A Threat Assessment Model for the Lone Terrorist: Does the behavior of a terrorist differ from that of other types of lone offenders?

by

Diane M. Zierhoffer

Henley-Putnam University

29 July 2013

Larry Klumb, Committee Chair

Dr. Donald Cummings, Subject Matter Expert

Dr. Tamara Mouras, Committee Member

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies
Abstract
This thesis will evaluate the viability of a threat assessment tool developed to
calculate the risk of targeted violence as a predictor of violence by a potential lone terrorist.
There is no profile, to date, which would assist in the identification of a lone terrorist prior
to an attack. Because of the terrorist’s pervasive use of the Internet and the difficulty of
detecting a lone terrorist not affiliated with a group, it is important to develop a structured
risk assessment tool to facilitate the prediction of a terrorist attack. The threat assessment
tool developed by Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, and Berglund and described in “Threat
Assessment: Defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted violence” (1999) poses
ten questions about the patterns of thinking and behaviors that may precipitate an attack of
targeted violence. This thesis seeks to determine whether the behaviors of a lone terrorist
differ from those of other lone offenders.

Three case studies of lone terrorists will be presented and the ten questions will be
posed, retroactively, to assess the value of the model as a predictor of terrorism. The
histories of Theodore Kaczynski, Eric Rudolph and Carlos Bledsoe/Abdulhakim Mujahid
Muhammad will be discussed. Two of the questions have been modified slightly to reflect
behaviors more consistent with terrorism. Two questions were posed in order to assess the
model’s utility. Will the model be effective as a tool for use within law enforcement, during
an investigation of someone brought to attention as a possible terrorist? Would these
questions be useful for family members or friends who might be worried about potential
terrorist behavior, and would the questions then encourage someone to report a friend to
prevent a possible attack?

In each of the cases, the model demonstrates a similarity in the behaviors exhibited
prior to their attacks between the lone terrorist and the perpetrator of targeted violence.
Although there are limitations to the effectiveness of this tool, this threat assessment model provides a foundation for future research focused on developing a structured risk assessment for the lone terrorist. In its present form, the questions can assist both the average citizen and law enforcement personnel in identifying the patterns of thoughts and behaviors that may be indicative of a lone terrorist.
Dedication

To the memory of the victims of 9/11 whose loss influenced my career and academic paths and to the victims of the Fort Hood shooting on 5 November 2009. May their loss continue to encourage our search for better ways to protect Americans and to prevent future attacks.

To Aria Rose: I hope this, in some way, makes your world a little safer.
Acknowledgements

I would first like to thank my committee, Dr. Cummings, Dr. Mouras, and my committee chair, Mr. Klumb. They provided valuable support and guidance through this process. In addition to technical and professional support, Mr. Klumb provided some levity, at just the right time, which was especially helpful. I began my program in one of his classes and credit Mr. Klumb with fuelling my interest in the study of terrorism and counterterrorism.

I am deeply indebted to Dr. Robert Fein for his support and encouragement, and also for trusting me to further his work in a small way. I am grateful to Dr. Fein and his colleagues, Dr. Randy Borum, Bryan Vossekuil, and John Berglund for their research and work in national security. Their contributions have significantly impacted law enforcement and psychologists in service to national security and other groups in an interdisciplinary approach to threat assessment and risk management. Our nation’s freedom and peace depend, at least in part, upon their efforts.

I’d like to especially thank Carol and Stacey for their never-ending love and support. They understand why I pushed on and so often gave me that much-needed nudge when the horizon seemed so far away. It’s your turn, Carol.
Table of Contents

Abstract ..................................................................................................................ii
Dedication .............................................................................................................. iv
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................v
List of Tables ...........................................................................................................viii

Chapter 1 Introduction ..........................................................................................1
  Statement of the Problem ......................................................................................2
  Limitations .......................................................................................................... 5

Chapter 2 Literature Review ..................................................................................6
  Definition of Lone Offender ................................................................................ 6
  The Lone Offender Threat .................................................................................. 10
  Radicalization and the Path to Terrorism ......................................................... 12
  Individual Jihad .................................................................................................. 16
  Lone Offender versus Terrorist Group .............................................................. 17
  Counterterrorism with Regard to the Lone Offender ....................................... 19
  Threat Assessment ............................................................................................ 22

Chapter 3 Methodology ......................................................................................... 28
  Threat Assessment Process: Ten Questions ..................................................... 28
  Case Studies and Data Analysis ....................................................................... 30
    Theodore Kaczynski/The Unabomber ............................................................ 30
    Analysis of Kaczynski Case .......................................................................... 42
    Eric Rudolph .................................................................................................... 55
    Analysis of Rudolph Case ............................................................................. 64
    Carlos Bledsoe/Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad ...................................... 76
    Analysis of Muhammad Case ....................................................................... 84
    Summary .......................................................................................................... 94

Chapter 4 Discussion .............................................................................................97
Chapter 5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................106
Conclusions .........................................................................................................................106
Summary of Contributions to Counterrorism .................................................................106
Suggestions for Future Research .....................................................................................107
References ..........................................................................................................................109
List of Tables

Table 3.1  Comparison of Questions Developed for Targeted Violence and Terrorism   29
Table 3.2  Summary and comparison of responses for each case to the 10 terrorism questions   95
Chapter 1
Introduction

Although there is no profile that would help to predict a terrorist attack by a lone offender, it may be possible to recognize the behaviors that could lead to an attack by a lone terrorist by applying the threat assessment approach refined by Borum, Fein, Vossekul and Berglund in their work “Threat assessment: Defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted violence” (1999). This approach, initially developed by Fein and Vossekul (2000) to assist the U.S. Secret Service in the assessment of the risk of assassination of public figures, has been modified and applied to other types of targeted violence; cases of school homicide, domestic violence, stalking and workplace violence, but has not been considered for the lone terrorist (Fein & Vossekul, 2000).

The shooting on Fort Hood, Texas on 5 November 2009 in which a lone offender is alleged to have aimed at friends and killed a former co-worker of this author brought the globalization of terrorism closer to home. Fellow students in Residency with MAJ Hasan, the alleged shooter, brought issues of concern to their instructors and their supervisors. Allegedly an instructor acknowledged allowing Hasan’s presentation to continue, although it was completely unrelated to the topic of environmental health, instead focusing on Hasan’s concern the United States was waging a war against Islam (Gibbs, 2009, p. 3). An instructor and a colleague had described Hasan as a ticking time bomb, yet no action was taken against him (Lieberman & Collins, 2011, p. 10). The FBI and the Department of Defense (DoD) had information prior to the shooting MAJ Hasan appeared to be radicalized into violent Islamist extremism and had been in contact with a suspected terrorist. Lieberman and Collins’ report alleges there were public and private signs of Hasan’s radicalization into violent Islamist extremism known to government
officials. Their report stresses the point DoD failed to grasp the threat of violent Islamist extremism, even after the Fort Hood shooting; however the threat of the lone offender extends beyond radicalization into violent Islamist extremism (Lieberman & Collins, 2011, p. 10).

**Statement of the Problem**

The terrorist, who operates alone, without the support of a terrorist organization, network or other individuals, can be extremely difficult to detect before the attack (Spaaij, 2010, p. 854). Spaaij points out that research into terrorism is predominantly focused on organizations and the concepts of social psychology that explain the influence of groups on the new recruit. Little research has been conducted which would lead to an understanding of the lone offender (Spaaij, 2010, p. 855).

According to Pantucci (as cited in Cruikshank & Lister, 2012, “Terrorist Loners,” para.1), the most difficult terrorist to detect is the one who seeks information online and absorbs the message from al Qaeda without interacting on the website. Though historically rare, there have been more instances of late in the United States where these individuals have been caught in the process of carrying out an attack (Cruikshank & Lister, 2012).

Leon Panetta, the director of the CIA stated in February 2010, “It’s the lone-wolf strategy that I think we have to pay attention to as the main threat to this country (Pantucci, 2011, p. 3).” Pantucci contends that the growth of al Qaeda ideology poses two issues that may influence the participation of the lone offender. The first issue is al Qaeda’s “…anti-establishment ideology…” has transnational appeal (Pantucci, 2011, p. 3). The second issue is al Qaeda’s use of the Internet to disseminate its ideas and provide
operational support. It is very easy for a lone offender to feel a part of a group, without having a physical connection. According to Pantucci, the lone offender has access to information to develop potent weapons and is encouraged by al Qaeda to engage alone. He cited the January 2011 issue of *Inspire* magazine, al Qaeda’s English publication, which promoted the lone attacker in the “borderless idea” of a global insurgency (Pantucci, 2011, p. 7).

The detection of the lone offender is an extremely difficult task. Anders Breivik, in his manifesto, described how “Solo Martyr Cells” are undetectable to law enforcement because they are established in a way that eliminates the need to communicate in any manner that could signal a plan. He wrote the cell commander often works solo basing all decisions on fixed fundamental principles, which would eliminate the need to ever consult. Breivik advises his reader against making any connection with extremist networks or other movements as a way of minimizing detection, and remaining hidden until ready to act (Breivik, 2011, p. 820).

It is difficult to distinguish between extremists who intend to commit attacks and extremists who preach hate or hold radical beliefs (Stewart & Burton, 2009 June 3, p. 3). Lieberman and Collins (2011) assert Hasan’s statements, specifically his religious beliefs took precedence over his oath to support and defend the US Constitution, should be viewed in the context of his behaviors (Lieberman & Collins, 2011, p. 32). The First Amendment protects the freedoms of speech and religion, making it difficult to detect the individual who moves from radical beliefs to radical actions (Stewart & Burton, 2009 June 3, p. 3).
Alex Shone (cited in Bakker & de Graf, 2011) believes the key to a counterterrorism response in the United Kingdom is to know how attacks are formulated, and not necessarily who will conduct an attack. Bakker and de Graf summarized from Shone’s work that insight into the radicalization process would yield a more effective way to defend against the lone wolf. Counterterrorism services must be vigilant for the signals, no matter how small, an individual gives off before an attack (Bakker & de Graf, 2011, p. 47).

This thesis will examine behaviors that may help to identify lone offender terrorists before they attack. The threat assessment approach developed by Borum et al. (1999) will be evaluated for its effectiveness as a tool to aid in the identification of lone terrorist offenders. Once identified as a potential terrorist threat, an individual may come under investigation of law enforcement personnel. One question to be discussed will be the potential for this tool to be utilized by the general public to recognize behaviors and thought processes that could help identify the possible lone offender before he engages in terrorist behaviors. The identification of an individual who poses a threat cannot and should not fall solely within the realm of law enforcement. Just as colleagues of Hasan identified behaviors of concern, and presented them to leadership, the tool developed by Borum et al. (1999) will be evaluated for its value for use by family, friends and others who suspect the behaviors of an individual to be a threat. Discussion will also include the usefulness of this tool as an aid to law enforcement professionals in the assessment of a potential terrorist. Are the behaviors of a terrorist similar enough to those of other types of lone offenders? Can this tool be used to help identify a potential lone
terrorist, thereby encouraging the average citizen to report their concerns to law enforcement personnel? Does this tool serve as a basis to initiate an investigation?

Limitations

The study is limited by its reliance upon open source information. It is possible there may be more specific information not available to the public that may shed more light on the usefulness of this assessment approach. In addition, much of the information available on the older cases was obtained from books where information may be presented with a bias perhaps not as prevalent in scholarly articles.

The specific cases were selected because of the amount of information available in the public domain. They were chosen above other cases because they have been adjudicated in a court of law and a final judgment rendered. Other cases might have been of interest due to magnitude or notoriety, such as MAJ Nidal Hassan or Anders Behring Breivik, however they have not been completely adjudicated in the courts.
Chapter 2
Literature Review

Definition of Lone Offender

Numerous researchers have discussed the definition of terrorism (van der Heide, 2011). For the purpose of this study, Bruce Hoffman’s definition will be used as a baseline. Hoffman defines terrorism as:

“…the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change…is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience’ Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.” (Hoffman, 2006, pp. 40-41)

Because law enforcement officials and analysts have described lone wolf terrorists very simply as terrorists who carry out attacks individually and independently from established terrorist organizations, Spaaij (2010, p. 854) has attempted to narrow the definition for the purpose of further research. His definition consists of three elements: the terrorist operates alone, does not belong to an organized terrorist group or network, and the plan is conceived and conducted solely by the individual with no direct outside guidance or command. Spaaij wrote that the ideology behind a terrorist group and an individual engaged in terrorism may be the same, and a lone offender may sympathize with the ideology of a terrorist group. A lone offender may even have once belonged to a terrorist group and may have been trained by a group, but by definition, the attack was neither directed by nor supported by any organization (Spaaij, 2010, p. 856).

It can be difficult to determine the motivation of a lone offender. Spaaij (2010) presents the difference between the assassin and the lone offender terrorist, pointing out the terrorist is motivated by a political, religious or ideological cause. In addition, the
target of the attack is not as important to the terrorist as is the broader audience indirectly affected by the attack (Spaaij, 2010, p. 857). However, the distinction is not always clear.

MAJ Nidal Hasan, the Army officer who is alleged to have killed 13 and wounded 32 at Fort Hood, is pending trial and has not publically addressed his motivations. He allegedly held strong views against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and had said Muslims should not be sent to war to fight other Muslims. It has also been reported Hasan had email correspondence with Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born radical Islamic cleric who was based in Yemen. These would suggest that Hasan had religious motives for a terrorist attack except that government officials deny any terrorist content in the emails, and report questions from Hasan to Awlaki were strictly religious in nature, and totally unrelated to any terrorist plot (Spaaij, 2010, p. 857). Currently, one can only speculate to the motives behind Hasan’s shooting spree, and therefore cannot clearly define him as a lone terrorist.

Pantucci (2011) discussed the Lone Wolf terrorist within the context of Islamist extremism, with the goal of ultimately applying his research to other ideologies. The growth of the al Qaeda ideology and the easy access to extremist material on the Internet enhance the ability of the self-taught extremist to superimpose the Islamist ideology atop any number of grievances. He defines the Lone Wolf terrorist as an individual who pursues Islamist terrorist goals alone, either motivated by personal reasons or by the belief he is a part of a larger group of individuals who share the same ideology. Pantucci’s (2011) definition states the terrorist is guided by an ideology, specifically the extreme and violent Islamist rhetoric. He further defines four typologies under the
umbrella of Lone Wolf terrorist. The four typologies are the “Loner,” the “Lone Wolf,” the “Lone Wolf Pack,” and the “Lone Attacker” (Pantucci, 2011, pp. 8-9).

Pantucci acknowledges the paucity of research on the individual terrorist. His research suggests there is more mental illness among individual attackers than is found within an organized terrorist group. Psychological issues could easily prohibit one from inclusion in a group, forcing a mentally ill individual to act out alone. Pantucci questions whether the lone attacker is then defined simply as mentally ill, and not considered a terrorist. He refers to Marc Sageman’s comments at a conference in July 2010 when he distinguished between the terrorist and the mass murderer; in Sageman’s analysis, the lone terrorist is part of a virtual community and the mass murderer has a “personal ‘insane’ ideology” (Pantucci, 2011, p. 5).

The importance of defining the lone offender of terrorism has counterterrorism implications. Pantucci (2011) highlights the typical process for a terrorist as having contact with others, often goes abroad for training, and likely purchases a weapon for the purpose of the attack. Any of these tasks could raise a flag for security personnel and signal a potential terrorist plot. Pantucci describes the lone terrorist as one with mental health or social issues and points out these individuals are unlikely to be involved in a group, nor likely to go abroad for training but would likely live a quiet life until attacking within the community. Because of the proliferation of extremist material, it may be difficult to distinguish between an individual who adopts the al Qaeda ideology and the angry loner who acts out and uses information he has obtained from the Internet to pretend to be part of a larger movement (Pantucci, 2011, p. 6).
One typology under Pantucci’s definition is the “Loner,” an individual who plans or attempts to carry out an act of terrorism under the guise of an extreme Islamist ideology. This individual is difficult to include in the subset of Islamist terrorists because by definition there is no connection to a group. What the individual understands is what is usually gleaned from the Internet. It is difficult to know how committed an individual becomes to the ideology, versus simply using the material and ideology as a cover for his own brand of violence. In his research, Pantucci cites two examples of loners who developed an interest in Islamist extremism, and who collected libraries of material in support of those interests. Both of these men discussed their new views with friends, and even identified targets, however their communities either ignored them or simply did not take them seriously. Both were arrested for plotting attacks (Pantucci, 2011, pp. 14-19).

A second typology is the “Lone Wolf.” Pantucci (2011) defines this terrorist as one who acts alone, but appears to have a connection to a network. This person likely has been under some degree of command and control from the network. Persons in this typology hold similar beliefs as the network, but may need the reinforcement of other extremists in order to act. While Hasan’s motives are not yet known, Pantucci uses him as an example of a Lone Wolf. Hasan had personal and email contact with Awlaki suggesting Hasan may have invested in extremism. Awlaki praised Hasan’s actions after the attack. Pantucci admits this does not suggest a level of command and control, but does suggest seriousness about Hasan’s involvement in extremism (Pantucci, 2011, pp. 19-24).

The third typology, the “Lone Wolf Pack,” is a small group of isolated individuals who self-radicalize into al Qaeda’s ideology. This group would have met, developed
friendships and together learned about extremism, sharing the same ideology. This group would have embraced the global Jihadist movement but not reached out to an extremist group before pursuing the goal of Islamist terrorism (Pantucci, 2011, pp. 24-29).

The final typology is the “Lone Attacker.” This is an individual who acts alone, but has been under the command and control of an al Qaeda affiliated group. While this individual may not clearly fit the definition of lone offender, the Lone Attacker is included because after receiving guidance, and possibly the means to attack, this individual acts alone. Richard Reid is an example of this type; a man who was attracted to a group that helped him establish contact with al Qaeda and then receive training from al Qaeda. He boarded an airplane alone and attempted to bring down the aircraft by initiating his shoe bomb. Although it is now known Reid was to have had an accomplice on the flight, he was prepared to act alone (Pantucci, 2011, pp. 29-32).

**The Lone Offender Threat**

Between 9/11 and 2010, arrests were made in 40 plots characterized as homegrown violent jihadi terrorist cases in the United States. Lone offenders conducted the four successful terrorist attacks in that time frame. These terrorists are described as homegrown Jihadists, having been radicalized. The thirty-six terrorist plots that were thwarted involved two or more people (Bjelopera & Randol, 2010, p. 2).

The Internet is rife with extremist material that appears to have fostered the growth of the self-taught extremist. Pantucci’s (2011) concern is an individual who tends toward violence can adopt an extremist creed and a more global outlook, utilizing this ideology to justify violence. Hoffman (cited in Pantucci, 2011, p. 7) described al Qaeda’s newest strategy as empowering and motivating individuals to commit violence without a
formal connection to a chain of command. Websites highlighting al Qaeda’s American spokesman, Adam Gadahn, who praised Nidal Hasan and encouraged other Muslims to follow his lead, can inspire the loner. Pantucci (2011) wrote that on the Internet, loners could easily connect with radicals on another continent, drawing inspiration and guidance, without direct contact. Not only is the Internet a source of ideology, but also provides information on how to build devices or otherwise inflict harm in the name of an ideology. Al Qaeda appears to be building a bridge between individuals with no true cause, and the jihadist ideology. This presents a dangerous tactical threat (Pantucci, 2011, pp. 6-7).

Pantucci’s research assessed the effectiveness of examples he selected from the four typologies. The most effective were the Loner, the Lone Wolf and the Lone Wolf Pack, because six of the twelve cases carried through with their plans to the implementation phase. The four cases with direct contact with al Qaeda were unable to implement their plans (Pantucci, 2011, p. 32). Pantucci’s research would suggest that, contrary to the fear most Americans have of an attack by al Qaeda, terrorists with no connection to al Qaeda might pose a far greater risk of completing an attack. Pantucci’s caveat is most of those loners who implemented plans with success used guns as weapons, and there are more successful shooting attacks than mass casualty terrorist attacks. (Pantucci, 2011, pp. 32-33).

Lone attackers are more difficult to monitor because they are not tied to an organization already under surveillance. Lone attackers have operated with little expense and much success (Michael, 2012, p. 3). Theodore Kaczynski and Eric Rudolph were very effective in tying up law enforcement resources and causing worry among citizens.
Although the focus of this paper is on terrorism in the United States, it is interesting to review the concept of lone terrorism in Israel. Hendel (2009) points out lone terrorists cannot be readily identified by their affiliations, choice of weaponry or planning process. In 2008, individuals with no organizational affiliation conducted 80 percent of the terrorist attacks in Israel. In spite of high security measures, individuals drove vehicles to run over civilians in three of those attacks. Vehicles would not be considered weapons, especially when driven by an individual with no known criminal or terrorism record. A vehicle would not draw the attention of security personnel if a driver with a history had no other weapons (Hendel, 2009, p. 2).

Hendel (2009) described the lone terrorist as one who has been inspired by a radical interpretation of Islam, having free access in an area rife with security. Lone terrorists have no known affiliation with a group, and tend to not fit any terrorist profile. Those with a history of terrorist behavior were not carrying suspicious weapons so were able to conduct attacks unhindered (Hendel, 2009, p. 3).

**Radicalization and the Path to Terrorism**

The Congressional Research Service defined radicalization as “…the process of acquiring and holding extremist, or Jihadist beliefs” (Bjelopera & Randol, 2010, p. 2). It is believed that through radicalization, individuals can become violent Jihadists. An individual who moves from simply believing in Jihad to actually pursuing Jihad using violence becomes a terrorist. There appears to be no one path down which an individual moves to become a terrorist. A major challenge for law enforcement is determining how quickly an individual moves from having radical beliefs to actually acting on those beliefs (Bjelopera & Randol, 2010, p. 3).
In March 2010, *As Sahab*, the media sector of al Qaeda, produced a film that appears to encourage lone offenders to act in the United States, particularly against targets that would cause financial hardship. In addition, al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula began publishing *Inspire*, an online English language journal, which appears to have the recruitment of lone offenders as its goal (Bjelopera & Randol, 2010, p. 9).

The Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law Consortium (TTSRLC; 2008) published a study on the causes of radicalization. The Consortium’s interest in radicalization goes beyond the threat of terrorism, pointing out that the radicalization of minority groups can also threaten intercultural relations within a society. (TTSRLC, 2008, p. 3)

Bakker and de Graf (2011) stress a counterterrorism response to lone offenders must include an understanding of their modes of attack as well as the radicalization process. Their perspective is the lone offender shares some level of commitment to, and likely identifies with, an extremist movement (Bakker & de Graf, 2011, p. 47).

The Internet appears to be instrumental in the transition between radical thought and violent action. Online, one can post messages and interact with others in an anonymous “community.” A loner can feel a part of a larger organization without direct support. One can find justification for violence, and can disperse blame for incidents to this like-minded anti-establishment online group (Bjelopera & Randol, 2010, p. 19). The concept of leaderless resistance appears to be growing with the help of the Internet resulting in the “super-empowered individual,” strongly influenced by the Internet, but operating on his or her own initiative (Michael, 2012, p. 4).
Moskalenko and McCauley (2011) attempted to explain how seemingly normal individuals are able to undertake violence by themselves for a political cause. In two cases reviewed for their discussion, these researchers state the lone terrorists put a political cause before self-interest. Political scientists and economists questioned why an individual, believing in the cause being promoted by a social group, would sacrifice himself or herself in order to advance the group’s cause. It has been difficult to find a model that would explain what appears to be irrational behavior, self-sacrifice for the cause of a group (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011, p. 120).

From evolutionary theory, Moskalenko and McCauley (2011) consider the concept of “Strong Reciprocity.” Research has shown that individuals will pay a personal cost to avenge bad behavior that does not affect them personally. In research, 40-60 percent of participants are willing to carry out justice against those who have hurt seemingly good people with whom the subject may identify. Altruism, in the form of assisting strangers, appears quite common (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011, pp. 121-122).

Group identification is the second concept Moskalenko and McCauley utilize to explain how individuals make the choice to sacrifice themselves for the good of a group to which they do not belong. Just as individuals care for their local professional sports teams, caring about people they do not know, they can care about those members of other types of groups. A lone terrorist may have positive identification with a group he or she perceives as victimized, and simultaneously have negative identification with the group that is victimizing the first group. The anger and outrage felt by the outsider need not be a continuous emotion; in fact, they are likely to be brief feelings. However, those
radicalized by anger can perform in a deliberate manner to support the victimized group and to punish the victimizer (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011, pp. 122-123).

From a psychological perspective, anger is usually only experienced for minutes to hours, yet the positive identification with the victimized group and the negative identification with the perpetrator of the injustice can combine to create a steady motivator to help the bearers of their cause and punish the victimizers. This concept of group identification may explain the sacrifice an individual makes for a group he or she does not personally know, yet empathizes with the cause (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011, pp. 122-123).

According to Moskalenko and McCauley, the lone terrorist may feel a connection to a larger group, but only depends upon the group for ideas, not for assistance in taking action. The question remains as to which sympathizer would actually act upon those beliefs, given the cost of political actions versus self-interest and safety. They suggest those who take action are likely to empathize strongly with the cause of the victimized group. Research suggests altruism, reaching out to help a stranger in distress, is significantly affected by feelings of empathy. In the two cases they studied, it appears something happened for each to make the political cause very personal (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011, pp. 124-125). These researchers conclude “…lone-wolf terrorism requires the combination of strong capacity for sympathy with an experience that moves sympathy to personal moral obligation to act” (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011, p. 125).

Other researchers describe the process of how an individual engages in terrorism as “…a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that involves…individual processes, interpersonal relations and socio-political and cultural circumstances” (COT, 2007, p.
42). They suggest searching for “micro-developments” that might contribute to the process of radicalization. While terrorist groups recruit from the top down, there are individuals who self-radicalize, becoming terrorists on their own initiative. They acknowledge influences stem from self-perception, family, community and identity. They stress it is as important to know how an individual turns to terrorism, as it is to know why an individual commits terrorism (COT, 2007, p. 42).

**Individual Jihad**

It is believed that as early as the 1980s Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, also known as Abu Musab Al Suri, began working with Osama bin Laden within al Qaeda. In the 1990s, Setmariam branched out somewhat independently. Instead of training the masses, he chose to focus attention on training those at the top, the recruiters. In 2000, Setmariam set the stage within al Qaeda to move away from an organization with hierarchy and bureaucracy, and simply provide an ideology for Jihadists with looser ties to the organization. This concept was aided after 9/11 by the loss of training camps in Afghanistan as well as the deaths of many in the leadership of al Qaeda. What has been known as “al Qaeda 2.0” protects the organization because if the smaller groups get caught, the rest of the organization is not compromised. During a videotaped class in 2000, Setmariam explained youth should be given the chance to participate without being a part of the organization. He recognized youth do not want to join organizations, yet they may not know how to act on their beliefs. Guidance provided by the organization can encourage individuals and small groups to act against the enemy. Each Jihadi operation should work to support the greater cause of al Qaeda (Cruikshank & Ali, 2007, pp. 1-3).

In March 2012, Mohammed Merah shot and killed seven people in Toulouse,
France claiming he had received military training from al Qaeda in Pakistan. An al Qaeda document found in Berlin during the winter prior to the shootings instructed operatives to look for loners and to recruit them and task them to conduct terror assaults, such as the one in Mumbai in 2008 in which ten Jihadis terrorized the city for three days. Anwar al-Awlaki was a strong advocate for the loner attack tactic, having allegedly inspired Nidal Hasan and others. Before his death, al-Awlaki encouraged Jihadists to focus on small attacks that would weaken the Crusader-Zionist enemy through terror. Jihadist websites, by late March 2012 were praising Merah’s efforts as proof of that concept (Riedel, 2012 Mar 27).

**Lone Offender versus Terrorist Group**

Research into the concept of lone offender terrorism has been minimal seemingly because terrorism is a collective activity. Most researchers study group dynamics and collective socialization to explain the pathways individuals take to terrorism. The social psychological approach to studying terrorism tends to focus on “…the influence of charismatic leaders, top-down or bottom-up recruitment, ideological training and indoctrination, moral disengagement, in-group solidarity, conformity and obedience, depersonalization, and other factors relating to organizational processes” (Spaaij, 2010, p. 855). From the perspective of social psychology, it is relatively easy to understand how a disenfranchised individual can be drawn into a terrorist group.

With a rise in individual attacks since 9/11, it may be important to research other approaches to terrorism. The terrorist with no connection or ties to a terrorist organization is likely motivated differently, and therefore may attack differently (Spaaij, 2010, pp. 854-855). The most significant challenge posed by lone offenders, from a
counterterrorism perspective, is because they work alone, it is very difficult to understand their intent. When terrorists operate in a group, it is more likely one member will become frightened enough to report plans to authority (Stewart & Burton, 2009, “Challenges of the Lone Wolf”).

A former CIA case officer believes the success of a self-radicalized lone bomber without a direct support network would be limited. Success would be hit or miss. Steve Emerson, a terrorism analyst said smaller cells are likely to be less powerful than the larger organization of al Qaeda, but will be more difficult to detect (cited in Bjelopera & Randol, 2010, p. 10). However, a Jihadist in the United States need not plan as dramatic an attack as 9/11. Any random bombing by an individual would be psychologically devastating to the US population (Michael, 2012, p. 3).

The form of terrorism has changed since the attacks of 9/11. Maras described al Qaeda as a “network of networks” having become decentralized, among other characteristics (Maras, 2010, p. 26). Homegrown terrorists have been inspired by the cause of al Qaeda. Converts to Islam who support the cause are valuable to al Qaeda because they blend into society. They often do not fit a profile of al Qaeda terrorists so these individuals could successfully engage in acts of violence. Those who can act without leadership or a support network and adhere to the ideology can be very dangerous. They are difficult to identify, therefore would be difficult to locate, track and monitor. Because converts emanate from all aspects of a population, security efforts must be prepared to cover everyone in the United States (Maras, 2010, pp. 26-28).
Counterterrorism with Regard to the Lone Offender

The threat posed by terrorists, particularly al Qaeda, has changed since 9/11. In the 1990s, efforts were made to pass laws that would create national identification cards; however there was no legal justification for it at the time. After 9/11, surveillance of everyone in the United States and the fingerprinting and registering of all who enter the United States have become mandatory. The attacks on 9/11 have given rise to the need for precautionary counterterrorism policies (Maras, 2010, pp. 20-21).

Maras (2010) wrote the risk of terrorism is great, not because of the probability of its occurrence but because of the potential devastation it can cause. Because we cannot predict the nature or the probability of an attack nor the target, counterterrorism policy has shifted to a precautionary approach. Maras reasons policy designed to deter terrorism is not likely to be effective. In order to be effective, laws preventing crime require an offender to process the cost of committing a crime versus the benefit and then make a series of rational decisions before making a choice. Al Qaeda terrorists do not appear affected by the threat of imprisonment or death, as many are willing to die for their cause. Maras questions the type of preemptive response needed to deter and prevent an unknown threat (Maras, 2010, pp. 22-24).

Mass surveillance has been proposed as a means of identifying everyone and tracking everyone’s movements. Biometric identifiers and facial recognition software have been proposed as means to detect terrorists before they board aircraft. As a result of their use, known terrorists would be unlikely to fly. Terrorists will look for avenues of attack that avoid detection. Maras (2010) believes counterterrorism efforts must remain secret, as terrorists will look for ways to circumvent published tactics. She cites the
effectiveness of undercover agents, informants and agent provocateurs who have infiltrated and reported on terrorist activity (Maras, 2010, pp. 34-36).

The FBI is now allowed to proactively investigate individuals or groups based on information that identifies terrorist threats or activity. This gives the FBI the opportunity to assess activity before a crime is committed. An example is the ability to monitor Internet websites and social media, where terrorists are known to recruit, train and communicate (Bjelopera & Randol, 2010, p. 3).

Bjelopera and Randol (2010) describe the counterterrorism approach to radicalization as challenging because the expression of radical ideas in an open forum is legal, but the planning toward a terrorist attack is done in secret as the activity is illegal. Tracking the secretive activity of groups has lately been made possible because of undercover agents or cooperative witnesses (Bjelopera & Randol, 2010, pp. 3-4). An individual who truly acts alone will not seek out partners, making that technique ineffective.

Brian Jenkins (2008) wrote that reacting to a crime does not protect the public from the threat of terrorism. Effective intelligence is required in order to anticipate and prevent an attack. In the case of an organization where guidance comes from a leader, as might be the case with al Qaeda, information may be gleaned from communication intercepts, from the monitoring of border crossings and the movement of money, as well as from relationships with foreign intelligence services. However, this intelligence is not likely to be available for the individual terrorist who does not communicate with nor gain support from an organization. Jenkins hypothesized because of the constant focus of attention on al Qaeda after 9/11, the organization’s efforts became more decentralized. As
a result, intelligence that is gathered at the national level may not be adequate to intercept an individual operating without command from a higher level (Jenkins, 2008, p. 215).

In 2008, Jenkins (2008) reported local police are able to gather information from the community through police networking, conducting investigations or intelligence collection. Much information is available to the local police, fire department, the local hospital and local industries. If intelligence efforts by police were enhanced and these agencies were encouraged to share information with one another, counterterrorism efforts may be more effective. Jenkins wrote sharing information is critical to counterterrorism, and an active police force in a community may be able to develop those relationships with citizens that would encourage reporting (Jenkins, 2008, pp. 215-218).

Hendel (2009) wrote intention and means identify terrorists. However, because of the secrecy under which lone terrorists operate, identification of lone terrorists prior to an attack is almost impossible. Security forces in Israel have been effective in dismantling terrorist organizations, however lone offenders remain capable of operating. Hendel addressed deterrence as a means of stopping attacks by lone terrorists. In 2009, Israel had no laws of deterrence, such as a lone terrorist would lose property if convicted of planning or carrying out an attack. Hendel suggests if Israel were to make the price for terrorism high enough, it might end the activity of lone offenders. The punishment must address the extent of the damage intended as well as actual damage (Hendel, 2009).

Legislation is often intended to prevent behaviors and for the average citizen, laws are fairly effective. Legislation aimed at curbing terrorism is fraught with difficulty in the United States. When one considers that a number of terrorists justify behavior based upon a radical interpretation of Islam, the potential effectiveness of legislation
might be questioned. Until a law is passed and tested, its effectiveness will depend upon the completion of an attack and ensuing trial. Risk assessment and mitigation, through legislation, would ultimately be the responsibility of the individual following the law.

**Threat Assessment**

Traditionally, threat assessment with regard to domestic terrorism has fallen in the realm of law enforcement with the Joint Terrorism Task Forces taking the lead (Bjelopera, 2012, p. 4). Psychologists have increasingly been supporting the counterterrorism mission within the armed forces and Department of Defense (Kennedy, et al., 2011, pp. 69-70). Psychology, the study of behavior, should be included in the search for a threat assessment tool for the lone offender who engages in terrorism.

Borum et al. (1999) define threat assessment as “…a set of investigative and operational activities designed to identify, assess, and manage persons who may pose a threat of violence to identifiable targets” (Borum et al., 1999, p. 327). Threat assessment is conducted prior to an event, in the effort to prevent a crime. This is in contrast to an investigation where facts are gathered about an incident after the fact to determine if a crime has been committed, to identify and apprehend the suspect, attempt to recover stolen property and to assist in prosecuting the case. Threat assessment involves the analysis of thoughts and behavior and an analysis of behavioral patterns that may result in an attack on a particular target. This assessment must determine the level of threat posed by the individual at a given point in time. The skills needed to conduct a competent threat assessment are likely different from the skills needed to conduct other types of investigations (Borum et al., 1999, pp. 324-327).
Monahan (2012) discussed several points that must be considered in the process of developing a risk assessment model for terrorism. Monahan addresses two areas in which the assessment of risk of terrorism is necessary: those being in determining the detention of accused or adjudicated terrorists and in the selection or retention of military and civilian contract employees of the Department of Defense (Monahan, 2012, pp. 2-5). Monahan also raised questions about the validity of applying a risk assessment tool for other violent crimes to terrorism and addressed individual risk factors for terrorism (Monahan, 2012, pp. 6-13). The final challenge he presented involves the specific manner of structuring a risk assessment for terrorism. He suggested that individual risk factors specifically related to terrorism be identified, suggesting ideologies, affiliations, grievances, and moral emotions as potential factors. Once factors have been identified, a manner for weighting different factors that might result in a measurement providing a final estimate of risk might be considered (Monahan, 2012, pp. 13-28).

Behavioral health professionals have been asked for years to assist law enforcement in the assessment of risk and to provide recommendations to prevent future violence. Initially it was believed an individual either was or was not prone to violence, and the threat of risk remained static. The prediction of violence is never a simple yes or no; the actions of a potential perpetrator are conditional, dependent upon numerous conditions or circumstances (Fein & Vossekuil, 2000, p. 49). The construct of dangerousness or risk has been viewed as more fluid; dangerousness depends upon the situation, it can change, and the level of risk lies on a continuum of probability (Borum et al., 1999, p. 324).
The two methods used by mental health professionals to assess the potential risk of violence were based upon the evaluation of the individual. Clinical decisions were then either based in clinical judgment or in statistical formulas. Initial research comparing these methods suggested statistical models were consistently more effective than clinical judgment. Actuarial models were more effective for long-term predictions, but for short-term predictions of violence, the statistical predictions were as effective as the judgment of clinicians. Early research has been criticized for inadequate means to measure violence and restricted validity samples. Much of the research was focused on either convicted criminal offenders or individuals with mental disorders, subjects unlikely to be released into the community for follow-up (Borum et al., 1999, p. 324-326).

Research may not be available that applies to other groups potentially at risk of violence, such as the lone terrorist. Statistical formulas may not account for the specific population and issues being assessed. Clinicians were encouraged to look for specific actuarial risk factors in their case, and establish base rates for their case from among the research. This method was likely to be more effective for criminals and people with mental disorders than for those who may engage in targeted violence because of the lack of research and low base rates. As an example, Borum et al. (1999) expressed concern that the prediction of violence for an individual who threatens to kill his boss may not be possible based upon the research at that time, as the frequency of this type of violence was minimal. Yet that individual’s potential for violence could not be dismissed simply because that behavior was uncommon. For this reason, Borum et al. (1999) believed there was a need to develop a risk assessment model for targeted violence, to include workplace violence, relationship violence, stalking, and school violence. At that time,
little was known about predictors for specific types of violence, although it was known that different types of violence might have different predictors (Borum et al., 1999, p. 326).

Historically, the United States Secret Service had the responsibility of assessing the threat of risk posed by individuals against persons under their protection. Assassination threats against the President and other national leaders require the Secret Service to conduct threat assessments. The military and other government agencies were responsible for assessing the threat of terrorism posed by groups and individuals. However, in recent years, the responsibility for the assessment of targeted violence has been brought to virtually every law enforcement agency in United States. Borum et al. (1999) developed a tool to assess the potential risk of violence posed by one individual to another (Borum et al., 1999, p. 326-327).

One model upon which the research of Borum et al. (1999) was based was developed from data about persons who attacked public officials and other public figures in the United States. Previous approaches for assessing the risk of assassination in America assumed the attacker would be male. Although males have committed most assassination attempts there have been attempts by women. Therefore, the assessment tool refined by Fein and Vossekuil (cited in Borum et al., 1999, p. 327) and used by the Secret Service is a fact-based approach independent of descriptive, demographic or psychological profiles. Another assumption upon which previous approaches were based is that those who convey verbal or written threats are the most likely to attempt an assassination. Secret Service files suggest few who have attempted assassinations have conveyed a direct threat, while very few of those who have made threats have actually
followed through. In light of that fact, the tool Borum et al. (1999) developed does not rely on the direct communication of threat. (Borum et al., 1999, p. 327)

The approach to assessing the threat of targeted violence is based upon three principles. The first principle is targeted violence is the culmination of a process of thinking and behavior that is deliberate and not impulsive. The planning for targeted violence is specific, often consuming the planner’s life. Some aspect of the plan may be communicated to others. The planning of targeted violence may represent the achievement of a goal that will bring the end of emotional pain (Borum et al., 1999, p. 329).

The second principle involves the interaction among the potential attacker, a past emotional event, a current situation and a target. When an individual is being assessed for the potential for violence, it is important to understand how that individual dealt with unbearable stress in the past. The situation is more likely to dictate behavior than traits or characteristics about the individual. In the case of targeted violence, when a person is suspected of planning to attack a specific target, it is important to understand how the individual coped with the loss of a loved one or loss of status, such as financial losses or humiliation, in order to understand how that individual may respond to the current situation. In assessing the level of risk, one must be able to compare the significance of the current situation to the pain or loss caused by previous situations. In addition to assessing the ability of the individual to cope with current stressors, it is important to assess the level of support the individual is receiving from significant others. An individual coping with a difficult situation without support is more likely to consider violence than the individual whose associates are offering alternative solutions. The
interaction with the target must be evaluated. Does the potential attacker know the target well enough to have access for an attack (Borum et al., 1999, p. 329)?

The third principle in assessing the risk of targeted violence is to understand the behaviors of the individual that are likely to lead to an attack. From the development of the idea to the actual movements toward the target, both subtle and obvious behaviors should be analyzed in order to determine the level of risk (Borum et al., 1999, pp. 329-330).
Chapter 3
Methodology

The threat assessment model refined by Borum et al. (1999), designed to assess
the risk of targeted violence, will be applied retrospectively to the cases of three lone
offender terrorists. These case studies will be evaluated against this threat assessment
approach in order to assess its value prior to the terrorist attack. The examination of these
case studies may demonstrate the similarities in the behaviors of terrorists compared to
the behaviors of lone offenders who are not deemed to be terrorists. It is desired that this
threat assessment approach will be useful in the development of a more effective
counterterrorism program.

Borum et al. (1999) proposed five areas from which information should be sought
in order to assess the risk posed by the subject of an investigation. The five areas are
compiling the facts that brought the subject to attention, the subject, attack-related
behaviors, motives, and target selection. Gathering information from these areas should
help to answer the ten questions developed for the assessment of risk (Borum et al., 1999,
p. 330).

Threat Assessment Process: Ten Questions

Borum et al. (1999) posed ten questions to guide an evaluation of a threat of
directed violence. Table 3.1 presents the questions as they were initially presented
(Borum et al., 1999, pp. 331-334) in the Targeted Violence Questions column. They are
presented beside the questions posed in this study, under Terrorism Questions, showing
the changes that make them more relevant for terrorism. Two questions, numbers three
and four, have been adjusted slightly for use in the case of a lone terrorist.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th><strong>TARGETED VIOLENCE QUESTIONS</strong></th>
<th><strong>TERRORISM QUESTIONS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>What motivated the subject to make the statements, or take the action, that caused him/her to come to attention?</td>
<td>What motivated the subject to make the statements, or take the action, that caused him/her to come to attention?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>What has the subject communicated to anyone concerning his/her intentions?</td>
<td>What has the subject communicated to anyone concerning his/her intentions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Has the subject shown an interest in targeted violence, perpetrators of targeted violence, weapons, extremist groups, or murder?</td>
<td>Has the subject shown an interest in terrorism, terrorist groups, weapons, extremist groups, or espoused a radical ideology?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Has the subject engaged in attack-related behavior, including any menacing, harassing, and/or stalking-type behavior?</td>
<td>Has the subject engaged in attack-related behavior, including surveillance, purchasing weapons or the ingredients for weapons?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Does the subject have a history of mental illness involving command hallucinations, delusional ideas, feelings of persecution, etc. with indications that the subject has acted on those beliefs?</td>
<td>Does the subject have a history of mental illness involving command hallucinations, delusional ideas, feelings of persecution, etc. with indications that the subject has acted on those beliefs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>How organized is the subject? Is he/she capable of developing and carrying out a plan?</td>
<td>How organized is the subject? Is he/she capable of developing and carrying out a plan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Has the subject experienced a recent loss and or loss of status and has this led to feelings of desperation and despair?</td>
<td>Has the subject experienced a recent loss and or loss of status and has this led to feelings of desperation and despair?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Corroboration – What is the subject saying and is it consistent with his/her actions?</td>
<td>Corroboration – What is the subject saying and is it consistent with his/her actions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Is there concern among those that know the subject that he/she might take action based on inappropriate ideas?</td>
<td>Is there concern among those that know the subject that he/she might take action based on inappropriate ideas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>What factors in the subject’s life and/or environment might increase/decrease the likelihood of the subject attempting to attack a target?</td>
<td>What factors in the subject’s life and/or environment might increase/decrease the likelihood of the subject attempting to attack a target?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question number three was altered to reflect the potential influence by others engaged in terrorism, including groups and their ideology that has been described by Pantucci as a strong influence on individuals to engage in terrorism (Pantucci, 2011, pp. 6-7). The fourth question was changed similarly, to reflect behaviors related to terrorism rather than to targeted violence.

The case studies selected are Theodore Kaczynski, known as the “Unabomber;” Eric Rudolph; and Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, formerly known as Carlos Bledsoe. A summary of each case will be provided with each followed by a discussion focusing on the answers to the ten questions posed for each case. The relative effectiveness of the proposed risk assessment model will be further discussed.

Case Studies and Data Analysis

Theodore Kaczynski/The Unabomber. Theodore Kaczynski was arrested in 1996 and, in 1997, was charged with murder and illegally transporting, mailing and using bombs. In 1998, he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (Chase, 2000, “The Manifesto,” para. 3). Kaczynski’s case was code named “UNABOM” by the FBI because of his initial attacks on universities and airlines with bombs. In total, Kaczynski mailed 16 package and letter bombs, which caused 3 deaths and 23 injuries over the course of nearly 18 years between 1978 and 1995 before his arrest. After the publication of Kaczynski’s manifesto, David Kaczynski contacted the FBI to report he believed his brother was the author (COT, 2007, pp. 82-83). Ted Kaczynski had remained elusive for so many years primarily because he left no clues and had minimal contact with other humans during those years.
Theodore Kaczynski was born on May 22, 1942 in Chicago and raised in Evergreen Park, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago (Ostrom, 1996, para. 13). He was described as a very happy baby until at age 9 months he was hospitalized for a week with severe allergies. Upon discharge, he showed little emotion for months. There had been strict limitations on visitation during his hospitalization due to hospital policy, and only twice during the week, were his parents allowed to visit for an hour (McFadden, 1996, “The Child,” para. 7-8). Kaczynski’s brother, David, was born when Ted was seven years old. David has since been told that Ted had not been allowed to visit in the hospital when David was born, and the family believed that Ted’s subsequent withdrawal was because he resented the attention the baby now garnered (McFadden, 1996, “The Child,” para. 10-12).

Family members and others who knew the family reported the boys were treated equally; both were encouraged to read and were provided cultural and academic experiences. However, the younger brother, though a bit of a loner, was able to make friends, unlike Ted. Although David preferred reading to sports as a child, he was able to engage with friends (McFadden, 1996, “The Child,” para. 18-19). David stated as children, Ted tended to care for David, and seemed to relish the role of big brother (McFadden, 1996, para. 28-29).

Ted Kaczynski was considered an intelligent child and was advanced a grade twice, once in elementary school and once in high school. Neighbors described him as having been a loner, who spent his time reading more than playing. Bypassing sixth grade appears to have alienated him further from classmates. Kaczynski always believed his parents cared more about his intellect than they did about him as a person. Family
members said he was aware of his own intellect and used it against them, in a condescending manner. In his manifesto, Kaczynski wrote it is abnormal for teenagers to be willing to study to the degree he had. He felt pushed into science and mathematics, areas in need of students in the mid-50s. Kaczynski felt an obligation to study, and believed he would have benefitted from exposure to a social life (McFadden, 1996, “The Child,” para. 21-27).

Alston Chase, who both interviewed Kaczynski and read his unpublished autobiography, wrote that Ted’s parents seemed to thrive on his intellect. While most people would say Ted had always been a loner, Kaczynski contends he made efforts to connect with others in school, joining clubs and engaging in other social activities. Kaczynski described his home life as unhappy because his parents pushed him so hard academically. To make up for it, he became involved in many activities (Chase, 2000, “The Roots of the Unabomber,” para. 9-11). Being promoted in high school meant he was considerably younger than his classmates, and likely lacked the maturity to make many friends.

Teachers and school counselors remembered Ted as a responsible, caring young man who had a lot to give. His school counselor had written that Ted was “…deeply conscious of his responsibilities to society” (Chase, 2000, “The Roots of the Unabomber,” para. 12). A friend of the family recalled recommending to Ted’s father, in the spring of 1958, that the young man not attend college that fall because he was immature and so young. However, the friend recalls the father was insistent that Ted would attend Harvard University, describing Ted’s acceptance and attendance there as an ego trip for his father (Chase, 2000, “The Roots of the Unabomber,” para. 13).
At age 16, Kaczynski began his freshman year there. It has been hypothesized that Theodore Kaczynski’s life as the Unabomber may have begun at Harvard. Sally Johnson, the psychiatrist who interviewed him while he was in prison prior to his trial, believes Kaczynski’s two belief systems merged, giving him justification to rebel against society. His studies of technology led Kaczynski to believe society is evil, and his childhood experiences left him angry, seething about his perceived injustices (Chase, 2000, Part I, para. 10). From the document entitled, “Industrial Society and Its Future,” known in the media as his manifesto, Chase gleaned because technology is constantly changing, Kaczynski believed it destroys human communities (Chase, 2000, “The Manifesto,” para. 5, 6, & 9). Technology forces people to conform to machines, which Kaczynski believes limits human potential. It is believed while at Harvard, Kaczynski developed his ideas of a revolution against technology (Chase, 2000, “General Education and the Culture,” para. 15).

In the 1950s, Harvard University was a leader in the national transition of college curriculum. The former curriculum focused on methodological issues within a discipline. The new General Education was to be interdisciplinary. The focus would be toward “…a code of behavior based on ethical principles with democratic ideals” (Chase, 2000, “General Education and the Culture,” para. 3). The goal was to engage students in the assessment of right and wrong in an ethical sense as well as a mathematical sense. However, because the faculty was divided on the implementation of the curriculum, humanists taught that science was a threat to civilization and scientists taught science could not be stopped and must therefore be accepted. There persisted a battle between humanism, the study where human interests, values and dignity predominate, and
positivism, study concerning positive facts excluding speculation upon ultimate causes or origins (Chase, 2000, “General Education and the Culture, para. 6-8).

Required readings within the curriculum contained the following themes: an anti-technology message; there were sinister forces beneath the surface of civilization; the individual is alienated; and science poses a threat to human values. Research by a Harvard faculty member suggested the curriculum had a significant impact upon the emotions, attitudes and health of students. Freshmen entering college typically look for simple solutions, dividing the world into dichotomies, for example, right or wrong, good or bad, friend or foe. Within this new curriculum, students were taught truth is relative. While some students are able to grasp that concept, many could not. Those who tended to hold on to a more absolute view seemed to gravitate toward math and science. Chase, who graduated Harvard in 1957, saw in Kaczynski’s writing the message of positivism, particularly when Kaczynski wrote in his manifesto, “There was no logical justification for morality” (Chase, 2000, “General Education and the Culture,” para. 15-19).

It has been reported that Henry A. Murray, a psychologist affiliated with Harvard University, conducted a study of how people react under stress. He solicited 22 undergraduates, and Kaczynski was one of the participants. Subjects of the study were exposed to intensive interrogations, which Murray described as “vehement, sweeping and personally abusive” attacks on the egos, ideals and beliefs of the participants (Chase, 2000, Part I, para. 9). The research project, by today’s standards, would be considered unethical. Students were asked to participate in research toward a solution for psychological problems. Kaczynski alleges he felt compelled to participate. After being told he would debate personal philosophies with another student, each subject was
aggressively attack the subject and upset him as much as possible. All subjects reported the experience as unpleasant; some described it as traumatic (Chase, 2000, “The Murray Experiment,” para. 15-17).

At 20, Kaczynski graduated from Harvard, and then attended graduate school at the University of Michigan, earning his PhD in mathematics in 1967. He became an instructor at the University of California in Berkley’s Department of Mathematics and quit after two years (COT, 2007, p. 38). He was described as a brilliant mathematician, and published articles that impressed his peers. He was on track for tenure at one of the most prestigious universities in the country when he appeared to have lost interest in what was believed to have been his passion (McFadden, 1996, “The Professor,” para. 9, 14).

Kaczynski lived in exile in Montana, in a one-room cabin he had built, for over 25 years. In those years, he kept a journal and wrote numerous documents, to include the manifesto consisting of 56 pages of text, and numerous letters (COT, 2007, pp. 47 & 55). Kathleen Puckett, a psychologist with the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Program in 1996, wrote that Kaczynski recorded nearly every thought and activity on paper (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, p. 197). Until 1993, the motivations of the Unabomber were unknown. In 1993, Kaczynski began writing letters to newspapers, magazines, potential targets, and to one victim. In 1995, his manifesto was published (Chase, 2000, “The Manifesto,” para. 1-2).

The premise of the manifesto, which appears to have given him justification for his attacks, were his concerns that human needs must be modified to meet the changing technology. Kaczynski’s perspective was the system threatens humanity; therefore the system needed to be destroyed. While he believed the system would ultimately destroy
itself, he felt there would be too much human loss before that happened. By attacking those who support technology, Kaczynski believed he could minimize the damage to humans. His ultimate goal in destroying technology and those who promoted it was to protect nature, the opposite of technology (Chase, 2000, “The Manifesto,” para. 6, 9, & 10).

After the Unabomber’s arrest, The New York Times interviewed his brother, David. He acknowledged his brother had seemed to become progressively disturbed. David believed he knew his brother better than anyone, yet because Ted was so private, David acknowledges there was little he truly understood about his brother (Johnston & Scott, 1996, para. 12-14).

Chase (2000) wrote that Kaczynski had been angry beginning in junior high (Chase, 2000, Part I, para. 12). Those who knew Kaczynski reported he never had friends; his parents seemed more concerned with his brain than with his happiness; and when he did play, it was with his younger brother and boys five to seven years his junior. Throughout their lives, David stated he made the social connections, and Ted seemed comfortable relating to people if David was initially involved. David reported his brother could not accept even the smallest of errors, and was known to have spent days in isolation in his room. David described his brother as being incapable of sympathy and of even the simplest of connections with people (McFadden, 1996, para. 24).

Included in the writings found in the cabin subsequent to his arrest were long treatises he wrote to himself about philosophy, history, and political science. His writing frequently cited the emotional abuse he has alleged his parents committed. He wrote that skipping him two grades and sending him to Harvard at such a young age caused him to
become a social cripple (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, p. 199). Puckett, who read all the documents written by Kaczynski, reported not only was he angry, but throughout his writing, he expressed loneliness and an agonizing desire for a relationship with a woman. He wrote repeatedly about his inability to understand and to engage in normal social relationships. He is alleged to have had only one very short relationship with a woman with whom he worked. Kaczynski wrote numerous letters to his parents, condemning them for turning him into a social cripple, found in his mother’s apartment after Kaczynski’s arrest. It appears from his writings he was terribly bitter about his inability to fit anywhere in society. The only relationship of any significance appears to have been with his brother, David (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, p. 199-201).

In an interview after the arrest, David acknowledged he and his brother had been relatively close until David married in 1989 (McFadden, 1996, “The Correspondent,” para. 8). Beginning in the summer of 1969, the brothers seemed to live parallel lives of isolation. During the summer of 1969, they spent two months together camping in Canada, looking for land for Ted to purchase. As Ted was preparing the paperwork for property he wished to buy, David noticed his brother suddenly became depressed, stopping the process temporarily. After submitting the application, Ted returned to the home of his parents and David returned to his senior year of college. During that year, Ted did virtually nothing. His parents urged him to work just to keep him busy. Ted interpreted that as intrusive pressure to conform to the world he hated (McFadden, 1996, “The Wanderer,” para. 1-10).

During this year, Ted wrote numerous letters to publications and to public figures opposing technology, the manipulation of advertising, and the logging industry. His
arguments with his parents over not working intensified and his application to purchase the land in Canada was rejected. When David graduated in the spring of 1970, he moved to Montana and took a job in a smelter. The following spring, Ted went to visit him and found a piece of property to purchase (McFadden, 1996, “The Wanderer,” para. 19-21). Ted built a small cabin in which he lived for the next 25 years (McFadden, 1996, “The Hermit,” para. 5).

David later moved to Iowa to live near his parents and became a teacher. In the early 1980s, David purchased 30 acres of land in a remote area of western Texas. He began living in a lean-to during the winters and returned to Iowa in the summers to work. David was as much a loner in Texas as his brother was in Montana (McFadden, 1996, “The Wanderer,” para. 22).

In Montana, Ted needed little money to live because he was able to hunt small game and grow vegetables. His major expense was his annual real estate tax of $110. He was able to live free from technology and free of people trying to control his life (McFadden, 1996, “The Hermit,” para. 3). He was once heard to complain that his annual expenses had risen from $200 to $300, yet he was receiving $1000-$1500 from his parents in gifts. During these years he wrote about 200 letters to his parents, but never asked for money until 1994 (McFadden, 1996, “The Hermit,” para. 11-12).

It has been reported that in the spring of 1978, Kaczynski arrived at the office of a Northwestern University math professor, without an appointment. He wanted the professor to read his 10-20-page treatise on the evils of technology. Because it was poorly written, and Kaczynski wanted it published, the professor suggested he enroll in classes at the Chicago Circle campus of the University of Illinois. When the professor
later saw Kaczynski, Kaczynski was furious the University of Illinois had rejected his manuscript. He vowed to “get even.” The professor saw Kaczynski one more time at a lecture on gunpowder. Investigators were not sure the events happened as the professor recalled after Kaczynski’s arrest. However, the first device sent by the Unabomber in May 1978 was a crude pipe bomb, containing gunpowder, found on the Chicago Circle campus, addressed to a professor at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in New York with a return address of a professor at Northwestern University. When the bomb was returned, unopened, to the alleged sender, a guard was injured in the explosion (McFadden, 1996, “The Hermit,” para. 26-40). It appears a connection between these events was not made until after Kaczynski’s arrest. The professor, in recounting the story, was unsure it was Kaczynski who arrived at his office suggesting Kaczynski may not have put his name on the manuscript.

In the early 1980s, letters from Ted to his parents became increasingly angry. His parents visited him in Montana several times until the mid-1980s. They reported the visits were cordial, but each time they returned home, Ted sent them angry letters (McFadden, 1996, “Date Brings Joy,” para. 17).

From 1981-1985, the Unabomber sent seven more bombs; all identified with the initials “FC” either engraved in metal parts of the bomb or spray-painted near the bombsite. A computer storeowner in Sacramento was killed in 1985. In 1986, David visited his brother for two weeks but slept outside because it was so crowded inside the cabin. In hindsight, David remembers seeing no chemicals or anything of suspicion but remembered Ted was very specific about David’s arrival date. During that visit, Ted took
David into town, and introduced him to people he knew. David said he was reassured that his brother was known around town (McFadden, 1996, “Date Brings Joy,” para. 20-24).

On February 20, 1987, the Unabomber left a bomb that exploded in Salt Lake City. When he placed that bomb, a woman saw him and he knew she had seen him. She was able to describe him to the police and it appears Kaczynski panicked at having been seen, because he sent no further bombs for six years (McFadden, 1996, “Date Brings Joy,” para. 28-29).

In 1993, Kaczynski sent a bomb that seriously injured two scientists. At that time, he sent a letter to *The New York Times* in which he identified “FC” as an anarchist group responsible for the bomb. He included an identifying number in the letter so no one else could claim responsibility for his attacks. He promised to use this number in future correspondence (McFadden, 1996, “The Correspondent,” para. 33). He sent two more letters in early 1995 from “FC” claiming responsibility for other bombs. In these letters he explained that “FC,” which stood for Freedom Club, was dedicated to destroying the world’s industrialized system, and used the letters to express his views, making threats against individuals and other physical targets. He used fake return addresses and disguised his own identity. An example would be the letter in which he mocked one of his victims with an advanced degree and suggested he himself had no college degree (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, pp. 104-106).

Each of these letters appears to have conveyed the same messages, similar to those he expressed in other venues in the past. He disguised himself in the letters, using an anarchist group behind which to hide, yet continually desired the credit for his work. According to Puckett (2007) after an analysis of the Unabomber’s writings by the FBI, to
include his manifesto, it was determined there were similar enough themes, developed over time, that publishing the manifesto could help identify the author. It was believed someone reading the manifesto may have heard the message and be able to identify the Unabomber (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, pp. 107-108).

During the six-year period when it appears Kaczynski went into hiding, David told him he had reconnected with a woman he used to know, and was becoming involved in a relationship. Ted responded angrily condemning her for manipulating David. When David married in 1991, Ted refused to attend. In the late 1980s, their father was diagnosed with cancer and in October 1990, he killed himself. Ted acknowledged the letter David sent informing him of their father’s death and called during the memorial service to offer condolences to his mother. When his mother tried to reach out to him to improve their relationship, Ted responded with a scathing 17-page letter again blaming her for caring about his intellect rather than his happiness (McFadden, 1996, “The Correspondent,” para. 8-24).

The Unabomber resumed his attacks just months after the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. His bombs were more sophisticated and deadly. The final bomb exploded five days after the Oklahoma City bombing. A letter arrived that same day to the offices of The New York Times with an explanation of the Unabomber’s goals and objectives. There was also the promise of more information, which was to be his manifesto (McFadden, 1996, “The Correspondent,” para. 49-51).

Before 1995, David Kaczynski was in denial, but had begun connecting the locations of the bombs as reported in the news to locations with which his brother had been familiar, because of previous residences and activity. David’s wife had suggested to
him in the summer of 1995 perhaps his brother was involved because of similarities between the Unabomber and terrorist bombings occurring in France. In 1995, when the manifesto was published, David’s wife read it and confronted her husband on the seemingly strong connection to his brother. Because of his fear of harming his brother, it took David several months to take his suspicion to the authorities. Ultimately, it was David’s fear of harm or death to others that prompted him to make the report through an attorney (Johnston & Scott, 1996).

**Analysis of Kaczynski Case.** The analysis of this case would suggest these questions, if available to the public, might have allowed for an earlier identification of a potential terrorist. Law enforcement may have had better leads in the investigation. Borum et al.’s (1999) questions will be systematically reviewed, beginning with the first question.

1. **What motivated the subject to make the statements, or take the action, that caused him to come to attention?** Essentially this question addresses the why of an investigation. Why did the subject take action? What did the subject intend as an outcome of the behavior, for example, did the subject believe that violence would be a legitimate means to an end?

Kaczynski began communicating his motivations for his actions in 1969, when he wrote letters to publications and public figures expressing his opposition to technology, the manipulation of advertising, and the logging industry. He wrote two letters to the *Chicago Tribune*, one complaining about snowmobiles and the other about motorcycles, in which he complained about the noise they make and how they ruin nature. In early 1970, he wrote a letter to *The Saturday Review* complaining about highway construction
and automobiles (McFadden, 1996, “The Wanderer,” para. 13-15). Although these letters may not have threatened any attack, his message in 1969 was consistent with the paper he presented for publication in 1978 to Northwestern University and the University of Illinois.

Kaczynski came to the attention of investigators because he was sending bombs. At the end of December 1985, after the 11th bomb had been found, the FBI was able to connect the bombings together, yet no motivation was determined at that time (Smith, Damphouse & Roberts, 2006, p. 246).

In June 1993, Kaczynski began to send letters from “FC” in which he became more specific about targets and future attacks, several years after he began his bombing campaign. He explained in letters to The New York Times details about previous bombs, why his targets were chosen, and the goals of the anarchist group, FC (Smith et al., 2006, p. 247). In 1995, he mailed two letters in which he claimed responsibility for several bombs. In these letters, he threatened individuals and physical targets and declared the FC was dedicated to destroying the world’s industrial system (Smith et al., 2006, p. 249). Although Kaczynski was not identified as the Unabomber for many years, the message he sent was consistent and the targets of his bombs were fairly consistent with his message. The bomb intended for the University of Illinois professor appeared to be for revenge, and not directly related to his plan to stop industrialization.

While his message about destroying industrialization was directly expressed in letters, it would appear a motive indirectly expressed by Kaczynski in his letters was a desire to be recognized. Although he disguised himself as a terrorist group, and used false return addresses, and mailed packages from cities away from where he lived, it seems it
was important to him that he be credited for all he had done. He sent a code to *The New York Times* he promised to use in subsequent correspondence to ensure the publication knew his correspondence and claims were genuine. He did not want to give up the credit for his work.

Family members, publishers and a few professionals with whom Kaczynski had communicated were familiar with his views. Kaczynski made his beliefs known, but was unlikely to have conveyed any reason for those who knew him to believe he had a plan to act on his anger. Prior to his bombing campaign, people knew his views, and given his views were frequently publicized in anonymous letters after his campaign began, there are people who might have been able to identify Kaczynski sooner, had anyone remembered his letters. Given his initial letters were written in 1970, and his bombing campaign began in 1978, it is unlikely anyone would have remembered the details. It is possible that today, the very technology against which he railed may have helped someone connect him sooner with letters or documents he had written years ago. A search of the Internet may have helped someone identify the man who once conveyed similar motivations in the past.

2. What has the subject communicated to anyone concerning his intentions?

Kaczynski wrote letters in which he promised future attacks, but his letters during the bombings were anonymous. He verbally made the threat to “get even” with the professor at the University of Illinois, and was seen by the Northwestern University professor at the lecture on gunpowder. His presence at the lecture ought not to have created a concern, but his indirect threat might cause greater concern today than it might have in 1978. It is
not clear whether Kaczynski’s name was on the manuscript he wished to have published at Northwestern.

It does not appear Kaczynski communicated any of his intentions to his family. His family knew he was angry, and that he desired to live away from society. His brother knew of his anti-technology views and had been invited to spend some time with Kaczynski in his Montana cabin. During those visits, his brother saw nothing that would suggest Kaczynski was conducting research on or actually building bombs.

Information from the letters and packages Kaczynski mailed during his campaign allowed the FBI to use computers to attempt to connect individuals who had been known to live or work in or near the places the Unabomber was known to operate. Kaczynski’s name appeared once in the huge databases because of his work at Berkeley (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, pp. 56-57). Kaczynski was eliminated from consideration because he did not meet the profilers’ expectations that he should be a white man in his late teens to mid-20’s (Johnston, 1998, “Old Persistence,” para. 3). His communication of personally identifying information was indirect, yet could have allowed for his capture, had profilers been willing to look beyond their expectations. Ultimately Kaczynski’s own words led to his arrest, when his manifesto was published. Puckett wrote it was Kaczynski’s need to matter within society by sending out the manifesto that allowed his brother to identify him (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, p. 219). His brother presented many of his letters from Kaczynski to the FBI allowing them to confirm the identity of the Unabomber (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, p. 118).

Kaczynski’s autobiography was found after his arrest. He wrote in 1979 that he began writing so when captured after he began killing, people would understand his
psychology. He did not want others to believe he was bombing simply for the sake of killing. He had a purpose and wanted people to know he was not killing simply because he was sick (COT, 2007, p. 55). While he wrote prolifically, most of what he wrote was either written anonymously when sent through the mail, or was written for his personal use in his journals.

3. Has the subject shown an interest in terrorism, terrorist groups, weapons, extremist groups, or espoused a radical ideology? This question would likely be answered negatively for Kaczynski. Although he claimed to be a member of “FC,” or Freedom Club, there is no evidence he had any connection to or interest in a terrorist organization. It is rather clear he acted alone and had no external influence from others engaged in similar activities. He did, however, espouse an ideology about the damage technology was doing to society. There is no indication anyone who heard or read his concerns had worried he might take action. Most people seemed to have considered him to be somewhat eccentric, yet harmless.

One external influence may have been a character in the book The Secret Agent by Joseph Conrad. The professor in the book had given up his position in the university to become a recluse, as Kaczynski did. It has been reported that Kaczynski owned the book and claimed to have read it more than 12 times. It has been suggested the book may have provided a rationale for his bombings of scientists (COT, 2007, p. 48).

While it does not appear Kaczynski was inspired to engage in terrorism by other terrorists or their behavior, it has been suggested that the bomb he sent five days after the Oklahoma City bombing may have been sent because he felt upstaged by the Oklahoma
City bombing. Along with the bomb, he had mailed three letters in which he described his political philosophy and his resentments (COT, 2007, pp. 69-70).

4. Has the subject engaged in attack-related behavior, including surveillance, purchasing weapons or the ingredients for weapons? Kaczynski’s threat to “get even” with the University of Illinois for not publishing his work in 1978 might be considered an attack-related behavior, as it could have been considered a threat. David’s wife, Linda, who had never met Ted, began to worry about Kaczynski’s ability to commit the attacks because she read about a similar terrorist while in France. The article in France described the Unabomber as a loner, and listed areas in the United States where the Unabomber was known to have been. While those behaviors may not have been menacing or in any other way resembled an attack, they were behaviors consistent with the behaviors of a lone attacker. Linda was familiar with Kaczynski’s views about the evils of technology and knew he had withdrawn from the family. These behaviors were reportedly a signal to Linda that perhaps her brother-in-law was the Unabomber (Turchie & Puckett, 2007 p. 120).

One of the members of the math club to which Kaczynski belonged in high school recalled he had once set off a powerful bomb in chemistry class. He also set off blasts in trashcans around the neighborhood. Most of these activities were considered the pranks of a youngster because he was viewed as a recluse with no friends. He read extensively, and took math books on vacation as a child. Math and science were viewed as essential disciplines in the 1950s and early 1960s (McFadden, 1996, “The Child,” para. 33-36). As a child, he demonstrated behaviors that could have been considered attack-like, and had
the interest in science to pursue the means for attacks. However, these behaviors were not likely to have caused concerns at the time.

5. **Does the subject have a history of mental illness involving command hallucinations, delusional ideas, feelings of persecution, etc. with indications that the subject has acted on those beliefs?** After his arrest, Sally Johnson conducted an extensive psychiatric evaluation on Kaczynski for the court completing it in January 1998. She diagnosed him with paranoid schizophrenia and cited two significant delusions. The first seemed to begin in the mid to late 1960s with his belief about the control by technology. The second delusion was his belief that his inability to socialize, particularly with women, was the result of abuse by his parents (Johnson, 1998, pp. 40-41).

Kaczynski’s brother had read his many letters expressing his views that man would become a slave to technology. The family concerned itself with Ted’s anger, failing to understand why their son and brother was so angry he would pull himself completely away from both the family and society. The family had sensed something was missing, not understanding what had gone wrong between Ted and his parents (McFadden, 1996, para. 7-8).

When Kaczynski attended Harvard, and had participated in Dr. Murray’s research project, psychological testing had been administered. During her evaluation, Johnson’s staff retrieved the test data and interpreted the scores as consistent with paranoid schizophrenia (Johnson, 1998, p.38). She learned Kaczynski had sought the assistance of numerous therapists since graduating Harvard, but most were only single visits or via
letter with no personal follow-up. Most of those visits or letters identified his lack of social skills as a reason for seeking treatment (Johnson, 1998, pp. 9-10).

The availability of Dr. Johnson’s evaluation, post arrest, sheds significant light on Kaczynski’s mental illness, to include significant delusions and feelings of persecution. She reported Kaczynski, in fact, acted upon those delusions, which supports the usefulness of question five. Johnson learned from his mother and brother Kaczynski routinely presented his delusions in his letters to them – his beliefs that technology was destroying humanity and his parents’ verbal and psychological abuse led him to become a social cripple.

It is unclear from Johnson’s report whether Kaczynski’s mother and brother were aware that Kaczynski sought counseling on several occasions. In their letters to him, Kaczynski’s parents routinely apologized though were unsure of what they were “guilty.” It does not appear the family considered Kaczynski was coping with a mental illness, until the later stages of his terrorist activity. Kaczynski’s sister-in-law seemed most willing to consider how unusual Kaczynski’s behavior was.

It is difficult for family members to accept one of their own is dealing with a mental illness. In an interview after his brother’s arrest, David expressed regret at having to admit his brother could have been the Unabomber. He expressed a sense of guilt he did not do enough to help his brother. It is easier to deny mental illness and label the behavior as something less offensive.

In 1995, did Americans understand the connection between mental illness and violent behavior? David idolized his brother and saw purity in his brother that seemed to prevent him from accepting that his brother’s emotional deterioration could result in
violent or destructive behavior. Given the publicity other lone attackers have received in the news in the past few years, the behaviors consistent with paranoid schizophrenia, as exhibited by Kaczynski, might be more alerting and may help families and friends recognize when an individual is at risk for illegal activity.

6. How organized is the subject? Is he capable of developing and carrying out a plan? Ted Kaczynski was considered to be a brilliant man, having completed his PhD in Mathematics by the age of 23. Although students rated his lectures at Berkeley poorly, he was offered tenure during his second year on faculty. Students complained he lectured out of the textbook, suggesting he was unable or unwilling to think through how to teach material to others. He had no interest in relating to others, yet he was able to study math and write scholarly articles for publication (McFadden, 1996, “The Professor,” para. 5-6). This would suggest people were able to recognize his ability to engage in purposeful, complex behavior, in spite of his seeming eccentricity.

Although his cabin and living conditions may have been crude, having no plumbing or electricity for the 25 years in which he lived there, Kaczynski built his home from scratch. He put a pump in a well, grew a garden in the summers, and lived frugally. His brother and parents had visited him and knew he was handy. His brother described him as a skilled woodsman who knew much about plant life. David recalled their father had taught them woodsman skills and all about plant life when they camped as a family. Ted was able to recall and utilize those skills (McFadden, 1996, “The Wanderer,” para. 1-3).

When faced with the possibility his brother was the Unabomber, David was not in disbelief his brother had the skills to engage in the bombings. David believed his brother
was brilliant, but a difficult person with whom to get along. In interview after his brother’s arrest, David stated he idolized his brother (McFadden, 1996, para. 6-10). It appears David’s subjective views of his brother and a desire to have a better relationship with him may have prevented him from recognizing signs.

7. Has the subject experienced a recent loss and or loss of status and has this led to feelings of desperation and despair? From Kaczynski’s writings obtained after his arrest, there were many references to loss. He believed his parents were responsible for his inability to relate to others, particularly women. He felt betrayed by his parents, and while he wrote them letters expressing his anger, his delusions did not make sense to them. His expressions of anger and loss occurred over a period of years. The behavior his parents witnessed from his childhood on never changed. He distanced himself from his family during childhood, so the family likely did not sense the loss he expressed.

Kaczynski also expressed his sense of loss of a peaceful world because of the rapid developments in technology. The manuscript he wrote and allegedly took to Northwestern University for publication in 1978 was reportedly written on the evils of technology. In many of the letters sent during his bombing campaign, Kaczynski wrote of the evils of technology, making his point rather well known. Again, the anonymity of his letters made it difficult to trace them back to identify Kaczynski.

From a behavioral perspective, eschewing an honest job and a comfortable home to live in the wilderness with minimal assets would have been consistent with his disdain for technology. The brother who idolized Kaczynski may have denied the similarity between his brother’s rejection of modern technology and the individual sending letters
describing his reasons for the bombings. The autobiography and other writings in the cabin certainly support the validity of this question about loss as an indicator of threat.

8. **Corroboration – What is the subject saying and is it consistent with his actions?** Again, Kaczynski distanced himself from his family and others at a young age. Neighbors commented he had few friends, and he tended to be a loner as a child. Living in a cabin in the woods would seem consistent with a loner lifestyle. He expressed a disdain for technology, and his lifestyle was consistent with that belief.

Residents in Lincoln, Montana paid little attention to Kaczynski, and in reports after his arrest, many stated they would not see him for months, but no one considered that odd. His demeanor was consistent and corroborated with his expressed interest of living alone. There is no evidence that residents of Lincoln saw the anger he expressed in his writings. His interactions were polite; he purchased books at a used bookstore, conducted research with the assistance of the librarian, and interacted minimally with other merchants on occasion (McFadden, 1996, “Date Brings Joy,” para. 25). His behaviors seemed consistent with the peaceful demeanor he projected.

Family members, those who knew him best, described an inconsistency in his behaviors. His brother, David, described loving letters that Kaczynski would write to their parents, and then found it difficult to understand the intermittent letters clearly written in anger. David described, after the arrest of the Unabomber, how his brother appeared to become more disturbed through the years. Upon reading his brother’s manifesto, David wanted to deny the similarity between his brother’s writings and the manifesto. His wife, who had never met Ted, had been able to connect the locations of both bomb placement and their originsations when mailed to places Kaczynski had been
known to live or work (McFadden, 1996, “The Correspondent,” para. 56). Her emotional distance from Ted may have allowed her to view, more objectively, his aberrant behavior. It is unknown how early she developed her suspicions. The article she read about the similar French terrorist appears to have enabled her to link her brother-in-law’s behaviors to those of the Unabomber.

9. Is there concern among those that know the subject that he might take action based on inappropriate ideas? In the case of Kaczynski, it appears Kaczynski’s family had little expectation he would act out his anger against people or groups outside of the family. The family knew of his anger about technology, but seemed to feel the brunt of his anger about his perceived neglect and abuse. His parents tried to maintain a steady, supportive relationship with him, visiting him in Montana and sending him money. They had attempted many times to encourage him to work in order to engage him in productive activity and to help him move out of a depression.

Interviews with the family, with hindsight, suggested the family had no anticipation Ted would act out his anger externally. David’s wife, however, had been able to see the connection between inappropriate ideas and the potential for taking action. As stated above, it is unknown how early she began to have suspicions. She was able to convince her husband to at least explore the idea his brother had the ability to engage in the behaviors for which the Unabomber had been held accountable.

Question nine would place responsibility on those who know a subject to make a report to law enforcement that could disrupt the equilibrium a family attempts to project. This point will be discussed further; however, it appears that the Kaczynski family may
have had some concerns but were unwilling to voice them until the evidence in the manuscript became too obvious.

10. What factors in the subject’s life and/or environment might increase/decrease the likelihood of the subject attempting to attack a target? Puckett summed the factors in Kaczynski’s life which led to his attacks as his inability to be a part of society, his belief that he was a “social cripple,” and ultimately his unfulfilled longing for a woman to share his life. She wrote that his anger at not fitting in led him to seek revenge for his unhappiness. In one letter to *The New York Times*, he wrote “…in order to get our message before the public with some chance of making a lasting impression, we’ve had to kill people” (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, p. 270). Kaczynski was unable to fulfill his desire to matter and chose violence in affiliation with an imagined group as his way to change his life.

In his journal, Kaczynski described numerous attempts to connect with women and to engage in therapy in order to learn how to interact with women and society. He constantly wrote about these failures in his life. Because he lived such a private life, and most of his writings were never seen until his arrest, the factors in his life that fueled his need to attack seemed unclear and unknown. Letters to his parents that expressed anger seemed to confuse his family. Perhaps the defensiveness his parents experienced when accused of abuse that allegedly led to Kaczynski’s perception he was a social cripple prevented his family from actually looking more closely at their son’s behaviors.

It is hypothesized attacks might have been averted had Kaczynski been able to sustain a personal connection. Attacks may have been prevented had Kaczynski’s family had more information sooner, which might have forced his brother to act on his wife’s
suspicions earlier. Only David’s wife, the least personally involved member of the family, made the connection.

In hindsight, there were clear circumstances that caused Ted Kaczynski to choose violence to make his mark in society. His lifestyle of withdrawing from society belied his needs and desires which may have prevented his family and the residents of Lincoln, Montana from recognizing those circumstances. However, the circumstances were strong motivators for Kaczynski and suggest this final question is of value in a threat assessment.

**Eric Rudolph.** Eric Rudolph was arrested on May 30, 2003 after eluding police and federal agents for five years. He was charged, in October 1998, with the bombing of Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, which occurred on July 27, 1996. The bomb killed one person and injured many. In the affidavit for his arrest, the FBI declared this to have been a terrorist attack against hundreds of innocent people. He was charged with a double bombing at an abortion clinic in Sandy Springs, Georgia on January 16, 1997; and with a double bombing of a gay nightclub in Atlanta on February 21, 1997. He had already been charged in Alabama in February 1998 with the bombing of a woman’s health clinic in Birmingham on January 29, 1998 in which one person was killed and one severely injured (FBI, 1998). Rudolph was the only alleged domestic terrorist on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted Fugitive list (Fonda, Cuadros, Fulton, Land, Richards & Sikora, 2003). Rudolph was sentenced to multiple consecutive life sentences without parole after trials in Atlanta and Birmingham (Dewan, 2005, para. 15-16).

Eric Rudolph was born September 19, 1966 in Florida and was raised in Homestead, Florida until he was fifteen years old. He was the fifth of six children. His
mother, Patricia, had been in training to become a nun and left the convent to marry his father (Ross, 2005, “Memories of,” para. 1). When she left the Catholic Church, she gravitated toward fundamentalist Christian and charismatic sects. His father, Bob, had been a carpenter and an airline mechanic for TWA working at the Miami airport. During his childhood, Rudolph’s parents volunteered as youth ministers at a Baptist church in Fort Lauderdale. It is believed Patricia dabbled in many different religions from Catholicism to New Age religions. She was described as a “seeker,” and people who knew him gave Eric the same label (Vollers, 2006, pp. 63, 94, 239).

One family friend of significance was Tom Branham who drifted from the Northwest to Florida, and attended the same church as the Rudolphs. The family took in Branham, basing the relationship on religion. In 1973, Branham moved to Topton, North Carolina, to a large tract of land in the Appalachians. The Rudolph family visited him regularly, and Eric and his brothers spent several weeks each summer with Branham. Bob Rudolph began building a retirement home on the property beside Branham, where the family eventually moved (Vollers, 2006, pp. 93-94).

Eric Rudolph described Branham as self-sufficient, self-reliant, and always finding alternate ways of doing things. He cut his own wood, raised livestock, repaired his own vehicle and procured his own food. Others described Branham as a Christian fundamentalist with an apocalyptic, ultraconservative view. It was believed Branham was preparing for a confrontation between good and evil. It was reported he stockpiled food, hoarded books, and gathered everything he could in flea markets that looked as if it could someday be useful in a “conflagration” (Vollers, 2006, pp. 96-97). At one point, Branham was convicted of forging coupons for groceries, which was a way he allegedly made
money. The conviction was overturned on appeal, but the relationship between Branham
and Rudolph’s mother deteriorated, because he reportedly felt she was not loyal enough
in her support of him. In court, Branham was not represented by a lawyer but by Nord
Davis, a member of Christian Identity. Branham and Davis ignored all government
except for the county sheriff (Vollers, 2006, pp. 96-97).

In 1980, Rudolph’s father was diagnosed with malignant melanoma. His parents
did not trust modern medicine and chose alternative medicine for the treatment of his
father’s cancer. They attempted to obtain Laetrile, however, the Food and Drug
Administration would not approve the drug. Bob went to Mexico where he was able to
obtain Laetrile, but because the drug did not work, returned to Florida for treatment (CBS
News, n.d.). During the period of his father’s illness, Eric went to North Carolina to live
with Tom Branham. It relieved some of the stress the family was experiencing. In 1981,
his father died from the cancer (Vollers, 2006, pp. 94-95). It has been hypothesized by an
agent of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation the Rudolph family’s failure to obtain
medicine they believed would have helped prolong his father’s life led Eric Rudolph to
hate the US Government and to turn toward extremist groups (CBS News, n.d.). Eric’s
former sister-in-law, Deborah, told the Southern Poverty Law Center the family had
“hard feelings” about Bob’s death, believing laetrile would have prevented him from
dying (Ross, 2005, “Early Indicators,” para. 4).

After Bob’s death, the mother moved with her two youngest children into a trailer
in Florida until the daughter finished high school. The three oldest boys were on their
own, and Eric remained with Tom Branham, until the end of the school year when
Patricia moved to their property beside Branham in North Carolina (Vollers, 2006, p. 94).
Eric started ninth grade in the North Carolina school system. He was tested and his scores were average. His math scores were poor; his vocabulary scores were very good, but his reading comprehension was well below average. This has been interpreted to mean he has excellent language ability but lacks the ability to interpret what he was reading in a conventional way. His grades improved while he attended school in North Carolina; however he did not stay in school long enough to graduate (Vollers, 2006, p. 101).

Years after he left school, teachers described him as witty, but stubborn and strange. He wore a uniform of blue jeans, flannel shirt and sneakers. He wore his hair short, and tried to fit in by chewing tobacco and driving a pickup truck. His classmates still considered him an outsider. His views on history were considered peculiar and in ninth grade he wrote a paper denying the holocaust ever happened. He brought a pamphlet in from home as his source of information. Although he read quite a bit, it is believed he never read an entire book until he went to live with Branham (Vollers, 2006, pp. 101, 239).

Former classmates, interviewed after Rudolph was identified as a suspect, remembered him as having extremist views, always getting into political arguments with other students. However, he was also described as a survivalist, teaching other students survival skills. Former classmates said he would often go camping on his own, leaving on a Friday and returning to class on Monday in the same clothes he was wearing on Friday (Vollers, 2006, p. 101).

Vollers interviewed a woman who was in eighth grade when Rudolph was in ninth grade. She said they dated, and when she was introduced to his mother, Patricia told
the girl if she and Eric were to have a baby, Patricia would deliver it without the aid of doctors, and this child would have no need for a social security number. This woman thought Eric’s brother strongly influenced him, teaching him to stockpile food. She said Eric was paranoid, refusing to be in photographs because he did not want them to be used against him. He would not sign the yearbook of friends because, already, in ninth grade, he wanted no handwriting samples available to connect to him (Vollers, 2006, p. 101).

This woman told Vollers she broke up with Eric after he dropped out of high school at the beginning of tenth grade but they remained friends. Eric would drop in to have dinner with her and her family. In hindsight, she thought he was trying to connect with a normal family, something he did not have in his own home (Vollers, 2006, p. 102).

When Eric dropped out, Patricia wanted to home school him and his younger brother. Unable to find what she considered appropriate curriculum, she moved the family to Schell City, Missouri to join the Church of Israel, under the direction of Dan Gayman. In the 1980s, the FBI knew Gayman and was aware he had a long-term relationship with violent white supremacist groups, to include the “Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord” (Vollers, 2006, pp. 102-103). His church was believed to follow the “Christian Identity,” with an anti-Semitic philosophy (Fonda et al., 2003, para. 5). When the Rudolph family arrived with little money, Gayman was able to employ Patricia, and enrolled Eric’s younger brother in school. While Gayman claimed Eric was uninterested in Gayman’s ministry, Gayman’s son told the FBI Rudolph became totally involved in the program. It is alleged that Eric was being groomed to marry one of Gayman’s daughters but fell in love with another woman in the church. When the family returned to North Carolina that relationship ended because his girlfriend was very involved in the
church, and Eric refused to conform to the group’s doctrine. Both Gayman and his son agreed Eric rejected the Christian Identity group because it focused too much on religion and not enough on survival skills (Vollers, 2006, p. 104).

After passing his GED, Rudolph attended Western Carolina University because his application had been rejected by Purdue University. Purdue cited as reasons his lack of sufficient credits in English, algebra, geometry and biology. While at Western Carolina, he focused on history and art. Former students and professors described Rudolph as haughty and argumentative, and said he had difficulty getting along with other students. He quit college after two semesters, and soon joined the Army (Vollers, 2006, p. 105).

Rudolph enlisted in the Army in order to join an elite military unit. It is believed he wished to join the Rangers or Special Forces, but was never able to do so. It is ironic Rudolph joined the Army when he was unable to accept authority and he distrusted the government. His commander described Eric as smart but immature and arrogant. Eric was stationed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky and learned survival tactics there. He also learned to build Improvised Explosive Devices, which were very similar to the bombs he later built (Vollers, 2006, pp. 105-106).

During his first year in the Army, he seemed to be doing well, to include having taken a college class in which he obtained an A. However, in the summer of 1988 he was reported to have developed an attitude problem. Leadership counseled Rudolph for sleeping on duty and for mocking authority. He reportedly told friends he resented having to take orders from “blacks and women” (Vollers, 2006, p. 107). He began frequently using marijuana and was finally discharged from the Army in January 1989 after
intentionally failing a urinalysis (Vollers, 2006, p. 108). Cathy, a high school girlfriend interviewed after his arrest, stated she broke up with him because of his prejudices. She said he seemed shy and quiet, and had been respectful toward her, but had radical views against other races (Ross, 2005, “Memories of,” para. 2-4).

While stationed at Fort Campbell, Rudolph frequently visited his brother and sister-in-law in Nashville. He and his brother were reported to have often stayed up all night watching television and smoking marijuana during Eric’s visits. During one of those visits in 1988, he began dating a young girl named Claire who was still in high school. She liked that he was exciting and dangerous, and he was an “older man.” He told her she had the correct “Aryan traits” and wanted to have children with her. After his discharge from the Army, she visited him in North Carolina on weekends. They would hike and she helped him cut firewood and tend to his marijuana plants, which she said was hard work. She broke up with him in 1991 because she did not want to leave her city life for his pioneer lifestyle (Vollers, 2006, pp. 107, 111).

One of Claire’s friends spent time with them in Nashville and described Eric as domineering, saying he called his girlfriend, “Woman.” She also said Rudolph would go off on Nazi tirades, and stood on milk crates, giving impromptu sermons. This friend stopped hanging around with the couple when Rudolph told her he wanted to build bombs, and described how he would do it. Rudolph frightened her (Vollers, 2006, p. 110). After Claire broke up with him, Eric began dating another woman, again in a long-distance relationship. During her visits to his home, she worked hard beside him, but eventually broke off the relationship, also unwilling to give up her comforts for life in the mountains (Vollers, 2006, p. 111).
Rudolph devoted his attention to growing marijuana after his discharge from the Army. He sent letters to two of his friends telling them to get out of the Army to come help him take care of his drug business. In one letter, he shared how relieved he was to be free but also expressed a “sense of not knowing exactly what to do with one’s self…” (Vollers, 2006, p. 108). Rudolph sent several letters to two friends begging them to join him in his outlaw life, needing their help to expand his marijuana distribution business. He became angry when each turned down his invitation and ceased all contact with them. It is reported that Rudolph worked diligently to grow marijuana, going to great lengths to keep his business hidden. One tactic was to take the drugs to Tennessee rather than to sell it in his own community. His former associates estimated Rudolph was grossing over $70,000 a year at the peak of his business. He was described as having the right traits for a drug distribution business, those of mental and physical stamina, planning skills, and paranoia (Vollers, 2006, pp. 107-111).

In April 1996, Rudolph sold the family home in Topton for $65,000, which he shared with his mother and two of his brothers. The family reported that Eric told them he was going out west to buy property, and would occasionally call the family from pay phones in Murphy, North Carolina as if he was out of town. However, he was seen in town a week before the Centennial Park bombing where he likely purchased items used in the bomb, according to the FBI (Vollers, 2006, p.113).

During the next 18 months, Rudolph was described as living like a ghost. He paid cash to rent trailers for a few months at a time, and moved frequently. He had minimal contact with family, and showed up unexpectedly for Thanksgiving dinner at his sister’s one year. He took his mother on a trip to New York, but disappeared immediately after
taking her home to Florida. One woman he knew in Murphy, North Carolina told the FBI he would show up without warning and expected her to be ready to do something social with him. He told her he was living with an uncle who had no telephone a few miles out of town, but he told her he would call her when he came to Murphy. He never contacted her again after he arrived unexpectedly one day and she continued with the plans she had made with other friends (Vollers, 2006, pp. 114-116).

The writings and literature found in Rudolph’s trailer when he became a fugitive highlighted his anti-abortion ideology. His writing was not eloquent and he used quotations from biblical scriptures to justify his violence against the “godless lackeys” of the federal government and those who provided abortions. His attacks were in the name of the “Army of God” of which he was the only member (Turchie & Puckett, 2005, p. 223).

In January 1998, Rudolph had buried a bomb disguised with greenery near the entrance to an abortion clinic in Birmingham before it opened. A security guard had moved the greenery and the bomb exploded killing the security guard and wounding a nurse who had arrived to work. A student in the dormitory near the clinic looked out his window and saw Rudolph walking away from the blast while everyone else was running toward the area. The student followed Rudolph as he walked and changed clothing along the way. The student and another customer in a restaurant, where the student stopped to try and call police, were able to follow Rudolph to his pickup truck and separately each recorded the license plate number, allowing the police to identify Rudolph (Vollers, 2006, pp. 51, 55-56, 58-61). This was his fourth and final bomb for which he was convicted. Rudolph subsequently went into hiding for five years.
Vollers described the residents of the Nantahala National Forest region, Rudolph’s neighbors, as people who had little trust in government and who traditionally rebelled against a central authority. She wrote that many in the community saw Rudolph as a rugged individual who took the law into his own hands. Although they may not have condoned his actions, they approved of the fact he was beating the odds, not getting caught. He seemed to be kicking sand in the face of the establishment (Vollers, 2006, p. 159).

A task force of federal, state and local law enforcement agents and prosecutors conducted investigations into the bombings, conducted thousands of interviews, and combed the Nantahala National Forest where Rudolph was believed to have been hiding (FBI, 1998). He was arrested by a local police officer who spotted Rudolph rummaging in a dumpster late one night.

**Analysis of Rudolph Case.** Because Eric Rudolph had more contact with family and with other people in his world than did Theodore Kaczynski, it would be expected the analysis of these questions would show them to have been more relevant prior to the start of Rudolph’s bombing campaign. However, the answer to the first question may not have been obvious to those who knew him.

1. **What motivated the subject to make the statements, or take the action, that caused him to come to attention?** Rudolph has been described as “disaffected,” a young American who found solace in extremism. Early on, Rudolph demonstrated his inability to fit in, spending weekends in the woods alone, living a very transient life with his family, adopting Christian Identity tenets which includes the belief in the supremacy
of the white race, and getting kicked out of the Army after only 18 months (Ross, 2005, “Eric’s Excellent,” para. 1-2).

Puckett pointed to his difficulty fitting in, including his inability to conform to Army life in spite of expressing a desire to join an elite team, as well as his superficial relationships with women. His journals centered on his thoughts about homosexuality and abortion and his anger at how the government handled these issues. Rudolph wrote the bomb he exploded at the Atlanta Olympics was designed “…to confound, anger and embarrass the Washington government in the eyes of the world” (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, p. 270). Rudolph had been unable to find a sense of belonging, but hid behind the “Army of God” in an attempt to fit in. Rudolph sought to gain attention for his ideology through covert acts of shocking violence (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, p. 223). Rudolph’s inability to conform and his failure to find others who believed as he did appear to have motivated him to attack in anger, to gain the attention through violence that he could not find in other ways.

Many who knew him could describe his inability to fit in and many seemed to admire his ability to survive in solitude, his self-reliance, and his quiet demeanor. It is unclear if many knew of his anger about abortion. His views on homosexuality seemed odd to his sister-in-law who knew that Rudolph remained very close to his younger brother who had declared his homosexuality. Against other homosexuals, he spoke with contempt (Ross, 2005, “Strange Disconnects,” para. 2-3). He was openly inflammatory against other races and the Jewish (Vollers, 2006, p. 101).

To those who knew him, Rudolph seemed to do well, seemingly able to take care of himself, with few apparent confrontations. After his vehicle had been spotted in
Birmingham following the bombing of the abortion clinic, investigators searched his former residences and found abortion literature and some of his writing. Investigators were able to identify his direct motive against abortion clinics. Investigators and journalists would later understand his inner motive to assuage his interpersonal difficulties. As Puckett described, Rudolph, like other lone terrorists, served his own needs. He was unable to matter in his own world socially, so connected himself to an ideology that allowed him to matter in a larger context (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, p. 256).

Rudolph made many attempts in his life to fit in and after failing to join an elite unit in the Army, demonstrated a desire to be a leader when he sent letters to his Army buddies inviting them to join him in his marijuana business. When they rejected his offers, he lashed back at them in anger. However, it is unlikely any of his so-called friends would have worried about his angry response. Although he aimed his personal anger at the anti-abortion cause and at homosexuals, it is unlikely any of those who knew him would have seen the depths of his personal anger. Rudolph seemed to pride himself in his ability to survive on his own. It is unlikely he would allow anyone to know his hurt. The underlying motivation of making a difference, of making his voice heard after being alienated and feeling disaffected, appears to have been well hidden. For 18 months prior to setting his first bomb, Rudolph lived in anonymity, distanced from anyone who may have noticed he had an agenda. It is unlikely anyone thought he was motivated to attack.

2. **What has the subject communicated to anyone concerning his intentions?**

At some time between 1988 and 1991, one of Claire’s friends spent time with Claire and Rudolph. The friend was one of many sources who provided information to the FBI and police once Rudolph was named a material witness in Birmingham. This friend identified
her fear of Rudolph, telling a journalist he had spoken to her about his desire to build bombs and how he would build them. She was frightened by him, and stopped socializing with Rudolph and his girlfriend. He did not share a target with her (Vollers, 2006, p. 110).

Because he was living alone and had distanced himself from family and friends in the weeks before the Atlanta Centennial Park bombing, it is unlikely he would have communicated his intentions to anyone. He maintained journals and had collected literature that would have supported his anti-abortion stance, but no one saw the material. It appears that Rudolph had successfully kept his intentions to himself.

3. Has the subject shown an interest in terrorism, terrorist groups, weapons, extremist groups, or espoused a radical ideology? Rudolph had been on the fringes of several extremist groups by virtue of his religious affiliations. He resisted the religious aspects of some of these groups, particularly Gayman’s Church of Israel in Missouri. Rudolph had expressed his hate of non-whites since high school, but broke away from the church because of its focus on religion. It is believed that Rudolph would likely have had some interaction with extremists belonging to the Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord as well as Gayman’s brand of Christian Identity, yet was unable to connect because the group focused too much on religion and too little on survival skills (Vollers, 2006, pp. 103-104). Unable to find a group, it appears Rudolph made up his own group when he identified himself as a member of the “Army of God.”

Christian Identity’s agenda is abortion is wrong, especially when it involves white people. Rudolph’s mother was also reportedly against abortion, and he was strongly influenced by her views (Springer, 2009, p. 57). Rudolph’s mother was responsible for
exposing him to extremists and radicals so would have been unlikely to find his views to have been problematic. Rudolph’s views were anti-abortion, anti-homosexual, and racist. He fought against social policy and the government’s tolerance of anything that would dilute the population of whites in America (Springer, 2009, pp. 57 & 67).

The terrorist operating alone may share the views of groups, but a study of individuals engaged in terrorism suggests they have psychological difficulty fitting in anywhere. Their desire to matter leads them to feeling more important than groups with whom they share an ideology (Turche & Puckett, 2007, pp. 255-256). Just as Kaczynski identified himself as “FC,” Rudolph’s “Army of God” appeared to provide him a sense of belonging to a social group with an ideology.

Those who knew Rudolph when his mother introduced him to Christian Identity shared similar views so were unlikely to believe Rudolph posed a threat as a terrorist. Rudolph was described by Gayman as belligerent and undisciplined, unable to get along with others in the church. Gayman’s efforts to educate Rudolph and get him to behave better were rejected. Gayman’s son reported Rudolph left the group essentially unable to conform to the group’s ideology (Vollers, 2006, p. 104). Rudolph shared some of the views of radical groups, but was unable to conform to their structure. It appears when he left the group, those who might have known his views may not have understood how violent his views might be. Rudolph’s inability to fit in has been described in a way to make him appear inept and a loner, but not as a violent independent man capable of terrorism. From a risk assessment standpoint, Rudolph’s ideology was not much different from that of his family and friends. When he had disagreements over ideology, he left rather than continue the conflict. Certainly after the bombings, when Rudolph had been
identified as a suspect, those who knew him could reflect on how differently he expressed his views. This question would likely have been helpful in an investigation focused on risk, reactively, rather than as a predictor.

4. Has the subject engaged in attack-related behavior, including surveillance, purchasing weapons or the ingredients for weapons? Receipts were found for materials used to make his bombs. Bomb fragments were matched to items available at Wal-Mart confirming Rudolph had made several shopping trips for his bomb materials. Investigators found books, manuals and pamphlets including a pamphlet called Guerilla Operations, survivalist literature, and a book on shadowing and surveillance. He owned a 9mm automatic pistol found loaded in his trailer. In letters written to Vollers subsequent to his arrest, he admitted to donning disguises to enter Wal-Mart while he was hiding (Vollers, 2006, p. 181).

Rudolph was described as having disappeared prior to the start of his terrorist campaign. He had sold the family home and rented trailers under an alias, moving every few months. He paid for everything with cash for about 18 months before detonating his first bomb. He lied to his family about his whereabouts, and had limited contact with society. Tom Branham had said Rudolph came back from the Army seemingly more radical, bitter, and secretive. During the search for Rudolph, Branham stated Rudolph threatened to retaliate if anyone informed on him to the police when it appeared Rudolph was engaged in trafficking marijuana. Branham ended his relationship with Rudolph in 1995, grateful Rudolph had moved from the family home (Vollers, 2006, p. 112). While this behavior may not have signaled attack behavior, Rudolph’s behavior changed and he gave up his connections with the people who had meant the most to him.
Rudolph was alleged to have owned weapons, to have killed pets on his property, and to have grown marijuana, but until he went into hiding after the bombings, little of his behavior suggested more than an anti-social quality. He learned skills in the Army that allowed him success in his bombing campaign, but no one had an opportunity to see him practice those skills that might have been alerting. It appears there was little in Rudolph’s behavior that would have alerted anyone to his plans. His behavior went unnoticed among family and neighbors.

5. Does the subject have a history of mental illness involving command hallucinations, delusional ideas, feelings of persecution, etc. with indications that the subject has acted on those beliefs? There is nothing in open source literature that would suggest Rudolph had a history of mental illness. He met the criteria to enlist in the Army yet purposely got himself discharged. He was reported to have used marijuana and there are references to paranoia given his alleged success at growing and selling marijuana (Vollers, 2006, pp. 110-111). His mother has been described as paranoid, suggested by her mistrust of the government. It has been suggested Rudolph was strongly influenced by his mother’s views including conspiracy theory, anti-abortionist views, and deeply religious views. He was alleged to have become a voracious reader (Springer, 2009, p. 61) and likely chose materials supporting the views taught by his mother and other influences from his past. His difficulty fitting in, paranoia, and history of crime would suggest a personality disorder, and not mental illness, per se. He did not appear to be delusional, although had become self-radicalized while living alone in the woods of North Carolina. Mental illness does not appear to have been an issue.
6. How organized is the subject? Is he capable of developing and carrying out a plan? Rudolph described in a letter to Vollers how he and his brother built a family homestead based on the lessons he learned from Tom Branham. Two former girlfriends had described how hard Rudolph worked to tend to his marijuana crops and his home during their visits. They described him as hard working (Vollers, 2006, p. 107). Although he did not complete school or fulfill his commitment to the Army, he appeared to have had a very successful marijuana business that would have required the ability to organize.

During his 18 months in the Army, Rudolph had completed basic infantry training at Fort Benning, Georgia. His military records indicate he did well. He was then stationed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky where he earned the Air Assault Badge and received training in survival, to include constructing booby traps and improvised shaped charges and Claymore mines. He learned to set the initial bomb as a diversion, and to set a second bomb in a location directing the blast toward the enemy gathered in response to the initial blast. This was a tactic he used when he set the two bombs at a gay nightclub in Atlanta (Vollers, 2006, pp. 42 & 107). Clearly Rudolph had demonstrated the ability to organize and carry out plans. Had anyone suspected that Rudolph might have had plans to attack, this question would have been relevant in predicting his ability to follow through.

7. Has the subject experienced a recent loss and or loss of status and has this led to feelings of desperation and despair? Springer described Rudolph as a man who never fit. He had attended public school periodically, and was always on the outskirts, unable to connect with other students. He did not complete his tour in the Army, unable to make it into the elite Rangers. He had a few relationships with women, but none lasted except for the relationship with his mother. Rudolph wrote to friends in the Army once he
was out asking them to get out and join him in his marijuana business yet they rejected him. According to Springer, the only part of his life that did not fail him was his ideology (Springer, 2009, p. 68).

There was no recent loss as he had been unable throughout his life to attain any level of status or significant connection. Rudolph was a misfit who retreated over the years from the limited connections he ever had to society. The loss of relationships was gradual as was the strengthening of his beliefs. The timing of his terrorist campaign was likely more affected by his ability to disappear in order to cover his actions than by any loss or strong negative feeling he may have felt. He was described as angry, and the more connected he became to his ideology, the more he seemed to believe he was justified in destroying his government (Springer, 2009, p. 68).

8. Corroboration – What is the subject saying and is it consistent with his actions? Many people heard Rudolph, over the years, rail against blacks, gays, and abortion. There is no evidence to suggest he acted out against any of those groups in the presence of others, except that he allegedly left the Army because he could not tolerate taking orders from black leaders.

His classmates remembered he often spent the weekend with few possessions surviving in the wilderness, and he taught them survival skills. His behavior as an adult followed that pattern of living alone and thriving on his self-sufficiency. He tried to join groups to include the Army and extremist groups, but never fit in. Each time he failed, it seemed he pulled back further from society. In this regard, his desire to be a part of a group, even if it was simply asking former Army buddies to join him in his marijuana
business, was inconsistent with his action of pulling back. Tom Branham witnessed Rudolph’s anger and bitterness after he returned from the Army.

In hindsight, those who knew him seemed able to point to the conflict between Rudolph’s desire to be a part of a group and his inability to do so. Yet, his independence and self-reliance appeared to impress people, rather than to worry people. He came across as a rugged individual who symbolized the attitude of others living in the Nantahala Forest away from the reaches of government. Rudolph’s mother taught her children to think for themselves and endorsed a fear of the government (Vollers, 2006, p. 249; Springer, 2009, p. 52). She was not likely to worry that her son was unable to fit in. Most who knew him or came in contact with Rudolph would have been unlikely to see a discrepancy between his thoughts and his actions.

9. Is there concern among those that know the subject that he might take action based on inappropriate ideas? Only one young woman is known to have expressed significant concern over Rudolph’s potential action and said she stopped hanging out with him after he spoke about building bombs. She apparently never reported this situation to anyone; she only kept her distance.

Rudolph’s mother, with whom he had always been close, supported his beliefs, in fact introduced him to many of the beliefs that formed his ideology. As paranoid as she was about the government, it is questionable whether she would have been concerned about her son’s plans. Puckett wrote about the dedication to a cause that seemed to be a part of the Rudolph fabric. When federal agents interviewed his mother to engage her cooperation to get Rudolph to turn himself in, she told the agents she taught her children...
to think for themselves, and she would not get involved in drawing him in (Vollers, 2006, p. 137).

Neighbors in the mountain community in the Nantahala Forest shared similar views against the government. During the hunt for Rudolph one woman who wrote a ballad about Rudolph did not believe he was guilty of all he was accused. She believed the government embellished the charges. Many in the local area were pleased he had been able to evade the law (Vollers, 2006, pp. 158-159). However, many others in the area do not believe in killing and had little sympathy for his plight. It is believed he stole food from the gardens and homes of locals in his years on the run, and it is unclear if any in the community were clearly complicit in his evasion of the law. One neighbor stated as long as he did not hurt anyone locally, she was not concerned he had not been captured (Jonsson, 2003). From this description of Rudolph by his neighbors, it would appear as long as one is not considered a threat to the local community, one’s behavior is tolerated. By disappearing into the community, it is unlikely anyone in the Nantahala Forest community would have been concerned that Rudolph would have taken any action.

10. **What factors in the subject’s life and/or environment might increase/decrease the likelihood of the subject attempting to attack a target?** In hindsight, it would appear that finding acceptance in a personal relationship or in a social group might have decreased Rudolph’s need to attack to gain attention. He seemed to need to be seen as important, to find legitimacy in the eyes of others.

The fact the Olympics were being held in Atlanta, relatively close to his home in North Carolina, seemed to give him the perfect opportunity to embarrass his government in the world’s eyes. In a letter to Vollers after his arrest, Rudolph admitted to wanting to
cause the cancellation of the Olympics, or to at least cause people to leave the city, in order to eat into anticipated revenue. His goal was to confuse the government on the world’s stage and the Olympics gave him that opportunity (Vollers, 2006, pp. 289-290).

Ironically he was taught by his mother to reject what is “normal” in society. She kept him from public school for many years, kept him from living in a suburban setting where he might have developed relationships, and connected him to non-traditional religions that prevented him from accepting diversity. His mother had been unable to find an acceptable curriculum for home schooling, which seems to have encouraged Rudolph’s belief his views were superior to others. He never learned to fit in, and it appears his thwarted efforts to matter fueled his need to attack. The more he withdrew and focused on literature supporting his views, the more he seemed to need to act out and find a way to punish others for failing to hear him.

It is likely had others in the community noticed his behavior, had neighbors turned him in for his marijuana business, he may have attacked sooner. He had expressed anger and threatened retaliation, and was deemed by at least one person as capable of acting out against others. It appears he purposefully chose the mountains of western North Carolina in which to live. He was allowed the freedom to do as he pleased, with no interference from other residents.

From a threat assessment perspective, it does not appear those who knew Eric Rudolph would have looked at these questions and wondered if he was not only capable of, but also intending to, engage in any kind of attack. Although he lacked the social skills to fit in, he was bright enough and arrogant enough to plan carefully to express his anger as well as to hide his intentions. These questions, to be effective in preventing a
terrorist attack, require the subject of an investigation have a relationship with others who could alert authority to danger. Rudolph’s history of isolation and independence prevented others from seeing the gradual change in him. Kaczynski’s transformation from college professor to loner in a sparse cabin was much more dramatic than Rudolph, who never amounted to much at any point in his young life.

Carlos Bledsoe/Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad. Carlos Bledsoe was born in Memphis on July 9, 1985, the younger of two children. He grew up in the suburbs of Memphis and graduated from Craigmont High School in 2003. Neighbors of his parents described Carlos as a good kid, saying he would mow his grandmother’s lawn, played football and did other “normal” things. Growing up, he had a dog that appeared to be his best friend. In the fall of 2003, when Bledsoe was 18 he moved to Nashville to attend Tennessee State University. He majored in Business Administration and remained in school for four semesters (NEFA Foundation, 2009, “The Conspirator,” para. 1-2). Bledsoe’s parents had hoped he would graduate and come home to run the tour business they own in Memphis so they could retire early (King, 2011, “Statement of,” p. 1).

As a teen, Bledsoe appeared to rebel against family values and was frequently in trouble with the law. After his arrest in 2009, Bledsoe/Muhammad wrote several letters to The Commercial Appeal, a daily newspaper in Memphis. In one he wrote he had been a member of a gang in high school. He had once been in a car that had been hit from behind. In response, he got out and went back to yell at the driver who claimed he broke out her window with brass knuckles. He was arrested on a weapons charge and reported the case was handled non-judicially by juvenile court. He was not yet 18. At age 15-16 he
drank alcohol on average two to three times per year and smoked marijuana once every two months (Goetz, 2010, Section 2, para. 4-6).

One night in February 2004, Bledsoe was a passenger in a car in Knoxville, Tennessee. When the car was pulled over, the police seized a loaded SKS 7.62 assault rifle, a sawed-off 12-gauge shotgun and a 20-gauge shotgun. Bledsoe also had an ounce of marijuana in his possession and told the police he was planning to sell the shotguns to the driver. He faced weapons and drug charges but the charges were dropped in June 2004 when he was 19 (NEFA Foundation, 2009, “The Conspirator,” para. 3). According to an affidavit, Bledsoe was in the rear seat of a vehicle stopped for an equipment malfunction. A front seat passenger fled the scene, and Bledsoe was cited for having a switchblade in his jacket pocket (Little Rock District Court, 2009, p. 11). In one of his letters to The Commercial Appeal, he wrote he was looking at 14 years in prison for those charges (Goetz, 2010, Section 2, para. 13-20).

Bledsoe suddenly realized he was on a bad path and decided he needed to change his life. He pleaded the charges down to a year on probation with the agreement that if he got so much as a traffic ticket, he would be in jail to serve the 14 years. He also admitted to drinking heavily, to the point of drunkenness, at least four times per week, and was smoking about an ounce of marijuana each week when he was in college. He looked to religion to find his way. He was raised Baptist but felt it did not meet his needs. He tried to turn to Judaism, but felt unaccepted at the synagogue. He then turned to Islam and found himself welcomed (Goetz, 2010, Section 2, para. 13-20).

Shortly after the arrest in 2004, Bledsoe converted to Islam. Friends in college reportedly showed him a new life, a path he felt compelled to follow. It appears he
attended the Muslim Society of Memphis occasionally. In 2005-2006, after dropping out of school, he lived in several low rent apartments, often moving from an apartment without paying his rent. This led to more legal proceedings. On March 29, 2006, Bledsoe applied to officially change his name to Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad. Five months later he received a summons for an expired driver’s license (NEFA Foundation, 2009, “The Conspirator,” para. 5).

In 2006-2007, Muhammad attended a mosque in Columbus, Ohio that had been frequented by a group of convicted terrorists, two of whom were sentenced for providing material support to al Qaeda. It is not known whether Bledsoe had contact with any of those who had already been convicted. He may have been under investigation by law enforcement while in Columbus (NEFA Foundation, 2009, “The Conspirator,” para. 6).

In September 2007, Muhammad flew to Yemen but not before family members tried to talk him out of it [The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT), 2011, para. 7]. Before his arrest there in October 2008, he taught English, learned Arabic, and met and married his wife, but little more is known about the time he spent there. When he was arrested, having overstayed his visa, he had among his possessions fake Somali identification papers, suggesting he may have been attempting to go to Somalia to receive training for Jihad (Dao, 2010 February 16, para. 25). Muhammad’s attorney suggested the Somali papers would have allowed him to travel without having his US passport stamped, minimizing suspicion when he returned to the US (NEFA Foundation, 2009, “The Conspirator,” para. 10). FoxNews.com reported Muhammad studied Jihad with an Islamic scholar in Yemen, according to the website, Jihadwatch.org (FoxNews.com, 2009).
When Yemeni authorities deported Muhammad in January 2009, he returned to Memphis. His parents commented that he seemed different; he was fidgety and frustrated and angry at the United States because of the wounded children he had seen from the war in Afghanistan. He was also angry about the immigration policy that prevented him from bringing his wife to the United States. His parents said he began to speak openly saying the United States needed to leave Muslims alone, and to stay out of the business and countries of Muslims (NEFA Foundation, 2009, “The Conspirator,” para. 17).

Marvin Bledsoe, Muhammad’s father, supported his son financially and emotionally, moving him to Little Rock, Arkansas to open a new office for the family’s tour bus company (Herridge & Donner, 2011, para. 1). Mr. Bledsoe allegedly wanted his son to have a job so he could bring his wife to the United States. However, because his wife could not obtain a visa to travel to the United States from Yemen, Muhammad filed for divorce (IPT, 2011, “The Road to,” para. 3). In April 2009, Muhammad moved into an apartment in Little Rock and by late May had led his first tour for his father’s business (Dao, 2010, February 16, para. 1 & 30). On May 23, 2009 Muhammad filed documents in Pulaski County, Arkansas, requesting to change his name again, this time to Abdulhakim Bledsoe. Reportedly this change was for religious reasons (NEFA Foundation, 2009, “The Conspirator,” para. 30).

Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad was arrested on June 1, 2009 after allegedly shooting and killing one soldier outside of the North Little Rock, Arkansas Military Recruiting Center. He was also reported to have critically wounded a second soldier. Charges at the time of arrest were for 15 counts of terrorist acts, because he was alleged to have fired shots into the recruiting station in which 13 people were working, and at the
two soldiers outside smoking cigarettes; one count of felony charge of terroristic acts for the wounding of one soldier; and a capital murder charge for the death of a soldier. Muhammad waived his rights and stated he was a practicing Muslim and was angry at the US military for what they had done in the past to other Muslims (Arkansas Crime Information Center, 2009, p. 4).

The Investigative Project on Terrorism reported, prior to the attack in Little Rock, Muhammad had tossed a Molotov cocktail at the home he believed belonged to an Orthodox rabbi in Nashville, but it did not ignite. His second plan was to attack an Army recruiting center in Florence, Kentucky but it was closed when he arrived. Frustrated at his inability to take revenge, he returned to Little Rock to devise new plans and stopped his truck when he saw the two soldiers outside of the Little Rock Recruiting Station (IPT, 2011, “First Attempts.” para. 1-2).

Muhammad told investigators he put three weapons into his vehicle and drove around. When he saw the two soldiers in uniform smoking outside of the recruiting center, he pulled into the parking lot and shot them with several rounds. He stated he intended to kill the soldiers and would have shot and killed more had more soldiers been outside (Arkansas Crime Information Center, 2009, p. 4).

In 2010, it was reported Muhammad had spoken to his sister a week before the shooting, and he appeared to be back to what his sister would consider his old self. He had just led his first tour in Little Rock for his father’s recently expanded tour bus company. When he returned to Memphis from Yemen, in early 2009, he seemed to be constantly angry about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In early 2010, he wrote a note to a judge asking to plead guilty, informing her that he was a member of al Qaeda of the
Arabian Peninsula. The Pulaski County prosecutor and Mr. Bledsoe believe Muhammad was acting alone, and he had never had contact with Anwar al-Awlaki, the American who was allegedly connected to MAJ Nidal Hassan. His sister said Muhammad seemed, in the week before the shooting, to be more relaxed than when he first returned home (Dao, 2010 February 16, para. 1 & 17).

Information from the FBI’s investigation prior to the attack remains unavailable in the public domain. Melvin Bledsoe believes the FBI should have been held accountable for the shootings, as his son had been interviewed twice by the same agent, once in Yemen while he was in prison, and then in February 2009 after Muhammad returned to Nashville (Dao, 2010 February 16, para. 6). Mr. Bledsoe believes the FBI knew Muhammad had attended Jihadi training in Yemen. Mr. Bledsoe believed his son would not face federal charges, that he would only be prosecuted by the state of Arkansas, which would prevent the FBI from releasing any information it may have known about Muhammad before the shooting (Herridge & Donner, 2011).

Stewart and Burton (2009) reported their understanding that the FBI had been told to suspend investigations into the activities of Black Muslim converts, which likely would have included that of Muhammad in 2009. They hypothesized even if a full-field investigation had begun, it would have been micromanaged to the point of inactivity. It appears politics may have interfered with any counterterrorism efforts the FBI may have undertaken. Had there been evidence of criminal activity, and a full field investigation been opened, these authors believe the FBI would have observed Muhammad as he conducted surveillance as part of the terrorist attack cycle (Stewart & Burton, 2009, “Limitations on Both Sides”).
On July 25, 2011, Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad pleaded guilty to capital murder, attempted capital murder and ten weapons-related charges. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the murder, plus 11 life sentences and an additional 180 years for the remaining charges. This guilty plea prevented the court from applying the death penalty had Muhammad been found guilty at trial (Nuss, 2011, para. 1).

Mr. Bledsoe addressed the Committee on Homeland Security of the US House of Representatives on March 10, 2011. He blamed Islamic radicals for programming his son and training him to kill, ultimately leading to the death of the soldier in Little Rock. His father reported that at age 8, Carlos became involved with his tour bus business, interacting with customers. Upon graduating high school, he went to college to study business administration, with his parents believing he would return home and take over the family business, allowing them to retire early (King, 2011, “Statement by,” p. 1).

Muhammad went home to Memphis during the Christmas holiday in 2005, which was when his family noticed changes. He argued with his brother-in-law about Islam and the family believed he had Muslim friends in Nashville, and that Carlos was simply offended by comments made by his family. During a subsequent visit home, Carlos took all the photographs off of his bedroom wall, to include a photo of Martin Luther King, Jr. with which he had grown up. The family worried this photograph no longer held meaning for him (King, 2011, “Statement by,” p. 2).

When Carlos declined to come home to visit after this, his parents went to visit him and learned he had dropped out of college at the beginning of the fall 2005 semester and he was working a temporary job with other Muslims who told him it was acceptable to interrupt business and pray as required by the Muslim religion. Mr. Bledsoe attempted
to reason with his son as a business owner, pointing out the difficulties of accommodating the religious beliefs of each employee. Mr. and Mrs. Bledsoe also learned Carlos had gotten a dog while in college, but upon converting to Islam, he let it loose in the woods, because he learned dogs were considered dirty within Islam. This worried his parents, because as mentioned above, Carlos had owned and cared for a dog since he was five years old (King, 2011, “Statement by,” p. 2).

Mr. Bledsoe reported his son converted to Islam in 2004 (IPT, 2011, para. 2). He described a gradual change in his son who became totally disinterested in his own culture and totally consumed with the culture of Islam. Mr. Bledsoe talked about the gradual brainwashing of his son by Muslim leaders at a mosque in Nashville who took advantage of Carlos. After he changed his name, Muhammad was afforded the opportunity to go to Yemen, from where he was told he would be able to go to Saudi Arabia in order to go to Mecca because he believed all good Muslims should do this. His father reported that a former imam of the Nashville mosque wrote a letter of recommendation to a school in Aden, Yemen that is a front for a terrorist training camp. Muhammad believed he would be teaching English at a British school in Aden, but his father told the Committee the school was involved in recruiting Westerners to be radicalized and trained for Jihad (King, 2011, “Statement by,” p. 3).

According to Mr. Bledsoe, his son had been “followed” by the FBI while in Nashville prior to going to Yemen. Muhammad was arrested in Yemen for overstaying his visa and was allegedly jailed with hard-core al Qaeda members who Mr. Bledsoe said convinced his son to seek revenge upon America. While in the Yemeni prison, Muhammad was allegedly interviewed by an FBI agent from Nashville before the US
Embassy was alerted to Muhammad’s arrest. The family sought help from the State Department, the Embassy, the office of their congressman, and the FBI to obtain their son’s release and return to the United States. Mr. Bledsoe believes the FBI continued to follow his son upon his return home, but no information was ever provided to the family about Muhammad, which the family believes they might have been able to use to have helped their son and ultimately to have prevented the killing in Little Rock (King, 2011, “Statement by,” p. 3).

Mr. Bledsoe described his son as a happy child who loved to tell jokes and was always smiling. He also said his son loved team sports to include football and basketball; he also loved swimming, dancing and listening to music. His description would appear to be of a normal child who grew up comfortably in his environment, however when he went away to college, he was preyed upon by Muslims with radical Islamic political views whose primary goal is to recruit citizens and convert them, turning them against non-believers. Mr. Bledsoe believes something must be done by the American society to prevent extremists from recruiting more citizens; America can no longer ignore the radical Islamists who are a separate group from the peaceful, law abiding Muslims he knows personally (King, 2011, “Statement by,” pp. 1-3).

**Analysis of Muhammad Case.** The application of the threat assessment model developed by Borum et al. (1999) may be more relevant to the case of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad and may have been useful as a counterterrorism tool.

1. **What motivated the subject to make the statements, or take the action, that caused him/her to come to attention?** Muhammad had stated many times, after returning from Yemen, that he was angry at what the United States military had done to
Muslims, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2004, Muhammad converted to Islam, turning away from everything in his native culture. His parents were aware, before he left for Yemen, Muhammad had turned to radical Islam; in fact, family members warned him to stay away from radical groups when he was overseas. Upon his return from Yemen, his parents were aware of his burning anger about what American soldiers were doing against Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not clear whether he had spoken before killing the soldier about revenge for the American killing of Muslims, but after his arrest he made it clear he was seeking revenge. After his arrest in Little Rock, he also told investigators that he was angry about what Jewish groups had done in Palestine (IPT, 2011, “First attempts,” para. 4). His parents were aware he had been radicalized while in Yemen and had returned home with anti-American views. They attempted to westernize him by directly involving him in the family tourism business (IPT, 2011, “The Road to,” para. 2). The family was aware of his anger toward the United States.

2. What has the subject communicated to anyone concerning his intentions?

It would appear Muhammad had not communicated his intentions to his family. His parents were aware of his discontent, and attempted to help him readjust to life in America by setting him up in their new office in Little Rock. Mr. Bledsoe was aware the FBI had followed his son, but the family did not know of his intentions to attack Americans. After he moved to his own apartment in Little Rock, he had the freedom to buy the weapons he needed for his personal Jihad (IPT, 2011, “The Road,” para. 7). Muhammad was able to hide his intentions and his plans.

3. Has the subject shown an interest in terrorism, terrorist groups, weapons, extremist groups, or espoused a radical ideology? Outsiders would most assuredly
respond positively to this question. This may have been a difficult situation for Muhammad’s parents to look at objectively. The Bledsoes were aware their son had converted from Baptist to Islam in 2004. They were not happy about his conversion and gradually watched him move completely away from his culture to what appeared to be a total preoccupation with Islam. Mr. Bledsoe stated he attempted to meet the imam in Nashville and other Muslim friends of his son on his multiple visits to Nashville, but he and his son were never able to find them. In hindsight, Mr. Bledsoe was sure his Muslim friends were trying to separate Muhammad from his family and friends (IPT, 2011, para. 5).

Not all Muslims are terrorists, and Mr. Bledsoe compared his son to his other relatives who were Muslim and clearly saw a difference. The family expressed concern to Muhammad before he left for Yemen. He told them he was going to teach English, and relatives cautioned him about becoming involved in radical activity. He agreed, and his father believes, or at least wanted to believe, his son was unaware that Jihadist recruiters would work to radicalize him (IPT, 2011, para. 8).

The FBI questioned Muhammad when he lived in Nashville, they questioned Muhammad when he was imprisoned in Yemen, and the FBI again questioned Muhammad upon his return from Yemen (IPT, 2011, “The road to,” para. 4). According to Mr. Bledsoe, the FBI never provided information to the family they might have used to help their son. The Bledsoes do not know what the FBI knew about their son’s involvement with terrorists either in Nashville or Yemen. In hindsight, the parents believe the FBI knew information that could have prevented Muhammad’s attack (King, 2011, “Statement by,” p. 3).
Stewart and Burton (2009) point out the difficulty that law enforcement has in preventing terrorist attacks. It appears that the FBI had opened a preliminary inquiry when they questioned Muhammad. However, because he had not conducted any illegal activity, they closed the case. Had the facts supported opening a full-field investigation additional techniques could have been used to enhance the investigation. Muhammad had a history of weapons charges in high school and then in college, but all charges had been dropped and no further cause prompted an investigation. (Stewart & Burton, 2009, “Limitations,” para. 3-4). After his return from Yemen, the FBI requested a meeting with his son in Nashville, and Mr. Bledsoe believes the FBI wanted to use his son to report on the activity of local Muslims, however Muhammad apparently refused to participate. He returned to live with his parents in Memphis (IPT, 2011, “The road to,” para. 4-5). It is possible the FBI had knowledge about Muhammad’s activity with terrorists, to include training in Yemen, but was limited in what the agency could do to have prevented the murder of the soldier in Little Rock (Stewart & Burton, 2009, para. 6).

4. Has the subject engaged in attack-related behavior, including surveillance, purchasing weapons or the ingredients for weapons? Muhammad reported during his psychological evaluation after his arrest he had been in trouble in high school and had used guns and knives in fights beginning in junior high school. Records in Shelby County, Tennessee indicate he had used brass knuckles to destroy property [Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS), 2010, p. 12]. Because he was arrested with a false Somali passport, it was believed Muhammad might have obtained training in a terrorist training camp, or that at a minimum he was headed to Somalia for that purpose.

In addition, Muhammad had begun purchasing weapons when he moved to Little
Rock. He reported during his psychological evaluation he had begun purchasing weapons and ammunition gradually, because of limited funds. He purchased one rifle from “a guy” because he feared the FBI was watching him. He went into a Wal-Mart to purchase a .22 rifle to test whether he was being watched or would be questioned. He expected to be on a list that prevented him from purchasing weapons. He stated that on his way out of Wal-Mart with the weapon in his hand, he knew he was free to further his Jihad (Arkansas DHS, 2010, p. 11).

5. Does the subject have a history of mental illness involving command hallucinations, delusional ideas, feelings of persecution, etc. with indications that the subject has acted on those beliefs? There was no reason for his family to suspect Muhammad had any mental health issues, although they suspected he was being “brainwashed” by his acquaintances at the mosque in Nashville. After his arrest, Muhammad’s defense team requested a mental health evaluation, which upset Muhammad. He defended his actions with his religion, believing the Koran and his newfound religion justified his actions. He denied there was a mental illness leading him to attack Americans.

The psychological assessment concluded with no diagnosis either at the time of the crime or at the time of the evaluation. One finding of significance was that Muhammad tested with an estimated IQ of 90, which is in the low average range of intelligence (Arkansas DHS, 2010, p. 12). Although not mentally ill, his relatively low IQ would suggest others who appear more knowledgeable might easily lead him. He had the capacity to learn, and he learned from Muslims who appeared to have manipulated him into their agenda.
6. How organized is the subject? Is he capable of developing and carrying out a plan? Muhammad had graduated high school and had been admitted to Tennessee State University in Nashville. At least for two years, he attended school and for at least three semesters did well enough to be allowed to continue with his academic program. He had been a happy child, engaged with the family and engaging with his father’s customers. His father trusted he could take over the family business allowing his parents to retire early. It appears his father turned a blind eye to his son’s use of alcohol and marijuana in college, and he chose to overlook his son’s deep involvement with radical Muslims. His father seemed to believe his son had the capability to be a productive citizen, trusting him in a new office in Little Rock with minimal supervision.

Fortunately, Muhammad lacked the ability to completely think through his plan for Jihad. He admitted during his psychological evaluation that he had two failed attempts, one in Nashville with the Molotov cocktail, and the second in Florence, Kentucky when the recruiting station near the highway was closed. He was returning home to Little Rock to think through his plan (Arkansas DHS, 2010, p. 11). Muhammad was caught because he stopped to attack when he saw the soldiers outside the recruiting station and failed to notice or pay attention to witnesses who notified the police. In addition, he had left the tailgate to his vehicle open when he pulled out his rifle for the attack, allowing the police to more easily identify his vehicle on the highway (Arkansas DHS, 2010, p. 12).

It appears Muhammad was randomly driving, hoping to find a target, without thinking through the plan. While he could engage in organized behavior, and had demonstrated an ability to conduct an activity in the proper sequence, he may not have
had the ability to manage a project from start to finish on his own. It appears that if someone set the stage for him, or coached him in the process, he could easily follow through, but initiating a plan and developing it to the end was not easy. Even the plan to pursue a degree in Business Administration and return to take over his father’s business appeared to have been his father’s idea, and not his own. It would appear that this question about organizing his behavior might have led people to believe, incorrectly, he was incapable of a successful attack.

7. Has the subject experienced a recent loss and or loss of status and has this led to feelings of desperation and despair? Muhammad had apparently made connection with Muslim radicals in Yemen. He had a job, had met and married his wife, and was apparently on his way to Somalia for terrorist training. He was arrested, ending his plans. He stated while in jail in Yemen, he met Muslims from other countries, and when the FBI came to speak with him, he told the agent he did not want to be returned to the United States (Arkansas DHS, 2010, p. 9). He was deported to the United States against his wishes (IPT, 2011, para. 11).

It would appear Muhammad lost his position within his world of radical Islam. He had the attention of imams and fellow Muslims who talked with him in Nashville, Yemen, and then in the Yemeni jail. He stated when he was seeking a way to make his life better, he witnessed the group behavior in the mosque of an entire congregation bowing in prayer. He tried to participate in their worship. When others saw he was unfamiliar with the religion, but was interested, they rejoiced in celebrating him. He felt welcomed, and paid attention to their lessons, becoming a believer (Goetz, 2010, Section 2, para. 21-26). Being deported forced him to return home where his parents tried to
return him to his own culture. It would appear he lost his “specialness” having to be taken care of by his father.

It is unlikely his family would have perceived Muhammad’s loss of status. His parents had taught the value of education and were willing to hand a successful business over to their son. In an effort to bring him back to his roots, Muhammad’s father willingly gave his son the opportunity to succeed. In his father’s eyes, having a new job in a new city, living in his own apartment likely would have appeared as if Muhammad was gaining status, not losing it.

8. Corroboration – What is the subject saying and is it consistent with his actions? Muhammad’s anger at America and the way soldiers were treating Muslims in other countries was made clear to his family. Mr. Bledsoe believes the FBI asked his son to work for them, reporting on the activities of other Muslims and may have been hopeful that his son’s rejection of the offer was because he was turning away from radical Islam (IPT, 2011, “The Road,” para. 4).

His son had been expressing anger toward Americans, but seemed willing to move to Little Rock to support his father’s new office. In the days leading up to the attack, Muhammad’s sister would later report he seemed to have calmed and seemed to be back to his normal self. Much like a depressed person whose spirits begin to rise when plans for suicide come together, so it appears Muhammad’s mood seemed to rise as he solidified his plans for attack. Because of his change in attitude, it is unlikely the family would have been worried had they been questioned about Muhammad’s potential risk for attack.

9. Is there concern among those that know the subject that he might take
action based on inappropriate ideas? The family had been concerned about the degree to which their son had been radicalized, and Mr. Bledsoe realized, in hindsight, neither the FBI nor the family knew how involved Muhammad had become (IPT, 2011, “The Road,” para. 5). Given his father offered him the opportunity to branch out and move away from home to begin a new job, it is unlikely the family was concerned that Muhammad posed a serious risk. In addition, the family knew the FBI had questioned Muhammad numerous times and were likely calmed by the fact the FBI did not provide information about their son’s risk for action nor had he been taken into custody. It is unclear whether the FBI denied the family information on the basis of Muhammad’s status as an adult.

It is clear the family had been concerned about their son as relatives cautioned him to stay away from radical activity in Yemen. Upon his arrest in Yemen, the family worked with several federal and government agencies to have Muhammad deported to the United States. At some point, his father learned Muhammad had attended at least two training camps for extremists in Yemen. He also knew the FBI had questioned his son several times, and after his last visit with the FBI in Nashville in February 2009, Mr. Bledsoe reported his son had become withdrawn and angry (Herridge & Donner, 2011). Although Muhammad was an adult, it might be presumed the family’s involvement in getting him out of Yemen would signal an involvement. Mr. Bledsoe stated the FBI knew his son was moving to Little Rock to run a branch office of the family business, so the FBI might have provided information to the family if the agency had reason to believe their son was at risk for inappropriate behavior. It is hypothesized the family had a false sense of comfort knowing the FBI had been involved but had not shared concerns with
10. What factors in the subject’s life and/or environment might increase/decrease the likelihood of the subject attempting to attack a target?

Muhammad’s family and other writers have hypothesized that had the FBI opened a full-field investigation Muhammad may not have been able to purchase all the weapons or may have been observed as he conducted surveillance on several targets (Stewart & Burton, 2009, “Limitations,” para. 9). In hindsight, this might have spurred the FBI to pay more attention to Muhammad, however he had not yet violated any laws. The lack of attention by the FBI, in fact, encouraged Muhammad to pursue his goals.

When Mohammed moved to his own apartment in Little Rock he had more freedom to prepare for his Jihad. He had the privacy to collect weapons and ammunition, to plot his trips on maps, and to search the Internet for targets. He also had a job so had cash allowing for the purchase of weapons. Mr. Bledsoe believed setting his son up in business would “westernize” him, but it appears to have made Jihad much more possible, doing just the opposite.

During the ten weeks Muhammad spent in the jail in Yemen, he listened to foreigners who held radical ideas against America and he was encouraged to pursue attacks on America when he was released. He told the psychiatrist in Little Rock he began planning for his Jihad in America while he was in the Yemeni prison (Goetz, 2010, Section 5, para. 7). Muhammad had been in the United States less than five months when he attacked the recruiting station and killed the soldier in Little Rock. Relatively little had been done to minimize his level of radicalization upon his return. Mr. Bledsoe may have felt his son was open to taking part in the family business, but it appears Muhammad’s
anger was stronger than the family suspected.

One other factor that may have made a difference is Muhammad had married a woman who would never be able to join him in the United States. The United States would not grant her a visa because she was from Yemen, a hotbed of radical Islam. Muhammad allegedly argued with her about the visa situation and told her he was going to obtain a divorce (IPT, 2011, “The Road,” para. 3). Mr. Bledsoe believed the extremists with whom his son had met in Yemen arranged the marriage (Herridge & Donner, 2011). Muhammad said very little about his marriage during his mental health evaluation, so it is possible, having only been married for two months prior to his arrest, he may not have felt very close to his wife. However, it is possible he was frustrated she could not come to the United States, another slight upon Muslims. Had she been able to join him in America, it is hypothesized they might have settled into a “normal” routine.

The fact that Muhammad seemed unable to initiate a plan and bring it to fruition likely prevented further attacks. Where Kaczynski and Rudolph had been able to conduct multiple attacks before finally being caught, Muhammad had only been able to conduct one attack and was caught. Although he may have planned for several targets, he was unable to consider all facets of a successful plan. He reported he had attempted two previous attacks without success, and fortunately was limited to the amount of damage he could do by his own limitations.

**Summary.** Table 3.2 presents a summary of each question for each of the three cases. It would appear the least relevant question in this study is the fifth one about mental illness. Most of the questions presented some information that could be alerting to law enforcement professionals. Family and peers may also be able to utilize these
questions as a foundation for a report to law enforcement officials.

Table 3.2
Summary and comparison of responses for each case to the 10 terrorism questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Theodore Kaczynski</th>
<th>Eric Rudolph</th>
<th>Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 Motivation | • Anti-technology  
• Anti-industry  
• Revenge  
• Desire to be recognized; to matter | • Anti-abortion  
• Inability to fit in  
• Desire to matter | • Angry at U.S. for killing Muslims  
• Radicalization |
| 2 Communication | • Anonymous letters  
• Expressed anger to family  
• Maintained journals | • Told acquaintance he wanted to build a bomb  
• Maintained journals  
• Limited contact with family | • No communication of intent with family |
| 3 Interest in Terrorism | • Hid behind “FC;” Freedom Club  
• Ideology against technology  
• Influence: The Secret Agent by Joseph Conrad | • Fringes of extremist groups  
• Hid behind “Army of God” | • Conversion to Islam  
• Went to Yemen  
• Was arrested with paperwork for Somalia  
• Imprisoned in Yemen |
| 4 Attack-related Behaviors | • Threat to “get even” in 1978  
• Science experiments in high school | • Purchased materials at Wal-Mart  
• Gave up connections to family and friends  
• Had weapons; learned skills in Army | • Fights and gang membership in high school  
• Purchased weapons  
• Two unsuccessful attempts before shooting |
| 5 Mental Illness | • Paranoid Schizophrenia with delusions  
• Diagnosis post arrest  
• History of seeking counseling; only single visits or letters | • No diagnosis  
• No psychological assessment | • No diagnosis  
• Psychological assessment post arrest |
| 6 Organization | • PhD by age 23  
• Professor at Berkeley  
• Built his own cabin  
• Lived frugally | • Completed Basic Training and Air Assault  
• Learned survival and infantry skills in Army | • Attended college successfully for 3 semesters  
• History of alcohol and drug use  
• Not a good planner: 2 failed attempts |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>7 Loss</th>
<th>8 Corroboration</th>
<th>9 Concern of Others</th>
<th>10 Prevention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|   | • Social outcast all his life  
• Loss of a peaceful world due to technology | • Few relationships with women  
• Never fit in  
• Gave up social connections prior to bombing campaign | • Lost his position among his Muslim world upon deportation to the U.S. |   |
|   | Always a loner  
• Loving letters versus angry letters to home | • People heard his rants for years  
• Anti-gay, blacks & abortion  
• Spent much time alone  
• Conflict between wanting to be part of a group and inability to do so | • Angry, but he was willing to move to Little Rock to run the family business  
• His attitude seemed to turn positive |   |
|   | Yes: sister-in-law  
• Family knew of anger | No, though one woman heard threat at least 5 years before 1st bomb  
• Community shared similar views | Yes, the family  
• FBI questioned and released him-no investigation  
• His father gave him a job in Little Rock to de-radicalize him |   |
|   | Ability to sustain personal connections  
• Finding acceptance  
• Ability to sustain personal connections  
• Mother who taught socially appropriate values |   | Had FBI opened a full field investigation  
• Had his father not moved him to Little Rock |   |
Chapter 4
Discussion

The threat assessment approach developed by Borum et al. (1999) to evaluate the assessment of risk for targeted violence appears to focus on relevant patterns of thinking and behaviors when applied to the potential lone terrorist. Utilizing these three cases, most of the questions provided answers that might have been used to prevent terrorist attacks, or in the cases of Kaczynski and Rudolph, may have been able to prevent at the least some of the attacks. However, their utility is seemingly more relevant with today’s technology and cultural awareness of terrorism than they may have been in the 1980s and 1990s when both men were actively conducting attacks.

The effective use of this threat assessment tool by the general population in assisting law enforcement depends upon relationships between the potential terrorist and those who might be able to detect potential risk. In cases of targeted violence, the attacker generally had a direct relationship with the target, and generally had close relationships with others in the community. Close relationships did not exist for Kaczynski or Rudolph. Muhammad, on the other hand, had a family with whom he had once been close and had had recent contact prior to his attack. In spite of the closeness the Bledsoes attempted to maintain with their son, he was able to engage in pre-attack behaviors and follow through on an attack, without their knowledge.

In a case of workplace violence, Omar Thornton was a driver for a beer and wine wholesaler in Manchester, Connecticut when he opened fire on fellow employees in August 2010. He was suspected by management of stealing beer and was offered the opportunity to resign before being fired. During the meeting, management showed Thornton video of his thefts. After the meeting with management and the union, at which
he agreed to resign, Thornton pulled a gun out of his lunch box and began shooting at employees. He killed eight and wounded two workers before heading to an area from where he called 9-1-1 to report the shooting and to call his mother to tell her he loved her and goodbye. He then committed suicide. A Teamster official described him as a disgruntled employee (Associated Press, 2010). In this case, the shooter knew his victims as co-workers in the company he believed caused him shame. Victims included the Teamster official who had represented him in his meeting with management and workers who had been friendly with him (Associated Press, 2010).

Targeted violence, as the term implies, is against an identified or identifiable target. In addition to the relationship the attacker had with the victims, it would seem that many of these attackers had other relationships as well. Thornton had a mother, and a girlfriend with whom he had spent the night before the killings. In stark contrast are Kaczynski and Rudolph who had inadequate relationships and even Bledsoe/Muhammad who turned away from his family to find acceptance in an unfamiliar culture.

In all three terrorist cases presented here, the targets were strangers who represented a cause to which each terrorist professed his belief. Philip Erdberg and Puckett discussed the significance of ideology to the lone terrorist. In their research, lone terrorists tend to be intelligent individuals who were able to look internally for the authority needed for taking action rather than in relying on others. However, the individuals they studied were unsuccessful in their social lives (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, pp. 257-258). Pynchon and Borum (1999) wrote that individuals join groups for social acceptance. Individuals who have not developed a successful social identity may feel the positive social and emotional affiliation when they join a group (Pynchon & Borum,
Being accepted in a group may help one to feel important, and to be a part of something that matters (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, pp. 259-260).

Theodore Kaczynski felt he was a social cripple and never felt like he fit in. He hated the technological society in which he felt he could not live and identified himself as an organization with an ideology that would not reject him. Rudolph was unsuccessful in his bid to join the Army’s Special Forces but by becoming the Army of God, he could vent his anger against abortion and find acceptance (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, p. 264). Muhammad fell in with a bad crowd in high school and then in college, and sought comfort in religion. When he found Islam, he found acceptance in a group that encouraged him to attack Americans to further their cause.

Given these specific histories, this threat assessment tool may have had limited success in identifying Kaczynski or Rudolph as lone terrorists, because these individuals had little connection to people who might have recognized changes. The Bledsoes seemed to be in a different position, as they recognized some of the signs, but believed law enforcement agents knew more than they did and so did not make a report. Had Kaczynski or Rudolph maintained closer personal ties with anyone in their environment, the tool would likely have been effective. Had the Bledsoes known more about the FBI’s knowledge, they may have hesitated to support their son in a job and apartment that took him away from their attention. Had Kaczynski or Rudolph been successful in joining a group with similar ideologies, someone may have contacted the authorities. The group to which Muhammad turned served to inspire and encourage him so the tool would have been ineffective from the perspective of the group.

It is believed that circumstances in the United States since 9/11 may lead to a
greater sense of awareness among average citizens. Since 9/11 citizens have been encouraged by the “If you see something, say something” campaign by the Department of Homeland Security. This campaign may be aimed at bystanders to report suspicious packages, and family members and friends may not have been inspired by this campaign. However, an educational campaign aimed at protecting someone one knows from committing a crime that could result in death or imprisonment, as has happened recently in the Boston Marathon bombing, may be effective. David Kaczynski’s wife saw a resemblance between her brother-in-law and a terrorist she read about in a newspaper while she was in France, which caused her to persuade her husband to contact the authorities after the Unabomber’s manifesto was published. Although it was painful to David to contact the authorities, he hoped to prevent more death and destruction (Johnston & Scott, 1996, para. 1). With the prevalence of the Internet and greater attention being paid to the threat of terrorism, this tool may have significance.

An example of a citizen who reported suspicions to the police is a landlord in Arlington, Virginia, who evicted a tenant in 2010 for not paying rent. Because the tenant had been receiving numerous packages in the mail, all marked as books, the landlord contacted the Arlington police. At the time, the police told the landlord there was no reason to be concerned, however in January 2011, this tenant, Amine El Khalifi, came to the attention of federal agents (Horwitz, Wan & Wilber, 2012, para. 9-10). In February 2012, El Khalifi was arrested “…for allegedly attempting to detonate a bomb in a suicide attack on the U.S. Capitol building as part of what he intended to be a terrorist operation (FBI, 2012).” The FBI report cited a confidential human source as tipping them off, but The Washington Post described the involvement of the landlord in reporting the
suspicious behavior (Horwitz, Wan & Wilber, 2012, Para. 9-10). The public may never truly know how El Khalifi came to the attention of the federal agents, however, it is important to note a concerned person made a report that was investigated and eventually a man desiring to conduct a terrorist attack was stopped.

While this threat assessment tool appears it may be useful for the average citizen, law enforcement agencies may have benefitted from having these questions, particularly in their attempts to assess the risk posed by Muhammad. The FBI had questioned Muhammad before he went to Yemen, while he was imprisoned there, and then upon his return to Memphis. It appears Muhammad was under a preliminary investigation, but the FBI was precluded from opening a full field investigation, which might have led agents to observe Muhammad in the early stages of the attack cycle. These questions may have encouraged the FBI to take a closer look at Muhammad’s level of risk.

Monahan (2012) discussed the empirical research identifying individual risk factors for other crime. Listed among these factors are age, gender, marital status, social class, major mental illness, prior crime, and personality (Monahan, 2012, pp. 9-13). Kaczynski’s name was in a database of individuals who had been known to live in areas within which the Unabomber operated. He was eliminated as a suspect because he was much older than the 20-29 year age bracket one would have expected for a terrorist.

McCaulley and Moskalenko (2011) described six mechanisms that may influence one’s path toward radicalization. These include personal grievance; group grievance; slippery slope referring to small steps moving one toward involvement; love for someone already involved; risk taking and status, or thrill seeking; and unfreezing, moving from the failure of one social connection to another that may lead to radicalization (McCaulley
Moskalenko, p. 12). Unless there is a close relationship, information about these mechanisms may not be known. Although motivations and personal traits may be significant aspects of a risk assessment, observations of behavior will more likely be the trigger for the attention of investigators. Individual factors may not be as effective in determining the risk of an individual to engage in terrorism as an assessment of the patterns of behaviors and thoughts identified by Borum et al. (1999) might be (Borum et al., 1999, p. 327). As was presented during the analysis of each case, the behaviors of each of these men might have been significant in identifying risk, had people known for what to look.

Borum et al. (1999) presented three principles upon which an assessment of threat should be based. The first principle is that targeted violence involves a process of thinking and planning that is deliberate and not impulsive, often consuming the planner’s life. Several questions in the assessment deal with the planning an individual must do in order to carry out an attack. The second principle involves the interaction among the potential attacker, a past emotional event, a current situation and a target. The third principle is to understand the behaviors of the individual that are likely to lead up to an attack (Borum et al., 1999, pp. 329-330). In hindsight, these three principles were known in each of the three cases presented.

Demographic questions such as the individual risk factors Monahan presented from research are unlikely to contribute to the assessment of a threat in the way that questions about behaviors and thoughts will. These assessment principles focus attention on behaviors that are likely to be a part of the attack process. Being physically or emotionally close to someone would expose one to the behaviors of another person. As
was learned during Kaczynski’s investigation, the demographic factors are not useful. Publicizing these principles and questions may lead concerned citizens to contact authorities that may, in turn, open an investigation and prevent an attack.

The most significant drawback to this assessment tool appears to be the significance of the relationships that a potential lone terrorist has with others who could potentially identify behaviors. Rudolph and Kaczynski were so isolated they were able to carry out plans. The plans were developed because they were so alienated and thus unable to find a place in an accepting social group. The person most likely to engage in lone terrorism is most likely to be that isolated individual virtually unknown to others. While the assessment tool may be unable to prevent the first attack, it may be effective in preventing future attacks, at a much earlier stage than when Kaczynski’s sister-in-law became suspicious.

One other significant drawback is the situation faced by David Kaczynski; turning in one’s relative. Mr. Bledsoe admitted to being worried about his son; he acknowledged a personality change while his son was living in Nashville and then his son’s anger upon return from Yemen (King, 2011, “Statement by,” pp. 1-2). He had also expressed concern to his son prior to his trip that his son may be tied in with a bad crowd. Mr. Bledsoe told the media he had tried to meet the people at the mosque when he visited his son in Nashville but he and his son had been unable to find them (IPT, 2011, para. 5). It is unclear whether the Bledsoes would have been able, emotionally, to turn their son in had they known the extent of his radicalization. The Bledsoes knew the FBI had been following Muhammad but were not provided information about the FBI’s concerns. It would be reasonable to think the family would trust that their son was not a risk for
terrorism, although it is unclear if the FBI withheld information from the family because Muhammad was an adult. It seems as if it would be very difficult for a family member to report a suspicion that an individual may pose a terrorist threat.

Three friends of one of the Tsarnaev brothers were arrested and charged with obstructing justice after photos of the brothers were displayed on television after they allegedly set off two bombs at the Boston Marathon. The friends were reportedly trying to keep their friend from getting into trouble, by taking a backpack full of fireworks and a laptop computer from his dorm room (Bump, 2013, “Thursday, April 18,” para. 5-6).

Hendel (2009) recommended decreasing the threat of terrorism in Israel by applying consequences to both the intended act and the potential for damage. Hendel recommended developing policies and punishments that would negatively impact a terrorist’s motivation (Hendel, 2009, pp. 3-4). Sentencing practices are likely to impact a family member’s decision to report, even if a model were established to detect terrorism.

Returning to the case of Nidal Hasan, use of this tool might have prevented the attack that left 13 dead and 32 wounded on Fort Hood. There were enough questions raised by colleagues to have answered several of the questions posed in this tool. Understanding Hasan’s ideology; his alleged connection to Anwar al-Awlaki, an identified terrorist; and his anger toward the US military engaged in what he perceived as a war on Islam ought to have warranted a more intensive investigation that might have uncovered his plan.

Understandably, positive responses to any or all of the ten questions posed in this assessment tool may not justify opening an investigation. There are also investigative guidelines, and legal and privacy issues to be considered. Stewart and Burton (2009)
pointed out the limit to the number of investigations that can be handled by any given law enforcement agency. They also wrote that politics might have limited the investigation on Muhammad because of the cultural climate. Prior to Muhammad’s attack it is believed political issues may have prevented the FBI from following Black Muslim converts whose behavior may have been suspicious (Stewart & Burton, 2009, “Limitations,” para. 7-8). Stewart and Burton (2009) commented the Obama administration appears to be returning to a policy of relying on law enforcement agencies to prevent attacks rather than relying on intelligence (Stewart & Burton, 2009, “Limitations,” para. 11). Intelligence would aid in answering the questions posed in this risk assessment model.

It is clear we do not yet have a valid tool with which to assess the threat of risk for the potential lone terrorist. Al Qaeda is using its online journal, *Inspire*, to radicalize any individual who may feel isolated and alienated, inspiring them to do anything that would forward the cause of al Qaeda (Pantucci, 2011, p. 7). In the process, a disenfranchised person can suddenly find importance and feel as if he or she matters, as Turchie and Puckett (Turchie & Puckett, 2007, p. 256) have described. Americans are being asked to report suspicious behavior; perhaps if they had a set of useful questions about the behaviors they observe, attacks by lone terrorists could be prevented.
Chapter 5
Conclusion

Conclusions

This paper examines whether the behaviors of a terrorist differ from those of other types of lone offenders. The ultimate goal is to assess the effectiveness of a threat assessment model by which citizens can identify danger signs and alert counterterrorism officials when the behavior of a potential lone terrorist becomes worrisome. Law enforcement and security officials are limited in their abilities to conduct investigations and to identify every possible criminal or terrorist in a given community. Citizens and law enforcement need tools to identify the lone terrorist, prospectively rather than reactively. The identification of an effective assessment tool might help to identify a lone terrorist before an attack and help focus valuable resources on a viable threat.

The questions posed by Borum et al. (1999) in their risk assessment tool, when modified slightly to reflect behaviors consistent with terrorism, appear to be effective in identifying a lone terrorist. It would be ideal to have a “silver bullet” that would identify lone terrorists before they attack, however even after an attack, this tool may help during an investigation, as both citizens and law enforcement become more vigilant. An assessment of behaviors may be more effective in identifying a terrorist than trying to match someone to individual risk factors. The behaviors addressed by this tool appear to be just as relevant to the prevention of an attack by a lone terrorist as they are for the perpetrator of targeted violence.

Summary of Contributions to Counterterrorism

The profiling of a terrorist, often based upon demographic variables, can be rather limiting. This study expands efforts to identify a lone terrorist by focusing on behaviors
that may be indicative of terrorist activity and not simply looking at characteristics of the potential terrorist. Demographics may be helpful in the initial stages of identification, but investigators must focus on what a person is doing more so than on whom the person is. Past behaviors are the best predictors of future behavior. Behaviors are likely to be more predictive than character traits and motivations. Many of the behaviors upon which this risk assessment tool is based were identified in the three case studies presented here.

This study offers a risk assessment tool for use in the identification of a potential lone terrorist. As the tool developed by Borum et al. (1999) has been utilized to help identify the risk in targeted violence, it may also be utilized to identify the risk for lone terrorism. The strength of this approach lies in its focus on behaviors. The weakness of the approach is that observations of behavior require proximity to the perpetrator.

**Suggestions for Future Research**

It is recommended this tool be further studied in an analysis of domestic terrorism. This tool could be further refined based upon such an analysis. It was applied to older cases that may have been influenced differently from current trends in terrorism. Its foundation has served as a basis for the assessment of threat in other situations. Subsequent studies of this tool could provide a more unified approach to threat assessment as it relates to terrorism.

Monahan discussed the concept of structuring a risk assessment. He addressed not only identifying risk factors related to terrorism but also measuring those factors to determine their value. It is recommended the model presented in this study be used as a basis for furthering Monahan’s work.
In each of these three cases, positive responses were given to some, but not all ten questions posed by Borum et al. (1999). It is recommended that future research assess the value of each question to determine how best to structure a risk assessment based upon the evaluation of behaviors. Future research should determine whether there is value to developing a method of scoring or weighting questions. It is recommended that future research determine if the approach is all or nothing, or might there be degrees of positive responses or numbers of positive responses that are determinate when investigators open an investigation.

It is recommended analysis be undertaken to identify factors that would encourage a bystander to come forward and report their suspicions. A threat assessment tool that would effectively identify a potential lone offender will lose its value if family members or friends fear the repercussions of making a report.

It is recommended agencies holding unpublished information about lone terrorists apply this model to further study the value of this risk assessment model.
References


