Efficiency Through Reorganization: An Improved U.S. Intelligence Community

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Abstract

The U.S. intelligence community currently consists of 17 member agencies operating under various operational parameters, budgets, policies, and chains of command. Each member agency of the intelligence community contributes to the national security of the U.S., and at their core is well intentioned. However, these agencies operating independent of each other can be, and indeed has been, detrimental to the overall goal of collecting, analyzing, and providing intelligence products. Furthermore, many agencies within the intelligence community are duplicating efforts or producing similar products, creating a community inundated with inefficiency and redundancy.

The author will show that reorganization of the intelligence community would provide more mission structured organization; reducing inefficiency and redundancy. Reorganization of the intelligence community is not a new topic. In 1947, the National Security Act of 1947 gave birth to the intelligence community, and since then, the United States government has made many changes impacting the intelligence community. Many of these changes included legislation towards reorganizing the intelligence community. A majority of these changes have only succeeded in adding layers to the intelligence community, instead of refining what already existed.

These changes have created an intelligence community suffering from inefficiency and redundancy. The author will explore the concept of a single intelligence agency, as opposed to the community that exists currently. Research will show a single agency to be less demanding on resources while producing the same, if not better results. Most importantly, a single agency will ensure efficiency and reduce redundancy.
Dedication

For Ayşe, Evren, and those who have imparted wisdom along the way.
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List of Terms, Abbreviations, or Symbols

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
DCI – Director of Central Intelligence
DEA – Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS – Department of Homeland Security
DIA – Defense Intelligence Agency
DNI/ODNI – Director of National Intelligence/Office of Director of National Intelligence
DoD – Department of Defense
DoE – Department of Energy
DoT – Department of Treasury
DS – Department of State
EO – Executive Order
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation
HUMINT – Human Intelligence
IMINT – Imagery Intelligence
IC – Intelligence Community
IRTP Act – Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
MASINT – Measurements and Signature Intelligence
NGA – National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NIMA Act – National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act
NRO – National Reconnaissance Office
NSA – National Security Agency
SIGINT – Signals Intelligence
USA – United States Army
USAF – United States Air Force
USCG – United States Coast Guard
USMC – United States Marine Corp
USA PATRIOT Act – Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
USN – United States Navy
Chapter 1

Introduction

In 1775, when brought news that British soldiers were on the move from Boston, Paul Revere stated, “You are the third person who has brought me the same information” (Lathrop, 2004, p. 349). Redundancy and inefficiency are not new phenomenon; especially with regards to intelligence operations. Currently, the United States intelligence community suffers from both.

Intelligence work is inherently difficult by the nature of what intelligence professionals are trying to accomplish. The intelligence community adds difficulty to this by adding layers of additional agencies, programs, and separate rules and policies for each agency. Beyond the fact that this can become costly and require extensive resources, it eventually costs lives. The study of this intention is to show that a single intelligence department would be a better option than the conglomerate that exists today.

While the intelligence community has seen multiple changes since 1947, a majority of them have been focused on establishing a leader of the intelligence community. Each of these changes, while intending to improve our intelligence capabilities, has only served to add additional layers of complexity. Even the most recent addition of the Director of National Intelligence, a position specifically designed to bring together the full force of the intelligence community, has only resulted in another office interested in establishing its own legitimacy.

In its current state, the intelligence community includes 17 members, comprised of 16 primary agencies and the office of the Director of National Intelligence. The intelligence community operates at least two major counter-terrorism centers, participates
in various task force or joint operations, and duplicates efforts within the five major intelligence functions.

This thesis will argue that the intelligence community needs more than just a simple reorganization or shuffling of existing agencies. Furthermore, this thesis will argue that there should certainly not be any additional positions, offices, or agencies added to the existing intelligence community. What is needed is to put all the existing pieces in the correct order, and reorganize so that the U.S. Government can eliminate waste and inefficiency and cease the redundancy that currently plagues the intelligence community.

This thesis provides the reader with the major Congressional Acts and Executive Orders pertaining to the intelligence community. These Congressional Acts and Executive Orders are the building blocks the intelligence community was built upon. As more blocks continue to be added, the intelligence community continues to grow. This continued growth and expansion has created an intelligence community that needs attention.

Many professionals, including authors, politicians, and intelligence professionals have opined the intelligence community needs to be reorganized. The call to reorganize the intelligence community is not a modern phenomenon, but has persisted on since the creation of the CIA in 1947. Over the years, the United States government has taken various steps towards properly aligning the intelligence community with national security goals. The steps taken by the United States government have included appointing the DCI as the focal point for all national intelligence, creating multiple additional agencies, and creating the position of the DNI.
The author will show that the United States government has merely patched the intelligence community instead of fixing it. Within the intelligence community, intelligence professionals are not only duplicating. Occasionally, the structure of the current intelligence community prevents solid intelligence from being shared amongst all agencies and intelligence consumers. This situation creates gaps in our national security which have been, and will be again, exploited.

Research will show that fusion based intelligence operations are the model of the future. Fusion based intelligence forces all involved parties to do their part in full knowledge of what their intelligence counterparts are doing. This creates an efficient intelligence system in which intelligence operations are circular, and involve constant input from the various professionals involved. Furthermore, a fusion based system will guarantee the best resources are being utilized to produce the best intelligence products.
Chapter 2

Methodology

Introduction and Purpose

Research for this thesis serves to show that the U.S. intelligence community would function more efficiently if reorganized into a single agency. Furthermore, the research serves to propose a new organizational structure for the intelligence community. The author’s intent is to analyze the intelligence community from its creation in 1947 until the present day. From this analysis, the author will show instances in which failures occurred from the current structure of the intelligence community.

Research Questions

The primary research of this thesis focuses on the viability and increased efficiency of a single U.S. intelligence agency as opposed to the conglomerate that exists today. This research includes analysis of the current intelligence community’s infrastructure, and how that infrastructure has changed since 1947. The secondary research of this thesis focuses on identifying an organizational structure to facilitate reorganization of the intelligence community while promoting efficiency and continued quality of intelligence products. The author intends to show that an organizational structure mirroring that of joint military or law enforcement intelligence efforts would reduce redundancy and inefficiency. This thesis answers the following questions:

1. Would a single U.S. intelligence agency reduce redundancy and increase efficiency within the intelligence community?
2. What is the best organizational model to use in reorganizing the intelligence community?

Research Material

The author drew information from a combination of books and online sources. The bulk of this research was done online with available open source materials. For any material pertaining to a specific agency or organization, the author made every effort to pull data from that agency’s official website.

Limitations to Research

The primary limitation to note in this thesis is the focus on open source material. In an effort to keep away from any potentially classified or damaging materials, the author did not use every resource available to him. As this is an academic work, not an internal governmental review, this should not affect the research conducted.

Since there have been militaries, there has been intelligence operations. The author did not distinguish military versus non-military intelligence in an effort to regard all intelligence agencies as simply a part of the overall intelligence community. The reader should understand that the intent of this thesis is not to separate intelligence from the military, but merely to consolidate the intelligence community as a whole.

This study does not breach two inherent factors of any reorganization – budget and personnel. Data pertaining to personnel and budget is not available for each agency within the intelligence community. In many cases, portions of personnel and budget information are still classified; preventing an accurate review. In addition, to include those two factors would expand this study beyond the intended scope.
As whoever may read this may be either an intelligence professional or someone involved/aware of intelligence operations, the following is provided for consideration.

The information used to describe each member agency of the intelligence community, and their primary functions within the community is what is openly available to the public. The author is aware that most of the agencies discussed in this study are far more complicated than what is presented in this study. Again, the author would remind the reader that the information provided was purposefully (and painstakingly) gained from open source material.

Conclusion

The author completed research for this thesis in support of the research questions identified in this chapter. The first research question regards reorganization of the intelligence community into a single agency. The second research question identifies an organizational model to facilitate that reorganization. The author used unclassified and open source material to recommend reorganization of a largely classified and secretive intelligence community. The author conducted research for this thesis as an academic looking in from the outside.
Chapter 3

Literature Review

Introduction

In order to present literary sources regarding reorganization of the intelligence community, the author separated the aggregate research into two categories. The first includes official laws, Congressional Acts, Executive Orders, etc. These will reveal the official steps the U.S. government has already taken or recognized as crucial to intelligence reform. The second category includes committee reports, studies, and expert opinions pertaining to Intelligence reform or reorganization.

The author presents category one sources chronologically, based on when the particular source of information occurred. Included in the second category are sources of material on the individual member agencies of the intelligence community. The separation of the two groups serves to organize the research and present the reader with a distinction between official policy and opinions of various individuals or organizations, regarding the intelligence community.

Category One Sources

All of the Acts detailed in this section are U.S. Congressional Acts, and carry the weight and legitimacy of the United States Government. The author retrieved the data for each Act from the website for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

As the foundation of the intelligence community as one knows it today, the National Security Act of 1947 was a pivotal starting point for any research regarding the intelligence community. Materials related to the National Security Act of 1947 showed
the recognition of a need for an organized intelligence community over 65 years ago. The Act officially created the CIA and implemented a DCI to lead it.

Furthermore, the Act identified the roles and responsibilities of the DCI, and stated creation of a DCI was necessary, “For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security…” (Act of July 26, 1947 (“National Security Act”), 1947). Even as the intelligence community was being developed, U.S. leaders recognized for leadership over intelligence activities.

The Act made clear that the CIA would have, “no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions,” and detailed that the DCI would have inspection authority over other intelligence agencies with exceptions identified in the Act (Act of July 26, 1947 (“National Security Act”), 1947). An article posted on the CIA’s website states that these limitations were a, “crucial concession to members concerned about threats to civil liberties,” and “drew a bright line between foreign and domestic intelligence…” (CIA, A Look Back...The National Security Act of 1947, 2008). These limitations established the CIA’s role in national security while satisfying those worried the CIA would be too powerful.

The same article identified a problem that is the basis of this thesis: “What the act did not do, however, was almost as important as what it did. It helped ensure that American intelligence remained a loose confederation of agencies lacking strong direction from either civilian or military decision makers” (CIA, A Look Back...The National Security Act of 1947, 2008). Although this article was discussing the National Security
Act of 1947, the words ring true for nearly every Congressional Act affecting the intelligence community.

In 1996, Congress passed the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act of 1996 (NIMA Act). While the NIMA Act primarily served to create a focal point for the imagery field of intelligence, it also showed recognition of a need to create a single “go to” office. In the NIMA Act, Congress stated their findings:

There is a need within the Department of Defense and the intelligence community of the United States to provide a single agency focus for the growing number and diverse types of customers for imagery and geospatial information resources within the government… (Congress U. , National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act of 1996, 2013)

The NIMA Act included language justifying the need of creating this new agency, but would hold true if the NIMA act was reorganizing the intelligence community as a whole.

Also in the findings section, the NIMA Act states, “There is a need for a single Government agency to solicit and advocate the needs of that growing and diverse pool of customers” (Congress U. , National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act of 1996, 2013). Congress made these comments in support of the NIMA Act, although Congress could apply this principle to the entire intelligence community. In the NIMA Act, Congress was speaking specifically about imagery and geospatial intelligence, but they unintentionally stumbled upon an idea that could revitalize the intelligence community as a whole.

Even the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, despite being one the largest pieces of legislation in United States history, does not propose an effective method of reform or reorganization (Congress U. , USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 2013). A review of the USA
PATRIOT Act reveals various improvements affecting the intelligence community and provides for a more unified effort against terrorism. In spite of the fact that many lines within the Act deal predominantly with “sharing,” there was not any reform to streamline the efficiency of the already existing intelligence agencies. It should be noted, however, when the U.S. government drafted the USA PATRIOT Act, more pressing issues were at hand than administrative restructuring.

The U.S. government took a critical step towards reorganizing the intelligence community with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTP Act). The most pertinent portion of the IRTP Act is in section 1011, titled “Reorganization and Improvement of Management of Intelligence Community” (Congress U. , Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004). This Act created the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the associated office. This removed management responsibility of the intelligence community from the DCI and placed it in an office removed from the operational agencies.

More than that, it showed a clear need to provide the intelligence community with not only singular management, but to reorganize the authorities granted to that manager. The IRTP Act clearly defined the role of the new DNI to include his responsibility for the overall intelligence community budget and ensuring smooth operations within the individual agencies (Congress U. , Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004). The IRTP Act added another layer to the intelligence community instead of bringing the existing entities under the same operational umbrella.
Executive Order (EO) 12333, as amended by EO 13284, EO 13355, and EO 13470 dictates essentially how the intelligence community operates. For example, EO 12333 orders:

(i) The Director of the National Security Agency is designated the Functional Manager for signals intelligence;
(ii) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is designated the Functional Manager for human intelligence; and
(iii) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is designated the Functional Manager for geospatial intelligence. (Office of General Counsel, 2013)

EO 12333 later states, in reference to the intelligence community as a whole, that the intelligence community will, “Deconflict, coordinate, and integrate all intelligence activities and other information gathering…” (Office of General Counsel, 2013). This language becomes very familiar as one researches the various congressional findings, Executive Orders, or laws affecting the intelligence community.

**Category Two Sources**

There are multiple sources identifying the need for intelligence community reform. Larry Kindsvater, an intelligence professional who retired as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, states:

The intelligence community (IC) should be reorganized to more concertedly, effectively, and efficiently address today’s national security intelligence needs. No one (except the Director of Central Intelligence) and no organizational entity is actually responsible for bringing together in a unified manner the entire IC’s collection and analytic capabilities to go against individual national security
missions and threats, such as terrorism, North Korea, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and China. (Kindsvater, VOL. 47, NO. 1, 2003)

Kindsvater points out an essential flaw to the intelligence community, which is the intelligence community is not efficient because there is no single leader.

Senator John D. Rockefeller, IV, is a presiding member of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In an article on intelligence reform, Rockefeller provides eight primary reform measures. He states, “…We must be ever mindful of the central objectives of reform and focus on how best to achieve changes that truly strengthen and improve our intelligence without creating unnecessary bureaucracies…” (Intelligence Reform: Our National Security Depends on It, 2004). This statement directly highlights the intent of this thesis. The intelligence community should be reorganized, but not weakened, and certainly not by adding more layers of bureaucracy.

Rockefeller presents other ideas such as placing the NSA, NRO, and NGA under the tasking of the DNI, while the Secretary of Defense would maintain operational control. Rockefeller points out:

Since the creation of the National Security Act in 1947, there have been no fewer than 46 significant studies, reviews, and commissions on the need to reform the US intelligence community…Sadly, these past commissions’ recommendations were never enacted, primarily because there was no precipitating event that called for action. (Intelligence Reform: Our National Security Depends on It, 2004)

Rockefeller identified one of the major issues surrounding reorganization of the intelligence community. Various entities, from commissions to study groups, have presented their findings regarding intelligence community reform. Unfortunately, most of
these recommendations have been ignored, because there were no events such as September 11, 2001 to identify the intelligence community’s vulnerabilities.

One of the most relevant and moving pieces of contemporary research available was the final report from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, more commonly known as the 9/11 Commission Report. The 9/11 Commission publicly released their final report in 2004, although the version used for this research was released in 2011 with additional information provided by the commission’s Executive Director, Philip Zelikow. The 9/11 Commission Report provides detailed accounts on the findings of the commission during their investigation, and cites many instances in which the intelligence system as a whole did not function as it could have, and should have.

In describing issues with overall operational management of intelligence agencies, the 9/11 Commission Report states, “The agencies are like a set of specialists in a hospital, each ordering tests, looking for symptoms, and prescribing medications. What is missing is the attending physician who makes sure they work as a team” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2011). This analogy is simple, yet creates a powerful image in the reader’s mind. That image is a perfect example of redundancy and inefficiency that exists in the current intelligence community.

The 9/11 Commission Report described many mistakes made and gaps in United States national security, which led to the attacks. The 9/11 Commission Report describes what appears to be one failure after another. One common theme, however, is the repeated success of military intelligence in worldwide operations. In reference to the combined efforts of military intelligence operations, the 9/11 Commission Report states:
That relationship is especially important because in counterterrorism, as in other missions, the intelligence establishment will be most effective when it is plugged tightly into policy and operations. Indeed, that is part of the story behind one of the finest intelligence efforts in recent years—the fusion of intelligence operations against al Qaeda in Iraq. The center for these operations was controlled by DOD’s Special Operations Forces in Iraq and fused every collection discipline. It employed an interagency team of interrogators and analysts (DOD, CIA, FBI, and more). With the intelligence tightly linked to operations, there were frequent cycles of questions, analysis, targeting, action, discoveries, and more questions.

(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2011)

As the 9/11 Commission Report states, the intelligence community will be more efficient when policy and operations are linked together. This is almost an impossible task when coordinating intelligence efforts across 17 different intelligence community member agencies.

Michael McConnell retired from the U.S. Navy as an admiral and spent over 25 years in the intelligence community, his last assignment being the Director of National Intelligence. In 2007, McConnell wrote an article for ‘Foreign Affairs’ which outlined his ideas for a consolidated intelligence community. In that article, McConnell states:

The DNI also needs to transform the culture of the intelligence community, which is presently characterized by a professional but narrow focus on individual agency missions. Each of the 16 organizations within the intelligence community has unique mandates and competencies. They also have their own cultures and mythologies, but no one agency can be effective on its own. To capture the
benefits of collaboration, a new culture must be created for the entire intelligence community without destroying unique perspective and capabilities. (McConnell, 2007)

The intelligence community has to combine the unique capabilities of each intelligence agency with the streamlined leadership of a DNI. The intelligence community will be both more effective and more efficient when all agencies are operating as one, and answering to only one director.

McConnell stresses the importance of consolidation and elimination of barriers between foreign and domestic intelligence requirements within the intelligence community. In an interview on June 29, 2007, McConnell details the fact that the terrorists who were responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks were able to do so because they existed in “seams” in the intelligence community (Transcript: Federal News Service, 2007). This is a critical failure point, as proven on September 11, 2011; one bound to be exploited again, unless the United States improves the intelligence community.

As a starting point for an overall review of the intelligence community, the author researched the official websites and peripheral webpages of the intelligence community members. This review began at the website for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. According to the ODNI webpage,

The Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the intelligence community, overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program and acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence
matters related to national security. (ODNI, Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Organization)

The ODNI website further lists the 16 member agencies of the intelligence community as: Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps Intelligence, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, and Naval Intelligence (ODNI, Members of the IC, 2013). Each of these organizations has their own websites, and substantial literature regarding their mission and past endeavors. All 17 intelligence community members, to include the ODNI, are discussed at length in Chapter 4.


A keystone book to any intelligence discussion is *The Craft of Intelligence: America's Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering for a*
Free World, by Allen W. Dulles. Dulles, as a prior DCI of the CIA, has invaluable insight into the many workings of not just the CIA, but the intelligence community as a whole. Two comments made by Dulles in his book are particularly relevant to this study.

First, Dulles is discussing espionage occurring during the American Revolutionary War, and the importance of communication. He states, “It is useless to collect information unless you can quickly and accurately get it to the user” (Dulles, 2006, p. 22). As discussed in Chapter 4, because of the current organization of the intelligence community, there have been multiple occasions in which collected intelligence was not provided to a user, and lives were lost.

Second, Dulles regarded the establishment of guidelines and order for intelligence operations and personnel. Dulles states, “Without guidance and direction, intelligence officers in different parts of the world could easily spend much of their time duplicating each other’s work or there could be serious gaps in our information” (Dulles, 2006, p. 75). This comment serves to further the argument that the intelligence community should be consolidated and reorganized to prevent duplication or gaps in intelligence.

In the recent open hearing regarding the nomination of John O. Brennen as the Director of the CIA, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence expressed concern of duplication within the intelligence community. Senator Angus King stated, …there needs to be some serious discussion with the Department of Defense about where the CIA ends and the Department of Defense starts…because in this day in age, we just can’t be duplicating a whole set of capabilities and priorities and officers and procedures and everything else. (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2013, p. 121)
Although many intelligence activities result in joint participation from military and national intelligence agencies, a distinction needs to be made for management purposes.

In one of many well-calculated responses to the senators questioning him, Brennan offered the following response,

…I really do believe that Defense-CIA relationship and integration of effort is critically important to the safety and security of this nation…mindful of not having any type of redundant capabilities or waste resources, we need to make sure that we can leverage the capabilities that exist in both organizations for the good of this country. (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2013, p. 122)

Both the national and military intelligence are equally important to national security, but a clear separation of management and mission will allow the intelligence community to operate more efficiently.

Ivan Eland is a Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute, and directs its Center for Peace and Liberty. Eland received his PhD in national security policy from George Washington University and has worked as Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (Intelligence Reform is a Failure, 2010). In 2010, Eland wrote an article for the Independent Institute titled, Intelligence Reform is a Failure. The article discusses the IRTP Act of 2004 and the creation of the DNI.

Eland is highly critical of the intelligence community, but the article discusses many issues relevant to this research. For example Eland states, “Instead of adding bureaucracies, Congress, to improve coordination, needs to eliminate some intelligence and homeland security agencies and consolidate the remaining intelligence and homeland security functions” (Intelligence Reform is a Failure, 2010).
Eland’s concerns mirror both those in favor, and opposed to, reorganizing the intelligence community. Both sides want to make the intelligence community more efficient, but are hesitant to create more intelligence offices or positions.

In 2010, Dana Priest and William Arkin wrote an article for the *Washington Post* titled *Top Secret America: A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control*. Priest, Arkin, and the *Washington Post* editors described the article as a two year long project. Dana Priest has won multiple Pulitzer Prizes for her work and specializes in investigative reporting regarding intelligence (Priest & Arkin, 2010). William Arkin has, “…worked on the subject of government secrecy and national security affairs for more than 30 years” (Priest & Arkin, 2010). Arkin is also the author of multiple books on these subjects.

In *Top Secret America: A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control*, Priest and Arkin discuss issues related to the intelligence community and national security, after September 11, 2001. Most relevant to this research, they discuss redundancy and inefficiency within the intelligence community. As an introduction to their work, Priest and Arkin state:

> The top-secret world the government created in response to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, has become so large, so unwieldy and so secretive that no one knows how much money it costs, how many people it employs, how many programs exist within it or exactly how many agencies do the same work. (Top Secret America: A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, 2010)

This article not only discusses inefficiency and redundancy within the intelligence community, but provides specific examples of both.
In 2008, Robert Sentse and Jeroen Jansen wrote an article in the *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* titled *Fusion: A Behavioral Approach to Counterinsurgency*. At the time of publication, Sentse was a Major in the Royal Netherlands Army. Jansen is a researcher for The Hague Center for Strategic Studies and was writing a PhD on intelligence collaboration (*Fusion: A behavioral Approach to Counterinsurgency, 2008*). Both Jansen and Sentse have written multiple articles regarding intelligence and military operations.

Sentse and Jansen’s ideas in *Fusion, A Behavioral Approach to Counterinsurgency*, directly support the type of model the author suggests for the intelligence community. Sentse and Jansen offer the following observation to explain the necessity of fusion in intelligence operations:

In our experience everyone seems to be aware of the fact that people, responsible for deploying instruments of influence (both kinetic and non-kinetic), should see and speak to each other more often. There is awareness that between the actors in the field, there needs to be an exchange of: valuable information; ideas on how to cope with the situation; and the feasibility of effects that are desirable. It is therefore strange to observe that despite this awareness the same people remain comfortably within their own “domain” and area of expertise in the day-to-day work process without including other disciplines. This effectively creates a stove-piped situation within each individual discipline (*Fusion: A behavioral Approach to Counterinsurgency, 2008*).

The above statement is important to this thesis for two reasons. First, Sentse and Jansen show the need for fusion amongst intelligence operations. Second, they illustrate that
even though individuals are aware of the need to exchange information and ideas, nobody does it on their own. A fusion-based intelligence organization will be necessary for the success of the intelligence community, and is a keystone for this research paper.
Chapter 4
Discussion

Current Organization of Intelligence Community

The U.S. intelligence community currently consists of 17 members, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). A review of information from the ODNI details the core responsibilities of each agency within the intelligence community. Provided below is a brief overview of the individual agencies responsibilities and functions within the intelligence community:

Director of National Intelligence

The Director of National Intelligence, “serves as the head of the intelligence community, overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program and acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security” (ODNI, Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Organization). The DNI is the newest member of the intelligence community. The position of the DNI was created with the IRTP Act of 2004, and was intended to provide better coordination amongst the members of the intelligence community.

Air Force Intelligence:

The United States Air Force’s Intelligence arm is called Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). USAF ISR primarily operates within the fields of SIGINT, MASINT, and IMINT. USAF ISR units are, “…responsible for mission management and support of signals intelligence operations,” “[conduct] imagery, cryptologic and measurement and signatures intelligence activities to meet Air Force needs,” and “works
closely with the National Security Agency, leveraging the net-centric capabilities of a worldwide signals intelligence enterprise to conduct national-tactical integration for joint and combined Air Force combat operations” (ISR, 2010).

Army Intelligence:

The United States Army Intelligence (G-2) covers the gamut of intelligence operations. U.S. Army G-2 has, “responsibility for overall coordination of the five major intelligence disciplines: Imagery Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, Human Intelligence, Measurement and Signature Intelligence, and Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures” (Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2). Due to participating in a myriad of military operations, the U.S. Army is one of the largest consumers of both military and non-military intelligence.

Central Intelligence Agency:

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is involved in nearly all aspects of intelligence disciplines from collection to analysis to production. According to available literature and material, the CIA’s primary focus is HUMINT, as detailed in the National Security Act of 1947 and amended by various policies since. The CIA has the responsibility to collect, “…intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means…” (CIA, About CIA, 2006).

Coast Guard Intelligence:

The United States Coast Guard Intelligence operates within OSINT, HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, and MASINT. According to Coast Guard publications, they have, “…unique authorities, access, and abilities for conducting a wide variety of HUMINT activities” (USCG, 2010). The USCG is uniquely situated under the DHS, and provides
maritime safety, security, and stewardship for U.S. seas and coastlines. In addition to HUMINT, USCG Intelligence utilizes other intelligence functions in their diverse mission.

**Defense Intelligence Agency:**

The Defense Intelligence Agency is, “…a Department of Defense combat support agency” (ODNI, Members of the IC, 2013). The DIA primarily works within the disciplines of OSINT, HUMINT, and MASINT. The DIA’s 2012-2017 strategic plan states, “DIA's core mission resides in four intelligence competencies: all-source analysis; counterintelligence (CI); human intelligence (HUMINT), and measurement and signature intelligence” (MASINT) (2012-2017 DIA Strategic Plan, 2013).

**Department of Energy:**

As stated in chapter 3, little open source information existed pertaining to the intelligence operations of DOE. The ODNI states, “[DOE] protects vital national security information and technologies, representing intellectual property of incalculable value, and provides unmatched scientific and technical expertise to the U.S. government to respond to foreign intelligence, terrorist and cyber threats, to solve the hardest problems associated with U.S. energy security, and to address a wide range of other national security issues” (Members of the IC, 2013). The DOE also protects the U.S. nuclear enterprise from proliferation and terrorism.

**Department of Homeland Security:**

According to the ODNI, “The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for using information and intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future threats to the U.S.” (Members of the IC, 2013). As with the DOE, very little open source information existed to detail the intelligence disciplines utilized or practiced
within the DHS. However, based upon the ever-expanding mission and scope of the DHS, and the intelligence operations of some of their sub-agencies such as the Coast Guard, we can presume they utilize OSINT, HUMINT, MASINT, IMINT, and SIGINT.

Department of State:

For the Department of State, “The Bureau of Intelligence and Research provides the Secretary of State with timely, objective analysis of global developments as well as real-time insights from all-source intelligence” (ODNI, Members of the IC, 2013). Very little open source information existed on the Department of State, pertaining to their intelligence operations. The website for the ODNI states lists the Department of State as one of the four primary agencies utilizing HUMINT (ODNI, ODNI Frequently Asked Questions).

Department of the Treasury:

The intelligence arm of the Department of the Treasury is the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is a part of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (ODNI, Members of the IC, 2013). The author was unable to find any information on specific intelligence functions of the Department of the Treasury. However, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis lists strategic intelligence analysis and counterintelligence amongst their activities (Strategic Direction: Fiscal Years 2012 - 2015, 2012).

Drug Enforcement Administration:

The Drug Enforcement Administration’s intelligence section is the Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI), which became a member of the intelligence community in 2006 (ODNI, Members of the IC, 2013). The literature reviewed regarding
the DEA did not provide intelligence functions the DEA would use; however, it is the author’s experience that the DEA regularly uses OSINT and HUMINT. The website for the ONSI stated the DEA was, “responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of drug-related intelligence” (Intelligence Topics at DEA).

*Federal Bureau of Investigation:*

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Directorate of Intelligence primarily utilizes OSINT, HUMINT, MASINT, and SIGINT. According to the FBI, “Within the United States, HUMINT collection is the FBI's responsibility” (Intelligence Collection Disciplines, 2013). Furthermore, the FBI provides, “Although HUMINT is an important collection discipline for the FBI, we also collect intelligence through other methods, including SIGINT, MASINT, and OSINT” (Intelligence Collection Disciplines, 2013).

*Marine Corps Intelligence:*

The United States Marine Corps Intelligence Department utilizes HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT (referred to by the USMC as GEOINT). The USMC Intelligence Department is responsible for, “Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Advanced Geospatial Intelligence (AGI), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Counterintelligence (CI), and ensures there is a single synchronized strategy for the development of the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Enterprise” (USMC: Intelligence Department). USMC Intelligence specializes in producing tactical and operational level intelligence.

*National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency:*

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency “is the nation's primary source of geospatial intelligence, or GEOINT for the Department of Defense and the U.S.
intelligence community” (NGA: Frequently Asked Questions). The NGA further states, “As a DOD combat support agency and a member of the IC, NGA provides GEOINT, in support of U.S. national security and defense, as well as disaster relief” (NGA: Frequently Asked Questions). The NGA also has a humanitarian mission, and produces intelligence related to natural disasters such as floods, fires, or hurricanes.

National Reconnaissance Office:

The National Reconnaissance Office, “designs, builds, and operates the nation’s reconnaissance satellites” (ODNI, Members of the IC, 2013). According to the NRO, “Together with other Defense Department satellites, the NRO systems play a crucial role in providing global communications, precision navigation, early warning of missile launches and potential military aggression, signals intelligence, and near real-time imagery to U.S. forces to support the war on terrorism and other continuing operations” (NRO: What We Do). The NRO is the United States’ primary provider of imagery and signals information.

National Security Agency:

The National Security Agency provides the nation with SIGINT. According to the NSA, “Our Signals Intelligence mission collects, processes, and disseminates intelligence information from foreign signals for intelligence and counterintelligence purposes and to support military operations” (NSA/CSS, 2011). The NSA is also “one of the most important centers of foreign language analysis and research…” (ODNI, Members of the IC, 2013). The NSA falls under the DoD, but provides intelligence to the entire intelligence community.
Navy Intelligence:

The United States Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, “…is the leading provider of maritime intelligence to the U.S. Navy and joint warfighting forces, as well national decision makers and other consumers in the intelligence community” (ODNI, Members of the IC, 2013). Navy Intelligence primarily utilizes MASINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT. The Kennedy Irregular Warfare Center describes their personnel as a combination of, “specialists in all-source analysis, targeteers, Human Intelligence (HUMINT), geospatial analysts, and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)” (ONI, 2012).

Intelligence Functions

To fully understand the redundancy occurring in the above described agencies, it helps to know the various intelligence functions involved. In his book, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, Robert Clark provides the following U.S. Collection Taxonomy, to describe the intelligence functions utilized on the collections side of the intelligence community:

Open Source [OSINT]: Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT): Intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.

Measurements and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT): Scientific technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors.
**Signals Intelligence (SIGINT):** Intelligence comprising, either individually or in combination, all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence.

**Imagery Intelligence (IMINT):** Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors, such as synthetic aperture radar, wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. (Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, 2010, p. 89)

In the chapter containing the above taxonomy, Clark prescribes a new view of the intelligence cycle and disciplines, and states, “…[Intelligence] names in the U.S. intelligence community are the result of bureaucratic initiatives, not proper [intelligence] descriptions” (Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, 2010, p. 88). However, the taxonomy provided by Clark is entirely relevant to this research because it allows the author to provide visual evidence of redundancy at one of the major stages of the intelligence cycle.

**Problems**

Based upon the taxonomy provided by Clark, and the roles and the primary intelligence disciplines practiced or utilized by each of the 16 intelligence members, the author compiled a list of redundant activity in the intelligence community. Table 1 represents the compilation of this data, and clearly shows redundancy occurring in every intelligence collection function. As a reminder, the author obtained descriptions of each agency’s primary intelligence functions from open source materials to populate Table 1.
Table 1 – Intelligence functions performed by intelligence community members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IC Member</th>
<th>OSINT</th>
<th>HUMINT</th>
<th>SIGINT</th>
<th>MASINT</th>
<th>IMINT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAF ISR</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Intel</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG Intel</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOT</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC Intel</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGLA</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN Intel</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the agencies use or produce intelligence from all five intelligence functions. The table depicts only the known core functions of each agency and still overwhelmingly shows redundancy occurring. A review of the information in Table 1 shows OSINT to be the least utilized intelligence function. Even though it is the least utilized intelligence function, six of the 16 agencies reviewed utilize OSINT. Of the 16 intelligence community members reviewed, seven use or produce MASINT, seven use or produce IMINT, eight use or produce SIGINT, and 10 use or produce HUMINT.

What these numbers show us is not that any of the agencies are unnecessary but that they are duplicating each other’s work. As Senator King stated, “…we just can’t be duplicating a whole set of capabilities and priorities and officers and procedures and everything else” (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2013) It goes without saying that the U.S. intelligence community is full of very intelligent, dedicated, and qualified individuals. So why waste those resources?
When looking at the redundancy amongst the intelligence functions, the reader should consider the three primary levels of intelligence – tactical, operational, and strategic. The situation and mission of each intelligence agency dictates which type of intelligence is produced. In a broad sense, the reader can associate the three levels of intelligence with the time involved with a various conflict. In *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach*, Clark provides descriptions of each level.

Clark describes tactical intelligence as operating, “...at the front line of any conflict” (Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, 2010, p. 51). Essentially, tactical intelligence is intelligence a customer needs immediately. Consider a SWAT team or infantry squad who will soon engage the enemy. Those teams need immediate intelligence because there is very little time before they will use it.

Operational intelligence is, as the name implies, primarily used in operational planning. Clark defines operational intelligence as, “…intelligence required for the planning and execution of specific operations” (Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, 2010, p. 51). Operational intelligence is less reactive than tactical intelligence. Consider a planned operation to conduct a strike against a foreign intelligence target. Operational intelligence would be utilized throughout the phases of such an operation to ensure success.

Strategic intelligence is the least reactive of the three levels and involves long-term intelligence activities. With regards to national customers, Clark defines strategic intelligence as being used, “…to create national strategy and policy, monitor the international situation, and support such diverse actions as trade policymaking or national industrial policymaking” (Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, 2010, p. 50).
As the name suggests, strategic intelligence allows a government to develop a national strategy and guides the long-term decisions of policy makers.

With regards to the military Clark states, “It is used to prepare military plans, determine what weapon systems to build, and define force structures” (Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, 2010, p. 50). The military relies heavily upon strategic intelligence. The military utilizes strategic intelligence for purposes such as preventing attacks on installations, developing information on an enemy’s intents or capabilities, and learning where high value targets might be in the future.

In considering issues of redundancy in the intelligence community, the various levels of intelligence must be factored in. The author does not intend to mislead the reader to believe anytime a particular intelligence function is used by more than one agency that redundancy is occurring. For example, the CIA might collect HUMINT in a country to gain strategic intelligence. The DIA may collect HUMINT in the same country to gain operational intelligence. Meanwhile, the Army might collect HUMINT in the same country to gain tactical intelligence, because units are encountering hostilities sporadically.

The agencies themselves are not necessarily duplicating efforts. However, the same intelligence functions are being utilized. This situation is not specific to the intelligence community either. Consider a criminal subject of an investigation who is arrested. The local police may interrogate the subject in order to gain information about his immediate crimes (tactical intelligence). At the same time, a federal agency might interrogate the subject to gain intelligence about a residence they intend to execute a
search warrant on (operational intelligence) or to gain insight into a particular criminal organization they are investigating (strategic intelligence).

Both the local police department and the federal agency have the same goal - to investigate crime. However, each agency has unique jurisdiction and priorities. This creates a situation where multiple agencies, requiring various levels of intelligence will be interested or targeting the same person. Therefore, redundancy and inefficiency are not directly tied to the intelligence function being utilized. Redundancy and inefficiency spawn from the amount of resources dedicated to achieving various levels of the same intelligence function.

In 2010, the Washington Post published an article, which they stated, was the result of a two year investigation. This article titled Top Secret America discussed the intelligence and counter-terrorism organizations operated by the U.S. government. In the article, the authors provide their investigative findings and state, “…the result is that the system put in place to keep the United States safe is so massive that its effectiveness is impossible to determine” (Priest & Arkin, 2010). If the U.S. government is unable to determine the effectiveness of its own intelligence community, the community will never be efficient. The intelligence community needs to be manageable of manageable size and scope, to allow decision makers to maintain necessary programs and eliminate unnecessary programs.

The article made statements such as, “Analysts who make sense of documents and conversations obtained by foreign and domestic spying share their judgment by publishing 50,000 intelligence reports each year - a volume so large that many are routinely ignored” (Priest & Arkin, 2010). The article quoted prior Defense Secretary Robert Gates stating,
“[he] does not believe the system has become too big to manage but that getting precise data is sometimes difficult” (Priest & Arkin, 2010). These statements go beyond inefficiency and redundancy. The intelligence community is expending resources for nothing, if the intelligence is not being used by an intelligence consumer.

In addition to quoting Secretary Gates, the article quoted prior DCI Leon Panetta as stating the levels of spending since September 11, 2001 were not sustainable. The article stated, “Particularly with these deficits, we're going to hit the wall. I want to be prepared for that… Frankly, I think everyone in intelligence ought to be doing that” (Priest & Arkin, 2010). In relation to government spending, the article stated, “Some 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies work on programs related to counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence in about 10,000 locations across the United States” (Priest & Arkin, 2010). Priest and Arkin demonstrate the overgrowth of the intelligence community, and illustrate why inefficiency is rampant amongst intelligence activities.

For example, Priest and Arkin stated, “Many security and intelligence agencies do the same work, creating redundancy and waste. For example, 51 federal organizations and military commands, operating in 15 U.S. cities, track the flow of money to and from terrorist networks” (Top Secret America: A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, 2010). Is it possible that each agency is doing something so unique that they must operate independently of each other while pursuing the same results?

One incident, which the article claimed was due to redundancy, was the shootings at Fort Hood by the murderer Nidal Malik Hasan, a prior U.S. Army Major and Psychiatrist. The article states that not only was Hasan communicating via email with a
radical Muslim in Yemen but that the Army was not focusing on internal threats. Priest and Arkin state the Army's 902nd Military Intelligence Group commander, “…had decided to turn the unit's attention to assessing general terrorist affiliations in the United States, even though the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI's 106 Joint Terrorism Task Forces were already doing this work in great depth” (Top Secret America: A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, 2010). Without a doubt, any soldier aware of an impending attack would have sounded the alarm, but everyone was trying to find the shiny object – in this case, foreign terrorists.

With issues such as the Ft. Hood shootings, one can reasonably argue that redundancy caused intelligence gaps, which in turn provided an opportunity for an attack. To quote prior DCI Allen W. Dulles, “Without guidance and direction, intelligence officers in different parts of the world could easily spend much of their time duplicating each other’s work or there could be serious gaps in our information” (The Craft of Intelligence: America's Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering for a Free World, 2006). Fort Hood is a perfect example of this type of intelligence gap. Without strong guidance from the overall intelligence community, each agency is essentially “doing their own thing.” This not only creates redundancy, but the redundancy pulls resources from where they could be used to save lives.

Of the most haunting intelligence gaps to have been exploited is doubtless the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Even prior to these attacks, the United States possessed a formidable and experienced intelligence community. However, the alignment of various agencies and existing policies for sharing information caused intelligence gaps
regarding threat information; particularly regarding individuals being watched or followed by various intelligence agencies.

Many of these were detailed in the final report from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, more commonly known as the 9/11 Commission Report. For instance, the report discusses intelligence possessed by the NSA on some of the terrorists who would later carry out the September 11, 2001 attacks. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, “The NSA did not think its job was to research these identities. It saw itself as an agency to support intelligence consumer, such as CIA. The NSA tried to respond energetically to any request made. But it waited to be asked” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2011, p. 488). Because the agencies were separate from each other and working towards their own unique goals, information was not immediately known to the entire intelligence community.

The problem was not that the intelligence community did not have any intelligence on the September 11, 2001 terrorists. The problem occurred when the intelligence community did not share the information. Various members of the intelligence community had their individual pieces to a large puzzle. Until the attacks occurred, most did not even realize the pieces of intelligence they held.

A small number of opponents argue against reorganization of the intelligence community. Most of these arguments oppose reorganization, not because they don’t think it is necessary, but because they believe reform will result in additional layers being added to the intelligence community. Likewise, opponents of reorganization fear additional layers of bureaucracy will be added to the intelligence community.
For example, in an article titled *Intelligence Reform is a Failure*, Ivan Eland discusses failures leading up to the creation of the DNI. With regards to the purpose the DNI was created for Eland states, “Simply creating a new “neutral” agency and shifting the intelligence coordination role from the CIA to it does nothing to alter this fact…smooth coordination among agencies, the original shortfall, was not helped by creating a new DNI and accompanying bureaucracy” (*Intelligence Reform is a Failure*, 2010). Eland, like many others, believes that instituting a DNI did not solve any problems, but added more bureaucracy to an already burdened intelligence community.

The author opines that reorganization of the intelligence community would not add bureaucracy. The Merriam-Webster dictionary provides three definitions of bureaucracy:

1 - A body of non-elected government officials or an administrative policy-making group.
2 – Government characterized by specialization of functions, adherence to fixed rules, and a hierarchy of authority.
3 – A system of administration marked by officialism, red tape, and proliferation. (Merriam-Webster, 2013)

Based on these definitions, the intelligence community is already a bureaucracy. Like trimming growth off an old tree, a reorganization of the intelligence community would thin out the bureaucracy by eliminating unnecessary offices and positions.

**Solutions**

The United States government has taken many steps towards unifying the intelligence community and sharing information. Primarily the IRTP and USA PATRIOT Acts have addressed these issues. The USA PATRIOT Act seriously addressed issues of
sharing and, in addition to adding capabilities to the intelligence community, it strived to create an environment where sharing of information should be the norm. The IRTP Act was probably the most recent acknowledgment by the U.S. government and the intelligence community that there needs to be better coordination and management. The IRTP Act attempted to fix these issues by creating the position of DNI.

After all this, what the intelligence community needs is not more leadership or oversight; and especially not more agencies or programs. The intelligence community needs to be streamlined and lean; it needs to be reorganized. The greatest model for the intelligence community to follow would be that of national law enforcement or joint military forces. Law enforcement and military intelligence units seem to better understand the importance of streamlining intelligence operations and sharing information.

The keyword is fusion. Local, state, and federal law enforcement, as well as intelligence and military organizations are utilizing and refining fusion based intelligence. Fusion based intelligence can be described using a term we should all be familiar with: E Pluribus Unum – Out of Many, One. When utilizing this approach towards intelligence, agencies reduce redundancy because information is shared through a network. Overall, there are higher levels of awareness because all involved parties are aware of the same information. Intelligence centers such as EPIC, RISS, and the National Counterterrorism Center are excellent models for fusion-based intelligence.

In their article, *Fusion: A Behavioral Approach to Counterinsurgency*, Rob Sentse and Jeroen Jansen describe fusion as having three components: network fusion, procedural fusion, and physical fusion. They describe network fusion as the connecting of people and information. They describe procedural fusion as different personnel using the same
methods. For physical fusion they state, “The concept of physical fusion is very simple: put people from the relevant organizations together in the same workspace” (Fusion: A behavioral Approach to Counterinsurgency, 2008, p. 5). As with any situation, fusion type intelligence or operations allow information to be shared and gaps identified immediately.

A fusion based working environment is proven to be successful, and was even recognized in the 9/11 Commission Report. The report states:

That relationship is especially important because in counter-terrorism, as in other missions, the intelligence establishment will be most effective when it is plugged tightly into policy and operations. Indeed, that is part of the story behind one of the finest intelligence efforts in recent years—the fusion of intelligence operations against al Qaeda in Iraq…With the intelligence tightly linked to operations, there were frequent cycles of questions, analysis, targeting, action, discoveries, and more questions. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2011)

As the 9/11 Commission Report indicates, fusion based intelligence operations ensured success because all members are working towards a common goal, while sharing information. Fusion decreases redundancy, since intelligence is being produced, reviewed, questioned, and produced again by all involved intelligence professionals.

In the event of a major reorganization of the intelligence community, fusion is the future. Reorganization of the intelligence community into a single intelligence department would reduce redundancy and intelligence gaps. A fusion based intelligence community,
using recent successful efforts as a model would ensure constant quality and target based intelligence the United States needs to protect our nation and interests around the world.

To reorganize the intelligence community, the author would create a single fusion based intelligence agency. Table 2 depicts the suggested organization of such an agency. This revised intelligence agency would be under the direction of the DNI. The DNI would have direct control over the entire intelligence community; with exception of military intelligence. Each intelligence function would be represented by a single department. Similar to the current intelligence community, each intelligence department would have a director. In the reorganized intelligence community, each intelligence department director would answer directly to the DNI.

The author is aware of the many complications involved in reorganizing the intelligence community, and those are not reflected in the proposed intelligence agency. In academia, the author is able to illustrate the simplicity of reorganizing a complicated intelligence community into two categories: national intelligence and military intelligence.

**Table 2 – United States Intelligence Agency**
The United States Intelligence Agency (USIA) would be divided into the major intelligence functions. The USIA would conduct intelligence duties at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The USIA would conduct intelligence operations in both foreign and domestic theaters. The most critical portion of the new intelligence agency would be that each intelligence function’s department would be operating under the same roof. By combining consolidated management of the intelligence community with fusion based intelligence operations, the USIA would be far more efficient than the current intelligence community.

As part of reorganization, the author would eliminate the intelligence missions of the FBI, DHS, and DS, and incorporate them into the USIA. In theory, this would allow those agencies to focus on their primary missions and further decreases redundancy and inefficiency on the side of the intelligence community. Member agencies of the intelligence community whose primary mission is not intelligence would operate as liaison members to the USIA. Liaison members would include DOE, DOT, and DEA.

In 2004, Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, a presiding member of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, presented his opinions on intelligence community reform. Senator Rockefeller stated, “The National Intelligence Director should control the budget, personnel and tasking of the three national intelligence agencies currently under the Pentagon’s control--the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency” (Intelligence Reform: Our National Security Depends on It, 2004). The USIA reflects Senator Rockefeller’s view of an efficient, consolidated, intelligence community.
Bringing each department under direct control of the DNI establishes better communication between intelligence professionals, leadership, and intelligence consumers. Furthermore, this reorganization greatly reduces redundancy. The author purposefully separated the intelligence efforts of national intelligence and military intelligence. Although they typically work hand-in-hand, for reorganization purposes, military intelligence is presented alone here in Table 3. Table 3 depicts a simplified view of military intelligence. The author would eliminate the DIA, and give their mission to the individual military intelligence branches, with oversight occurring at the DoD.

**Table 3 – Military intelligence as part of the intelligence community**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of Defense</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAF ISR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Intel</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC Intel</td>
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<tr>
<td>USN Intel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reorganization utilizing the proposed methods would reduce the intelligence community from 17 members to eight. The new intelligence community would consist of the USIA, USAF ISR, USA Intel, USMC Intel, USN Intel, DOE, DOT, and DEA.
Military intelligence would account for four of the eight members, while DOE, DOT, and DEA would remain as liaison members. This new intelligence community would suffer far less from inefficiency and redundancy than its predecessor, simply by removing the amount of agencies involved. All intelligence, excluding military intelligence, would be collected, analyzed, and produced by the USIA.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

Research for this thesis was accomplished to answer two questions. First, would a single United States intelligence agency reduce redundancy and increase efficiency within the intelligence community? Second, what is the best organizational model to use in reorganizing the intelligence community? To answer these questions, the author examined unclassified, online and hard-copy literature.

The author discovered multiple sources such as Congressional Acts and Executive Orders which have created and cultivated the intelligence community. These Congressional Acts and Executive Orders resulted in the intelligence community as it exists today. From the creation of the intelligence community with the National Security Act of 1947, to the creation of a Director of National Intelligence with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the intelligence community has been at the forefront of the U.S. government’s attention for over 60 years.

Additional research revealed multiple sources citing redundancy and inefficiency within the intelligence community. These sources covered a wide berth of individuals from United States Senators to prior CIA directors. Despite the varied backgrounds of utilized sources, they all recognized the intelligence community had grown too big and was not operating as efficiently as possible.

As important as literature pertaining to reorganization of the intelligence community is the internal structure and intelligence functions utilized. The intelligence community exists of 17 members, including the DNI. These member agencies have
various missions and operating parameters. While many of the agencies work jointly, each agency has unique requirements, policies, and leadership.

A review of the intelligence functions utilized within the intelligence agency showed the 17 member agencies primarily utilize five types of intelligence: OSINT, HUMINT, MASINT, SIGINT, and IMINT. Combined analysis of the intelligence community members versus which of the five intelligence functions they use revealed redundancy within the intelligence community.

Although many of the intelligence community members are duplicating the intelligence functions with other member agencies, they are not all operating at the same levels of intelligence. The members of the intelligence community conduct intelligence operations at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Despite the variance in the level of intelligence operation being conducted, redundancy can still create inefficiency within the overall intelligence community.

Redundancy seems to occur most at this point of the intelligence spectrum. Each member agency of the intelligence community might require different pieces of information from the same source. By necessity, each agency could end up conducting their intelligence operations simultaneously with other member agencies, with everybody chasing different pieces of the same puzzle. This redundancy and inefficiency costs the United States precious resources like money, time, and intelligence professional’s lives.

In order to reduce redundancy and increase efficiency, the U.S. government should reorganize the intelligence community into two parts: a single U.S. Intelligence Agency and Military Intelligence. This separation will streamline ongoing intelligence efforts and allow distinct intelligence capabilities to be utilized against our enemies. By pulling all
intelligence capabilities into one agency, the intelligence community would have a clearly defined organization with a single leader.

A crucial aspect of a successful intelligence community is to implement fusion based intelligence operations. A single intelligence agency would be able to best utilize fusion based intelligence, since the different departments within that agency are all answering to the same bosses. Most intelligence agencies in the current intelligence community utilize a fusion based approach to intelligence, but they each have their own priorities and unique perspective.

A single intelligence agency would be able to properly utilize fusion to blend intelligence capabilities into a single, formidable intelligence apparatus to face our enemies. A single intelligence agency would become the go-to agency for all intelligence related matters. Not only would the agency be able to better produce intelligence, but more strict accountability can be enforced on a single intelligence community leader, as opposed to multiple agency directors in competition with each other.

Through reorganization, the intelligence community would become more efficient. Instead of multiple agencies doing the same thing in multiple ways, a single intelligence agency would produce all non-military related intelligence. More importantly, this single intelligence agency would be able to focus on making the intelligence they develop available to intelligence consumers, instead of bureaucratic issues. To quote Dulles, “It is useless to collect information unless you can quickly and accurately get it to the user” (The Craft of Intelligence: America's Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering for a Free World, 2006, p. 22). This quote should be a driving force in any consideration of reorganizing the intelligence community.
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