Domestic Terrorism & Underutilization of Resources

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Abstract

Today’s terrorist threat has evolved since the attacks on September 11th, 2001. The prospect of such a catastrophic event occurring within America's borders could hardly be imagined. With the occupation of U.S. forces in the Middle East, and the systematic dismantle of al' Qaeda's core structure, Islamic terrorism became severely fragmented in its approach. That plan spread through the use of numerous forms of media outlets which were the foundation of inspiration for a trend in homegrown violent extremism. America's tactics for countering domestic terrorism are in need of an overhaul. The gap between federal, state and local entities must be bridged. Emphasis should be placed on utilizing all our public safety resources to include incorporating emergency medical services and fire departments among others in information sharing and suspicious activity reporting. Several key steps can be taken to maximize our effectiveness and better prepare the state of our country for an internal conflict against lone wolf and organized domestic terrorism.

Keywords: fusion centers, sd-lecc, public safety, emergency medical services, fire, department of homeland security, director of national intelligence.
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Introduction

According to counterterrorism expert Hal Kempfner of the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center (SD-LECC), in June of 2006, paramedics in Langley Virginia received a call for shortness of breath at a residential neighborhood. As the paramedics approached the home, they were greeted by five middle-aged men who were not ecstatic for their arrival. The two paramedics entered the home and began treating another man on the living room floor who was having trouble breathing. The two medics observed six people living in the house with no furniture- only sleeping bags and clothing. In a bedroom of the home was a picture of Osama Bin Laden taped on the wall. Upon completion of transport of the patient to the hospital, the two paramedics reported the strange encounter to authorities. Upon investigation from authorities, what ended up being reported turned out to be a terrorist sleeper cell in the home which bordered the security fence of CIA headquarters (Kempfner, 2014).

In the wake of 9/11, American citizens called for more to be done in regards to protecting our nation from terrorist attacks. President Bush responded quickly on October 8th, 2001 with an active agenda for the creation of the Office of Homeland Security which was to be run by the Director of Homeland Security Tom Ridge. Director Ridge has the full backing of the president to take any measure necessary to protect America from terrorism. The Homeland Security Council was formed in addition and served as the antiterrorism relative to National Security Council. Tens of billions of dollars were allocated in a new budget for these endeavors and by July 2002 a formal document emerged from the white house which outlined the objectives of the "National Strategy for Homeland Security." Director Ridge ran a staff of 170,000 with a $40 billion dollar budget, making this department the second largest behind the Department of Defense (Macmanus, Caruson, p.48-68, 2008).
The only response to 9/11 which was applicable was to enhance our security efforts. Impulsive it may have seemed, it was the only reasonable reaction to undergo to reduce America from further attacks. Investing financial and organizational resources was also appropriate. Understanding exactly what homeland security entails is hard to pinpoint. Arguably, homeland security needed to be ramped up immediately following the attacks on 9/11, though much of what was done was inspired through grief and passion with little time for proper assessment of best practices. To better ensure homeland security a calm approach must be used to assess vulnerabilities and opportunities to improve protection. Prevention, response, and mitigation are core elements in homeland security. Prevention is ideally the end goal for efforts put forth. The ability to better protect vulnerable areas of attack is detrimental to success. In the event prevention fails, an active consequent management response is needed for minimizing adverse outcomes. Thwarting terrorist attacks domestically begins with the recognition of attack rituals and evidence of plots. There are many ways that this task is completed, much of which has been placed on the shoulders of local law enforcement personnel. However, one entity alone may not be enough to disrupt a well-established terrorist network within a community. Instead, the cooperation and utilization of “all” our public safety agencies such as fire and EMS in conjunction would better suit our interests in denying the means of a terrorist attack.

One of the most recent threats to our nation has become domestic terrorism and homegrown violent extremism. Collectively, America as a country has an issue with the underutilization of public safety entities in thwarting and preventing domestic terrorism. In the City of San Diego, a startling discovery was made that none of the cities contracted ambulance company’s paramedics, or EMT’s had any specific training in recognizing signs of terrorism even though they are cordially invited into people’s homes during an emergency. These entities
have access to the personal aspects of people’s privacy that law enforcement doesn’t have (without a warrant) and that they need to be able to recognize signs in people’s homes or lingo being used that can be identified as a possible terrorist activity.

This untapped resource should be partnered closer with law enforcement and counterterrorism officials around the country. What is provided is a lot of extra eyes and ears with largely uninhibited access compared to limitations in law enforcement. There is great importance in regards to exposing other public safety entities such as fire/EMS, hospital staff, and so on, to the past and current trends in terrorism so that they may recognize early warning signs. Without this exposure, it would be understandable for a paramedic on a house call to see airport blueprints on the table as just that. Vice questioning; not what it is, but what can it be used for?

As of December 2015, approximately 240 million calls were made to 9-1-1 emergency systems according to the National Emergency Number Association (911 statistics, 2015). These calls range from law infractions to fires and medical emergencies, as well as natural disasters. During almost all of these calls, emergency units deploy to the location reported in response to the situation. These units are all members of our public safety system with the responsibility to protect citizens of each respective village, town or city.

This prompts a notion that conceivably, the responders to each call have the tools and ability to be able to recognize and report suspicious activity at the scene of a call. Especially activity relating to terrorism and national security. However, without proper training on “what” and “how” to report things they see, they are virtually ineffective in this matter. Once again placing all responsibility on the shoulders of law enforcement, from federal to municipal, as well as the intelligence community. Training in counterterrorism and suspicious activity reporting
could, and should be universal; similar to how law enforcement is trained in basic lifesaving skills.

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center site prompted a massive swarm of responders each day. An undertaking of that magnitude demonstrated the broader scope of emergency responders within the nation. This event suggests the need for a truly integrated emergency response coordination that completely incorporates federal, state, local and private sector agencies. Outlining the scope of the threat that is faced is paramount in developing requirements for a capable national response system. Often proper appreciation for personnel or services that encompass national response capabilities involving disasters occurs. The term-“first responders” generally refers to police, fire, and EMS. This term does not adequately describe all assets involved in a terrorist attack or disaster. Rather, "emergency responders" does a better job at comprising all the participants during an incident.

The Homeland Security Act developed in 2002 includes federal, state, and local public safety, law enforcement, emergency response and emergency medical to include hospital emergency facilities. It also includes related personnel such as HAZMAT response, search, and rescue, anti-terrorism units, bomb squads, S.W.A.T., emergency management officials, as well as private agencies responsible for communications, transportation, public works, public health and construction (Homeland Security Act, sec 2 p.6, 2002).

Though post 9/11 has brought significant attention to law enforcement, fire and EMS, public health and urban search and rescue, for example, lack the assets for responding to national emergencies. Private sector responders have seen even less attention. The initial search and cleanup effort after the World Trade Center buildings fell required around 10,000 support personnel such as heavy equipment operators, iron workers, carpenters and truck drivers each
day. These units were significant and were exposed to extreme safety and health risks (EPA Response to September 11, n.d.).

Another aspect that is overlooked in the scheme of national defense is agricultural emergencies which could threaten our food supply through infectious disease. Infectious diseases are already a danger worldwide naturally. The possibility of terrorist introducing contagions to spread disease is an added element to the equation. Response assets for agricultural consequent management could also be considered an important requirement to thwarting terrorist attacks. In addition to this, an emergency response could also include chemical-biological response units as well as domestic energy support teams, nuclear response teams, disaster medical assistance teams and so on.

According to information from the non-profit group America's First Responder Foundation, it is believed that an estimated 2.3 million police, fire, and EMS personnel are considered first responders (America's First Responders Foundation, n.d.). However, this is a narrow segment of the broader scope for responders. In a report for the “Center for Strategic and International Studies,” Dr. Joseph Collins includes a wider view of responders, estimating roughly between 9 and 10 million. Dr. Collins also points out that in addition to these numbers, there are around 6.5 million skilled construction workers in the U.S. who possibly could be called upon in a disaster (Collins, 2001). With such large numbers, the need for more integrated approach and structure between resources is essential. Tasking of emergency response efforts goes far beyond merely aiding victims after an incident. Perpetration, intervention, and recovery from terrorist attacks are also integral elements of a successful response effort. Historically, first responders have primarily been based on experience from natural or man-made disasters which differ significantly from a terrorist campaign. The scene at an act of terrorism can become
intentionally hostile for responders due to the deliberate targeting of emergency response efforts which creates more psychological and physical damage. One example would be secondary devices intended for responders or civilian onlookers. Another example could be the use of chemical, biological or radiological attacks to disrupt coordinated responses. To add more complication, secondary strikes may not always be at the initial attack scene. Instead, they could be launched at police stations, hospitals and emergency operation centers to include a few. On the 23rd floor, the World Trade Center Building held the New York City Emergency Operation Communications Center and when it was destroyed the city had no secondary command and control in place. Three days passed before all reconstruction of the operation was restored (Kendra, 2003). This scenario could make for a deliberate attack on emergency service centers for terrorist.

The threat landscape has shifted over the years. No longer can the responsibility of defending against terrorism solely rest upon the shoulders of our intelligence community (IC) and federal officials and agencies. With greater training and accountability shared domestically, the efforts of the (IC) can be more focused on the international threat rather than duel-tasked which strains capabilities.

Authors Brian Michael Jenkins, Andrew Liepman, Henry H. Willis published a journal for the RAND Corporation titled, "Identifying Enemies Among Us" in which they overview the current terrorist threat in America and identify the challenges that the intelligence community faces domestically (Jenkins, 2014). The three authors question the capabilities of collecting information within the United States after 9/11. They go on to explain the challenges faced from "terrorism fatigue" and budget constraints, as well as public scrutiny on privacy issues involving federal agencies and the collection of domestic intelligence operations (Jenkins, 2014).
The argument can be made that it is not the sole responsibility of the federal government to deter, detect and mitigate potential domestic terrorist threats. Vigilance in the prevention of domestic terrorism can, and should, also be a shared responsibility with public services agencies within each community. Questions that will be explored in this examination of our emergency services are:

- How can we better utilize our public safety entities in thwarting domestic terrorism?
- How do we utilize non-sworn law enforcement entities while maintaining ethics of privacy in coordination with national security?
- Is there a responsibility for all those working within the public safety sector to report suspicious activity?

Besides identifying these issues, it is important to explore suggestions and regulations that can be emplaced universally throughout all public safety agencies.

According to a government census bureau taken in 2014, the population in the United States is over 321 million (U.S. and World Population Clock, n.d.). This number varies greatly on a minute to minute scale depending on births and deaths making this a rough estimate. It’s an enormous amount of people for law enforcement to interact with and prevent crime on any level. Neighborhood watches and community policing been introduced to help law enforcement needs, providing an opportunity for extra eyes and ears. These initiatives contribute to getting people of a community involved and builds a proper relationship with civilians and law enforcement though its focus is on community particular crimes such as burglaries, vandalism, sexual assaults and so on. Little education is spent on terrorism as it pertains to individual communities. A majority of what the general public is exposed to in regards to terrorism is through media sources. Domestic terrorism, however, isn't a new phenomenon. Timothy McVeigh detonated a
bomb in 1995 at the Alfred P Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City resulting in killing 168 people and injuring hundreds more (The Oklahoma City Bombing, 2010). The Boston Marathon bombing in 2013 and the recent San Bernardino attacks from a couple of radicalized Islamic extremists are just a few of the most notable and recent tragedies in America. The question remains, “do public service entities such as EMS come in contact with individuals who may have ties or direct correlation to terrorism?” The exact data is uncertain, though the probability warrants attention.

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) published a study in 2012 which cataloged certain cities and areas within the United States as “Hot spots of terrorism” based on recorded statistics from 1970-2008 (Bersani, 2012). Certainly, some parts of the United States are more prone to interaction with those involved in terrorism. This should not deter a national policy for training and educating those in all aspects of public safety on suspicious activity reporting. Understanding and identifying what it is that is being witnessed along with being able to recognize possible terrorist activity through lingo or physical aspects is crucial. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a list of potential indicators of terrorist activity on their website which encourages the reporting of suspicious activity. Though it is mentioned that the signs alone may have a legitimate reasoning and it is left to the individuals' discretion should they decide to report on it (Homeland Security, n.d.).

The notion of understanding terrorism enough to be able to recognize signs and report them is essential in implementing training across the spectrum of public service agencies. With no practical concept for the workings and ideologies of terrorists, it becomes difficult to expect those in service of the public good to comprehend small signs that possibly relate to potential terrorist activity.
Background & Project Description

Though most law enforcement agencies already provide counterterrorism training to their officers, less (if any at all) is conducted for other public service entities. This includes EMS, fire, hospitals and staff, along with 911 dispatchers and possibly public utility workers. There are numerous government agencies along with private companies that offer web-based and in-person training. Much of the material is tailored towards law enforcement which suggests the frame of mind that law enforcement is primarily responsible for dealing with acts of terrorism. In the matter of "post-incident," this is true. Preemptively, however, stopping terrorism before it occurs needs to be the addressed on a larger national level.

In regards to providing mandatory training to all emergency services personnel, law enforcement agencies need to be involved in the coordination of information and reporting. In San Diego California for example, the SD-LECC provides bi-monthly training and meetings with volunteers from various public service entities on counterterrorism trends in their respective areas. Those volunteers then take that information and pass that on to employees of their agency or company. This is strictly on a volunteer basis for those who attend, however, the training provides an intense look at the reality of crime and terrorist activity in the southern California area. As opposed to this exposure being only voluntary, the proposal would be that this is mandatory training for any employee of public safety or service enterprise.

The training requirements should be approved by a federal agency such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or National Security Administration (NSA) for example and should be contingent upon personnel's ability to work, similar to holding a license for that job. The training could be web-based, tailored to specific regions and the most likely
threats in the area. Covering aspects such as symbolism used, lingo, history of groups in this field, and capabilities of homegrown violent extremism among others. Additionally, training would be on an annual schedule since the threat and capabilities of terrorist regularly change. A subject matter expert (perhaps training coordinator at that agency who is required to attend and pass a DHS-approved course) should be delivering the training in person to new hires during an orientation and web-based training conducted yearly to maintain operational readiness for the employees. The training would not be designed to make employees experts in terrorism, only to familiarize them with the reality of the terrorist threat so suspicion can be triggered when something is recognized as opposed to not understanding what they are seeing or hearing and continue without addressing it.

Some could argue that it may be immoral for a paramedic, for example, to be reporting suspicions of illicit behavior to law enforcement. Perhaps that is even a breach of trust and duty in the medical profession. The countering argument is that, when a doctor takes the Hippocratic Oath, they are obligated not to share and/or divulge a person's medical history and standing to any others unless it is pertinent to the patient's current health situation or authorized for release by the patient themselves (Hippocratic Oath, n.d.). However, doctors are obligated by law to report evidence of domestic violence and child abuse to law enforcement officials through “Mandated Reporting." Meaning that, this information is granted a release in order to preserve the well-being of said individual. This is a duty and responsibility of the health professional to report such evidence (United States, Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2010). The same should be observed for homeland security and the well-being of people in communities. It is the duty of all American citizens to report and be vigilant for the safety of each other.
With the understanding that non-law enforcement personnel don’t have the same authority as standard officers of the law, they are not expected or authorized to physically act on any suspicion of terrorism activity, only to report what they witnessed. For example, paramedics head to someone’s home for a 911 call. They notice building plans of the local airport on the dining room table with surveillance equipment. They are not authorized to confiscate any material or even to take photos with a cell phone of what they see, they are only responsible to report. The information that is reported will be sent out to a local Law Enforcement Coordination Center where members of the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force will take and disseminate the pieces of information and look for any validation or coherence with other or current investigations that the information may have ties too.

It is imperative that proper utilization of public service entities in the effort to thwart counterterrorism is conducted throughout the United States. The current methods of placing full responsibility on law enforcement alone are clearly not working at maximum effectiveness. Safety of citizens in each city and town lies in those who have chosen the challenge to serve and protect them, as well as those who have the ability through their exposure to the public. Addressing the issue of proper training in terrorism awareness for public service agencies will be the first step in mitigation of potential terrorist attacks and will help raise awareness in everyday lives. Vigilance is a quality that should be instilled throughout our society. Law enforcement and counterterrorism resources can better utilize similar sectors of public safety such as firefighters, hospital employees, emergency services and others alike. Law enforcement officers are trained in basic lifesaving skills; the same can be done with training non-law enforcement personnel in counterterrorism. Cohesion works best.
This can be achieved by examining what entities exactly should be involved other than law enforcement and in what situations may be aroused that would warrant a suspicious activity report from them. Along with this, we will take a look at what training material should be offered that will help those involved identify suspicious behavior and how it will be regulated by a government entity. Certain real-world instances that have been reported in the past, resulting in an arrest, will also be examined as well as potential scenarios that each agency may face. The desired result of this project will be to expand the current consciousness of counterterrorism and be able to harden our countries potential targets through proactive measures.

**Literature review Introduction**

The way terrorism is viewed has evolved over the past years. The new York times posted in 2011 that, “Al Qaeda spent roughly half a million dollars to destroy the World Trade Center and cripple the Pentagon… the Unites States has spent $3.3 trillion, or about $7 million for every dollar Al Qaeda spent planning and executing the attacks to eradicate al- Qaeda on foreign territory through strategic military involvement” (Carter, 2011). From the United States campaign on terrorism which has smothered the core element of al-Qaeda, another more decentralized threat has emerged; involving smaller splinter groups to form with less formal structure than al-Qaeda presented. The Jihadist threat got transformed into a global movement reaching far beyond the Middle East, using the ease of the internet and social media to inspire and radicalize people who may not have the encouragement to lean towards terrorism. The world is seeing a growing trend in homegrown violent extremism and domestic terrorism. It is imperative to understand how it is being dealt with currently and what can be done to improve strategically in countering the threat. An abundance of journals and books have been written in the wake of 9/11 speaking about countering today’s terrorism threat. Topics such as:
- Information sharing systems to include fusion centers.
- Federal and local collaborations.
- Responsibilities of local agencies in regards to homeland security.
- Hindsight of what did and did not work in response to attacks.

Being able to identify the past, present and future success and failures will enable better preparation and mitigation in our nation's fight against terrorism. Especially on the national forefront. Boston, for example, has become a model city after its excellent handling of the Boston Marathon bombing. Emergency services were well prepared and informed across the spectrum of those involved which allowed a smooth and efficient response to a drastic situation. The question remains, "how well prepared is the rest of our country to respond to similar attacks?" "Can more be done and how?"

**Literature review**

The threat from terrorism has altered over the course of time since September 11, 2001. Varied views in the direction it has undertaken, complicate the scope in which it's dealt with. With the war on terrorism stifling groups such as al-Qaeda (AQ) from having the capabilities to undergo massive scale theatrical attacks, splintering has occurred. Several separate groups have emerged, each with different logistical reaches and distinct yet similar ideologies. Posting a greater threat for smaller, more frequent attacks that effects more on a local level than nationally.

Because terrorist violence has shifted its focus from the centralized “global jihad” to smaller groups scattered throughout different foreign regions, the decentralized nucleus of al-Qaeda’s power has prompted a surge in social media outreach to help radicalize and empower others from greater distances (Jenkins, 2014). Dr. Gabriel Weimann of Haifa University in Israel has written numerous books and articles on the use of the Internet by terrorist organizations.
Weimann concurs with Jenkins and states that the number of terrorist sites has grown from less than 100 to over 4,800 in the past decade (Weimann, 2006). Though a good deal of them attributed to al-Qaeda are no longer active according to Dr. Weimann, several still exist and operate through AQ affiliated groups among other organizations. The internet has become a cheap and efficient means for spreading ideology to areas of the world that normally would be less affected.

In a journal published by the RAND Corporation in 2014 titled “Identifying Enemies Among Us,” author Brian Jenkins suggests the intelligence community struggles to be anticipatory, but rather focuses on past incidents which equate a reactionary posture strategically (Jenkins, 2014). Jenkins questions whether we "can" and "should" be doing a better job anticipating the threats and then adjusting tactics accordingly? Alternative analysis and more frequent contact between Washington and what local authorities encounter in their jurisdictions could help identify a correlation between overseas terrorist activity and domestic (Jenkins, 2014).

This communication should include mandatory regulatory compliance training involving domestic terrorism trends seen across the nation and at least biannual response drills coordinated, by the department of homeland security, between multiple agencies. Much of the federal strategic level has identified the relative capabilities of terrorist groups while local authorities seemed to be less focused on how the threat has been diminished and more on what's left of it in the aftermath of 9/11 and where it is going. Tying the efforts and resources of local, state and federal entities closer will leave fewer gaps in the vigilance.

Many federal agencies become defined through their bureaucratic jurisdiction. The same does not apply to the jurisdictions of local authorities who are bound geographically. Local authority is obligated to protect those within their jurisdiction. Domestic officials report
correlations between terrorism and criminal enterprises such as human traffickers, international gangs, cartels and other aspects of organized crime (Kane, Wall, 2004). This is according to authors John Kane and April Wall who published a journal in 2004 for the National White Collar Crime Center. Both authors support Jenkins thoughts on the direct relation to domestic and international terrorism to transnational crime. Federal agencies do not view much of these issues to fall into a category with the framework of national security or under their definitions of terrorism which curtails their mission. It becomes difficult to be able to intermingle local intelligence efforts with federal jurisdiction (Kane, Wall, 2004). Because terrorism is not specific to one type of region, religion, race or economic status to name a few, it becomes difficult to be able to predict with certainty, who is involved with terrorism. Though there may be particular warning signs, a majority of past domestic terrorist have operated among peers with little or no suspicion. Timothy McVeigh who bombed the federal building in Oklahoma City and Tashfeen Malik along with her husband Syed Rizwan Farook who conducted the San Bernardino attack, come from different backgrounds, ideologies, and agendas. Thus proving the difficulty and complexity to mitigating domestic terrorism.

United States Department of Justice established the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, which facilitates information sharing between federal and public safety entities. This platform provides electronic based distribution mechanisms to help exchange timely, accurate and current information between agencies. Their mission statement is; “Efficient sharing of data among justice entities” (Global, n.d.). Though this initiative aims to collaborate efforts between federal and local public safety agencies, it caters directly to “law enforcement” and does not open the door for sharing between non-sworn public services such as EMS and hospitals.
Ultimately, the goal would be to integrate these services more directly as opposed to a "need to know" philosophy.

Jose Docobo, who is the Chief Deputy of the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, published a journal in 2005 on community policing as a strategy for Homeland Security. Docobo asserts that terrorism is similar to traditional crime in that it becomes a local issue and a shared responsibility between federal, state and local governments to prevent it. The link between international and domestic terror groups to traditional crimes rest through acts of money laundering, fraud, drug trafficking and identity theft to name a few (Docobo, 2005). These issues have a direct correlation to terrorism and though most people see the federal role in combating terrorism as focused on high level threats and catastrophic events, they are not able to detect everyone. The Boston bombing is an example of an attack that was simplistic in its organization and resources which allowed the perpetrators to operate with little attention brought to themselves. The brothers utilized pressure cookers filled with various shrapnel as the vehicle to deliver the explosions. Michael McCaul the chairman of the House of Homeland Security Committee indicated in his 2014 report on the Boston Marathon bombing that the brothers were in fact motivated by Islamic extremism, though they were not affiliated with any particular terrorist group. They used the internet to inspire and learn to build the bombs (McCaul, 2014). Threats of this nature are difficult to identify at the federal level because the focus is on such a grand scale.

Domestic intelligence perhaps is better collected at the local level with those who interact with the public on a daily basis such as police officers, emergency medical services and hospital staff even. Budget constraints for the resources to do so make that extremely difficult. Jenkins states that “counterterrorism is not just about raids and drone strikes. Additionally it’s important
to collect and sift through vast amounts of information and managing relationships between organizations that regard sharing information as an unnatural act” (Jenkins, p.8, 2014). In the wake of 9/11, information sharing mechanisms have been at work through the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in the form of fusion centers. The fusion centers collect and disseminate information from various local and regional sources. Sharing of information not only plays a role in prevention of terrorism but also handling aftermath of one as seen in the Boston Marathon bombing. This attack provided a clear and concise example of the importance of sharing information not only between federal and local law enforcement, but with first responders, hospitals and private sector entities. Boston was well prepared due to a dynamic integration of its emergency operations and sharing of information which enabled such a well-coordinated response.

Though Boston did handle the crisis well, a report conducted by Joe Eyerman and Kevin Strom for the Department of Justice in 2005 investigated interagency coordination between law enforcement and public health officials. Eyerman and Strom assert that before 2001, there were few instances of coordination between law enforcement and public health agencies in regards to terrorism. Agencies responded independently using different protocols and procedures. They align with Jenkins in conjunction with a large disconnect in information sharing. The fundamental reasoning for this disconnect revolves around different missions, training and on the job experience. The cultural differences between the two entities affects their willingness for intertwining confidential information (Eyerman, Strom, 2005).

Dr. Arthur Kellermann published an article in 2013 for the New England Journal of Medicine titled “Lessons from Boston” where he highlighted the detailed workings of the reaction to the Boston Marathon Bombing through the first responders and hospitals. Dr.
Kellermann notes that hospital emergency staff had previously gone through training on handling explosive mass casualties at a conference where doctors from Israel, India, Spain, Britain and Pakistan explained the triage system’s they used for mass casualties due to explosives. Kellerman asserts that though Boston was able to manage the victims successfully, many other cities would not have done as well in the same situation. Israel has a vast amount of experience with terrorist bombings, and according to Kellermann a majority of hospitals in the U.S. view disaster preparedness as an afterthought (Kellermann, 2013). "We would be wise to emulate Israel's doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of national coordination, standard operating procedures, constant attention to surge capacity, the avoidance of emergency department overcrowding, the distribution of casualties according to type and severity, and the frequent conducting of rigorous drills. Boston was efficient because they followed the same principles, however this is not the case for a majority of our cities” (Kellermann, 2013). Every city needs to be able to conduct preparedness and response in this same manner. Boston is an example of utilizing a broader approach to counterterrorism and national preparedness.

The San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center (SD-LECC) is 1 of 77 fusion centers located in the United States according to terrorism expert Hal Kempfner (Kempfner, 2014). San Diego is the first and currently only fusion center which has begun integrating the cities Fire and EMS employees into its training for counterterrorism. The SD-LECC provides training for law enforcement, public health officials and private sector companies against Southern California’s threats in regards to border security and any possible local activity in terrorism. The ultimate goal being that, fire and EMS employees will be able to recognize preemptive signs of possible terrorist activity and know how to report what they saw (Kempfner, 2014). The role of fusion centers and questions about their value have been discussed within the
intelligence community. They are supposed to be utilized for analysis and synthesis of local information, though Jenkins mentions that many don't work as designed. The Department of Homeland Security supports, encourage and funds the fusion centers but has no authority over them. Originally, fusion centers were established to share domestic information as an alternative for collecting local intelligence which may be construed at spying. Data would need to be collected by local law enforcement initially for this to work (Jenkins, 2014)

Congress questioned the effectiveness of fusion centers in 2012, claiming they are not contributing enough to the situational awareness of the nation's terrorism threats according to Jenkins. Each center is different than the next one and has evolved quite differently due to having to adapt to the local need for individual locations, as opposed to what Congress and federal entities would like them to do. Priorities of fusion centers are clearly catered to local stakeholders and less for the national consumer which makes performances from the centers uneven (Jenkins, 2014). Being that fusion centers are run from the bottom up, local sponsors are able to shape and mold the activities and tailor intelligence to fit the needs of the region. What is lacking is a linked network of centers of different areas which would enable a higher success rate for terrorism prevention. With "guidance" from DHS and not "control", centers would be able to maintain its region's needs and federally, receive funding, advice and information flow between centers. This allows for larger centers with more resources to be able to pick up where smaller ones cannot. Collaboration and communication would be encouraged through the particular expertise of individual centers such as Texas and Arizona with illegal immigration, California with pacific coast threats, New York and Virginia dealing with the east coast, and so on. Each being able to reach to another for information (Jenkin, 2014). This allows putting the nationwide threat into better focus. With a sole database with reach back capabilities, linkage and
commonalities would be easier to detect nationally, and an integration of public services such as EMS, fire, and hospitals which San Diego is utilizing will make flagging potential threats and those involved easier.

**Analysis & Critical Application**

Hindsight is usually 20/20; in that mistakes and success only matter when something can be learned from them. Information sharing between agencies is as essential to the prevention of terrorism just as consequence management is for post attack. As mentioned before, we saw the success in Boston and the progress that was made through broad information sharing. Their success stemmed not only from the federal to local law enforcement coordination but through the inclusion of all first responders such as EMS, hospitals, and private sector entities. Boston displayed the critical application of information sharing along with the advantages of integrating operations resulting in a well-planned, conceived and coordinated response.

Several areas of concern are open to consideration in where we can improve our anti-terrorism strategies. As discussed previously, prevention is the overall methodology, and that begins with improving our intelligence. America's opposition strive to keep themselves as well as their intentions discreet. The challenge of collecting data is daunting in itself and before 9/11 there were enormous amounts of raw intelligence collected which presumably increased post attack. The collection is only the first step, however. All of the intelligence data needs to be analyzed as well as integrated with other assessments before it becomes available to those who can effectively make use of it. The United States has many agencies engaging in different forms of intelligence collection which have increased issues with coordination, communication, and integration. Large bureaucracies such as the CIA and FBI are an example of competing agendas combined with strict mandated separation between external agencies (Theoharis, 2007). Because
of this paradigm, intelligence sharing and cooperation between agencies has proved difficult in domestic investigations. Only after 9/11 has the FBI begun to orient itself to shift a portion of its focus on the counterterrorism mission. Even so, that information obtained by the FBI only becomes useful if it is disseminated through immigration services down through local level agencies it is truly to be used to mitigate terrorism. The Bush administration launched analytical and intelligence integration initiatives through the use of fusion centers as a cornerstone of their efforts.

Authors Jeremy Carter and Steven Chermak published a book titled “Evidence-Based Intelligence Practices: Examining the Role of Fusion Centers as a Critical Source of Information.” Carter and Chermak assert that currently, fusion centers are the sole mechanism for collecting domestic intelligence nationally. Both authors argue more could be done to equip better and utilize public safety agencies to provoke a wider array of information. Fusion centers classically have a narrow focus on terrorism. The modern world has become incredibly connected, and it no longer makes sense to compartmentalize threats. The techniques, money handling, weapons, and travel routes are all too similar to terrorist, cyber criminals, organized crime, amongst other threats. Cartels and drug lords operate in similar ways to terrorist groups though not considered terrorists by federal definition (Carter, Chermak, 2011). Unfortunately, the sharing mechanisms differ from those in terrorism even though the data used by an analyst to identify and make sense of the threat is the same. This prompts the notion of disintegrating the barriers between threats and allows better flow for integration between agencies.

Jenkins offers one option that could be considered to facilitate better interagency coordination would be the role of the DNI’s office (Director of National Intelligence). The DNI distributes information among the intelligence community as well as building capacity and
reducing redundant queries. The majority of the DNI's staff are well versed in foreign intelligence matters which perhaps has prevented its role in the architecture of domestic intelligence (Jenkins, 2014). The DNI can have a substantial role in the integration and coordination of future data platforms by increasing the outreach of state and local entities with the intelligence community. The purpose of this would be to familiarize both parties with the capabilities that each other possesses and priorities they need to meet. This opens up communication and understanding between communities that have essentially many of the same core missions. Once the divide has been bridged, the DNI can assist in the training of analytics for the state and local agencies (Jenkins, 2014). The intelligence community has much to offer regarding understanding adversaries and national level Intel collection. The same works in reverse for local organizations providing beneficial information to the feds. The DNI would lead the team building for collaborative partnerships between federal and local first responder agencies.

Along with this the DNI primarily drives protocols for the prioritization of fusion centers depending on the region they are located. Every area has its particular interests and threat potential which most likely differs from the next. The border of southwest America doesn't have the same immigration issues that the northwest border has, and thus the prioritization for the regions differ (Perl, 2009). The DNI would be able to see the broader picture country-wide and be able to assist in identifying which threats are most imminent in particular areas, resulting in less waste of resources.

It is imperative that local public safety resources focus on how the terrorist threat in its region can manifest. As violence spreads to new areas overseas, it has potential to prompt radicalization in local communities in the U.S. which can invoke violence in their respective
jurisdictions. Currently, there is a categorization of threats within the intelligence community such as domestic terrorism, international terrorism, cyber terrorism and so on (Perl, 2009). Compartmentalizing these issues only serves to limit the cooperation and sharing between agencies and focuses more on the past than the future. At some point all of these threats intersect and because of the division between agencies, intelligence itself is not well positioned to detect them.

This unfortunate phenomenon can be counteracted by beginning a dialogue between Washington and state agencies in which both parties work together to intertwine their efforts and reroute the focus from fault finding to improving performance in counterterrorism. Carter and Chermak acknowledge that the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) is the prominent domain in domestic terrorism structure. The need for a higher level of cooperation should be sought between JTTF, local police, and local first responders as well as unnecessary obstacles removed which prevent quality integration (Carter, Chermak, 2011). The reasons for some of the barriers varies. They can be derived from policies, legality and even some being strictly cultural between agencies. Obviously, legal obstacles are the most difficult to work around due to the cumbersome nature of reversing laws. Furthermore, some of the barriers initially put in place were done so for the protection of privacy and civil liberties. This issue has gained extreme momentum and must be held at the front of relationship building and agency integration. With that said; civil rights and privacy cannot be used any longer as a universal excuse for the separation of local public safety and intelligence communities. Rather, the forefront of discussion should be how to smartly and professionally remove the restricting barriers which prevent cooperation between the two while still preserving the liberties that are developed for protection. To facilitate this initiative and inspire those involved to be proactive in this measure it is
important to do two things; better equip and prepare the fusion centers and quantify national intelligence efforts that reach far beyond the borders of the United States to include all domestic aspects of terrorism (Perl, 2009).

First, the acknowledgment that the fusion centers do not currently maximize their product for their local consumers as well as the counterterrorism efforts on a national level. Their performance varies from center to center, and that is due to having no streamline structure in-place (Carter, Chermak, 2011). They would be best equipped for effectiveness by creating an overall protocol governed by our national intelligence structure (DNI in an example as Jenkins pointed out) which could serve to reduce redundancy, properly direct expertise where needed, encourage cooperation, and in the end eliminate waste by reducing cost and maximizing effectiveness. The caveat for this is that budget restraints consistently remain an issue (Carter, Chermak, 2011).

The second is the way national intelligence views domestic terrorism issues. The DNI amongst other federal agencies treads lightly with the topic of domestic terrorism. Not so much with foreign-inspired ideologies from homegrown terrorist, but more so dealing with violent extremism from far left and right political and single issue individuals and groups. National security is tailored to a foreign intelligence agenda, and when it becomes intertwined domestically, things become riskier. Perception is the sole proprietor of this problem. Although the FBI along with the ATF has an extensive history of pursuing related cases to domestic terrorism, this is not the same for many federal intelligence agencies who are bound by the political bureaucracy not to deploy assets against Americans. This perception needs to be massaged and revisited publically to be able to adapt our countries security measures to the changing threat that we face.
Authors Kirstie Ball, Kevin Haggerty, David Lyon addressed issues of U.S. intelligence gathering processes and questions about the actual security that the information provides, outlining key elements such as:

- surveillance and population control
- policing, intelligence and war
- production and consumption
- new media
- security
- identification
- regulation and resistance.

The book titled Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies asserts that America’s current state focusses mostly on keeping closer tabs on visitors, international students and those may be capable or have the intent on violence (Lyon, Haggerty, Ball, 2012). This does not come without great concern for civil liberties and fundamental privacy rights. Information technology in the modern age is exploited to detect and collect information. It is known that the individuals involved in carrying out the 9/11 attacks traveled, trained and lived within the United States. The American body has been more accepting of empowering the government with intrusive surveillance techniques. Border security has increased drastically in the wake of 9/11. Tighter security and scrutiny has been placed on our points of entry with regards to the visa process. Massive challenges are faced in the border control entry due to the long remote borders and vast coastlines.

Transportation Security has also received a major overhaul as far as security procedures are concerned. Our own airplanes were used essentially as cruise missiles to attack America
which sparks the realization that various transportation forms which we depend on day to day have potential to be used in nefarious ways such as trains, boats and large trucks as seen recently in Nice France. Prevention runs parallel with protection in reducing vulnerability to terrorist attacks. The landscape of targets has changed from large theatrical to targets of opportunity using any means necessary. Any building or facility is a potential target. It is generally assumes that we cannot protect every target all of the time, which is why such importance should be placed on the prevention aspect through recognition of suspicious activity. Pre-attack indicators are the best way to intercept and stop attacks. No matter what the long term effect of terrorism is, the immediate interest needs to be on identifying new potential targets. The National Strategy for Homeland Security which the Bush administration outlined pressed high importance on the protection of critical infrastructure which encompassed thirteen major areas of the economy; transportation, agriculture, water, energy, banking and finance, the chemical industry telecommunication and so on (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007). These elements are obviously important, but the task for protecting such a broad spectrum from electronic data to crops is incredibly daunting.

Particular attention to individual aspects of critical infrastructure has been placed which may cause the greatest disruption. Public water supplies and electricity grids are a top priority due to being such a necessity. Disruption of these would most likely cause major displacement and in the age of technology, much of what can affected can be through computer based cyber terrorism without ever having to make a physical presence. The question is raised; what responsibility should private sector have in public protection? The United States government does have regulatory power, although the majority of financial and physical assets are privately owned. Ultimately it is up to private decision makers to determine what security arrangements
need to be made for buildings, power plants hospitals and so on. Recommendations can come from government but it cannot mandate measures that benefit the preferences of the Department of Homeland Security. Though private sector authorities are not blind to the need for security, they also have shareholders to answer to in the hunt for profit. The airlines for example used private security prior to 9/11 though due to the “bottom-line” it had to be done cheaply. The United States responded post attack by federalizing security for airports. Another tactic is providing tax breaks or subsidies to persuade desired results but ultimately security resides in the hands or private interest.

Pertaining to the emergency medical side is the threat of chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) weaponry. Separate from the devastation of a nuclear attack which can inundate large masses in an instance, CBR threats become difficult to detect and readily more available and cheaper. The Bush administration initially pressed emphasis on the health care industry to stockpile vaccines and heighten awareness. This recognition of the necessity for the public health system to engage in not only prevention and protection but consequence management as well has fallen short of its potential ability. Responding effectively to terrorist attacks on American soil requires a complex network which involves multiple levels of government and chains of authority, and command including an array of specialties. Improvements to homeland security initiatives must include the following avenues:

Preparation and training all first responders- considerable finances and resources must be invested in the cohesive integration of all first responders in order to dissolve the gaps between operations. Shifts in cultures between law enforcement, fire and EMS are necessary to bridge the gap which divides each entity. As previously mentioned, this begins with the fusion centers serving as the catalyst for cooperative intelligence and integration.
Enhancing public health capabilities- Ensuring that our public health system is aware and current with trends and analysis in regards to terrorism will assist in providing a more productive and controlled response to mass casualty incidents. Better unification of real-time data will help eliminate miscommunication and undesired reactions. Boston was clear evidence of successful first responder integration in a post-attack scenario. Indeed in a CBR related incident, the public health community is a key to success in preparation and response to that style of catastrophic event.

The United States ambitious agenda in homeland security is postured on minimizing vulnerability to attack. If the possibility exists in achieving each and every desired improvement and innovation, vulnerability in some degree will always be certain. This puts into question how much of our agenda is feasibly accomplished? There will always be insurmountable obstacles with potential for constraining trade-offs. For instance there are several considerations which suggest the difficulty of achieving major progress in securing the nation. For example, taking into account our efforts for globalization which directly conflicts with controlling the borders. Our technology age and politics both invoke monumental flows of products, ideas and people in and out of our country. Maintaining a 100% success rate for filtering potential terrorist from crossing our borders is unfathomable. The only exception may be those who are already known terrorists or associates.

The next issue is balancing state power against civil liberties. America has rooted its allure in tradition with individual civil rights and resistance to state power expansion. This has coincidently brought a conflict of interest between the many measures taken to counter threats such as intrusive surveillance, stronger powers in policing, search and seizure restrictions being relaxed and loosening restriction on wiretapping (Lyon, Haggerty, Ball, 2012). American
citizens became more accepting of these measures post 9/11, however traditional concerns of encroachment by the government resurfaced as years have passed.

Decentralizing the prevention and response to terrorism from solely the Department of Homeland Security to conjunction with the state and local level is paramount. This is particularly the case in consequence management given that when a terrorist attack occurs, local fire and EMS may be some of the first on the scene. With no overall directive for standardized training, individual responders may not be equipped with the wherewithal to respond effectively. This suggests the dire necessity for higher level basic training and integration for all realms of emergency response. Sharing of intelligence and tactics between disciplines will help to mitigate that issue. Intelligence has been coveted in the past as information that must be held secretive and agencies must be reluctant to share. This notion was conceived in essence for preservation of risking leaks or not wanting to hinder ongoing investigations. This works well in criminal investigations but differs significantly in regards to counterterrorism where information closely held does not benefit. This was brought to light in the 9/11 Commission report which displayed intelligence held between different agencies that when put together could have painted a clearer picture of things to come.

Homeland security intersects through enormous domains of public and private sectors of life, requires comprehension and cooperation between numerous organizations and requires diligent efforts from so many arenas that conforming to traditional bureaucratic structure is obsolete. It draws from groups ranging from the Secret Service, Coast Guard, the Nuclear Incident Response team, Customs and Border Protection, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and many others. This is a broad range of interests, mission, traditions, histories cultures
and organizational languages, and all with little experience in cooperation with each other. This includes crucial investigative and intelligence agencies of the FBI and CIA.

As a country, America has adopted a zero tolerance stance on terrorism. This comes into direct conflict with budget constraints that America is faced with. It is inevitable that the two will intersect prompting the question: Should nations tolerate the risk of terrorism to some degree and to what level can that degree be?

**Conclusion**

The terrorist threat and how it is dealt with has shifted drastically over the past few decades. With the advent of internet technology and social media, the landscape of how terrorist communicate and recruit across the globe has become much harder to intercept. Intelligence collection can no longer rest solely on the federal government. Combating today’s threat requires a larger decentralized data outreach spanning far beyond the realm of federal jurisdiction. Instead, the focus should be shifted to collaborating the extensive expertise of the nation’s federal, state and local public safety agencies. Instating a change from our current centralized intelligence processes to a traversable fluid system will require a shift in company culture across the spectrum. An importance must be stressed in training the new generation of public safety employees in the recognition and awareness of terrorism within their communities. Lone-wolf terrorism has been a very recent concern in America's homeland security efforts. Because the lone-wolf activities are much smaller in organization and scope, it often skims past the sights of national radar due to being harder to detect. The assumption would be that local agencies are better equipped to deal with prevention of homegrown violent extremism and need to be better utilized as they understand the dynamics of their communities.
It is easy to understand that culture in different agencies varies from region to region. The motivations for what is important are directly connected to the proliferation of types of crime in that area. With that being said; the reluctance for change can prove undoubtedly problematic in the context of national security for local agencies because terrorist strategies and tactics are always evolving. Terrorist utilize changing tactics to be undeterred. This uncoordinated and asymmetrical approach quickly throws off traditional paradigms of current local law enforcement strategies. A new approach that uses proper coordination and cooperation from all levels of public safety is necessary to keep up with the modern threat.

It important that while creating a new shift in our domestic intelligence infrastructure that agencies such as law enforcement do not sacrifice productivity in traditional crime fighting and EMS does not divert attention away from their duties of proper medical care. What should be considered is an “intelligence driven” model of operations between agencies. By creating a close working relationship with the community and those who serve it, effectiveness in combatting terrorism will also roll over into better practices for stopping other criminal activities. The dual benefits of such an effort will be proactive in implementing the collective resources needed to combat domestic terrorism.

While terrorism can be viewed as a foreign affair by-product, it becomes locally driven when an act happens on American soil. The realization of a change in federal and local culture, as well as their operational willingness to collaborate efforts, will be the key in successfully thwarting domestic terrorism issues in the future. Federal, state, and local agencies, to include legislative counterparts will have to think beyond only strategically and adopt a value amount for combating terrorism in broader terms across a wide range of public safety entities. This can be administered and supported at a congressional level with the following steps;
- Presidential level talks regarding full participation and partnerships of federal, state and local agencies with emphasis on the necessity for cultural change in combating emerging threats of domestic terrorism.

- A uniform set of training standards lead by the Department of Homeland Security and the DNI entailing a comprehensive plan to educate a new era of public safety officials from the Fed down.

- Increased resources for fusion centers throughout the country as they serve as a catalyst for integrating intelligence and analytical support processes. The fusion centers are an essential element of unifying efforts across the spectrum.

- Executing a presidential directive that brings state and local voices to the national discussion table for homeland security talks. They will play a predominate role in policy for integration between all levels.

In conclusion, the collection of intelligence can only be the first course of action for mitigation of terrorism within American borders. The big picture comes from multiple pieces of the puzzle put in place to illustrate the broader view. Merely possessing information will not stop terrorism; that information needs to be shared and then brought into action through all components of public safety to protect American lives. If we are to create equal partnerships between federal, state and local sectors, it is imperative that a new culture of responsibility and awareness be developed. That can be achieved through progressive leadership prowess combined with legislative endurance.
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