does not come to work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fascination with Weapons or Violent Events</td>
<td>Justifying the use of violence for their perceived grievance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substance Abuse</td>
<td>Not limited to illicit drugs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienation of Coworkers</td>
<td>Grow disaffected with peers and exhibit anger and frustration toward them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in Personality</td>
<td>A significant change in action and behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterioration in Self-Care</td>
<td>No care regarding appearance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chronic Grievances  Continually filing complaints against coworkers and immediate supervisors

Discussion of Taking Violent Action  Threatening an individual or group by telling someone

**Table 6 – Indicators of Workplace Violence according to Academia**

These indicators are the basis of a comprehensive workplace aggression policy within the US Army. The Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and the Direct Reporting Units should craft the boundaries of what is and is not workplace aggression. These entities should utilize the indicators provided in tables five and six to provide indicators of workplace aggression. Table seven provides an example of indicators the US Army can utilize.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Indicator</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional</td>
<td>Social isolation</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Signs of emotional distress</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changes in personality</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alienation of Coworkers</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abnormal obsessions</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fascination with weapons or violent events</td>
<td>Academia Civilian Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extreme changes in behavior</td>
<td>Civilian Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numerous conflicts with supervisors and other employees</td>
<td>Civilian Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paranoia</td>
<td>Civilian Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical</td>
<td>History of aggressive behavior</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intimidating, belligerent, harassment, bullying, or other inappropriate</td>
<td>Civilian Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and aggressive behavior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Substance abuse, which may or may not include illicit drugs.</td>
<td>Academia Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterioration in self-care</td>
<td>Academia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringing a weapon to the workplace when not required, brandishing a weapon in the workplace</td>
<td>Civilian Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeated viewing of Internet websites, without official sanction, that promote or support international terrorist themes</td>
<td>AR 381-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soliciting advice, encouragement, finances, training, or other resources from a person who advocates the use of unlawful violence to undermine or disrupt U.S. military operations or foreign policy.</td>
<td>AR 381-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Ethic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent Productivity</td>
<td>Academia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable Work History</td>
<td>Academia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic grievances against coworkers and immediate supervisors</td>
<td>Academia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pending or recent layoffs</td>
<td>Civilian Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of Taking Violent Action</td>
<td>Academia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct or veiled threats of harm</td>
<td>Civilian Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statements showing fascination with incidents of workplace violence, statements indicating approvals of the use of violence to resolve a problem, or statements indicating identification with perpetrators of workplace homicides</td>
<td>Civilian Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statements indicating desperation (over family, financial, and other personal problems) to the point of contemplating suicide</td>
<td>Civilian Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advocating support for terrorist objectives</td>
<td>AR 381 – 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expressing hatred of American society, culture, government, or principles of the U.S. Constitution</td>
<td>AR 381 – 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advocating the use of unlawful violence or force to achieve goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature</td>
<td>AR 381 – 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expressing a duty to engage in violence against DOD or the United States in support of an international terrorist cause</td>
<td>AR 381 – 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expressing support for persons or organizations that</td>
<td>AR 381 – 12</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
promote or threaten the unlawful use of force or violence

Advocating loyalty to a foreign interest over loyalty to the United States

Expressing a political, religious, or ideological obligation to engage in unlawful violence directed against U.S. military operations or foreign policy.

Expressing support for foreign persons or organizations that promote or threaten the use of unlawful force or violence to achieve political, ideological, or religious objectives

Table 7 – Suggested US Army Workplace Violence Indicators

Table seven further articulates from where the indicator is derived and classifies the indicator into four categories, emotional, physical, work ethic, and verbal. The table also highlights significant discrepancy amongst the three entities assessed. No one entity, between academia, government sector or the US Army factors in all potential indicators. This oversight leaves a gap in potential reporting and can end in a tragic scenario. The indicator list in table seven will be utilized when assessing the indicators in the case studies.

Types of Violence in the US Army Workplace

Historically, the US Army experienced three styles of workplace violence. These three styles are workplace violence as a result of dual loyalties, indiscriminate violence targeting Soldiers, and violence against noncombatants in a combat zone. Each of these types of violence is unique and poses a different series of questions. The US Army must differentiate between the three if they are to mitigate unjustifiable violent acts in the workplace.

Global Jihadism as Workplace Violence

The first category, workplace violence as a result of the global jihadi worldview, is now becoming a common occurrence in the US Army. Hasan Akhbar has the dubious distinction of committing the first act of global jihadi terrorism in the workplace (Associated Press, 2003). Ex-
Major Nidal Malik Hasan was the second, and Naser Jason Abdo’s failed attempt would have made him the third. The global jihadi worldview is not compatible with the US Army (Lieberman & Collins, 2011).

Dr. Marc Sageman, in his interview with the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, discusses issues with dual loyalties. He discusses that some loyalties, such as loyalty to global jihadism is not compatible with loyalty demanded by the US Army (2010). The Army must make every attempt to find and separate individuals that ascribe to this belief from its ranks.

Global Jihadists believe that the prophet Muhammad and his followers were obstructed from practicing their religion freely in Mecca and had to flee to Medina (Brachman, 2009). Global Jihadists believe that an individual must both declare that Allah is the Creator and Provider and adhere strictly to the tenets stated in the Sunnah and the Quran (Brachman, 2009). Global Jihadists interpret the following verses from the Quran literally (2:191-193) –

And kill them wherever you find them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out. And Al-Fitnah is worse than killing but if they desist, then lo! Allah is forgiving and merciful. And fight them until there is no more Fitnah and worship is for Allah alone. But if they cease, let there be no transgression except against Az-Zalimun.

This literal interpretation justifies acts of indiscriminate violence on those that, according to Global Jihadists, do not abide by the tenets of Islam (Brachman, 2009). Global Jihadists interpret polytheists as anyone that is not Muslim; therefore they are doomed to die or convert.

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1 Al-Fitnah is an Arabic word that connotes strife, trial, and affliction. Al-Fitnah in 2:191-193 is used to mean persecution of those that Muslims deem as unbelievers.
2 Az-Zalimun is interpreted as the wrong-doers. It is also translated as those who are unjust and oppress. This verse calls for Muslims to kill those that are classified as Az-Zalimun.
Since 9/11 and the advent of the Global War on Terror, four US Army Soldiers attempted to take violent action against their fellow Soldiers in support of Global Jihadist rhetoric. Hasan Akhbar and Nidal Hasan succeeded, Naser Jason Abdo was stopped immediately before committing a violent act, and Ryan Andersen attempted to provide material support to a terrorist organization while offering to defect. These four Soldiers went through the radicalization process, became Global Jihadists, and believed that the only method to effect change was through violent action. Naming these violent acts as workplace violence does not cheapen the act these individuals committed. The US Army awarded Purple Hearts to the victims of ex-Major Nidal Hasan’s brutal attack due to his strict adherence to global jihadi ideology (Koran & Crawford, 2015).

There is little difference between workplace aggression and violence based in global jihadi radicalization. The indicators correlate. Both require the individual to alienate themselves from the crowd and to identify ways and methods to justify their perspectives. Both require that there be a triggering event. Finally, and possibly the most telling, the mobilization phases are identical. Once the individual experiences a triggering event, the reason for the shooting is nondescript.

The indicators of those who commit acts of workplace violence based on the global jihadi worldview are not different than acts of aggression not associated with a worldview. Both groups are disenfranchised with the US Army and take violent action to influence change. The reasons for violent action are different but the target population is the same. The basis of workplace violence in the US Army is a disenfranchisement with the US Army Establishment. Every individual cited in the succeeding case studies exhibits disenfranchisement with the US Army Establishment.
The distinction between global jihadi workplace violence and indiscriminate workplace violence is important. Soldiers caught in the line of fire during an act of global jihadi workplace violence are casualties of a war with the global jihadist ideology. The US is at war with a worldview, meaning the enemy can be anyone who ascribes to that belief. These individuals are in the ranks of the US Army. When the day comes that they decide to take violent action, the US must treat their act as an act of war (Lieberman & Collins, 2011). The Soldiers killed and wounded by Ex Major Hasan were rightfully awarded the Purple Heart and received full benefits of a Soldier wounded in combat (Lieberman & Collins, 2011).

The Radicalization Process

The radicalization process encompasses three phases. The three phases are radicalization, mobilization, and violent action (Department of the Army, 2010). Radicalization begins when the individual seeks out violent extremist rhetoric and believes said rhetoric. Hasan was in contact with Anwar al-Aulaqi (Leiberman & Collins, 2011). Naser Jason Abdo’s father was a Palestinian Liberation Authority member, and Naser Jason Abdo provided material support to terrorism (Department of the Army, 2010). After radicalization, the subject then mobilizes for action.

Typically, the subject will experience their triggering event right before the mobilization phase. A triggering event is anything that pushes the individual to the point of violent action. Once the subject begins the mobilization phase, they believe that they must take violent action to affect change. Ivan Lopez’s triggering event was that his permissive temporary duty authorization was not processed correctly (Martz, 2014). During the mobilization phase, the subject identifies their target. Their entire reason for survival is striking a violent blow to that
target. After they identify the target and move to their objective, they take violent action in the name of global jihadi rhetoric (Department of the Army, 2010).

**Nidal Malik Hasan**

On November 5, 2009, a lone attacker strode into the deployment center at Fort Hood, Texas. Moments later, 13 Department of Defense employees were dead, and another 32 were wounded in the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil since September 11, 2001.

(Lieberman & Collins, 2011)

The individual that conducted this heinous attack was Major Nidal Malik Hasan, a US Army Psychiatrist and Officer (Lieberman & Collins, 2011). Shortly after the attack, the Obama Administration classified Hasan’s act as an act of workplace violence (Daly, 2013). The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) advised the President to classify the act as workplace violence to mitigate any violent actions against Muslims who are part of DOD (Lieberman & Collins, 2011).

Irrespective of their reasons, the JCS correctly classified this act as workplace violence. Hasan’s act is dual purpose. He committed an act of international terrorism as a lone wolf and an act of workplace violence because he specifically targeted those in his workplace as a result of his disenfranchisement with the US Army (McElhaney, 2004).

Hasan’s indicators, and the command’s potential opportunities to intervene, are peppered through his history leading to the terrorist act (Lieberman & Collins, 2011). Hasan entered the US Army in 1995 through the USUHS (Lieberman & Collins, 2011). During his time at USUHS, he articulated his perspective of Muslims in the US Military that disturbed his classmates and instructors. His radicalization process began in 2003, and he moved to the mobilization phase in 2006 (Lieberman & Collins, 2011). His OERs were contradictory. A rater on one OER praised Hasan’s controversial research into Muslim ideology and counterterrorism. Another rater on a
subsequent OER documented poor performance and articulated concern for Hasan’s research (Lieberman & Collins, 2011).

Throughout this cycle, Hasan made no effort to conceal his Global Jihadi ideology (Lieberman & Collins, 2011). He solidified his paradoxical relationship with the US Army during a presentation he gave as a student at USUHS titled, *Is the War on Terror a War on Islam: An Islamic Perspective?* The instructor stopped the briefing due to the controversial nature and because the students were growing disenfranchised with Hasan’s rhetoric (Lieberman & Collins, 2011). The briefing called into question every aspect of the Global War on Terror, leading students and instructors to question Hasan’s loyalty to the United States as an Officer in the US Army (Lieberman & Collins, 2011). Hasan’s second presentation was worse than the first. He defended Osama bin Laden and justified the use of suicide bombers against military targets in Iraq and Afghanistan (Lieberman & Collins, 2011).

Hasan managed to meet all criteria for graduation partially because USUHS allowed Hasan to complete the training out of fear reprisal. The USUHS leadership believed that Hasan would file an Equal Opportunity complaint if USUHS were to fail him. Hasan also stated in both presentations that the primary threat to US Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq were Muslim Soldiers conducting fratricidal acts against their fellow US Soldiers (Lieberman & Collins, 2011). Hasan verbally accosted a female ranking officer by stating that if they were in Islamic lands, she would not be allowed to speak to him and that since she was a woman, he did not have to abide by her directives (Lieberman & Collins, 2011). Hasan then reached out to Anwar al-Aulaqi for guidance and support. Aulaqi stated that Hasan had a spiritual duty to conduct an attack on the US Homefront (Lieberman & Collins). Hasan then moved to mobilization shortly after corresponding with Aulaqi.
AR 381-12 has two tables that state reportable indicators of potential terrorist associated insider threats and extremist activity that may pose a threat to DOD or disrupt US military operations. Table 3-2 is a table of indicators of possible terrorist-related insider threats. Hasan exhibited seven of the 14 indicators listed in Table 3-2 and three of the six listed in Table 3-3.

**Hasan’s Act as Workplace Violence**

Hasan targeted his coworkers specifically due to their affiliation with the US Army. This distinction is important and codifies the perspective that Hasan committed both an act of global jihadi terrorism and an act of workplace violence. Again, there are two types of workplace violence that US Army members can commit, violence against their fellow Soldiers and violence against civilians. Global Jihadist radicalization further classifies Hasan’s act as an act of war, further justifying medical, financial support for the victims of Hasan’s attack (Daly, 2013). The objective is to ensure that the US Army can mitigate and prevent these violent acts. Classifying this act with other types of workplace violence ensures the US Army will leverage all capability to prevent them.

**Workplace Violence by Soldiers Targeting Soldiers**

The second category of workplace violence in the US Army is acts committed by Soldiers against other Soldiers, not as the result of a worldview. SPC Ivan Lopez and SGT William Kreutzer are the only two examples where a Soldier killed another Soldier as the result of their disenfranchisement with the US Army. Workplace aggression is ubiquitous in the US Army, especially due to the prevalence of violence in the US Army. The difficulty arises when attempting to understand what is an acceptable level of violence and when does that violence become the result of disenfranchisement. If a junior soldier physically accosts another soldier out of anger and not during training, then the act is workplace violence. The indicators of soldiers
that conduct minor acts of violence are not different than those SGT Kreutzer and SPC Lopez
committed. The reason Kreutzer and Lopez received any attention from the US Army leadership
is due to the gravity of their respective attacks.

Workplace violence targeting Soldiers that is not as a result of a worldview is an issue
that does not get much coverage. Two significant cases have occurred in the US Army. The SGT
William Kreutzer case occurred in 1995 and provides a historical reference point for indicators
of workplace violence. SPC Ivan Lopez took violent action as a result of disenfranchisement
with his command in 2014. The indicators between the two are identical. These two cases prove
that workplace aggression in the US Army is not a new issue, but one that the Army needs to
address.

**SGT William Kreutzer Jr.**

Kreutzer joined the US Army in 1992 and was assigned to the 82d Airborne Division in
1993. His superiors considered him to be a good Soldier. Kreutzer, however, had issues relating
to his coworkers (US vs. Kreutzer, 2005). The Kreutzer case is the textbook example of
workplace violence that does not have the influences of global jihadism in the US Army and
missed opportunities to prevent such acts. Kreutzer grew disillusioned with the 82d Airborne
Division early in his service (Pierson, 2014). The ridicule Kreutzer received on a daily basis
fomented his perspective that the command did not perceive him as a valued member of the team
(Pierson, 2014). As the insults continued between April and July 1994, he grew disaffected with
the unit and began to make general statements of committing violent acts against his coworkers
(US vs. Kreutzer, 2005).
Kretuzer’s Triggering Event

Kreutzer experienced endless ridicule during a deployment to the Sinai Peninsula (Pierson, 2014). His platoon sergeant confronted him regarding the death threats Kreutzer made. He was command directed to see a therapist. Dr. Darren Fong cited that Kreutzer had low self-esteem but was not a danger to others irrespective of the death threats he made (US vs. Kreutzer, 2005).

Kreutzer’s disenfranchisement with the 82d Airborne Division grew in 1995 after Dr. Fong and Kreutzer’s command stated that Kreutzer was not a threat to the unit (Pierson, 2014). The Command did not conduct any reviews or inquiries. The unit did not take Kreutzer’s death threats seriously (Pierson, 2014). In October 1995, after Kreutzer attended the Primary Leadership Development Course, he told his roommate that he was going to commit a violent act at the brigade run the following morning (Pierson, 2014). The squad mate reported the threat; the platoon sergeant laughed at Kreutzer’s squad mate and disregarded the threat (US vs. Kreutzer, 2005). The Company Commander and Company First Sergeant also ignored the threat. Kreutzer shot at the Brigade on 27 October 1995 (US vs. Kreutzer, 2005). Kreutzer took violent action because he believed that his unit did not value him (Pierson, 2014).

The context of the Kreutzer case demonstrates how the US Army did not view aggressive behavior in any context in the 1990s as an issue (Pierson, 2014). The US Army encourages aggression and violent behavior since this behavior ensures that the US Army can win wars. Ridicule and banter are a part of daily life in the military. Superiors encourage such behavior to show solidarity amongst the unit (Pierson, 2014). Kreutzer’s violent act is the product of his disenfranchisement with his chain of command. He believed that he was not getting the support he needed and decided to take violent action (Pierson, 2014).
SPC Ivan Lopez

SPC Ivan Lopez has the dubious distinction of being the most recent act of workplace violence within the US Army. Lopez committed his violent act on 2 April 2014. He killed three Soldiers and wounded 12 others (Martz, 2014). Lopez had a history of struggling in the US Army; however, LTG Martz’s report states that Lopez did not exhibit any indicators of potential workplace aggression (Martz, 2014). LTG Martz found that SPC Lopez should be classified as a case of workplace violence since his behavior was not intended to degrade US Army capability for a larger cause. Also, Lopez’s case further vexes those attempting to author Amy policy on workplace aggression because Lopez did not display any indicators. The US Army identified the following:

- Lopez was facing involuntary separation due to his lack of desire to seek promotion to Sergeant.
- There was no implication of any psychological, behavioral, or medical issues that would have provided an opportunity to predict his violent act.
- Lopez’s peers considered Lopez to be a pathological liar
  - Lopez lied about a traumatic brain injury
  - Lopez lied about an improvised explosive device attack on his HMMWV
  - Lopez lied to his command about his family moving to Killeen, TX

Lopez complained about his supervisors on Facebook and to his wife. He omitted information frequently and communicated his frustration to his wife on several occasions (Martz, 2014). Even though the indicators are minimal, the triggering event is not. Lopez’s Battalion Commander authorized Lopez to utilize permissive temporary duty (PTDY) to find a new apartment after his previous one was supposedly burglarized (Martz, 2014). However, S1
suspected that Lopez was not entitled to PTDY because he found a new apartment already and moved his family into that apartment. S1 advised Lopez of this issue after Lopez’s Battalion Commander signed the PTDY authorization. Lopez then went home, retrieved his weapon and shot 15 individuals (Martz, 2014). There were two significant findings, first Lopez’s command identified obstacles to information flow by both the Soldier and HIPPA. Secondly, Lopez’s indicators were sporadic, and there is not one particular instance that justifies his irrationally high-stress level (Martz, 2014). Martz concluded that the best method to utilize in this case was preventing acts of workplace aggression. Intervention at any point would have minimized the chance of Lopez taking violent action. The Ivan Lopez case study identifies the need to include workplace aggression prevention into a greater insider threat policy. The US Army does not offer specific training on indicators of workplace violence. Lopez’s stress level was extremely high, even though it was for irrational reasons. Incorporating workplace aggression prevention into the US Army Insider Threat Policy ensures that the Army will fund training and management of workplace aggression prevention programs.

**Violence against Noncombatants in a Conflict Area**

Soldiers grow disenfranchised with the US Army mission and believe that they should take action on their accord. An Infantry platoon in the Maywan District of Afghanistan grew disenfranchised with their command and their unit and decided to murder three Afghans (Krauss, 2015). The individuals associated with these murders are named The Kill Team due to the process in which they murdered Afghanis. Platoon members, upon return home, commented on how the mission was nothing like what they expected and that the US interests crippled their ability to find and kill the enemy (Krauss, 2015).
Robert Bales committed a violent act by himself. He came to believe that anyone that was not American was evil (Associated Press, 2015). He slipped outside his compound at night and murdered 16 Afghans (Associated Press, 2015). Bales committed this atrocious act partially due to the poor command climate fostered at the compound in which he resided (Cbsnews.com, August 2015).

The unjustified killing of noncombatants is an element of workplace violence in the US Army. SSG Robert Bales is an excellent example of how disaffection with the local command element and the US Army as a whole will drive Soldiers to take violent action. The underlying theme of both examples is that the Soldiers who committed these acts of violence believed they had no control and that the command was not supportive of their objectives. They did not have a clearly defined mission, and the Rules of Engagement were too restrictive (CBS/AP, 2015). The lack of support from the command coupled with the indicators the Soldiers exhibited present identifiable metrics that the US Army can use as a training tool to prevent this type of workplace violence.

**Staff Sergeant Robert Bales**

Staff Sergeant Robert Bales joined the Army in November of 2001 at 28 years old. He joined for personal vindication and to fight those that conducted the attack on September 11, 2001. Before Bales enlisted, he’d lost a lawsuit and owed 1.4 million dollars as a result (Vaughn, 2015). Bales had issues with alcohol; it once landed him in jail when he assaulted a security guard at a casino in Tacoma in 2002 while on active duty (Vaughn, 2015). Robert Bales was an Infantryman, and it is partially for that reason that he was not disciplined (Vaughn, 2015).

Robert Bales’ first combat tour was in 2007 when he deployed to Iraq. He experienced his first firefight during that tour and came home obsessed with war. He knew they were
deploying again and became obsessed with preparation. He left for work at 0430 and returned home after 2200 consistently and wittingly (Vaughn, 2015). Bales then began exhibiting signs of paranoia by clearing his house continually in the evenings whenever his wife suspected she heard something (Vaughn, 2015).

Bales’ alcoholic incidents grew along with his emotional distress. He received an open beverage container citation in 2005 and his wife stated his drinking was a problem at times (Vaughn, 2015). Other times, Bales sat on his back porch smoking a cigar, drinking and brooding over his time in Iraq (Vaughn, 2015). In 2010, Robert Bales admitted he needed help. By this point, he had all of the classic signs of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. He was paranoid, sleeping only three hours a night, self-medicating with alcohol, and had an explosive temper (Vaughn, 2015). Bales believed PTSD to be a cop-out and a sign of weakness; therefore, he agreed to see a therapist only to treat the headaches (Vaughn, 2015). Bales viewed his emotional distress as a sign of weakness and communicated his belief to a military judge in February 2015 (Vaughn, 2015).

The Army, aware of Bales’ issues, deployed him again in 2011. He worked well supporting the Special Forces team that was stationed on the compound. However, he had issues with the incoming Special Forces team. The next team, according to Bales, treated the Infantry as amateurs and did not respect any of them (Vaughn, 2015). Bales also had another unjustifiable violent incident during this time. He punched an Afghani driver who accidentally grazed Bales with a box when the driver was unloading a truck (Vaughn, 2015).

**SSG Bales’ Triggering Event.** Bales had served a total of 42 months in combat in Afghanistan and Iraq when he lost control of his behavior and decided to take violent action (Vaughn, 2015). The day of Bales’ triggering event was 5 March 2012. Bales’ command ordered
him to his sentry post due to the Taliban’s continual attacks on US Forces (Vaughn, 2015). Bales tracked an unidentified individual in a white tunic through the scope of his rifle. Bales stated that the man walked between ditches and scooped holes out of the dirt while talking on a communications device. Bales could not tell if it was an Icom radio or a cell phone (Vaughn, 2015). The distinction is important because Taliban fighters utilized Icom radios as command detonation devices.

An explosion occurred targeting an armored vehicle carrying US Soldiers. The man moved towards the explosion carrying his communications device. Bales questioned the purpose behind the man’s movements toward the blast but made the decision to not shoot. Minutes after he made the decision not to shoot the man, he watched as an explosion removed the leg from a fellow service member (Vaughn, 2015). At the center of the explosion was a tree that the Taliban used as a marker for launching attacks (Vaughn, 2015). Bales’ command ordered him to take his squad out and destroy the tree. The act took hours to complete. Bales brought the tree trunk back to the compound and kept it as a reminder of his failure to stop the unidentified man in the white tunic (Vaughn, 2015). On 10 March 2012, Bales destroyed the tree trunk by chopping it into little pieces. The interviewer provided the exchange below:

This tree was used to hurt my friends, man, Bales told me recently, recalling the episode in an odd, detached tone. It was used by the enemy. I had to see it go, you know? (Vaughn, 2015).

That same day, 10 March, Bales left his compound and killed 16 Afghanis, including a three-year-old Afghani girl (Vaughn, 2015).

**SSG Bales’ Violent Act.** 10 March 2012 is the day that Bales took violent action. Most of Bales’ indicators were presented on this day. First, Bales complained to a Private that he
deserved Sergeant First Class, E7, and had been passed over on a previous promotion board. He and the Private were on duty at a guard post at the time (Vaughn 2015). After Bales’ shift had ended, he got drunk with his fellow squad leaders and took a handful of sleeping pills (Vaughn, 2015). He took the pills because he could not control his paranoia that insurgents were coordinating an attack on the compound. He believed that an attack was imminent because he saw lights coming from Naja Bien and Alikozai during his guard shift. These were two villages approximately 1200 yards away from each other (Vaughn, 2015). He believed these were signals between insurgents (Vaughn, 2015). Navy SEALs spotted fighters in Alikozai, and other soldiers seized weapons from homes in Naja Bien (Vaughn, 2015).

Attacks in the area were not prominent. The villages were small and insignificant to Taliban fighters. Bales also reported this possible communication to the next shift and the Special Forces liaison with the Infantry. Bales believed that the Special Forces unit was too passive and were part of the reason there was an increase of attacks in the area. Bales communicated his perspective to the Special Forces Team Sergeant (Vaughn, 2015). The Special Forces liaison disregarded the claim, further solidifying Bales’ belief that the Special Forces unit believed that the Infantry assigned to support their operations were amateurs (Vaughn, 2015).

During Bales’ drinking session, he complained about how he could no longer afford to live in his house and that he and his wife were constantly fighting. He then complained about how he was not yet a Sergeant First Class and not sure if he would get promoted (Vaughn, 2015). Bales believed that he had lost control. He could not stop the Taliban fighter on 5 March, he and his wife were fighting, and the Special Forces unit he was supporting did not respect him. He then looked to what he perceived to be the problem, the Afghanis in the villages. Early in the
morning of 11 March 2012, he took violent action and killed 16 Afghanis, including a three-year-old girl (Vaughn, 2015).

There is no doubt that Bales was suffering from PTSD and that the Army did a disservice to him by deploying him repeatedly. Bales spent 42 months in combat as an Infantryman (Vaughn, 2015). He’d grown disenfranchised with the US Army and his local command element. He felt that he had no control at home and labeled his problem as the Afghanis. He then took violent action when he could not save his friend that ended up losing his leg because Bales did not shoot the man in the white tunic. Indicators are tricky; one standing alone is not a gauge of potential workplace violence; however, two indicators together is a sign of someone that might take violent action.

The Maywan Kill Team

The group of three Soldiers, led by SSG Calvin Gibbs, murdered at least three Afghanis in the Maywan District of Afghanistan (Krauss, 2015). SSG Gibbs was on his fourth deployment when he arrived at the Maywan District (Krauss, 2015). He replaced a fallen squad leader and garnered the respect from his fellow Soldiers immediately (Krauss, 2015). He taught these Soldiers how to emplace a weapon on an Afghani and respond by killing the individual (Krauss, 2015). SSG Gibbs created the atmosphere that justified killing Afghanis for sport (O'Hehir, 2014). He believed all Afghanis were subhuman and crafted the perception of the platoon to conduct such activities (O'Hehir, 2014). The group adopted Gibbs’ sadistic perspective and killed innocent civilians on three separate occasions (Krauss, 2015).

The Kill Team is an extreme perspective of the group mentality; however, it articulates how the group influences the individual. The Kill Team is also an example of a group committing an act of workplace violence within the realm of the US Army. The group was
disenfranchised with the mission and with the US Army (Krauss, 2015). The group recently lost a member of their team and was not authorized to engage the enemy unless they received direction from their command element (Krauss, 2015). Should the group be under fire, the Rules of Engagement stipulated that they could not return fire until they were authorized to return fire (Krauss, 2015). The loss of control and the perceived need to defend led to the group taking violent action.

Table nine depicted below is a summary of all indicators exhibited by each case study presented, as well as other individuals who committed violent acts in the US Army workplace.

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<tr>
<th>Violent Act Committed?</th>
<th>Aggressive Behavior</th>
<th>Social Isolation</th>
<th>Inconsistent Productivity</th>
<th>Signs of Emotional Distress</th>
<th>Abnormal Obsessions</th>
<th>Unstable Work History or Fascination with Weapons or Violent Events</th>
<th>Substance Abuse</th>
<th>Alienation of Coworkers</th>
<th>Changes in Personality</th>
<th>Deterioration in Self-Care</th>
<th>Chronic Grievances</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ryan Andersen</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calvin Gibbs</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 – Indicators exhibited by Subjects
The Rules of Engagement

Violence in the US Army is justifiable in certain circumstances. Soldiers derive their right to utilize violence from the Rules of Engagement (ROE) (Cole, Drew, McLaughlin, & Mandsager, 2009). The ROE defines the use of force when in a combat environment (Cole, 2009). Furthermore, it designates between justifiable violence and unjustifiable violence. If a military unit comes under attack from an individual that is shooting at them, then the unit justifies rightfully the killing as self-defense. However, should the military unit attack an armed individual that is not actively engaging them and is not a member of an adversarial uniformed service, then the act might be deemed as murder (Cole, 2009). The distinction is important because it drives the use of violence in military operations and allows tactical commanders the latitude to cultivate the use of violence in their Area of Operation. The objective of the ROE is to mitigate the chance of atrocity. However, a nation at war that is fighting an enemy who engages in guerilla warfare cannot always make that distinction between fighter and noncombatant (Grossman, 1995).

Sexual Assault as Workplace Violence

Sexual harassment and assault are considered acts of workplace violence. However, the US Army Sexual Harassment and Assault Response and Prevention program covers the topic in depth. Sexual harassment also does not fit the definition of workplace aggression expressed in chapter five because individuals who conduct these acts are not disenfranchised with the command. The aggressor utilizes their harassment and assault actions to garner power from the victim (Losey, 2015). The victim might then become more susceptible to committing a violent act due to the loss of confidence in the system. Sexual assault is so prevalent in DOD that DOD
established a command whose sole purpose is to develop and oversee sexual assault prevention mechanisms and training (DOD, 2014).

The US Army received 2184 unrestricted reports of sexual assault in FY14 (DOD, 2014). Sexual assault destroys the good order and discipline of a unit and removes the sense of power from the victim (Stimson, 2013). The indicators of an individual who commits sexual assault in the workplace are different than the indicators of a perpetrator of workplace violence. The assaulter will alienate the victim, and has a history of aggression (Losey, 2015). The important fact to understand is that assaulters might not fit the idea of an individual who commits an act of workplace aggression, but their actions might promulgate justifiable violent acts in the workplace as a manner of self – defense.

Defining workplace violence in the US Army is a complex and dynamic issue. The problem requires a collegiate level of understanding regarding the difference between justifiable and unjustified violence. Furthermore, one must understand that the entire basis of the US Army is to utilize violence to defend the homeland and US interests abroad. Identifying those who might commit an act of violence in the workplace has its difficulties. However, case studies of Soldiers who committed acts of violence in the workplace demonstrate that the indicators outlined in this chapter apply to Soldiers and the culture of violence that is prevalent in the US Army.
Table nine depicts indicators, the subject’s name and the action taken by the subject.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Subject’s Name</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct or veiled threats of harm</td>
<td>William Kreutzer</td>
<td>Outward statement regarding harming someone on two separate occasions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimidating, belligerent, harassing, bullying, or other aggressive behavior</td>
<td>Calvin Gibbs</td>
<td>Bullied subordinates into not reporting murder in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numerous conflicts with supervisors and other employees</td>
<td>Ivan Lopez</td>
<td>Perpetual state of conflict with both his command and his peers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug/alcohol abuse</td>
<td>Robert Bales</td>
<td>Utilized illicit drugs and alcohol when committing violent act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>History of alcohol abuse and acts of domestic upheaval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme changes in behavior</td>
<td>Robert Bales</td>
<td>Aggressive mood swings that both his peers and superiors stated was a problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringing a weapon into the workplace when a weapon is not required</td>
<td>Ivan Lopez and Nidal Hasan</td>
<td>Carried pistols to their workplace prior to their event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statements indicating desperation to the point of contemplating suicide</td>
<td>Robert Bales and Ivan Lopez</td>
<td>Made statements regarding desire to commit suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paranoia</td>
<td>Robert Bales</td>
<td>Believed everybody in the villages of Balandi and Alkozai were plotting to kill him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienation of Coworkers</td>
<td>Robert Bales</td>
<td>Verbal altercation with fellow Soldiers. Often a recluse in his under his own volition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9 – Indicators assessed with the Subject

US Army Aggression Prevention Policies and Regulations

There are three entities within the US Army that have the capability of investigating US Army Soldiers and DACs. These entities are the Commander of the unit where the potential act of workplace aggression might occur, USACI and USACIDC. The jurisdictional boundaries of the US Army leave a gap that has the potential to affect the entire workforce. No specific entity has the authority to investigate potential acts of workplace violence. There are four regulations and one Department of Defense Instruction that govern the investigation of crimes within the US Army. These four regulations govern the investigative practices for all entities that conduct investigations within the US Army. They are the following:
• Department of Defense Instruction 1438.06 – DOD Workplace Violence Prevention and Response Policy
• Department of Defense Directive 5205.16– Insider Threat Program
• US Army Insider Threat Program – This policy is not fully developed.
• Army Regulation 195-2 – Criminal Investigation Activities
• Army Regulation 381-12 – Threat Awareness and Reporting Program
• Army Regulation 381-20 – The Army Counterintelligence Program
• Army Regulation 15-6 - Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers

**DODI 1438.06 – DOD Workplace Violence Prevention and Response**

The DODI is a basic policy that authorizes the command or leadership to remove an individual who conducts what coworkers or leadership perceive as aggressive behavior from the premises. The aggressor could be denied re-entry and prosecuted. The DODI then states that each department head must establish a workplace violence prevention and response policy (DOD, 2014). The Secretary of Defense established the policy in 2014 as the result of the 2010 report titled *Final Recommendations of the Ft. Hood Follow-on Review* authored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The policy does not provide any insight into actual prevention since the policy stipulates the command cannot take action until there is a tangible act of violence in the workplace.

**Department of Defense Directive 5205.16 – The Insider Threat Program**

On 7 October 2011, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13587 directing all elements of the Executive Branch to craft an Insider Threat Policy (Obama, 2011). The Department of Defense authored and implemented DOD Directive 5205.16 – The Insider Threat Program. This policy articulates the following:

60
- Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities within DOD to develop and maintain an insider threat program to comply with the requirements and minimum standards to prevent, deter, detect, and mitigate actions by malicious insiders who represent a threat to national security or DOD personnel, facilities, operations, and resources.

- Identifies appropriate training, education, and awareness initiatives that may be made available to DOD personnel and contractors in accordance with Reference (b).

- Ensures appropriate DOD policies, including but not limited to counterintelligence (CI), cyber – security, security, civilian and military personnel management, workplace violence, emergency management, law enforcement (LE), and antiterrorism (AT) risk management, are evaluated and modified to effectively address insider threats to DOD.

- Defines Insider Threat as an individual that will use their authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of the United States. This can include damage to the United States through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities (DOD, Insider Threat Policy 2014).

This policy focuses explicitly on identifying and neutralizing threats that degrade DOD capability as it pertains to providing an advantage to an adversary. The policy further stipulates that the branches and component commanders will maintain a threat management capability that identifies and neutralizes these potential threats (DOD Insider Threat Policy, 2014). This policy does not address workplace aggression prevention and response since DOD does not consider acts of workplace violence and aggression as an insider threat.

**The US Army Insider Threat Policy**
The Army Insider Threat Program is an integrated departmental effort to deter, detect and mitigate risk by employees or service members who may represent a threat to national security. A comprehensive insider threat program is essential to the safety and security of our Soldiers, Families, civilians, contractors, infrastructure and information. The Army's program will strengthen the protection of personnel, information, and resources.

(McHugh, 2013)

The Army implemented their insider threat policy before the DOD completed DODD 5205.16. The DOD did not change the definition of an insider threat. The Army Insider Threat Policy stated that the G2 and the Provost Marshal would coordinate to provide information to commanders on potential insider threats in their units (McHugh, 2013). The policy also dictates the Army Protection Program (APP) will track and monitor the Army Insider Threat Program (McHugh, 2013). Therefore, the Army coordinates changes to the Insider Threat Policy and Program through the APP.

The US Army also did not place workplace aggression in the same category as an insider threat. The US Army speculates that those who commit acts of workplace aggression are not doing so to provide an advantage to a foreign entity or adversary. The Insider Threat degrades unit cohesion, mission effectiveness, and provides an advantage to a foreign entity (Department of the Army, 2010). Workplace aggression is an insider threat even though it does not provide an adversary with an advantage over the US. Workplace aggression degrades unit cohesion and mission effectiveness. SSG Calvin Gibbs’ and SSG Robert Bales’ actions degraded unit cohesion and mission effectiveness and indirectly provided an advantage to an adversary. These two acts could have been prevented or predicted had workplace aggression been a part of the greater Insider Threat Policy.
The US Army Criminal Investigations Command and AR 195 – 2

A USACIDC Agent must have at least three elements present before they can investigate whether or not a crime has been committed. These three components are:

(1) The crime is committed on a military installation or facility, or in an area under Army control.

(2) There is a reasonable basis to believe that a suspect may be subject to the UCMJ.

(3) There is a reasonable basis to believe that a suspect may be a DOD civilian employee or a DOD contractor who has committed an offense in connection with his or her assigned contractual duties, which adversely affects the Army (AR 195-2, 2014).

If any of these three are not present, then the USACIDC Agent must not begin the investigations process. Furthermore, USACIDC is not able to investigate a potential crime based off of indicators. AR 195-2, Appendix B provides a list of crimes that warrant USACIDC investigation; however, USACIDC cannot investigate based solely on conspiracy to commit a crime. USACIDC hampers the prevention of workplace violence when attempting to investigate before the commission of a crime. Agents do not have that authority. Once an individual who is under the jurisdiction of USACIDC commits a crime, then USACIDC has comprehensive investigative authority. USACIDC has no jurisdictional authority concerning the scenario because the employee has not yet committed a crime.

Table B-1 of AR 195 – 2 states that USACIDC can investigate a threat or hoax with evidence of planning beyond the mere expression of ideation, any death threat where an explosive device (including components for an explosive device) or toxic substance is found. USACIDC can also investigate all threats (for example, terrorist, insider) to kill unlawfully, injure, or intimidate a person or to damage unlawfully or destroy certain property as long as
USACIDC evaluates and approves the investigation (AR 195-2, 2014). USACIDC does not authorize investigations of potential threats when the subject has not committed a crime. USACIDC established the precedent over a series of years that investigation of possible crimes before the commission is the jurisdiction of US Army Counterintelligence.

**US Army Counterintelligence**

USACI derives its authorities from Executive Order 12333, several Department of Defense Instructions, and US Army Regulations. USACI directly derives its authorities from the following ARs:

- AR 381-10 – US Army Intelligence Activities
- AR 381-12 – Threat Awareness and Reporting Program
- AR 381-20 – US Army Counterintelligence Program

**AR 381 – 20, The US Army Counterintelligence Program**

The US Army updated AR 381-20 in 2010 as a result of the insider threat incident that occurred in Fort Hood Texas in 2009 (Department of the Army, 2010). The US Army enhanced the investigative capability and jurisdiction of USACI. These enhancements still pertain to when USACI investigates national security crimes, including terrorism (Department of the Army, 2010). USACI investigative jurisdiction over potential terrorist incidents now includes lone wolf terrorism and terrorist organizations actively targeting US Army personnel and equities (Department of the Army, 2010). The distinction between USACI investigative jurisdiction and other government agencies is that USACI can only investigate when there is a risk to US Army equities, and the potential terrorist is affiliated with an international terrorist organization.

**The Counterintelligence Investigations Process**
USACI conducts counterintelligence activities to detect, identify, assess, counter, exploit and neutralize adversarial, foreign intelligence entities, international terrorist organizations, and insider threats to the United States Army and U.S. Department of Defense (Department of the Army, 2010). USACI Agents conduct CI investigations based off of indicators. Therefore, USACI is the only entity that is capable of investigative action before the commission of a crime. AR 381-12 (2010) states these indicators in Table 3-2 and 3-3. Tables 3-2 and 3-3 of AR 381-12 provide the only vehicle for USACI to conduct an investigation on a potential workplace aggression issue. The indicators identified in the above scenario fit the model listed in Table 3-2 and 3-3. USACI needs two elements to investigate; USACI needs a foreign nexus and an indicator that might lead to the commission of a crime (Department of the Army, 2010).

According to Table 3-2, an individual that expresses hatred with the US Government can become the subject of a USACI investigation if there is reasonable suspicion that the subject might be in contact with a foreign entity (Department of the Army, 2010). MAJ Hasan was of interest of USACI due to his relationship with Anwar al-Aulaqi (Leiberman & Collins, 2011). However, at the time of the investigation, USACI did not have the authority to investigate MAJ Hasan due to a strict interpretation of AR 381-20 and 381-12 (Leiberman & Collins, 2011).

The investigations process starts with receipt of a report of CI interest (Department of the Army, 2010). After the case agent receives the report, the US Army Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority determines investigative interest via AR 381-12. If USACI determines that a CI nexus exists, the investigation begins. Again, USACI requires the presence of a foreign entity to investigate (Department of the Army, 2010). Consider an individual who is travelling to a foreign nation that is of interest to USACI. USACI desires to conduct a foreign travel pre-briefing within their investigative charter. The security manager of the employee then reports all
of the issues they are having with the employee, and USACI must determine if they have
investigative jurisdiction.

The issues, although they meet some of the indicators listed in Table 3-2 and 3-3 of AR
381-12 (2010), USACI determines that the employee is not attempting to meet with a foreign
intelligence entity. Throughout the process of the inquiry, USACI becomes aware that the
individual they are debriefing is exhibiting indicators of workplace violence. According to
regulation, USACI must not investigate the individual even though the employee is exhibiting
indicators of a potential act of workplace violence. Currently, if USACI were to pass the
information to USACIDC, USACIDC does not have investigative authority since a crime has not
yet been committed (Department of the Army, 2014).

### Indicators of Potential (International) Terrorist – Associated Insider Threats (Table 3-2, AR 381-12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocating support for terrorist objectives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressing hatred of American society, culture, government, or principles</td>
<td>of the U.S. Constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of an international terrorist cause.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocating the use of unlawful violence or force to achieve goals that</td>
<td>are political, religious, or ideological in nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are political, religious, or ideological in nature.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressing a duty to engage in violence against DOD or the United States</td>
<td>in support of an international terrorist cause.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or unlawful use of force or violence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocating loyalty to a foreign interest over loyalty to the United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeated viewing of Internet websites, without official sanction, that</td>
<td>promote or support international terrorist themes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 10 – US Army Indicators of Potential (International) Terrorist Threat**
Indicators of Extremist Activity That May Pose a Threat to DOD or Disrupt U.S. Military Operations (Table 3-3, AR 381-12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Extremist Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soliciting advice, encouragement, finances, training, or other resources from a person who advocates the use of unlawful violence to undermine or disrupt U.S. military operations or foreign policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressing a political, religious, or ideological obligation to engage in unlawful violence directed against U.S. military operations or foreign policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressing support for foreign persons or organizations that promote or threaten the use of unlawful force or violence to achieve political, ideological, or religious objectives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11 – Indicators of Extremist Activity

The Commander of the Unit AR 15 – 6

The 15-6 investigation is a fact-finding inquiry that allows the command to make an informed decision (Department of the Army, 2016). The commander can initiate an informal or formal inquiry, depending on the gravity of the issue. An informal inquiry is designed to identify facts and make recommendations so the commander can make an informed decision. A formal inquiry results in due process and the reading of Miranda Rights (Department of the Army, 2016). The main effort of a 15-6 investigation is the conduct of interviews. The investigating officer conducts interviews with personnel that are knowledgeable about the issue (Department of the Army, 2016). Dr. Marc McElhaney discusses the need for interviews in his text *Aggression in the Workplace*. He states that corporations do not conduct interviews to identify workplace aggression issues until after an individual commits an act of violence (2004).

Commanders have the option of conducting either a formal or informal inquiry for any reason. Workplace aggression is no exception. The 15-6 investigation is the best tool available to identify and prevent, deter, or mitigate acts of aggression in the workplace. However, commanders are so risk adverse that they do not want to expose issues within their formation, even if that means ensuring an individual that needs help can get it as a result of command referral.
Summary of Findings

The case studies, policies, and regulations, discussed in this chapter further describe the fragmented approach the US Army takes to prevent and respond to aggressive acts. No formal process to prevent workplace violence exists. The case studies provide indicators that can provide the basis of a comprehensive workplace violence prevention policy. Furthermore, the definitions of workplace violence articulated in this chapter can construct a viable definition of workplace violence in the US Army. The US Army already has the foundation of a workplace violence prevention policy based off of other mechanisms that are currently utilized. However, these mechanisms are not utilized in a manner that will prevent workplace violence. The next chapter will establish a workplace violence prevention and response policy for the US Army and discuss how the US Army can implement this policy in a manner that does not degrade the enterprise.

The next chapter will revisit the definition of workplace violence in the US Army already provided in Chapter Four. Chapter Five will also discuss redesigning jurisdictional boundaries of key entities to allow these groups to conduct inquiries. Finally, Chapter Five will discuss different methods the command can utilize to prevent acts of unjustifiable aggression and intervene to mitigate intense situations that might end in a violent act.
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this case study was to understand, define, and classify different acts of violence in the U.S. Army using the lens of workplace violence from a civilian perspective. The intent was to document the US Army’s experiences with workplace violence and provide a civilian perspective on the phenomenon to explore the possibility of how the Army might improve for more positive outcomes. This study classified workplace violence in the US Army into three categories and used case studies of each to support the classification. This study further provided a definition of workplace violence and this chapter offers a plan on how to prevent and respond to violent acts in the workplace.

The US Army does not deter, prevent, or respond to workplace violence effectively; nor does US define workplace violence or aggression properly. The case studies demonstrate that the US Army needs a comprehensive workplace violence prevention and response program with a proper definition. The following definition is derived from workplace violence definitions in academia, corporations, and various government entities. It is the product of analysis of these definitions.

Below is the definition that is the culmination of the research.

Workplace violence in the US Army is an act of aggression that is the result of disenfranchisement with the command element or due to a basis of moral depravity that is directed against fellow Soldiers or Department of the Army Civilians in either peacetime or wartime or noncombatants when in a wartime environment.

The research indicates a dire need for the US Army to develop a workplace violence prevention and response program. This program must provide clear jurisdictional boundaries for
the investigative entities within the US Army. Furthermore, commands must understand their active role in workplace violence prevention and response. The command climate affects prevention of workplace violence directly. Commands can influence their subordinates through various means that drive response and intervention to potential acts of workplace aggression.

**Recommendation – A Workplace Violence Prevention Program**

A US Army Workplace Aggression Prevention and Response Program (USA-WAPRP) must address the threat of global jihadi ideology to the workforce specifically. Ex-Major Nidal Hasan and Hasan Akhbar conducted successful attacks that led to the death of a combined 15 US Soldiers. Global Jihadism is not compatible with US Army culture and livelihood (Sageman, 2010). Both Nidal Hasan and Hasan Akhbar expressed their disaffection with and disenfranchisement from the US Army. They took violent action because they believed that their act would influence change in the US Army (Department of the Army, 2010). Individuals such as SPC Ivan Lopez and SGT William Kreutzer took violent action as a result of the command climate. Neither Soldier believed that the command was concerned with their personal well-being. Kreutzer’s unit ridiculed him to the point where he began making verbal death threats before he took action (US vs Kreutzer, 2005). Lopez’s command refused to authorize his permissive temporary duty request so he could move his family and he took violent action as a result of that issue and several others (Martz, 2014).

Under USA – WAPRP, investigative entities would offer the command an intervention course of action to rectify the situation. Individuals that file grievances against fellow employees typically do so in order to protect themselves. Currently, the security manager can only store these data points and report to the commander. The commander then chooses the course of action. A troublesome employee might have a file that is several inches thick, yet the commander
might not intervene for a myriad of reasons. According to the USA – WAPRP, the investigative authority will have the capability to conduct inquiries and report their findings to the proper echelon of command.

**Initial Prevention of Workplace Violence**

The USA-WAPRP must differentiate between workplace violence as the result of the global jihadi worldview and all other forms. The best entity to intervene and counteract workplace aggression is the first – line supervisor, squad leader, or platoon sergeant. The commander must foster a positive command climate to ensure that the squad leader or platoon sergeant can intervene. Often, individuals can prevent workplace violence by intervening and leveraging resources to help or relieve the person from duty.

A lack of education and understanding the indicators of workplace violence is the most significant issue facing the implementation of a workplace violence prevention and response program (Grundman, Wagner, & Robbins, 2012). The second issue that arises is that commands invalidate claims as workplace aggression and violence as normal behavior and foster poor command climates (US vs Kreutzer, 2005). These are the following elements needed to construct a comprehensive workplace violence prevention and response program in the US Army. A workplace violence prevention and response program utilizes both Dr. McElhaney’s 10 – step mitigation plan and the jurisdictional capabilities of the investigative entities in the Army (2004). This plan also provides commanders the authority to form a Threat Mitigation Team within their units to identify and mitigate potential acts of workplace violence (Grundman, Wagner, & Robbins, 2012).
**Workplace Aggression Prevention and Response as Part of the Insider Threat Policy**

The Lopez case study posed three findings of significance. The first is that Lopez’s leaders were caring, experienced, and involved (Martz, 2014). His leadership attempted to minimize Lopez’s stress and attempted to authorize PTDY, which is something he was not authorized to utilize (Martz, 2014). The second finding is that the US Army has no systems capable of identifying all forms of violent behavior. The result of the second finding is that the Army is further analyzing implementation of DODI 1438.06 (Martz, 2014). The third finding is that since Lopez did not meet the criteria to be defined as an insider threat, interpreting him as an insider threat would degrade the intent of the EO 13587 (Martz, 2014). The intent of EO 13587 is to neutralize those that seek to provide advantage to an adversary. Diverting resources from an insider threat program to prevent workplace violence would allocate valuable resources away from national security issues (Martz, 2014).

These findings minimize the overall issue that the US Army has no program to prevent and predict workplace aggression and violence. Workplace aggression in the US Army is a national security issue when continual acts of violence degrade the overall capability of the US Army. Workplace aggression further becomes a workplace violence issue when considering the definition of workplace aggression in the US Army offered in chapter 4. Workplace aggression and violence in the US Army degrades unit cohesion and can lead to acts of atrocity in combat. SSG Gibbs’ and SSG Bales’ acts put US forces in danger on a global scale. They murdered Muslims and left the world questioning the global objectives of the US. US Soldiers are often the first Americans with whom many people on earth will ever interact. These heinous acts degrade the overall national security of the US.
Lopez’s act of violence did not technically damage US national security. However, his act has a profound impact on the rest of the force that could degrade unit cohesion and mission effectiveness. This degradation will have an adverse impact on US national security because Soldiers and leaders must now consider that the individual they redress might kill them. There is no effective measure to predict all violent behavior (Martz, 2014). However, the US Army Insider Threat Program articulates and directs entities to provide resources to identify and neutralize the insider threat. The indicators of workplace violence are associated closely with the indicators specified in Table 3-3, AR 381-12. The leaders associated with Lopez were not aware of any indicators of workplace violence. Had they understood these indicators, they could have intervened and defused Lopez before his violent act. Intervention does not ensure that the Soldier will not commit the act in the future; it does defuse the issue and provide a support service for the Soldier that is stressed to the point of taking violent action.

**Mitigating the Threat of Workplace Violence**

A workplace violence prevention program incorporates the following:

- Creation and implementation of a Threat Mitigation Team (TMT) at the Battalion Level that focuses on advising the command on mitigating potential acts of workplace violence;
- Annual training for all Soldiers on the indicators of workplace aggression with more specific training at Professional Military Education;
- Expanded jurisdiction amongst the investigative elements of the US Army so they may conduct inquiries based on indicators;
- Command application of the 10-step workplace violence prevention process;
- A monthly workplace aggression prevention and response working group amongst the various commands and investigative entities on each installation;
● The establishment of a workplace prevention program is the Commander’s responsibility according to DODI 1438.06; however, G-34 Protection has the responsibility for establishment and direction;

● Monthly report of potential acts of workplace aggression to the Senior Mission Commander, delegated to the Garrison Commander;

● The program requires support the support of USACI, USACIDC, US Army Provost Marshal Office (USAPMO), and the security managers at the Brigade Command level. These elements are the only investigative entities within the US Army;

Dr. McElhaney provides an excellent template for mitigating the workplace violence prevention threat in his work *Aggression in the Workplace*. Dr. McElhaney provides 10 steps to preventing workplace violence and aggression:

(1) Pre – Employment Screening

(2) Establish a Workplace Violence Policy – Written Policy as Part of the Command Philosophy

(3) Involve Employees in the Process

(4) Annual Training for Supervisors and Soldiers

(5) Generate a Threat Response Plan
   - The Threat Management Team
   - Empowering US Army Legal and Law Enforcement Capability
   - Develop the Working Group
   - Advising the Commander – Quarterly Requirement

(6) Grievance and Disciplinary Processes

(7) Identify Employee Assistance Programs

(8) Identify Outplacement Services
Conduct a Thorough Pre – Screening prior to Entry

The US Military conducts a vigorous screening process that focuses on physical and mental health, as well as intelligence. This screening process occurs at Military Entrance and Processing Centers around the US. This process also identifies potential security clearance holders and has them fill out a Standard Form – 86 Questionnaire for National Security Positions. There is not any serious screening to see types and levels of aggression the person may have exhibited prior to entering the service. The background check prior to military service is conducted at the recruiting station and it screens out felonious individuals and some of those that have committed egregious misdemeanors. The behavioral health assessment is done only to ensure that the individual does not have any underlying issues (Pierson, 2014). The US Army conducts a security interview with every Soldier that enlists. The security NCO can conduct a brief screening interview of the applicant that focuses on potential indicators of workplace violence. The interview does not need to be in – depth or very long.

Written Policy as Part of the Command Philosophy

Chairperson Durkovich’s committee found that implementation of a written policy ensures that everyone in the workplace understands that aggressive behavior is not tolerated. Her committee articulated that agencies within the US Government should incorporate the following elements into their written policies:

- All employees are responsible for maintaining a safe work environment
- Employees are obligated to act appropriately on the job
- The policy covers not only acts of physical violence, but also harassment, intimidation, and
other disruptive behavior

● The policy covers incidents involving coworkers and incidents involving individuals from outside the agency who commit violence against agency employees
● The agency will respond appropriately to all reported incidents
● The agency will act to stop inappropriate behavior

Secondly, Durkovich’s committee found that agencies should author a separate policy on what will lead to removal from the workplace, arrest, and potential prosecution. These elements are clear and present the message that the agency does not tolerate aggressive behavior.

● Direct threats or physical intimidation
● Implications or suggestions of violence
● Stalking
● Possession of weapons of any kind on agency property, including parking lots, other exterior agency premises, or while engaged in agency activities in other locations or at agency-sponsored events, unless such possession or use is a requirement of the job
● Assault of any form
● Physical restraint or confinement
● Dangerous or threatening horseplay
● Loud, disruptive, or angry behavior or language that is clearly not part of the typical work environment
● Blatant or intentional disregard for the safety or well-being of others
● Commission of a violent felony or misdemeanor on agency property
● Any act that a reasonable person would perceive as constituting a threat of violence.
The US Army must author a workplace aggression prevention and response policy that allows for aggressive behavior in certain situations. However, the commands must articulate that they will not tolerate violent and aggressive behavior that degrades mission effectiveness and unit cohesion. The US Army, and commanders by default should utilize the elements provided by the *Violence in the Federal Workplace, a Guide for Prevention and Response* when authoring their policies. The policy should encompass the following additional elements:

- Appropriate behavior that is not aggressive
- Every Soldier assigned to the unit has an overall responsibility to foster a safe environment in both garrison and in combat
- Command response through the Threat Management Team (TMT) and the reporting process through appropriate Law Enforcement channels
- The unit’s sexual harassment assault prevention and response policy is included

**Promote Soldier Involvement**

The US Army does an excellent job in promoting Soldier involvement. However, the issue lies at various echelons of command and the command’s perspective on what is deemed as justifying an inquiry. The US Army also conducts annual Threat Awareness and Reporting training. The focus of the training is teaching to identify potential indicators of terrorist related insider threat and indicators of espionage. Since the indicators of workplace violence have commonalities with terrorist related insider threat indicators, reports are typically given to CI Agents. Soldiers do not have issue with reporting; the command is cautious to take action (Pierson, 2014).
**Annual Training for Supervisors and Soldiers**

With great power comes great responsibility; however, great responsibility does not always come with great power. First – line supervisors carry the weight of the Army on their shoulders. They have the best opportunity to prevent acts of workplace violence, yet they do not always have the capability to leverage any power to mitigate a potential problem. Commanders have the most power with minimal interaction with their soldiers. Therefore, all entities within the US Army must receive annual training on indicators of workplace violence. The S-2 will govern the task of conducting annual training. Commanders and first – line supervisors will receive training specific to their capability to intervene.

Training should cover risk factors that cause or contribute to threats and violence in the workplace, early recognition of warning signs of problematic behavior, and the methods of preventing or diffusing volatile situations or aggressive behavior (Grundman, Wagner, & Robbins, 2012). Commanders must attend the training as well to set the standard that they understand the risk posed to their workplace by the command climate they foster (Grundman, Wagner, & Robbins, 2012). Annual training will encompass a block of instruction on defining and recognizing workplace violence and aggression, the indicators of both, and response mechanisms. Response mechanisms include information on who is on the Threat Assessment Team and to whom people should report indicators of workplace violence.

The US Army offers Professional Military Education (PME) at every level of leadership to those who are pending promotion. The Army offers PME training at all levels of ranks. Workplace violence prevention and response training should be a requirement at PME. Training at PME will encompass a block of instruction on the information stated above, in – depth training on the purpose and authority of the TMT and the jurisdictional authority of the
investigative entities. Finally, PME students will conduct scenario – based training to refine their identification of potential workplace aggression and violence.

**Recommendation – Developing The Threat Response Plan**

Dr. McElhaney articulates repeatedly the necessity of a Threat Response Plan and the implementation of a Threat Management Team (2004). In the civilian sector, the TMT is constructed of trusted individuals that evaluate workplace aggression claims and implement measures to mitigate or neutralize the threat (American Society for Industrial Security and Society for Human Resource Management, 2011). The US Army has all the tools to implement TMTs at the Brigade level. A Battalion level command can implement a condensed version of a TMT. The 15-6 inquiry provides all necessary investigative tools to the commander at all levels to implement a TMT. The Commanders at all levels can conduct a 15-6 (Department of the Army, 2016). The TMT can consist of the senior leaders at the Company and Battalion level. At the Brigade and higher, it will include subject matter experts with regard to behavioral health and legal.

**The Threat Management Team**

The civilian sector utilizes TMTs. TMTs in the civilian sector review all acts of aggression to identify potential acts of violence (Grundman, Wagner, & Robbins, 2012). The TMT will assess acts of aggression reports of threats, harassment, violence, or other incidents (Grundman, Wagner, & Robbins, 2012). The TMT will reside at the Brigade level and be comprised of individuals from each of the Battalions that are assigned to the Brigade. The TMT acts as a first response entity. They have initial inquiry authority derived from the Commander. They, as the first entity to take the report, will ascertain if there are any possibilities of intervention.
The TMT will conduct liaison with law enforcement to establish at what point the issue become a law enforcement issue (Grundman, Wagner, & Robbins, 2012). Furthermore, only one individual should receive the report from the person providing the report and direct the TMT (Grundman, Wagner, & Robbins, 2012). That individual within the Brigade Staff should be the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO). The SIO receives all reports of potential violations of AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities and Insider Threat – related reports. The SIO should have the authority to direct the TMT as needed and brief the Brigade Commander on the actions, findings, and proposed courses of action to prevent a potential violent act occurring in the workplace (Grundman, Wagner, & Robbins, 2012). Each TMT will have a seat at the Workplace Aggression Prevention and Response Working Group (WAPRWG). They will discuss all reports of workplace aggression they have received.

**Empowering US Army Legal and Law Enforcement Capability**

Typically, reports of workplace aggression are initially provided to the security manager of a command, who then reports it to the local counterintelligence (CI) office. Neither the security manager nor the CI office is equipped to handle these types of reports due to the lack of jurisdiction and investigative capability of both offices. The Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) must decide which entity has investigative authority over acts of workplace aggression. According to Department of the Army Regulation 381-20 *US Army Counterintelligence Activities* and Department of the Army Regulation 195-2 *Criminal Investigation Activities*, there are two entities that can conduct investigations, USACI and USACIDC. USACI is the only entity that currently can conduct inquiries prior to the commission of a crime (Department of the Army, 2010). USACIDC can only conduct investigations after a crime is committed (Department of the Army, 2014).
SECARMY Grants USACI has Jurisdictional Authority. USACI should retain investigative authority prior to the commission of a crime; this jurisdiction should be extended to acts of workplace aggression. Investigating acts of workplace aggression is not wholly a CI issue since no foreign nexus is present and USACI may only conduct inquiries into indicators for the purpose of determining a foreign nexus (Department of the Army, 2010). However, the US Army should not convolute jurisdictional authority and the investigative process and allow USACI to conduct inquiries into individuals exhibiting indicators of workplace aggression in an effort to leverage intervention opportunities. The primary effort of these investigations is to leverage commanders to conduct inquiries based off of the AR 15-6 process. The conduct of a 15-6 is not a tacit admission of guilt, but determines if intervention is needed.

The main detractor to this policy is that USACI does not have arrest or detention authority. Therefore, USACI must contact USACIDC to detain an aggressive individual. However, detention authority is not a significant issue because if an individual is at the point where they committed a violent act then investigative authority will be passed to USACIDC.

This option minimizes the need for specialized training in the difference between workplace violence based global jihadi rhetoric and a common act of workplace violence. This option does not convolute the traditional counterintelligence investigations process since 12333 would not apply to a workplace violence inquiry because the subject would not have a foreign nexus. AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities will require an update that stipulates the collection, retention, and dissemination of US Person information based on indicators of workplace violence with no foreign nexus present is not an intelligence oversight violation (Department of the Army, 2007).
SECARMY Grants USACIDC Jurisdictional Authority. The Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) should grant investigative authority to USACIDC. SECARMY will authorize USACIDC to conduct inquiries into indicators of workplace aggression. USACIDC will provide results of their inquiry to commanders to ensure commanders take appropriate action to minimize the aggressive behavior. USACIDC will have the authority to leverage the commander to conduct a 15-6 investigation.

Should SECARMY grant USACIDC investigative authority, USACI and USACIDC will have issue determining jurisdictional boundaries if the individual is displaying indicators of workplace aggression and is suspected to ascribe to the global jihadi ideology. USACI must receive training on the indicators of potential workplace aggression that is not related to either a foreign entity or a terrorist organization. Global jihadists and individuals that commit acts of aggression in the workplace exhibit the same indicators. The difference between global jihadists and persons that commit violence in the workplace is global jihadists radicalize based off of an ideology. USACI will retain jurisdiction over potential global jihadists. USACI and USACIDC must act in concert to determine the nature of the allegations should an act of workplace aggression based on an ideology is reported.

USACIDC cannot investigate anything until a crime is committed. USACIDC is not authorized to investigate based on indicators because it violates AR 381-10 US Army Intelligence Activities and EO 12333. USACI must identify a foreign nexus in order to garner more investigative authority but is the only entity that can utilize Standing Investigative Authority (SIA) based on indicators. Commanders can initiate a 15-6 inquiry for any reason, but do not understand fully the importance of workplace aggression and the results of workplace violence. There is a gap in law enforcement capability within the US Army.
The best solution is to provide USACI, the jurisdiction to utilize SIA to identify potential acts of workplace aggression or violence. USACI has the responsibility of providing force protection support to all command elements in the US Army. USACI will author a report based off of information gathered in the process of SIA. They will then provide a Summary of Investigation to the Command and leverage the command to utilize their capability through the AR 15-6 inquiry. Throughout this process, USACI will inform USACIDC of these potential violent threats to ascertain when and if a UCMJ violation occurs.

USACIDC, in conjunction with USACI will question anyone that reaches the point of making verbal threats of violence. USACIDC will also question anyone exhibiting neuro–linguistic behavior that is aggressive or threatening as interpreted by the recipient. These reports must meet the “reasonable person” threshold; meaning how often does the behavior occur and is anyone else the recipient of such action.

The Commander will employ the TMT to support inquiry from USACI and USACIDC. The TMT should act as the initial screening authority for reports prior to USACI and USACIDC receiving the report. The TMT will only address those associated with the perpetrator, they will never interview the perpetrator. The TMT does not have any jurisdictional authority other than validating the report.

Example of the process:
1. SPC Jones and SPC Smith are coworkers who are not deployed. Jones verbally accosts and threatens to harm SPC Smith.
2. SPC Smith reports the threat to the TMT.
3. The TMT interviews SPC Smith and those associated with SPC Jones and determine that SPC Jones exhibits aggressive behavior towards several other Soldiers, and discussed bringing a weapon to work.

4. The TMT contacts USACI and discusses the report. USACI collects the report and communicates the issue to the command via a SOI. USACI also conduct any further inquiry to complete their report.

5. USACI contacts USACIDC and alerts them to the issue. USACIDC ascertains if they have any jurisdiction in the process. USACIDC does not yet have any jurisdictional authority.

6. USACI meets with the command to discuss the issue. The Commander initiates a 15-6 to conclude the initial report from the TMT and then takes action to intervene.

7. The TMT then reports the behavior and intervention plan to the Garrison Commander.

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**Figure 6 – The reporting process**
The Quarterly Working Group

USACI and USACIDC have the best opportunity of identifying leads of potential workplace aggression. The author surmises, based on experience in the CI field that the majority of leads are derived from security managers, S2s, CID, and the MPs. Typically, USACI conducts a monthly CI Working Group that identifies CI leads of common interest. USACI, USACIDC, S2s, and Security Managers, should conduct a quarterly Workplace Violence Prevention Working Group. Workplace violence might not be a rampant issue; meeting monthly might not produce desired results.

Quarterly working groups provides the different elements the time to ascertain if reported issues meet the threshold of workplace aggression. CI, CID, Security Managers or S2s, and members of the respective TMTs should have quarterly workplace aggression prevention meetings in order to identify potential workplace aggressors. Each participant will have a specific role in the process. Security managers must be granted the authority to store information pertaining to potential aggressors in the workplace.

The objective of the WAPRWG is to identify and neutralize any potential acts of workplace violence in the US Army. Members of the WAPRWG are USACI, USACIDC, USAPMO, TMT members, Security Managers, and a representative from the Garrison G3/5/7. Local and Federal Law Enforcement will have a standing invite. The WAPRWG meets quarterly to discuss any potential acts of workplace aggression and violence. The G3/5/7 will author the minutes of the meeting and track all potential threats. They will compile these threats and pass to the community and submit to the Garrison Commander quarterly.
Advising the Commander – Quarterly Requirement

The Garrison Commander, a Colonel/O6 has the responsibility of managing the G3/5/7 cell. G3/5/7 governs the US Army Insider Threat Program (Secretary of the Army, 2013). The Garrison Commander also has a direct reporting line to the Senior Mission Commander, a General Officer O7 – O9. The WAPRWG on each installation will provide a quarterly report of all potential cases of reported workplace aggression. The PMO will have the responsibility of compiling the report and briefing the Garrison Commander. The Garrison Commander will identify those of significance and will brief the Senior Mission Commander.

Grievance, Disciplinary, and Termination Processes

Soldiers can address grievances through the Inspector General, Behavioral Health, the Judge Advocate General, Congress, and many other facets. Commanders at all levels have an open door policy. Therefore, Soldiers are able to access their commanders at any time. The US Army has an excellent policy for addressing the grievances of Soldiers. The Army does not need to change any portion of their method and process of addressing grievances. Termination from the ranks as a Soldier is extremely difficult because Soldiers are subject to UCMJ. Therefore, the ultimate objective with Soldiers is to build camaraderie amongst the unit and use the TMT in order to intervene and decrease abnormal workplace aggression.

The Kreutzer incident could have been mitigated had the command established a TMT and evaluated the credibility and validity of the threats he was making. Instead, the command did nothing and the worst occurred (US vs Kreutzer, 2005). The threat was reported several times, action was not taken. The Command could have significantly decreased the potential threat posed by Kreutzer by disciplining him for the several instances of disrespect he’d exhibited and by ensuring the behavioral issues he was exhibiting were addressed (Pierson, 2014).
The Hasan case demonstrates multiple times where the grievance process was used and several commands ignored the problem. The disciplinary actions taken were negligible (Leiberman & Collins, 2011). The result was Hasan taking violent action. Had the threat even been remotely investigated, the command would have discovered a nefarious plot. Establishing a TMT would have identified (Pierson, 2014).

**Guarantee Access to Employee Assistance Programs**

The US Army has many programs designed to help mitigate potential issues of workplace violence. Military OneSource is a crisis hotline that is designed to help distressed individuals associated with the military. This association includes service members, civilian employees and family members of service members. Military OneSource is not designed to handle workplace violence issues but capable of providing immediate psychological care. The tool is integral in the solidification of a workplace violence policy. US Army Employee Assistance Programs also include command referred/directed behavioral health attendance. The US Army can also assign a TMT member to the aggressor to monitor progress (Pierson, 2014).

**Utilize Outplacement Services**

Soldiers can use ACAP. Civilians have the TAO and civilians must develop an ITP. These programs demonstrate to the employee being released that the US Army is involved in their future. The US Army separates Soldiers properly (Pierson, 2014). Individuals that are chaptered or released from service and not charged with a crime or in violation of UCMJ have access to these services (Pierson, 2014).

**Conduct Training to ensure Supervisors can Adequately Resolve Conflict**

Supervisors conduct online training regarding conflict resolution only. Conflict resolution must be conducted in a manner that applies knowledge gained in the training. Experience is the
only way a supervisor can be successful in conducting conflict resolution. Training programs and curriculum should focus on case studies and scenarios. During the scenarios, the supervisor will resolve a conflict that is done via role players. The Army already has a reporting chain and authorities that are needed to ensure a successful workplace violence prevention program. However, the Army does not train or educate its leaders on defining workplace violence and identifying indicators. Kreutzer and Hasan both demonstrate what happens when the leadership does not take the threat seriously. Soldiers reported their concerns, yet the leaders did not look into the issue. Ensuring leaders are trained to not ignore potential abnormal workplace aggression and how to resolve conflict will mitigate future violent action (Pierson, 2014).

**Conclusion**

The US Army has the power and capability to identify and prevent acts of workplace aggression. The US Army must first define workplace aggression in a manner that encompasses the uniqueness of the US Army mission and its personnel. The recommended definition is:

Workplace violence in the US Army is an act of aggression resulting from disenfranchisement with the command element or due to a basis of moral depravity that is directed against fellow Soldiers or Department of the Army Civilians in either peacetime or wartime or noncombatants when in a wartime scenario.

This definition drives the US Army workplace violence prevention and response policy. The policy should address violence against fellow Soldiers, violence in the name of a radical worldview, and violence in a combat zone against noncombatants. The US Army workplace violence prevention and response policy should become part of a greater Insider Threat policy for two reasons. First, workplace violence can degrade a force to the point that it affects national security. Second, the insider threat policy already directs different entities to provide resources
and support investigations related to insider threat issues. The US Army could have prevented SPC Lopez’s violent incident had his supervisors understood the indicators of workplace aggression. Robert Bales also exhibited many of the indicators associated with workplace violence. However, due to the lack of training and education on potential acts of workplace violence, nobody in Bales’ unit was aware of Bales’ behavior patterns that led to him taking violent action.

Army policy is designed to identify and neutralize issues where individuals attempt to support foreign adversaries with the intention of providing them an advantage over the US. These policies leave a gap in preventing acts of workplace aggression in the US Army. DODI 1438.06 does nothing to address indicators and only states that the branches have a specified amount of time to generate a workplace violence prevention and response policy. DODI 1438.06 should not address indicators but should provide the basis of identifying indicators of workplace violence. The perception is that DOD and the branches are moving through a paper drill and hoping to stay out of the courtrooms.

USACIDC is unable to investigate based on indicators and USACI can only investigate based on indicators. Once there is a commission of a crime USACI will move to prosecution in the most expedient manner possible. Commanders seem not to comprehend the gravity of violence in the workplace. The US Army already has the tools for success to intervene and provide support. These support services will hinder the chances of the Soldier committing a violent act. These services range from a friendly supervisor chatting with the Soldier to termination from service and revocation of a security clearance.

The lack of a centralized workplace violence prevention and response policy constructed by the Service Branches leaves large gaps in jurisdictional capability of the investigating entities.
The IMCOM OPORD does not provide the weight needed to ensure that workplace violence is prevented. SECARMS must design an overarching policy that incorporates a definition, provides training on indicators, and distinguishes jurisdictional authority amongst the two investigating entities. This comprehensive policy will ensure that there is opportunity to prevent future acts of workplace violence.

The US Army will never be able to predict or prevent every act of violence in the workplace. However, providing the proper tools for prevention and prediction will only enhance the capability of the Soldier, leverage intervention leading to immediate Soldier support, further enhancing unit cohesion and overall national security.
References


US vs Kreutzer, 04-5006 (Armed Forces United States Court of Appeals December 16, 2005).
